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THESIS ABSTRACT

Outsourcing in the public sector has been an issue of much debate in the Australian
public sector over the last one and a half decades. Following a decade long
experimentation elsewhere in the wake of public sector reforms, primarily in Western
and other OECD countries, it has impacted upon various tiers of the Australian Public
Sector since the late eighties. The reasons for such debates centred on the role of
government in serving its citizens from a shrinking revenue base and rising
unemployment levels. After the early 1990s management theorists have challenged the
efficiencies of governments. Government production has been labelled as inefficient
and ineffective. To redress these allegations, various countries adopted measures to lift
the performance of the public sector. Some of the measures were administrative in
nature, while others directly impacted the operational aspects of government service
provision. As a result, intellectual currents flowed back and forth among countries
about their practices to address the inefficiencies. Overall, the tiers of governments
were scrutinised for their performance. Local governments in different countries were
seen to have addressed these concerns more than any other level of government. This
is evidenced by the prevalence of a rich body of literature on contracting out in local
government contexts.
Ironically, the outsourcing practices in local governments lacked the rigour demanded
by critics. Allegations were made that the methods for evaluating government
efficiency and of reforms for making sourcing decisions are historically flawed.
Though these did not bear much on the decisions of the public servants in the past,
they mattered a lot in recent times, especially in the wake of declining revenue bases in
local government. The reform advocates demanded inputs from accounting
professionals in making their administrative decisions. In particular, outsourcing of
big-ticket items over multi-year period attracted the attention of local government
bodies. So there have been increasing calls for more research into outsourcing
decisions using contemporary managerial and accounting practices. The role of local
government management accountants suddenly became prominent within their
organisations.
This thesis has addressed this gap in the literature by introducing a holistic framework
for pricing government production and evaluating bid decisions. Attempts have been
made to use theory triangulation, drawing on literature from public administration,
economics, management accounting and government financial management. The
conceptual framework of the thesis extends research to date by bringing in the
theoretical and practical rigour for competitively pricing internal bids and making
decisions.
A case study method has been adopted to collect and analyse data from primary and
secondary sources. In analysing data, the triangulation approach has been used to
reinforce the findings and validate the conclusions reached in this thesis. A local
government city council in New South Wales has been used to conduct the case study.
The major findings of this thesis are that outsourcing practices in the researched
organisation reflected two distinct theoretical perspectives, the transaction cost theory
(TCE), and the new managerialism (which descended from Public Choice Theory).

xv
Overall, outsourcing practices in the researched organisation were not prevalent. But
after the introduction of public sector reforms, the processes of sourcing decisions
were much more formalised, and the managerial accountability was made more
rigorous. Finally, overhead allocation played a vital role in pricing internal bids in both
cases. Especially, the role of overhead allocation in bid pricing emerged as a dominant
theme after the introduction of public sector reform in the researched organisation. It
required the introduction of private sector and commercial style accounting and
management practices. The researched organisation changed its Accounting
Information Systems in general, and Management Accounting Systems in particular,
across the board, borrowing private sector managerial and accounting expertise. It was
also revealed that strategic management accounting had enormous potential to reshape
the accounting and operating environment of the researched organisation.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1

BACKGROUND

Outsourcing has been a widely debated issue in Western countries and other parts of the
world (Bisman, 1999; Canez et al., 2000; Davis, 1992; Drtina, 1994; Grice, 2001;
Johnstone, 1999; Kee et al., 1997; Kee and Matherly, 1996; McIvor, 2000; McIvor and
Humphreys, 2000; Sciulli, 1997; Widener and Selto, 1999). It has been widely used in
manufacturing firms for over a century (Canez et al., 2000; Gietzmann, 1996; McIvor and
Humphreys, 2000; McIvor, 2000; Venkatesan, 1992; Zeller et al., 1999). Outsourcing, or
contracting out, has different theoretical and philosophical underpinnings from Public
Choice Theory, Transaction Cost Theory, Property Rights Theory, and New Public
Management theory, but it has been used to save costs or for strategic reasons (Canez et
al., 2000).

In the public sector, outsourcing has also been used for centuries (McIntosh et al., 1997).
Its wider use, however, is only two decades old and it has been growing since the early
‘80s in some countries such as the USA, UK, New Zealand, Sweden, Denmark, Australia,
France and other less developed countries. The use of contracting in these countries is
regulated by different government policy guidelines concerning contestability, pricing, and
decision-making. These three aspects are debated under the rubric of public sector reform
in general.

Public sector reforms in different countries have been undertaken because of concerns over
the efficiency and effectiveness of government service provisions (Alam and Lawrence,
1994; Blanchard et al., 1998; Domberger, 1990; Hoque and Mall, 2001; Lane, 1997;
Lapsley, 1992; McCrae and Kaidonis, 1997; McGulloch and Ball, 1992; Miranda, 1994;
OECD, 1997; Osborne and Gaebler, 1993; Suppanz, 1996). In the wake of these concerns,
some notable actions were taken by some countries to improve the performance of the
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public sector (Wanna et al., 1996)1. These reforms were targeted at improving the better
utilisation of society’s resources.

The outcomes of the reforms in some of these countries were undertaken to address the
administrative and financial management crises faced by the public sector (Guthrie and
Humphry, 1996). While these reforms were targeted to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of public service production, the make up of the public sector in different
countries differed, and their roles in the economy also differed. So the reforms were
approached in keeping with the structures of the public sectors in different countries. The
Australian public sector also differs from that of other countries in its make up and in the
roles played in various jurisdictions. The outsourcing approach, its costing, and the policy
of decision making of local government bodies in Australia, are more exposed to the
citizens than are the other tiers of the government. Other western countries also
experienced similar trends in their outsourcing practices.

1.2

STATEMENT OF RESEARCH PROBLEM

This thesis explores the outsourcing of public sector services in context, and the role of
overhead allocation in the pricing of internal bid calculations within that context.
Following existing discussion of the public sector reforms mainly in the Western countries,
Australian public sector organisations embraced reforms on three tiers- the Federal, the
State and the Local Government levels. In the wake of shrinking revenue bases, the public
sector generally, and, in particular, Local Government in Australia, have adopted various
service delivery arrangements to minimise drainage of valuable social resources and to
improve the efficiency of internal production costs. Competitive tendering and contracting
out, which descended mainly from the Western countries, have had a big impact on service
delivery arrangements.

1

Wanna et al., (1996, p. 34) in particular, cites such reforms in the US (the Gore report), Canada (the
Canadian Public Service 2000 initiative), the UK (the ‘next steps’ or the agency model), New Zealand
(‘State Sector Reform Program’), the Nordic and other continental European countries (manifold reform)
as part of the ‘entrepreneurial’ initiatives.
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In this competitive tendering and contracting process, municipal councils were asked to
scrutinise the efficiency of services that exceeded $2 million dollars in annual budgets. In
the process, the ethos of service provision changed from regulated monopoly to
competition over the last one and a half decades. Rather than using the term ’outsourcing’,
the reforms introduced the concepts of sourcing (either from internal or external parties)
from the most efficient sources. This change in service provision arrangements brought
about some changes in the internal Accounting Information Systems, including
management accounting systems (e.g., Walsh, 1995, p. 94). Municipal councils introduced
commercial style accounting for facilitating their sourcing decisions. In this Accounting
Information Systems change, overhead allocation captured significant attention. This
change in internal accounting systems has been instrumental in shaping the decisions of
managers who, lacking formal training in financial management, relied on the expertise of
the accountants for cost data (including allocated overheads). In the commercial
accounting environment, however, overhead allocation issues are widely debated for their
purposefulness in decision making, and for over a century, they were studied under the
rubric of ‘cost allocation’ for correctly determining ‘cause and effect’ relationship between
costs and causes of costs (Horngren, 1995, p. 282).

Cost allocation has been considered as a pervasive problem during the last century
(Horngren, 1995, p. 282). It is argued that too much subjectivity in allocating cost data
make them unreliable and that cost allocation should be avoided (Thomas, 1969). Even
though this prescription was influential in academia, practice suggested otherwise. A large
body of literature found evidence that in practice the academic prescription is completely
ignored and costs are allocated to serve various organisational purposes (Atkinson, 1987;
Dean et al., 1991; Fregman and Liao, 1981; Horngren et al., 1996; Zimmerman, 1979,
2003).

Research has focused on cost allocation in manufacturing and service sectors, and
attempted to explore the reasons for cost allocation from either a technical or a behavioural
point of view (Bondar and Lusk, 1977; Zimmerman, 1979). There is little research on cost
allocation practices in public sector organisations (see for example, Bourn and Ezzammel,
3

1987; Chua, 1995; Dent, 1991). These studies are descriptive in nature and theorised on the
basis of the description of the limited evidence. One of their limitations is that they have
ignored the rationale of applying commercial sector principles to the public sector. Tierney
(1994) argued that private sector accounting principles are clearly not applicable to the
government sector because of contextual and structural differences between them.
However, the Australian practice simply rejected this argument, and disregarded the
propositions of Tierney in the belief that public and the private sector have structural and
contextual similarities. Therefore, private sector accounting principles are equally
applicable to public sector organisations (Henderson and Peirson, 2000, p. 839).

Though the earlier studies on cost allocation were undertaken in different contexts, the uses
of cost allocation appeared to be similar in public or private sectors. Those studies were
abridged versions of the surveys of larger sample sizes, and little has been done to
ascertain the detailed processes of the usage of cost allocation in pricing, reimbursing of
funds, or motivating behaviours of managers. This study is aimed to fill the gap in the
literature, and attempts to study a particular use of cost allocation in a public sector setting.
An Australian public sector City Council has been chosen to study how cost allocation is
used in making outsourcing decisions.

1.3

RATIONALE OF THE STUDY

It is argued in the literature that the private sector is more efficient and effective in utilising
the resources at their disposal than the public sector, which is inefficient and expensive in
providing goods and services to consumers (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993). This longstanding notion has recently been challenged by the seminal work of Osborne and Gaebler
(1993). The causes and consequences of the inefficient and ineffective usage of resources
are well documented by some authors, and remedial measures to overcome them have
been proposed. As a result various initiatives have been taken in different countries to
revamp the operational aspects of the public sector (see for example, Wanna et al., 1996).
It been suggested that the management style of public sector organisations should be
changed simultaneously to address the performance problems of the public sector
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organisations. Some alternative models are suggested to reflect the private sector ethos in
the public sector organisations.

Following the wave of changes in the public sector arena, through various government-led
initiatives, Australian public sector entities also went through similar changes. This thesis
specifically explores the accounting change issues in one of the public sector City Councils
in the Australian state of New South Wales. Before commencing this research, ten city
councils were approached for access. Only two responses were received, one was visited,
but the data proved insufficient for this thesis. The other City Council allowed access and
the collection of data from their archives, and from departmental managers, directors and
other staff members. Before seriously entering into the research assignment, preliminary
meetings were held with the Financial Services Manager and the Management Accountant
of the organisation to explore the possibility of collecting data. The site seemed a perfect
one for studying the research problem, and it was also found that they were undergoing
massive reform as part of their ongoing reform of organisational structure and the
Accounting Information Systems. The organisation also allowed access to study the
accounting changes phenomenon surrounding their outsourcing practices.

1.4

THE OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

Following the research problem stated earlier, the objectives of this thesis are multidimensional and draw issues from across sections of the organisation involving the
decision process. Instead of considering outsourcing as a single isolated phenomenon, an
attempt has been made to capture the broader picture of the sourcing decisions within a
holistic context. The two particular aspects of the broader research questions are: why
outsourcing is done (the policy question), and how the decisions to outsource are made (the
process question)? In order to understand these two broader questions some specific, but
related questions, are framed to enhance data collection and subsequent analysis. Thus, the
overall objectives of the study are to address two research questions.

1. Why is outsourcing done? This policy question essentially leads to the following
specific research questions:
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(a) Why is outsourcing a preferred choice?
(b) What are the circumstances for preferring in-house options?
(c) What philosophical stances drive outsourcing in general and in specific
circumstances?
(d) What are the different practices in local government contracting out in
Australia?

The second broad question involves the process element of the outsourcing decisions.
Evidence suggests that there is a dearth of studies in the literature on the process aspect of
outsourcing; especially, the methodology of outsourcing is underdeveloped for the multiyear outsourcing of services (Miranda, 1994; Sciulli, 1996). Thus the question is:

2. How are outsourcing decisions made? This process question essentially leads to the
following specific questions relating to the processes of outsourcing:
(a) How did the Council prepare the internal bid for competitive bidding?
(b) How does the Council treat overheads (including internal transfer prices)
in pricing the internal bids?
(c) How does it prepare a competitive bid strategically to successfully compete in a
contestable market?
(d) How did the Council solve the dilemma of allocating joint costs in the presence
of interdependencies and jointness of services?
(e) What methodologies are available to evaluate outsourcing decisions?

These questions will be addressed in light of the research to date in manufacturing and
public sector organisations. Because of the cross-disciplinary nature of the research
questions, different theoretical perspectives will be used to understand and explain the
research questions. The first policy question is widely researched in economics and public
administration. Chapter 2 discusses these strands of research and guides the explanation
and analyses of it. The second question is a subordinate one, and recent accounting based
literature on the process aspect of outsourcing will guide the analysis and provide
explanations for it. In understanding the second question, exhaustive reviews were
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considered necessary; Chapters 3 and 4 shed light on the pros and cons of common cost
allocation. Chapter 2, 3 and 4 are, in fact, complementary, and are considered necessary to
address the constructs explored in the specific research questions. This led to the
development of a conceptual framework by integrating the theories and evidence presented
in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. This conceptualisation is necessary because of the type of the
research problem. There are strong arguments for analysing case study evidence using a
conceptual framework when a single theory is not sufficient to explain the research
phenomena under investigation (Kumar, 1996, p. 32; Marshall and Rossman, 1999;
Maxwell, 1996, p. 25). Kumar (1996, p. 32) states “the conceptual framework grows out of
the theoretical framework and relates to the specific research problem….”

1.5

THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR SELECTING SUTHERLAND
SHIRE COUNCIL FOR THE STUDY

Sutherland Shire Council in New South Wales, Australia was selected as the representative
public sector entity that had the suitable attributes identified in this study. The main
reasons for choosing it were: the significance of the Council as a pioneer in public sector
outsourcing practice in Australia, access to the site, and the relevance of the
interdisciplinary theories (economics, public administration and management accounting
and financial management) for the study of the research problem. The justifications are
discussed below.

1.5.1

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF REFORM BASED SOURCING DECISIONS

Local governments in Australia, especially, the city councils, have significant interface
with local residents. Even though they serve the entire population living within the
jurisdiction, and are perceived to be important in providing all the social and communal
amenities, their funding sources are too few compared to the other tiers of the Australian
public sector (that is, the Federal and the State Governments). Due to the ongoing funding
crises (Kodrzycki, 1998; Mouritzen, 1992), and the drying up of grants from federal and
state governments, the Councils have taken initiatives to be self-dependent by introducing
various measures such as user pays, raising rates when practicable, and using efficient
delivery options for the services. Sutherland Shire Council followed suit and was one of
the pioneers in embracing contracting out through competitive bidding, following similar
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practices overseas (especially in the UK and New Zealand). The contracting culture of big
ticket services in the Council was the aftermath of the ongoing reform programs taken in
the early nineties when Nick Grenier was serving as the Premier of New South Wales.
Moreover, the Council also agreed to participate in this research because they were looking
for an external evaluation of the accounting system change surrounding their cost
allocation practices and sourcing decisions. Accordingly, data were collected in late 1998
from the field. Because of the extremely confidential nature of the data, the Council
permitted gathering data from only two of its divisions that experienced competitive
bidding and contracting out in different time periods of significance to the Council’s
operations. The Manager of the Financial Services reported that the subsequent contracting
out would follow the same methodology but the costing system would be a fully-fledged
one.

1.5.2

THE ACCESS ISSUE

In field study research, access is the most important factor for completing a research
project. Especially, for management accounting research, a variety of internal documents
need to be studied. For confidentiality reasons, an organisation may be reluctant to provide
the necessary access or restrict access to selective data that may prove inadequate to
complete the research.

The first access issue was the selection of a single City Council. There were a few
justifications for selecting this site. First of all, it is one of the largest city councils in terms
of population served and the annual dollar value of the budget. Second, the researched
organisation was a pioneer in adopting public sector reforms and introducing contracting
out in Australia. Third, during the data collection phase, I was located in Sydney and able
to visit the site for data collection for this thesis. Lastly, my supervisor advised me to visit
the site as the city Council had a very rich financial management structure that potentially
included all the complex attributes of the research problem stated earlier.

In order to access the research site the Financial Services Manager in the researched
organisation was approached in May 1998. A letter was sent describing the nature of the
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research project and data to be collected. The Finance Manager sought approval from the
President of the City Council. After receipt of confirmation, a series of emails were
exchanged with the manager who organised a series of interviews, provided valuable
internal management reports along with other archival documents, to complete the study.
Two departments with significant budgets were visited several times for in-depth study.
They used contracting practices in two different periods of operational significance to the
Council. The first period lasted until 1995 and was characterised by a monopoly regime,
when the services were regulated and protected by Local Government Act of 1993. The
second period was after 1995, which was a major transition point as the Council embraced
competition in some of its services and divisions. These periods cover ten years of
operational aspects of the Council. By the nature of the study, this will be a longitudinal
one of the outsourcing and the overhead allocation phenomenon.

1.6

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN THE
AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC SECTOR

Depending on their location and the legislation of the states, Councils provide a range of
services ranging from water supply, electricity, sewerage, and waste collection, to public
health management. Though the other two tiers of governments have overseeing
responsibility over the local government bodies, they don’t take part in any direct service
provision. As a consequence, a close relationship exists between the local city councils and
the populations under their jurisdiction. In providing the services, local councils rely on
funding from different sources.

In terms of sources of revenues, the local governments receive a lion’s share (that is, 4050%) of the annual budget in the form of grants and loans from the Federal and State
governments. After the introduction of public sector reforms in Australia in the late 1990s,
Federal and State governments reduced the level of funding to the local government bodies
and insisted they be self-sufficient in generating enough revenue to meet the expenditures.
This follows similar trends overseas (Kodrzycki, 1998; Mouritzen, 1992).
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1.7

THEORETICAL APPROPRIATENESS OF THE STUDY

Because of the nature of the research problem of this thesis, an interdisciplinary
perspective has been adopted. A number of rationales are put forward for this stance. First
of all, this study is based on the assumption that private sector accounting principles are
equally applicable in public sector organisations. Second, contracting theories used in
economics and public administration literature are used before actually discussing the cost
aspects of accounting for contracting out. This position has been taken because of the
recent emergence of accounting- based decision models in contracting out decisions.
Third, the outsourcing decision making framework has been developed combining the
literature on outsourcing theory and practice, and the cost allocation processes in two
different strands of literature on overhead allocation. Conceptualisation of these theories
was necessary because neither of the theories was deemed sufficient to evaluate the
outsourcing decision process.

Kumar (1996) and Maxwell (1996) argue that examining research problems through a
conceptual framework strengthens the validity of findings. Some assumptions are made to
study the research problems posed in this thesis. First, this study assumes that private
sector accounting principles and practices are easily transferable to restore the public sector
financial management problems. Others argue that private sector accounting principles are
not applicable to public sector as the organisational and contextual factors differ between
these sectors (Tierney, 1994). However, there is also a counter argument that the private
and the public sectors have similar accounting problems that can be resolved using private
sector accounting principles (Henderson and Peirson, 2000, p. 839). This latter argument
has been recently adopted in the Australian financial reporting environment where the use
of heritage assets has been the substance of the debate. Second, the research problem
requires some discussion of contracting out from the perspectives of economists and public
administrators because contracting out has been widely researched in public administration
and public economics research. Before discussing the research problem, therefore, a brief
discussion about various theories will be necessary. Miranda (1994, pp. 260-261) argued
that contracting out over multiple years were hardly studied. Therefore, more study should
be done by the accountants to address this gap in the literature. Third, the theoretical and
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technical literature on cost allocation and its application in contracting out (make or buy)
situations is appropriate because of the nature of the research problem. The theoretical
literature on cost allocation is appropriate because of the debate surrounding cost allocation
during the last century (Horngren, 1995; Thomas, 1969). Some argue that allocation
misleads decision-making (Thomas, 1969; Wells, 1978), while others argue that it is
practiced because of its usefulness (Blanchard and Chow, 1983; Zimmerman, 1979). The
technical literature follows the theoretical literature on cost allocation, and it deals with the
process of cost allocation in different situations.

1.8

AN OVERVIEW OF THE MAJOR FINDINGS

The major findings of this study in two major areas, at the organisational level, and at the
specific research site level, are summarised below.

Outsourcing is a complex management decision process that requires input from
accountants. However, small dollar value items or non-recurring services can be
outsourced without having to go through rigorous decision-making process. The role of
accountants in outsourcing such services is not very vital, though an approximate costing
of the services may be necessary. Outsourcing of these services is not formalised but
documented at department/divisional level where managers exercise a decentralised
decision making authority. However, outsourcing of large dollar budget items pulls in a
significant number of issues from a cross section of the organisation studied. A decision
process is involved and requires inputs from the major stakeholders. In addition to costs,
qualitative factors have major ramifications on the outsourcing of the services. In the
decision making process, market regime, the internal expertise, employment effect, and
cost calculations, along with the overall administration and monitoring of the services, are
key decision variables. It was also found that the organisation used its past experience as a
guide to future outsourcing of services. The sourcing of the services in the researched
organisation, as represented by two theoretical and purposive sample cases discussed
below, suggests that the organisation experienced a steady growth in its intellectual bases
and internal expertise to address the needs of the community. The major external catalysts,
the Local Government Act of 1993, the National Competition Policy and the Australian
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Accounting Standard 27, have significantly influenced the sourcing process. It has also
been found that the researched organisation had been progressively updating its accounting
information system in the wake of increased competition imposed on them. In order to
better compete with the external services providers, they adopted private sector style
commercial accounting practices (that is, accrual accounting system and management
accounting systems).

The second major finding is that the organisation used overhead allocation after the
introduction of competition. This followed legislative changes at the local government
level and the adoption of the National Competition Policy at the organisational level. The
overhead allocation practice followed the organisational change introduced during the
early eighties to reduce costs. The organisational change was introduced to reduce the cost
of running the organisation. The overhead allocation change occurred after the
transformation of the organisation from a pure monopoly provider to a semi-regulated
provider. In this semi- regulated structure, some of the services that met the National
Competition Policy guidelines and the Local Government Act of 1993 stipulations as
competitive services were subjected to open market testing and/or benchmarking. The
overall position in regard to overhead allocation was, thus, only a phenomenon after the
year 1997. The overhead allocation was introduced in phases, and it was planned for a fullfledged adoption after the year 2000. It was learned later that the Council experienced
delays in the implementation.

The third major finding is that the organisation used cost data from its newly developed
cost management system. Most importantly, it attempted to introduce a commercial style
accounting and cost management system. As part of a broader system change, the
organisation introduced organisation wide overhead allocation. The overhead allocation,
however, was used cautiously in that the organisation did not want to repeat past mistakes
of ad-hoc allocation of overhead, and under costing bids for winning competitive tenders.
In the past, this was the norm when the organisation followed the economic rationalists’
view (the replication of the transaction cost ethos) in sourcing its services. After the public
sector reforms, the organisation followed newly introduced practice of New Public
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Management doctrines that descended from Public Choice theory. In this theory, cost is
not the only consideration in making decisions. Community Service Obligations are also
considered as a major driving force for decisions. The role of overhead allocation was
instrumental. However, other cuts in expenditures were also explored to provide services
efficiently. The overheads were allocated strategically to give the internal provider a
competitive edge over its competitors. Though this stance was kept confidential, there
were allegations from potential bidders about manipulation of cost data, which followed a
very rigid written contract specification. In addition to strategic uses of cost allocation to
reduce costs, some other inefficiencies revealed from the evidence suggest that the internal
provider divisions re-engineered their work processes to achieve maximum reduction in
costs.

1.9

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The study is limited in a few respects. First of all, this is a qualitative case study, which
lacks the rigour of survey-based research. Therefore, it is a study of a ‘particular’ (Stake,
1995) context. Secondly, only two units of analysis were used to generalise about the
research issues, from specific to general. Even though data from other parts of the
organisation were collected, more data about the bids would have made the internal
validity stronger. Before engaging in the research project, this issue was raised with the
sponsor. The sponsor assured that the researched organisation would follow some
standardised practices for its outsourcing decisions and organisation wide overhead
allocation. The procedures were in fact in progress when the data collection for this thesis
was finished. It was also confirmed recently that the organisation standardised its
outsourcing policies.

1.10 CHAPTER SUMMARY
This section provides a summary of the thesis by chapters. Earlier in this chapter, scenes
have been set for the research problem and it has been indicated that the relationship
between accounting and organisation will be explored. Though study of this nature has
been criticised (e.g., Bourn and Ezzammel, 1987), the documentary evidence suggested
that it was appropriate to use highly confidential internal management reports within that
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organisational context and leave the broader social context out of the picture. This was
attributable to the fact that the transformation process within the Council, like other public
sector organisations in Australia, was at a nascent stage. This was revealed at the time of
discussing the research issue with the project sponsor, and also during the literature review
stage.

The outsourcing literature is discussed in Chapter 2 as one of the theoretical pillars for the
study of the research problem. In discussing the outsourcing issues, the theoretical
perspective and the practices of contracting out has been discussed. Evidence from the UK
and the US local governments suggest that outsourcing was done in those countries mainly
to save costs. This cost saving is a manifestation of the ethos of the Transaction Cost
Economics (TCE) theory where cost alone is the dominant decision criteria. The
Australian evidence was later presented and the findings conformed to international
practice of using cost as the dominant rationale. The studies were completed prior to the
introduction of public sector reform in Australian local governments. Though New Public
Management Theory has been presented, the empirical evidence followed this doctrine in
the second instance of the contracting out of the Council. Chapter 2 does not provide any
guidance about the details of bid pricing used in any of the studies. Most of the studies
were either single year studies or time series studies and used statistical techniques. Thus
the studies had researcher bias. Data were collected from the field; the analysis was
imposed on the data rather than the data imposing the analytical guidance to the
researchers. Therefore, concepts and practices of costing were necessary to complete the
analysis of the research problem under investigation.

Chapter 3 introduces the core concepts about common cost allocation. Common cost
allocation is considered as one of the crucial steps in pricing of internal bids, especially its
exclusion from internal bid price can mislead decisions in favour of existing internal
providers. In discussing overhead allocation issues firstly the arguments for and arguments
against overhead allocations were weighed in the light of research up to the early eighties.
It was also highlighted that cost allocation was used extensively in an organisation, and it
was necessary for a wide range of organisational purposes. Though limited evidence on the
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public sector was discussed, the discussions did not provide any theoretical reflection
about the unique operational, contextual and other aspects that could have been used to
guide the research problem. The literature on cost allocation practice for make-or-buy
decisions is one of the uses, but it lacked guidance for multi-year decision horizons.

Chapter 4 introduces the cost allocation processes that addresses the traditional debate
over no allocation. The successor of traditional costing, Activity Based Costing (ABC) has
been discussed in detail. ABC considers full cost allocation using a better and more logical
cause and effect relationship. It has emerged as a revolution in cost management, and has
been extensively used in governments, not-for-profits, and commercial sectors. It also
serves various organisational purposes, especially it emerged as a better resource allocation
and management tool. The process of ABC allocation, however, still lacks the rigor
demanded of traditional cost allocation. It is also labelled as arbitrary by some authors.

Chapter 5 integrates the concepts and practices introduced in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Thus, it
is the conceptualisation chapter for this thesis. The purpose of Chapter 5 is to pull all the
issues discussed in the previous three chapters together and focus specifically on
outsourcing decisions. The outsourcing decision is seen as a holistic process of
organisational sourcing initiatives where decision inputs from all areas are consolidated.
Thus it demands the expertise of the staff from the production and the support departments
(e.g. accountants, financial managers, Information Technology supports, human resources
etc.). Therefore, Chapter 5 is a blend of the theoretical perspectives from public
administration, economics, cost management and financial management. In modern day
terms, this is commonly known as theoretical triangulation (Patton, 2002, p. 562). There
are arguments that theory triangulation enhances the explanation building process where a
single theory is either weak or deficient in explaining a phenomenon under investigation
(Kumar, 1996; Marshall and Rossman, 1999; Maxwell, 1996; Patton, 2002). It improves
both internal and external validity of case study findings. The conceptual framework of
Chapter 5 has been used to explain the holistic decision-making in outsourcing. Emphasis
has been placed on the costing aspects by also drawing on the technical literature and
government white papers on costing for contracting out (see for example, Commonwealth
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of Australia, 1997; Council on the Cost of Government, 1997; Department of Finance and
Administration, 1998; Office of the Auditor General of Western Australia, 1995). These
white papers are extensively used by different Australian state and territorial governments
in managing outsourcing processes.

Chapter 6 introduces the research method for this study. A case study approach has been
used in this thesis. There are different types of case studies, and different traditions of case
studies use different strategies to gather and analyse data, and finally to make
generalisations. This study uses an explanatory case study method2 to gather and analyse
data. In the analysis phase, the program logic model of analysis has been used to analyse
and make generalisations from the case sites.

Chapters 7 and 8 are the first two chapters that discuss the general aspects of the Council.
In Chapter 7 the structure of the organisation, its transformations, and resources allocation
systems are discussed as a pretext for introducing the resource allocation process in the pre
and the post reform eras. Chapter 8 takes the issues raised in Chapter 7 further by
focussing on the mechanics of resource allocation and their use for various organisational
purposes. It was revealed that the budget acted as the hub for all of the activities in the
Council. Budgets and their uses in controlling organisational resources are discussed
before the public sector reforms. During that pre-reform era, the budgets were used as a
cost control tool. After the introduction of public sector reforms in 1995 a new budget
format was introduced in the Council. In this new format, the service provisions
(operational aspects) were separated from policy decisions (the funding aspect). This
reflects the New Public Management doctrine’s effect. In Chapter 8, the scene has been
set for the analysis of costing information for various organisational purposes such as
sourcing decisions, benchmarking and subsidy determination. At the time of gathering data
for this thesis the organisation contracted out one of its major services to an internal

2

Ryan et al. (1992, p. 115) argue that explanatory case studies are used to study specific cases of
observed accounting practices and to explain the observed practices using existing theory or by modifying
existing theory. The main objective of this type of case study is to generate theories which provide good
explanations.
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provider. The three-year contract with this internal organisation (quasi-market) was a test
case for the other major market testing activities of the organisation.

In Chapter 9 one of the historical bidding exercises was re-examined in light of the
conceptual framework developed in Chapter 5 and the discussion in Chapter 2. The
arguments for and against the competitive tendering exercise clearly conformed to similar
trends overseas. Some of the arguments for and against were, however, unique to the
organisation. Finally, the internal bid price was examined in the light of research to that
date (that is, the economic rationalist approach). The conclusion reached in the chapter
suggests that the organisation did not give adequate consideration to other important issues
affecting the decision. The re-examination of the bid unleashed some major conceptual
flaws in the cost calculation assumptions. These flaws were subsequently discovered and
the decision to outsource was proved wrong. The mistake of the decision inflicted a huge
penalty on the Council; the Council had to internalise the services after an agreement was
reached with the contractor. This particular instance of competitive bidding was a
benchmark for many city councils in Australia for a long time.

In Chapter 10 the contracting issues resurfaced in the wake of public sector reforms in
local governments. In light of past experiences and lessons from past mistakes, the Council
relied on its in-house expertise to organise the entire bidding process. This particular
bidding was arranged in the light of the changes in the organisational structure followed by
the accounting information systems changes. The overhead allocation issue received
prominence in this new bidding exercise. Though the management process of the bidding
went very well, the outcome of the bid did not reflect on the efficiency of the internal
provision of the services, the accuracy of cost calculation, and finally, the accuracy of the
decision. The internal bid price was, thus, perceived as under costed and had ‘low balling’
tendency in it. The potential bidders alleged that the Councillors had favoured the in-house
bid.

Chapter 11 summarises the major findings from the field and compares the findings to
extant theory on outsourcing (Chapter 2), overhead allocation (Chapters 3 and 4) and
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finally the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 5. The final section of the chapter
attempts to generalise the findings of the key research questions introduced in Chapter 1.
The study concludes by proposing that a conceptual blend of theories from different
disciplines may be a useful way to understand the interrelations among outsourcing,
overhead allocation, the internal bid pricing in a competitive tendering and contracting
exercise, and finally the outsourcing decisions in public sector organisations.
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CHAPTER 2
AN OVERVIEW OF CONTRACTING OUT IN
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: INTERNATIONAL
INTERNATIONAL AND
AUSTRALIAN EVIDENCE

2.1

INTRODUCTION

‘Contracting out’ is one of the many ways of delivering services to the general public.
In an organisational setting, it is also known as ‘outsourcing’ or ‘make or buy’
decision. It has been a buzzword in the public sector arena from the early 1980s. Some
countries such as the UK, US, New Zealand, Sweden, Denmark, France and Canada
made it a popular tool to save public money and improve the efficiency of public sector
service provision. The crux of the ‘contracting out’ decision is based on the belief that
goods or services that are not produced within an organisation, or produced at an
inefficient level, can be supplied from an outside source. Many justifications are
provided in the literature on contracting out, cost saving being the most dominant one.
Contracting out attracted the attention of public servants in later part of the 1980s and
the earlier part of the 1990s. Efficiency and effectiveness issues of government service
provisions were widely debated and were targeted for rigorous scrutiny (e.g., Osborne
and Gaebler, 1993; Prager, 1994, p. 179). In this process, numerous service provision
alternatives were tried and contracting out ranked as the most attractive means of
service delivery because an organisation can have an absolute control over the delivery
of the contracted services. Osborne and Gaebler (1993) provided 22 different types of
alternative service delivery methods and suggested that contracting out was by far the
most commonly used alternative service delivery method (see also Miranda, 1992;
Prager, 1997; Touche Ross and Co., 1987) and it was practised in all spheres of an
economy. In this chapter, particular emphasis has been placed on the contracting out of
local government services.

This chapter is organised as follows: in section 2.2 the concept of contracting out is
discussed: in section 2.3 the arguments for and against contracting out are discussed; in
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section 2.4 the competing explanations of contracting out are examined in light of
different philosophical strands underlying Public Sector contracting; in section 2.5
evidence of local government contracting out are presented; in section 2.6 the
limitations of extant research on contracting out are presented, and the last section will
summarise the chapter.

2.2

CONCEPTS OF CONTRACTING OUT

Contracting out (also known, as competitive tendering, outsourcing and subcontracting) is one of the many ways of providing services. Hayward (1993, p. 24)
defines it as:
(o)ne legally and institutionally separate entity (an organisation or individual) entering into a
legally binding agreement with another entity to provide for a specified time period a good or
service in return for an agreed payment.

There are different views of contracting out, with some authors providing a detailed
account of numerous alternative service delivery arrangements (e.g., Osborne and
Gaebler, 1993). Contracting out is similar to the ‘make or buy’ decisions in
organisational contexts (Domberger and Hall, 1995; Morris and Noreen, 1994; Prager,
1997; Rimmer, 1994; Siegel, 1999, p. 373; Walsh, 1995; Walker and Weber, 1984). In
a typical make or buy situation, the fundamental questions are: is it cheaper to make inhouse than to buy from outside suppliers? What are the conditions necessary to make a
product in-house despite cheaper alternatives being available (Rimmer, 1994)?

Hayward (1993, pp. 25-26) provides four main dimensions of contracting out. They are
ownership, economic efficiency via competition, the effectiveness dimension, and the
monetary cost dimension. The ownership dimension addresses questions of
responsibility for the service delivery (Hayward, 1993, p. 27) while the economic
efficiency dimension addresses the causes and consequences of competition in the
market and the aftermath of competition on the users of a service. Hayward (1993, p.
27) argues that competition may bring down costs of a contracted service. However, if
there are chances of collusive behaviour among the market participants, the prices of
the services may rise eventually. Contracting out is based primarily on the economic
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theory of competition though other dimensions are also apparent. Ranald (1992, p. 26)
summarises the theory of competition in contracting out as:
(i)n usual terms contracting out means providing goods and services by private suppliers or other
third parties as per some agreed terms and conditions but the organisation primarily responsible
for the delivery of such service is still responsible for the delivery of the service.

The effectiveness dimension of contracting out addresses the attitude of the public
sector towards its service delivery objectives. Cash ties the balance between the
urgency of service delivery and the ultimate consumers (Ranald, 1992, p. 26). The cost
dimension is a multifaceted one in that efficiency is not the only source of cost savings.
There are other sources of reduced monetary costs such as reduced level of services,
lower wages and taxation, tax minimisation, low-balling or some other combination of
these (Ranald, 1992, p. 27).

In contrast to the literature on contracting out, textbooks use the common term ‘make’
or ‘buy’ to suggest the dilemma of internal production versus sourcing from external
producers. The focus of textbooks is on short-term maximisation of benefits in ‘make
or buy’ decisions; quite often this topic is taught in single year decision environment in
commercial (profit making) organisations (see for example, Atkinson et al., 1995, pp.
371-372; Horngren et al., 2003, p. 375-377). In contrast to the textbook discussion of
make or buy in commercial organisations, a large body of literature discusses ‘make’
(produce) or ‘buy’ (source from outside) in the context of public sector organisations
(see for example, (Coleman, 1993; Fraser, 1992; Houghton et al., 2002; Industry
Commission, 1996; Lambert, 1994; Messiter, 1993; Paddon, 1991). The notable
difference between these two bodies of literature is the time horizon of the ‘make’ or
‘buy’ decisions; the public sector organisations make such decisions in a multi-period
setting. Unlike commercial organisations, ‘cost savings’ is one of the main
justifications for public sector contracting out. However, other reasons are also found in
the literature. These rationales and justifications for and against contracting out are
discussed next.
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2.3

ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST CONTRACTING OUT

The following arguments for contracting out are derived from economic theory and the
practices of contracting out in organisations operating both in profit-oriented and nonprofit oriented sectors.

The proponents of contracting out argue that it should be pursued as a cost-effective
organisational practice. They mainly argue that contracting out enhances a firm’s
ability to expand the range of services without owning the necessary assets. Therefore,
there is no need to invest in assets to become vertically integrated. The proponents also
argue that contracting out is a good strategy to reduce cost of production. On the other
hand the proponents of contracting out believe that it should not be used as an
organisational practice. Rather, an organisation should produce as many goods as
possible through its vertical production system. They also view organisations from a
holistic point of view and argue that providing services through contracting out
damages the integrity of an organisation.

Whether contracting out is a suitable form of service provision depends, to a great
extent, on the organisation and its manufacturing state, its operational strategy, the
nature of demand for services, it ability to invest in technology, and expertise. The
decision to contract out is not dependent on a single factor or all of them. A balanced
assessment of factors is necessary before making recommendation about contracting
out.

2.3.1

ARGUMENTS FOR CONTRACTING OUT

Arguments for contracting out reflect the underlying philosophy of organisations
making the decision to do so. A review of the literature suggests cost savings, expertise,
monitoring ease, and ad-hoc needs, are the major arguments for contracting out.

2.3.1.1 COST SAVINGS

The consideration of cost savings as the major justification for contracting out is
consistent with the ‘value for money’, ‘efficiency’, and ‘cost cutting’ ethos of public
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sector organisations in recent times (Domberger et al., 1986, 1987; Domberger and
Jensen, 1997; Ferris and Grady, 1991, p. 546; Osborne and Gaebler, 1993; Szymanski
and Wilkins, 1993). Such ethos is echoed in response to the cutbacks in budgets,
shrinking revenue bases (Kodrzycki, 1998; Mouritzen, 1992) and pressure from users
to become more efficient in service provision. As a result, organisations are forced to
look for the means to produce goods and services cheaply. Research on service delivery
suggests that government (or bureaucratic) production is costlier than private
production (Miranda, 1994). The sources of inefficient public production systems are
primarily attributed to the inefficiency of the production process, unionism in deterring
productivity improvement measures, poor pay conditions, and lack of incentives to
improve productivity. Brooks (1996) argues that local government production and
prices are normally more than those of their private sector counterparts. Contracting out
is argued to be one of the ways to remove these inefficiencies in production system,
and saves costs.

The cost savings are derived from ex-ante delivery of services and assume that the cost
of the services of a public sector body and the private sector bodies are identical, and
the costs are comparable at the time the decision is made. However, there are criticisms
of this assumption, in that the cost savings at the end of the contacting out may differ
from the envisaged savings because of extras or cost over runs not covered by the
contract conditions. The methodology of cost savings has also been criticised in recent
times for its incompleteness (Miranda, 1994; Sciulli, 1996). Despite such criticism,
achieving cost savings is canvassed as the major decision-making factor in contracting
out, especially it is more appealing to local governments facing financial crisis
(Domberger and Jensen, 1997, p. 74). Political ideologies of local government officials
are also argued as a reason for cost savings from contracting out. Miranda (1994, p.
358) argues that cost savings from contracting out are channelled to other service areas
of a local government body. She also argues that local government managers have
political motivations to bolster their discretionary budgets funded through the cost
savings from contracting out (1994, p. 359).
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2.3.1.2 LACK OF EXPERTISE

Contracting out is a preferred service delivery arrangement when any organisation,
either public or private, lacks necessary expertise and wants to concentrate on the
‘core’ activity (or main activity) (Messiter, 1993, p. 54; Quinn and Hilmer, 1994;
Rehfuss, 1989). It provides a firm with the opportunity to supply goods or services
even when it lacks necessary expertise to produce them in-house (Messiter, 1993, p. 53;
Rehfuss, 1989). The expertise may be technological or technical. Technological
expertise comprises up to date and specialised equipment, know-how to produce
efficiently, whereas the technical expertise includes the expertise of a specialist or
employees necessary to produce the goods within an organisation. By relying on
outside suppliers with such expertise, a firm can reap the benefit of an expanded level
of services. An organisation may also want to avoid production of perceived
unnecessary services and want to concentrate on core activities (Quinn and Hilmer,
1994). Core activities are the skeleton activities of an organisation. By emphasising
them an organisation can manage its in-house production efficiently, manage the
contracted services within its abilities, and finally reduce the number of employees. It
can also reduce the need to recruit and train new employees. Despite these rationales,
Greene (2000) suggests that contracting out can cause loss of control and skills and has
implications for quality, employee health, and safety.

2.3.1.3 CONTRACT MONITORING

An outsourced service can be monitored to ensure the technical compliance with the
contract agreement. In order for a service to be comparable, it should be measurable
with some level of objectivity for the appropriate level of performance. Services that
cannot be objectively measured for performance or are difficult to monitor should not
be contracted out. Prager (1994) argues that the lack of adequate monitoring of
government services (including local government services) make them attractive to
private sector contractors.

In order to measure services objectively (e.g., comparing the expected and the actual
performance of the contractor), a contract document should contain or stipulate the
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service specification. The written contract document mandates a contractor to follow
the provisions of the contract (Hazell, 1997). In the monitoring process, therefore, the
skill and expertise of the staff involved (in monitoring the services) use some common
tactics such as feedback from the users about the quality of services, timeliness,
quantity, and other non-financial measures. Monitoring the contract is an added cost of
contracting out. There are different approaches to factor such costs into the total cost of
the contracted services.

The inclusion of monitoring cost as part of the total cost of a contracted service may
counterbalance the savings from a contracted service. Therefore, a provision of some
percentages of savings is essential for meeting the monitoring costs of a contract. To
avoid the risk of contract failure, the normative view is that before the contracting
process begins, a firm should evaluate the eligibility of the potential contractors, visit
their sites, evaluate their past performances in other contracts, explore more about them
from the recipients of the services and, finally, examine some testimonials from the
recipients of the services.

2.3.1.4 MEETING NON-RECURRING DEMANDS

Contracting out is a preferred option where demand for a service is temporary or nonroutine in nature (Dixon, 1988). Services that are completely technical and
technologically advanced in nature should be contracted out (Rehfuss, 1989).
Contracting out brings together scarce technical skills and expertise within an
organisation. Some other areas where contracting out works well are legal services,
insurance, and social services of different nature; one-offness is another good reason
for contracting out (Rehfuss, 1989, p. 56). The justification for contacting out is that inhouse provision is costly to maintain. Some common examples of outsourced services
are: audit services, data processing, central purchasing, building construction, and road
plans. Another major issue is the rate of technological advancement. Contracting out is
the only way to reap the benefits of new technology. In fact, specialised firms see
contracting as a source of revenue because they can supply their services to a range of
clientele who cannot afford to keep those services in-house for limited use. Contracting
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out does not foster technological advances; rather technological advancements are
major argument for contracting out (Rehfuss, 1989, p. 52).

2.3.1.5 CONTRACTING OUT TO ESTABLISH BENCHMARK COSTS

Jones (1999, p. 44) argues that contracting out facilitates benchmarking of services
through examining services available from alternative sources such as the market. In
this comparison process, it is assumed that both public and private parties have
mechanisms in place to prepare their bids. The offshoot of this process is the intention
to introduce competition, and to force the parties in the marketplace to be competitive
and effective in their utilisation of resources. Benchmarking has certain advantages: it
is a yardstick against which costs can be compared, and it helps rationalising
management decisions to contract out if the in-house provision is inefficient compared
to an organisational benchmarks. Benchmarking, however, may be judgmental and may
not be useable if all the subsequent costs are not factored into the benchmark (Rehfuss,
1989, p. 55).

2.3.1.6 EXPANSION OF SERVICES

Contracting out may be a tool to expand service delivery. Some organisations
(including local government bodies) contract out as many services as they possibly can.
Apart from cost savings, other possible reasons for doing so are keeping the work force
low, and concentrating on core policy issues (Rehfuss, 1989, p. 54). Demand for
services is another important consideration in that lower demand is a suitable reason for
economic and efficiency reasons.

2.3.1.7 MANAGEMENT AND POLICY CONSTRAINTS

One approach to avoid management and policy constraints is to contract out services
and thereby free up their valuable time overseeing important areas of an organisation.
Some justifications include keeping a manageable workforce to save money, to
concentrate on major policy issues, to ease management problems, to prevent top
management from discontinuing programs, and ignoring long term strategic planning
(Rehfuss, 1989, pp. 55-57).
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Managing a large work force is often expensive, as it often distracts the main thrust of
providing services to staff development and management (Rehfuss, 1989, p. 54).
Usually, less demanding services are ideal for contracting out. Rehfuss (1989, p. 55)
states:
After all, cities do not exist to provide services…. Cities exist to meet the needs and desires of
residents. If there is a little citizen demand for services, contracting out is perfectly acceptable.

Contracting eases management problems. If organisations are more geared to pursue
political ideology, contracting out releases top management to devote their time to
policy issues (Boyne, 1998, p. 481). Contracting out also prevents the discountinuation
of products or services, ignoring long-term strategic planning. Contracting out enables
managers to concentrate on planning and policy issues when staff size is kept low
(Boyne, 1998, p. 481; Rehfuss, 1989, p. 56). A low level of staff is good when
introducing any new idea, like contracting, in that the lower number of staff may not
pose any significant political threat to an organisation (Rehfuss, 1989, p. 57).

2.3.1.8 CONTRACTING OUT FOR POLITICAL OR OTHER REASONS

Contracting out may be used temporarily or on a long-term basis. When functions must
be added rapidly, contracting out provides the solution because there is no waiting
period, either for investing in equipment or in manpower, before embarking on the new
service. Some services that are traditionally provided by the private sector may be
contracted on a longer-term basis. Another reason for contracting out is to pass on
controversial programs such as welfare, health, and others, to other jurisdictions. Doing
this may reduce conflicts. Empirical evidence also supports the view that the politicians
and the public administrators in local governments use most efficient source/s
(including contracting out) to provide services. A contrary view posited by Niskasen
(1971) is that public administrators are reluctant to contract out (Bartle and Korosec,
1996).
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2.3.2

ARGUMENTS AGAINST CONTRACTING OUT

Though there are more arguments for contracting out than there are against it, those
against contracting out may outweigh the arguments in its favour. Because of the
arguments against contracting out, some contracting out efforts may not be successful
or may be deferred.

2.3.2.1 QUALITY REDUCTION

If contracting out brings about a reduction in the level of services it should not be done.
Cost savings can mask the level of services provided before the contracting was
introduced. Reduction of services may occur when the contract is not monitored, when
there is a slipshod estimate of costs, or if the contract requires lower standards of
services (Rehfuss, 1989, p. 58). Cost savings may be achieved at the cost of quality of
services. This has happened in Britain with the provision of services in water, gas, and
telecommunication services (Ogden and Anderson, 1999).

To guard against the erosion of the quality of contracted services, design and
specification, or planning is very important. Monitoring for quality throughout the
contract is also essential since loose monitoring, or lack of it, may be an incentive for
the supplier to lower the quality of services and provide them at a cheaper price.
Therefore, if the quality of service is sacrificed for cost savings, the service should not
be contracted out.

2.3.2.2 STRONG UNION RESISTANCE

Union resistance is used as one of the major arguments against contracting out. Theory
and evidence on contracting out suggest that contracting out as a service delivery
option is largely unsuccessful due to the presence of unionists (e.g., Hirsch and
Osborne, 2000; Rehfuss, 1989, p. 58; Ward, 1992). Sawicky (1998), however, argues
that this particular claim is exaggerated.

If there is strong union resistance to contract out, it should not be done. The impact on
local politics is such that managing good workplace relationships is crucial to local
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politicians as they work for votes rather than the maximisation of profits (Rehfuss,
1989, p. 58; Osborne and Gaebler, 1993). Dehoog (1984) argues that in such a situation
cost savings are relegated to a secondary consideration in contracting out (Rehfuss,
1989, p. 58). When there is resistance to contracting out, it usually demoralises staff
within an organisation and damages relations between union and worker. Quite often
the impact on job losses may be reduced by allowing natural attrition rather than laying
off staff, mandating contractors to employ retrenched workers in their projects
(Shulman, 1982 quoted in Rehfuss, 1989, p. 59).

2.3.2.3 ORGANISATIONAL INTEGRITY

Contracting out should not be done if it is a threat to the overall integrity of an
organisation. Especially, if it is a threat to the morale of the employees, it should be
avoided if other mechanisms can be put in place to maintain the existing work order.
There are at least three reasons for such an argument. First, contracting out in one part
of the organisation may have some effect on the morale of workers working in the other
parts of the organisation. Domberger and Jensen (1997, p. 73) argued that contracting
out affects short term and longer term employment of workers. In the short term an
organisation may rely on casualisation and flexibility in employment. In the longer
term, contracting out causes joblessness, the shift of in-house workers to the contractors
or increase in social costs, in the form of increased social welfare payments. Second, in
an organisation where a team environment is crucial, the introduction of contracting
may interrupt the team spirit, and productivity in other areas may be hampered, leading
to more contracting (Domberger and Jensen, 1997, p. 74).

2.3.2.4 COST SAVINGS DEBACLES

Prager (1994) argues that contracting out should not be done if local government bodies
fail to implement adequate contract monitoring provisions. He also argued that quite
often monitoring costs are not included as part of the total cost of in-house provision of
services. This essentially shows a misleading cost savings figure when a contracting out
option is seriously considered.
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Prager (1997) argues that incorrect cost calculation is also another reason why
contracting out decisions are incorrectly made. He contends that fully allocated costs to
in-house provisions may rectify the ‘cost savings’ claims of the pro-contracting
managers and may show that cost savings are not as great as estimated when services
are compared without fully allocating costs of in-house provision. This will essentially
dampen the efficiency claim of the contracting option.

2.4

COMPETITING THEORIES OF CONTRACTING OUT

Contracting out practice is guided by three theories, which essentially provide the
framework within which much of the traditional public sector contracting took place
(Dollery and Marshall, 1997; Miranda, 1994). A brief review of these theories,
therefore, will shed some lights on their contribution and adaptation to contracting out
practices. These theories essentially provide explanations of the relationship between
the public production system and the role of the bureaucrats in organising and
delivering the outcomes of such systems. They also consider an organisation’s internal
atmosphere, competition in the marketplace, and difficulties in transacting in the open
market, as the major reasons for producing a good or service either internally or
through contracting.

2.4.1

PROPERTY RIGHTS THEORY

Property Rights Theory is widely discussed in the works of Coase (1937, 1960),
Alchian (1965), De Alessi (1969, 1987), and Alchian and Demsetz (1972) (quoted in
Miranda, 1994). This theory suggests ownership is the most important factor that
differentiates a public and a private firm. In public firms, the ownership rights are
vested with the citizens who do not possess the exclusive transferability right of the
resources. While in the private firms, the owners have the exclusive right to transfer the
ownership right of the resources. In public firms, the lack of transferability and
assignment of property rights are the major obstacles to optimum performance. The
lack of citizen oversight also results in aggrandisement by elected officials, public
employees and bureaucrats. Against this, owners of private firms have the incentive to
monitor management and their activities in the best interest of profit maximisation.
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The implication of the Property Rights Theory for government performance is that
public managers do not organise factors of production to maximize the wealth of
citizens, and therefore the approach is labelled as less efficient than the market
arrangement of production of goods and services. Instituting controls to get around this
leads to more inflexibility in production arrangements and reduces the ability to
innovate (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993). Miranda (1994, pp. 239-240) concludes that the
absence of a mechanism that assigns property rights in government to citizens leads to
sub-optimal performance by government organisations. The poor performance of
public organisations is not attributable to the performance of the bureaucrats or public
administrators alone; it is also a matter of the choice of production delivery. These
production delivery arrangements are determined in part by ‘public choice’, and
covered by the fundamental tenets of Public Choice Theory.

2.4.2

PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY

Public Choice Theory is different from the Property Right Theory in that it explains the
reasons for poor government performance. Whereas the Property Rights Theory
attributes poor performance to the inability to transfer ownership, the Public Choice
theory attributes poor performance to lack of competition facing public bureaus
(Miranda, 1994, p. 240). Public Choice Theory challenges the proposals favouring the
expansion of state capacities to provide public goods. Those arguing for this theory
suggest that the costs of remedying government failure can exceed those initially
imposed by markets.

The seminal work of Niskasen (1971) is the best-known example of the application of
Public Choice Theory in the context of government service production. Niskasen
(1971, p. 9) developed a positive theory that sheds lights on the relations between a
bureau and its environment, particularly the environment of a representative
government, and develops consequences of these relations for the bureau’s budgets and
output (quoted in Miranda, 1994, p. 240). Niskasen (1971) (quoted in Miranda, 1994)
found that bureaucrats tend to maximise their budgets for personal reasons, such as
higher pay cheques, and power and prestige, and that they tend both to push their own
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budget harder than their private counterparts and join in the lobby groups that promote
their political interests (Miranda, 1994). Thus bureaucrats tend to maximise their
budget using their monopoly of information sources and oversight authorities. The
consequences of this are more expensive and higher levels of output in the public
sector. Public Choice Theory thus argues that private production is desirable because of
the availability of competition. Empirical evidence challenges this premise and
suggests that scale, rather than competition, is the driver of contracting out decisions
(Boyne, 1998, p. 481).

Charles Wolf (1988) proposes another theory that resembles Public Choice Theory
(Miranda, 1994, p. 240) which attributes four reasons for non-market failures. These
are: difficulty in defining and measuring output, single-source production, uncertainty
of production technology, and absence of “bottom-line” measures, and termination
mechanisms. These four characteristics of non-market supply place limits on
government organisations to achieve efficiency gains. Wolf (1981, p. 18) (cited in
Miranda 1994, p. 242) argues:
(e)fficiency is like a contest among different ways of doing a job: if the market can accomplish
the job at lower cost than other institutional arrangements, or can do a better job for the same
cost, then the market is relatively efficient. On the other hand, if other institutional arrangements
can accomplish the task at lower cost, or can do it better for the same costs, then the market is, in
this respect, relatively inefficient.

2.4.3

TRANSACTION COST THEORY

Transaction Cost Economics is derived from the earlier work of Coase (1937) and the
subsequent work of Williamson (1975, 1985). This theory is believed to be most
powerful in explaining the underlying philosophy of ‘vertical integration’ and the
reasons for the preference for internal production, despite cheaper alternatives being
available from the market. At the core of this theory is the belief that it is expensive to
write costly contracts, and execute them, for transactions taking place in the market. It
is also cheaper to produce through the organisational hierarchy, as it reduces the need
to write costly contracts, execute, and monitor them throughout the contract period.
Transaction Cost Economics became popular because of this bounded rationality
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assumption. This assumes that humans have limited ability to calculate things
accurately.

Some researchers used Transaction Cost Economics as the theoretical basis to study
contracting out practices. Globerman and Vining (1996, p. 584) argued that asset
specificity and task complexity were the two reasons for contracting out. They argued
that contracting out decisions under Transaction Cost Economics theory should be
based on the combined reduction of production and transaction costs.

2.4.4

NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT THEORY

New Public Management Theory of the nineties is especially appealing to public sector
organisations (Dollery and Marshall, 1997, p. 69; Hood, 1995). It is applied to different
national settings to address the efficiency and administrative problems of public sector
organisations (Dollery and Marshall, 1997, p. 69; Hood, 1995; Stewart, 1997, pp. 8-9).
It is an improved version of the old public administration theory ethos in that it
addresses the old public administration concerns of efficiency, effectiveness and value
for money; it represents a clear practical and intellectual advance on old public
administration. It ensures that accountability mechanisms are in place to scrutinise the
production processes and hierarchical control. The production process is scrutinised
according to outputs, competition, and contractual relationship between a supplier and
the user of funds (Stewart, 1997, pp. 8-9).

Some of the refinements in the New Public Management (as it is applied to the public
sector) are that rationality in the production process is derived from the market places
through competition and contractualism (Stewart, 1997, pp. 8-9; Dollery and Marshall,
1997, pp. 82-83), and even sale of public sector organisations to the private sector
(Dollery and Marshall, 1997, p. 83). It replaces public bureaucrats with motivated
managers, allows for delegation of decision making, and emphasis on improvement of
quality of services, emphasis on purchaser/provider split (Dollery and Marshall, 1997,
p. 84; Stewart, 1997, p. 8). The implication of this New Public Management doctrine
for local government contracting is that local governments can use private sector style
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commercial and management principles to enhance decision making (see for example,
Dollery and Marshall, 1997, p. 84), contract out service delivery provisions using the
competitive market principles (Dollery and Marshall, 1997, p. 83; Stewart, 1997, p. 9),
ensure contestability in contracting out provisions and availability of free information
(Stewart, 1997, pp. 21-23).

These conditions imply that a careful choice of situations in which contracting is to
occur, and an ability to structure the contract, is put in place so that relational or long
term contracting can be employed without endangering the contestability. The
management of tenders has a bearing on the extent of competitive pressures on
contractors. The implications of the theorising process are that initial indications of
savings may well be distorted by the omission of transferred costs, and inappropriate
contractual arrangements. At times savings may not persist in the longer term.

2.5

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON CONTRACTING OUT

In this subsection, evidence of contracting out of local government services in western
countries (including Australia) will be discussed. The discussion is restricted to studies
that examined cost savings as the major driver of contracting out decisions because of
the emphasis of this research project. The majority of the studies were carried out by
economists and government sponsored research projects (see, for example, Evatt
Research Centre in Australia, Urban Institute in Washington, USA). In general,
contracting out in these studies has been found to be a popular means of service
provision, although the concept is applied differently in different parts of the world. For
example, Hayward (1993) maintains that contracting out in the US is an arrangement of
service delivery through the private sector. In Great Britain, contracting out is a mixture
of direct contracting out and competitively tendered service provision. Similarly, in
Australia, contracting out is administered differently in different states. For example, in
Victoria contracting out is mandatory for at least 50% of local services, whereas, in
New South Wales, contracting out is a tiered concept in terms of annual budget
allocations and their nature. Regardless of the alternative meanings or interpretations
attached to this term, the central principle of contracting out is that it is an alternative
34

service delivery arrangement, controlled by the government bodies or public sector
entities. Under all circumstances, the government bodies are responsible for the
ultimate payment for the services out of tax revenues.

2.5.1

INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE ON CONTRACTING OUT

Contracting out is one of the oldest service delivery practices in the US (Osborne and
Gaebler, 1993). It is also practiced in the UK, New Zealand, Canada, Sweden,
Denmark, Germany, Japan, and other developing countries. Literature on contracting
out in other parts of the world is sparse. The nature and number of services studied
differ because of differences in organisational structures, the responsibilities of local
government bodies, organisational hierarchy, inter-governmental relationships,
population size, the annual budget of the councils, and the range of services mandated
by legislation, the structure of the economy, and, above all, the political affiliations of
the bureaucrats pursuing contracting out policies. Most studies found evidence that
contracting out saved money. Except for few of the cases, most of these studies used a
survey method. Only the cost aspect of contracting out is emphasised below because of
the research problem and the nature of the thesis.

2.5.1.1 UK EVIDENCE

Compulsory Competitive Tendering in the UK was vigorously introduced as part of
political ideologies of the Conservative Party in 1979 (Domberger and Hall, 1995). It
was also made compulsory under the UK Local Government Act of 1988. The
contracting out studies on local governments in the UK examined the contracting out of
blue collar services or services provided under Direct Service Organisations (DSO),
and focused on direct contracting without any bidding arrangement or services under a
competitive arrangement. Most studies done in the UK were conducted using actual
data but employing the researchers own choice of method. The focus of the studies was
mainly to analyse the determining variables in sourcing services from the most efficient
source/s.
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Empirical evidence suggests that cost savings have been the main driving force behind
the majority of contracting out decisions (Asher, 1987; Audit Commission, 1987;
Domberger et al., 1986; Huby, 1986; Szymanski and Wilkins, 1993; Walsh, 1991a).
The studies examined a number of services in local authorities across the United
Kingdom. The studies examined a range of services in different tiers of the UK public
sector. The services included 23 services in Wardsworth Council (Asher, 1987); refuse
collection (Domberger et al., 1986; Domberger and Rimmer, 1994; Huby, 1986; Audit
Commission, 1987), vehicle maintenance (Audit commission, 1987), building
maintenance and repair, cleaning, refuse collection, pest control, security services and
management (Huby, 1986), street cleaning, building cleaning (Walsh, 1991a). The
focus of the study of each of these services was to find the underlying reasons for
contracting out. Table 2.1 below shows the services contracted out and the outcome of
such contracting.
TABLE 2.1

TYPES OF SERVICES CONTRACTED OUT IN THE UK

Study
Asher (1987)

Services contracted
23 Services

Outcome of study
6-58% cost savings.

UK Audit Commission (1980)

Housing maintenance
Refuse collection
Vehicle maintenance

20% average savings.

Huby (1986)

Building maintenance and
repair
Cleaning
Refuse collection
Pest control
Security services

Average 28% savings.

Walsh (1991a)

Miscellaneous

Net 6-7% savings after
considering transaction costs

Szymanksi and Wilkins (1993)

Refuse collection

20% reduction in unit costs.

Source: The researcher’s own compilation from Asher (1987), Audit Commission (1987) Huby
(1986); Walsh (1991a), and Szymanski and Wilkins (1993).

The study of the reasons underlying service provision is important in that the local
governments in the UK experienced significant financial constraints during the era of
the conservative government in 1979 (Walsh, 1991a). The response to such crises was a
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search to find cheaper means to deliver the services. Contracting out was seen as one of
such an alternative, and the evidence presented in the studies indicated such savings.
The studies reported cost savings in extremes (Ahser, 1987) or average savings
(Domberger et al., 1986; Huby, 1986; Audit Commission, 1987; Walsh, 1991a). They
also reported ranges of savings, savings realised in different types of services, and
decreases in costs from contracting out (Walsh, 1991a). Overall the findings were that
the cost saving from contracting out were 20% or higher on an average. With the
exception of Walsh (1991a), the studies suggested that cost savings were achieved in
all the services contracted out and there were no other costs associated with contracting
out. However, Walsh (1991a) reported that there were cost increases in some services
and the actual realised cost savings were dissipated after factoring in the transaction
costs associated with contracting out (e.g., monitoring of contract). In determining the
cost savings, the studies used different methodologies.

The methodology used to determine cost savings, or to compare costs, is crucial, as the
incorrect use of the methodologies could reverse the decisions to contract out. The
researchers in the studies used survey approaches (Asher, 1987; Huby, 1986; Walsh,
1991a), statistical modelling (Domberger et al., 1986; Walsh, 1991a), and computer
models (Audit Commission, 1987). With the exception of Walsh (1991a), other studies
used ex-post contracting out data to analyse the impact of contracting out on cost.
Walsh (1991a) conducted a longitudinal study to analyse the impact of cost savings on
contracting out decisions. The methodologies employed to determine costs were
criticised for their simplicity and incompleteness (Rimmer, 1994).

2.5.1.2 US EVIDENCE

Contracting out practice in the US is by far the oldest, but the motivations behind it are
very similar to those found in the UK. The studies also examined numerous services,
employed multiple methodologies to study the impact of contracting out on costs or
budget bottom line of the municipalities, and examined the underlying reasons for
contracting out. The discussion below is restricted to studies done to examine cost
savings. Other studies that examined other aspects of contracting out are mostly drawn
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from public administration literature and mostly focused on the political motivation
behind contacting out (e.g., Miranda, 1994; Prager, 1997; Ward, 1992).

Contracting out studies in the US examined various services that are the common
candidates, including refuse collection (Edward and Stevens, 1978; Savas, 1977b;
Stevens, 1984), street cleaning, janitorial services, traffic signal maintenance, asphalt
overlay construction, turf maintenance, street tree maintenance (Stevens, 1984), and
rural and urban road maintenance (Steel and Long, 1998). The studies were conducted
over a significant number of city councils which served most of the population (Savas,
1977a). The studies also examined various options for service delivery. This is
contrasted with contracting out options in other western countries. Savas (1977a)
studied four alternative options of service delivery: franchise, in-house provision,
privately employed contractors by individuals, and private contractors. Savas (1977b)
studied public versus private production costs, and Pack (1987) studied contracting
over longer-term contract period.

The objective of studying these alternatives is to find out cost differences in alternative
production systems, and locate the status of contracting out as a means of service
delivery. The common finding is that cost savings are highest when the services are
contracted out, although the rates of savings varied ranging from 5-60% in different
types of services. The studies reported savings on average for all services contracted
out (Oxley et al., 1990), savings achieved at individual service level (Stevens, 1984),
and a range of savings (Edward and Stevens, 1978; Pack, 1987; Savas, 1977b). The
common conclusion of these studies is that contracting out is the cheapest alternative.
The studies largely relied on cost saving methodologies to make this conclusion.

Research on contracting suggests that cost comparison methodologies are important
determinants of cost savings calculation. The studies employed various methodologies
to calculate cost savings. Some used regression analysis (Edward and Stevens, 1978;
Ohlsson, 2003; Savas, 1977a; Stevens, 1984), and cost reduction over longer time
periods (Pack, 1989; Savas, 1977b). Using actual or simulated data, the studies
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examined the impact on costs, quality, scale economy, and other organisational
attributes perceived significant to the researcher. The common finding is that cost is the
most important determinant in contracting out decisions.

The studies analysed various options of delivering services to make informed decisions
about sourcing of services (Savas, 1977a), and compared cost of public and private
production through a longitudinal study (Savas, 1977a). The objective was to compare
the cost changes over a range of period. Savas (1977b) found that over a longer time
period, the costs of public and private production become closer. The underlying reason
was the competitive pressure from competitive bidding. Similar findings were also
revealed from other studies that competition brings down cost of service provision (see
for example, Ohlsson, 2003; Rehfuss, 1991).

2.5.1.3 CONTRACTING OUT IN AUSTRALIA

Contracting out in Australia dates back at least half a century, although the most recent
form of contracting out is the outcome of Public Sector Reform, and the changes in
focus on the public production system initiated during the 1980s (Domberger et al.,
1995). This subsection will locate the catalysts for local government contracting, and
the evidence on contracting out to date.

The Evatt Research Centre (1990) found that at least 55% of Australian local
government bodies contracted out at least one service. The ongoing changes in local
government contracting out has been characterised by a reconsideration of the
definition of core business of the public sector (Dollery and Marshall, 1997, p. 191).
The recent contracting process of the service provision has been influenced by the
intellectual currents, and reform in the competitive environment (Dollery and Marshall,
1997, pp. 194-201). The first factor impacting on local government contracting out,
‘intellectual currents’ (Dollery and Marshall, 1997), is derived from overseas in
response to the bureaucratic failure of the 1960s following the development of the
Public Choice Theory, Property Rights Theory and the Transactions Cost Economics
Theory. These three theories explain why contracting out is a preferred option over
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bureaucratic (or internal) production. It is argued that these theories don’t explain
contemporary contracting out practices and another theory, New Managerialism, has
emanated from these three. The assumption of New Managerialism is that private
sector management principles are equally applicable to the private sector (Boston et al.,
1991 cited in Dollery and Marshall, 1997, p. 193). Dollery and Marshall (1997, p. 193)
argued that Australian local government contracting has been influenced by the
managerial revolution of some liberal democratic countries such as Canada, Great
Britain, and New Zealand. They identified five practices of this new managerialism
revolution impacting on Australian local government contracting: devolution of
management control, efforts to make departments more responsible to clients, the use
of private sector terminology and practices, emphasis on cost cutting, and finally,
development of new financial management systems.

The second factor, reform in a more competitive environment, encompasses the microeconomic reform of the National Competition Policy, reforms to the state and Local
Government Acts, competitive tendering, and finally other state reforms (Dollery and
Marshall, 1997, pp. 194-201). Micro-economic reform is the reform in all levels of
Australian government, to compete successfully, both nationally and globally. This set
the broader agenda for all tiers of Australian government. The other reforms are more
related to the competitiveness of Australian public sector bodies, especially addressing
the productivity and the user-charging issues.

The National Competition Policy was finalised in 1994 and introduced in Australia in
June 1996. A part of overall micro economic reform, it affected all states, was endorsed
by all state and local governments, which stipulated the application provisions of Trade
Practices Act, 1974. As part of National Competition Policy, local governments are
required to scrutinise their pricing and market policies. The key policies of the National
Competition Policy were: maintaining competitive neutrality in service delivery,
maintaining regulatory and commercial activities within the control of local
governments, overseeing the pricing structure of monopoly services, and finally,
reviewing State government legislation restricting competition (Dollery and Marshall,
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1997, p. 196). This policy was a means to other reforms, such as the Local Government
Acts in different states.

The reforms in the Local Government Acts followed the provisions about service
delivery, charging, funding, and pricing, stipulated in the National Competition Policy
documents. The specific reforms undertaken in different states influenced the adoption
of similar Acts in other States. For example, changes in the Victorian Local
Government Act about the status of local governments, as followers of government
mandates, was amended through the reform process. This in turn provided autonomy to
local government bodies to operate to suit their needs and objectives, thereby providing
the way for other local governments in other states to amend their own Acts.
Accordingly, other States changed their Acts to effect changes in the approaches to
service delivery and charging users for services. This process also changed the
state/local government relationship in regard to funding and grants. State governments
put pressure on local governments to become self-sufficient in funding their own
services, thus expecting the local government bodies to contribute to Commonwealth
Government and increasing their own revenue bases. Two responses from local
government emerged as a result: adoption of commercial practices, and rate increases
to fund services. In Victoria and New South Wales, local governments were forced to
manage their activities within their budget, and were not allowed to increase rates. The
outcome of such pressure forced them to find efficient ways of providing service
delivery. The other States, however, were allowed to adopt commercial practices such
as opening their own business units, and topping up customers by extra charges for
services provided. Some States also adopted competitive tendering as part of the
reform.

Competitive tendering was in vogue in all spheres of Australia for much of its history.
However, recent tendering practices in Australia are in sharp contrast to the traditional
form, in that in-house providers are allowed to submit competitive bids along with the
external bidders. Again this competitive tendering took various forms in different
States. For example, in Victoria, tendering was made compulsory for 50% of the local
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government services within a timeframe of three years; in South Australia, it was
mandated to have time frame and performance targets; whereas the other states did not
have the mandatory status of this tendering process. The initial outcome of tendering
exercises was gauged by various surveys. Initial results suggest that in almost all States,
local governments subjected their services to tendering. Victoria outperformed all
others, followed by South Australia, while the other States are gradually following suit.
The New South Wales government amended its Local Government Act 1993 and the
provisions for service deliveries, adopting a tiered approach to ‘market testing’1
(Department of Local Government, 1997, p. 7).

The reforms in the competitive environment were followed by the process of
addressing broader reform agendas facing local governments. The Ministerial Advisory
Group on Local Government Reform (1995, p. 1) summarised the pressures for change
to local governments (quoted in Dollery and Marshall (1997, p. 199) as:
•

financial constraints,

•

the impact of the Hilmer Report2,

•

nationwide reforms,

•

a state government mandate for public sector reform, and

•

the increasing responsibility of Local Government to expand its role in
economic development, environment and people services.

These pressures influenced the States to find strategies to address them. Two
approaches were taken, political and technocratic, to achieve broader Public Sector
Reform. Competition, and its peripheral reforms, were resolved both politically and
technocratically in Victoria; while the other States achieved them through collaboration
and political participation (Dollery and Marshall, 1997, pp. 199-200).

1
Harris (1994, p. 30) defined market testing as “an outsourcing but with a concession to permit an inhouse bid”.
2
Hilmer report mainly discusses the competitiveness of the Australian public sector organisations, and the
government trading enterprises. The recommendations of the report were later adapted as the National
Competition Policy reform Act 1995. The report provided guidelines for competition and regulation both for
the public sector and the government trading enterprises. Three major areas, pricing, competition and
organisational structure/s, were emphasised in this report (Quiggin, 1996, pp. 33-35).
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The influence of the Hilmer Report to restore the competitive environment in local
government is a precursor to the competition agendas set by the Australian government.
It has had a profound impact on all tiers of government facing financial crisis and
service delivery options (Dollery and Marshall, 1997, p. 201). As a result, the local
government bodies undertook different contracting initiatives to provide services. The
next section discusses the empirical evidence on contracting out in Australia.

2.6

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON CONTRACTING OUT IN
AUSTRALIA

Contracting out in local governments has been widely researched in recent times (Albin
1992; Domberger, 1990; Domberger and Rimmer, 1994; Evatt Research Centre, 1990;
May, 1992; Rimmer, 1988a, 1988c). Rimmer (1988c) studied city councils in
Tasmania, South Australia and Brisbane. Evatt Research Centre (1990) conducted a
nationwide study on councils; and finally May (1992) examined Mosman City Council
in New South Wales, Australia. These studies examined reasons for, as well as
outcomes and dimensions of, contracting out in local governments across all states of
Australia.

The general conclusion of these studies is that cost is the main factor in contracting out
of services- a similar result to studies of that of local government contracting in the
UK, New Zealand, and the US (Miranda, 1994). The Australian cases are consistent
with the US, the UK, and the New Zealand evidence. Influenced by contemporary
intellectual currents and by the reform programs in other tiers of Australian
government, local governments looked for cost minimising avenues to offer services
(Alluich, 1997). Contracting out provided the desired impetus of cost savings for local
government contracting, the range of cost savings varying significantly as a percentage
of total cost and in different services. The Australian Chamber of Commerce (1988)
reported 17% cost savings, while the Evatt Research Centre (1990) reported differing
levels of savings across the services with the savings averaging 32% for all the
contracted services. This study is also consistent with other studies in that cost savings
were realised in a majority of the services. It also reported 4.3% extra cost increases
experienced by some respondents. The studies discussed above used different
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approaches to calculate cost and the resultant cost savings. The costing calculations in
the studies suggest the use of various methodologies to cost services. Some studies
(Evatt Research Centre, 1990; May, 1992) used case study and/or qualitative
approaches to analyse costs. Others (e.g., Albin, 1992) used an econometric approach
to determine costs. The role of cost is justified because cost savings were used as the
main driving force to contract out the services. Cost savings in the range of 20% were
envisaged in almost all these studies and across different services. The range of
services examined in these studies included refuse collection (Rimmer, 1994; 1988c;
Albin, 1992), maintenance and construction of roads and bridges, public halls, civic
theatres and facilities, maintenance and capital works facilities, sanitation (Rimmer,
1988c), road sealing and mechanical street sweeping (Rimmer, 1988c), toilet cleaning,
beach and reserve cleaning, street cleaning, and weed spraying (May, 1992). Except for
contracting out, volunteers were also used in one of the studies as an alternative service
delivery option (Evatt Research Centre, 1990).

2.7

METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN CONTRACTING OUT
STUDIES

The methodological flaws discussed here are those most often found in the studies
discussed above. These flaws are most often evident in the studies conducted by the
economists. Because of their use of secondary sources in the studies, these studies were
inconclusive, to the extent that they reported cost aspects, and incomplete.

2.7.1

CONTRACTING OUT AND COSTS

The overall conclusions derived from these studies suggest that contracting out reduced
costs. In the US studies, average cost reduction was 30%, and in the UK studies it was
20%, while in the Australian studies, it was mixed, ranging from 5% to 24%. Cost
savings were attributable to many factors such as different methodologies, the
economic, political, geographic and institutional characteristics of each of these
countries (Rimmer, 1994, p. 187). Howard (1992, pp. 96-97) argued that 20% savings
claimed by Rimmer (1991) was not reliable because Rimmer’s work was influenced by
Domberger’s studies on local government contracting out in the UK. Howard (1992,
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p.p. 96-97) was also critical of Domberger’s studies arguing that cost savings were
actually in the order of only 8%.

2.7.2

SOURCES OF COST REDUCTION

Rimmer (1994, p. 187) and Prager (1994, p. 181) maintain that cost reduction is not
attributable to the award of contract to the private providers. Both of them suggested
that the extent of competition among the bidders was the main reason for cost savings
from contracting, as opposed to selection of private contractors to provide the same
service. Rimmer (1994, p. 187) concludes that: 50…existing studies provide no clear
evidence that the private sector is inherently more competitive than the public sector, in
an environment characterised by open competition between two sectors.

Miranda (1994, p. 359) also argued that the political ideologies of local government
bureaucrats were one of the reasons for contracting and the resultant cost savings.

2.7.3

THE PROBLEM OF SAMPLE SELECTION

The findings of the existing studies may be biased because of sample selection bias,
leading to distorted information. Councils that experienced cost reductions may be
more numerous than those not responding who may have had bitter experience with
cost increases. However, Rimmer (1994) points out that the sample selection bias is
minimal when the response rate is very high. Howard (1992, pp. 96-97) and Boyne
(1998, pp. 481-482) also argued that in some studies (e.g., Domberger et al., 1986;
Domberger and Jensen, 1987) sampling bias (e.g., absence of control for scale and size
difference) influenced the results.

2.7.4

ABSENCE OF MEASURES OF COMPETITION

Boyne (1998, pp. 481-482) argues that in contracting out studies there is no measure to
capture the magnitude of competition and the resultant cost savings. The general
conclusion is that the number of external suppliers in any regions is a proxy for the
extent of competition. Though initially a contract is awarded to the best bidder in a
competitive bidding environment, the ‘competition’ later turns to ‘negotiation’ if an
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external provider wins the contract because of the requirement to maintain constant
contact with the contractor, for service provision, contract monitoring and contract
reviewing, throughout the contract term (p. 481).

In sum, the discussion in previous sections about cost and costing of public sector
services indicates that there is paucity of sound methods of cost comparison in
contracting out decisions. Because of the weaknesses of this method, the studies are
inconclusive. Further, the data used in these studies are filtered by the researchers’ own
research methods, making the outcome of such research vulnerable. Against such
considerations, a better cost comparison method that addresses the weaknesses is
needed.

Recent literature in accounting journals and monographs uses actual accounting records
of some public sector bodies. Most of these studies are qualitative in nature, often
focusing on a few in-depth case studies, and cost calculation has been addressed using
commercial accounting principles (see, for example, Ahmed, 2000; Drtina, 1994;
Johnstone, 1997; Kee et al., 1997). Their methods stressed overhead allocation as one
of the major refinements to extant research on contracting out. In order to understand
cost calculations, a detailed understanding of overhead allocation issues is, therefore,
necessary.

2.8

CHAPTER SUMMARY

Contracting out has been a predominantly popular mode of service delivery in the
public sector organisations in different parts of the world. The fundamental principles
and philosophies of contracting out are mainly grounded in economics and public
administration. Cost saving is canvassed as the main reason for contracting out, though
other reasons also play a part. In this chapter an attempt has been made to review the
literature on contracting out in the context of Local Governments because of the nature
of the research problem under investigation.
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First, the economic perspective, backed by three different theories, was considered.
Among those three theories discussed in section 2.4, Transaction Cost Economics
(TCE) was claimed to have the maximum potential to answer such questions as: what
drives organisations to consider outsourcing decisions, why things are produced
internally and what are the ideal circumstances to consider outsourcing and other
peripheral questions. In the public sector context, the fundamental question answered
by Transaction Cost Economics suggests that it is a better decision to produce
internally under certain conditions. There are a number of studies done in the context of
public sector bodies in various parts of the world.

These studies are mainly done by the economists and largely suggest that contracting
out saves money. However, there is evidence that contracting out also increases the cost
of service provision. In these studies, a diverse range of services were considered and it
has been reported that contracting out saved at least 20% cost of allocated budget on
outsourced services. Section 2.7 claimed that the studies have methodological and other
flaws. The first limitation is that the cost calculation method is either incomplete or
does not exist at all. The second limitation is that the data used in these studies are
either manipulated or fabricated by the researcher/s to estimate the cost of services. The
methods are arbitrarily chosen and flawed because of sampling bias. Therefore, the
studies and their conclusions may be biased and inconclusive.

Though contracting out or ‘make or buy’ is a common organisational practice,
academic literature, especially in local government contexts, did not provide a detailed
insight into the process aspect of the contracting out decisions (Miranda, 1994). Extant
research is thus deficient in proving a detailed account of the ‘contracting out’ process.
In the next two chapters, cost allocation literature will be introduced as a prelude to
introducing a conceptual framework for costing, and evaluating competitive bids in the
longer term.
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CHAPTER 3
COMMON COST ALLOCATION: THE
TRADITIONAL APPROACH
3.1

INTRODUCTION

The allocation of common costs has been a pervasive problem in financial and
management accounting for a long time (Horngren, 1995; Wells, 1970, 1978;
Zimmerman, 1979, 1995). Cost allocation poses two problems: allocation of periodic
common costs across cost objects; and allocation of a pool of common costs (e.g.,
depreciation) across a number of periods (Fregman and Liao, 1981). These problems
need a methodology to allocate them either to cost objects or to different accounting
periods. The establishment of a reasonable cause and effect relationship is a means to
end this allocation dilemma (Horngren, 1995). Cost allocation also needs a reasonable
solution as it hinges on various organisational purposes, including, pricing, inventory
valuation and external reporting,

compliance with regulatory requirements,

performance evaluations, management control, and business decision-making.
However, there is controversy as to the usefulness of cost allocation in decision-making
as it needs an orientation of ‘different costs for different purposes’ (Clark, 1923). The
focus of textbooks and of organisational practice suggests that the main use of cost
allocation is dominated by financial reporting objectives (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987).

Arbitrariness and the incorrigibility issues were two important barriers to cost
allocation (Eckel, 1976; Thomas, 1969). The arbitrariness issue suggests that the
methodology underpinning cost allocation is not unique, and that a matrix of allocated
cost data can be derived using different allocation methods (Thomas, 1969). Decisions
based on these allocated costs are, therefore, unreliable (Thomas, 1969, 1974). The
second issue is the distortion of costs as a result of allocation. The distortion can reflect
in inaccurately allocated costs, incorrect transfer prices, and distorted product costs.
These two issues need to be explained in the light of controversies surrounding
accounting literature and organisational practices.
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This chapter has been organised as follows: in the next section, the concepts of
common cost allocation will be discussed; major arguments for and against overhead
allocation will be discussed in section 3.3; the cost allocation process will be presented
in sections 3.4 and 3.5; evidence on cost allocation will be presented in section 3.6; and
the concluding remarks will be drawn in section 3.7.

3.2

CONCEPTS OF COMMON COST AND ‘ALLOCATION’

Edward (1973) argues that cost is a subjective terminology that can be perceived
differently by users. The relationship between direct and indirect costs is contextual.
Costs may be direct to a user but indirect to other users of the same organisation
(Vatter, 1945, p.145). Kory and Rosenberg (1984, p. 54) added that the operating
environment of an organisation determines whether costs are direct or indirect. Beckett
(1951) argued that the test of ‘directness/indirectness’ depends on the remoteness of the
relationship between costs and cost objects. The more remote the relation, the greater is
the possibility that the cost is a common cost. Sometimes costs may be direct (or
identifiable) but treated as indirect (or common) costs to save economy of effort
(Vatter, 1945, p. 165).

Horngren et al. (2006, p. 544) define common costs as “cost of operating a facility,
activity, or like cost object that is shared by two or more users”. It is also known as oncost, overhead and joint costs- the terms are interchangeably used. The AAA (1952, p.
179) Report of the Committee on Cost Concepts and Standards defined joint costs as
those which “exists when from any one unit source, material or process, there are
produced units of goods or services which have different unit values.”

There are several typologies of common costs. Thomas (1969, 1980) used a time-based
typology to classify common costs into single year (e.g., product related common costs)
and multi-year common costs (periodic costs e.g. depreciation of equipment). Vatter’s
(1945, pp. 166-167) typology considers common costs as costs to be allocated to cost
objects, and costs to be allocated to different time periods. There are other typologies
and these can be grouped into two categories: common costs and joint costs (Biddle
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and Steinberg; 1984, Horngren, 2003). Some authors (e.g., Bourn and Ezzammel, 1987;
Scapens and Ahmed, 1991) argue that common costs and joint costs are the same and
have advocated the use of a single term. When the terms are used interchangeably, joint
costs are considered a subset of common costs (Bourn and Ezzammel, 1987).
Following Bourn and Ezzammel (1987), common costs and joint costs will be used
interchangeably in this thesis.

Webster defines the verb "to allocate" or "to distribute or assign, allot or apportion".
When associated with the word "expense", it means "the apportionment of a general
expense of a business to the account of its particular departments according to some
arbitrary rule" (Cheng and Manes, 1988). Kohler's dictionary for Accountants (1970, p.
25 quoted in Cheng and Manes, 1988, p. 21) provides several notions of the term
allocate, among which one is: “…to charge an item or group of items of revenue or cost
to one or more cost objects, activities, processes, operations and products in accordance
with cost responsibilities.” Biddle and Steinberg (1984, p. 3) define cost allocation as:
“…the efficient partitioning of a cost among a set of cost objects.”

The meaning of allocation is, thus, related to common costs and joint costs, on some
subjective basis, to some cost objects, using some subjective criteria. The criteria used
to allocate may be objective or subjective, contextual or general. The general argument
is that costs should not be allocated for decision-making (Thomas, 1969). Divergence
of practice from theory, especially in accounting, has long been debated. The general
conclusion is that divergence should be ignored (Scapens, 1994).

3.3

ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST OVERHEAD
ALLOCATION

Some authors (for example, Bourn and Ezzammel, 1987; Skinner, 1990; Thomas, 1969,
1974; Wells, 1978) argue that cost allocation is useless. While some others (e.g.,
Horngren et al., 2003; Zimmerman, 1979, 2003) argue that cost allocation is useful in
an organisation, otherwise it would not have stood the test of time (cf. Zimmerman,
2003, p. 12). The arguments for and against cost allocation are discussed below.
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3.3.1 ARGUMENTS AGAINST COST ALLOCATION
Some authors (e.g., Barton, 1965; Baxter, 1947; Coase, 1973; Thomas, 1969, 1971,
1974, 1980; Vatter, 1945; Wells, 1970, 1978) have argued that cost allocation is
unnecessary, as it distorts product costs, because the allocated costs are arbitrary and
incorrigible. The perils of cost allocation are also discussed under the rubric of volumebased allocation or traditional cost allocation (see, for example, Cooper and Kaplan,
1992; Miller and Vollman, 1991; Shank and Govindarajan, 1993). A survey of the
major arguments against cost allocation is discussed below.

3.3.1.1 OVERHEAD ALLOCATION IS ARBITRARY

Overhead allocation in general has been labelled as arbitrary (Dopuch, 1977, p. 81;
Horngren, 1977; Kaplan, 1977, p. 52; Thomas, 1969, 1974; Wells, 1970). Beckett
(1951, p. 327) argued that ‘arbitrariness’ could be captured by analysing the ‘cause and
effect’ relation between the costs and the cost objects. Beckett (1951) also points out
“the relationship being somewhat remote, the method of assignment becomes arbitrary.
And the arbitrariness increases as the relationship becomes more remote.”

Thomas (1969) argued that any allocation that lacks theoretical justification is arbitrary.
For theoretical justification three criteria are to be met: unambiguity, logical
defensibility and additivity (Eckel, 1976, p. 768). In addition, an allocation can lead to
arbitrary allocation if there are input interaction effects- that is, interaction between at
least two inputs (Thomas, 1969). Thomas (1969) argued that there is no best method to
allocate common costs in the best possible manner, and it is theoretically impossible to
consider all the alternative methods of allocation and then to choose the best option.
The magnitude of differences in allocated data may be significant, thus making the
allocated cost data unreliable for further use (Coase, 1937; Thomas, 1969). Even if the
supposedly best method is chosen, it may be susceptible to criticism by the users (Dent,
1991; Verrecchia, 1992).

51

3.3.1.2 OVERHEAD ALLOCATION IS INCORRIGIBLE

Thomas (1974) argued that any allocation of common costs is arbitrary because the
allocated cost data cannot be verified in reference to the market for its accuracy (Eckel,
1976; Wells, 1978). Because the figures are not verifiable they are labelled as
‘incorrigible’, implying those common costs should not be allocated. Thomas (1969)
also argued that the allocated common cost ‘lacks the proof available in physical
sciences’. Therefore, the resultant allocation figures are also incorrigible. As the results
are incorrigible, they are not reliable, and incorrigible costs should not be allocated.

3.3.1.3 OVERHEAD ALLOCATION LEADS TO DISTORTED PRODUCT COSTS

Overhead allocation, in traditional costing literature, generally suggests that allocation
is a simple average consumption of organisational resources. This was a reflection of
the view about overhead consumption toward the beginning of the twentieth century,
when the scientific management movement was at its nascent stage (Kaplan, 1984), the
production environment was simple, products and processes were almost standardised
(Johnson and Kaplan 1987), cost reduction through economies of scale was a norm,
(Johnson, 1983) and, above all, the markets were the sellers’ market (Wells, 1970).
Cooper and Kaplan (1988, 1988b) suggest that the sources of distortion included the
size and volume diversity. This distortion is severe in the manufacturing industry.

3.3.1.4 OVERHEAD ALLOCATION LEADS TO WRONG STRATEGIC DECISIONS

Literature on traditional costing suggests the limitations of full cost data in making
different strategic choices. Such choices may include the right market for operations,
the right market within which to compete, the right customer to sell to, and the right
product to produce. All these are dependent on the accounting information system in
place to provide management with the necessary data on product cost. Although full
cost is a norm in practice, textbooks often emphasise the use of variable costing for
guiding such strategic choices. However, in recent times, authors argue that this cannot
be a solution as the variable costing emphasis for strategic choices is short-term
focused and does not shed light on the long-term aspects of a company (Cooper and
Kaplan, 1992).
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3.3.2 ARGUMENTS FOR OVERHEAD ALLOCATION
A review of theory and practice of cost allocation suggests that they are made to serve
different organisational purposes (Bourn and Ezzammel, 1987; Horngren et al., 2003;
Kaplan, 1975; Zimmerman, 1979, 1995). Some important uses of cost allocations
include valuation of inventory and financial reporting, evaluation of managerial
performance, organisational reasons such as recording accurate factor input costs, the
allocation of insulated versus non-insulated costs (Zimmerman, 1995), and the
motivation of division managers (Atkinson, 1987; Vatter, 1945; Wells, 1970;
Zimmerman, 1995).

3.3.2.1 INVENTORY VALUATION

One of the most important purposes for the allocation of common costs is to aid in the
valuation of inventories for different organisational needs, primarily dominated by
financial reporting requirements, and to determine periodic income (Horngren et al.,
1994, p. 498; Wells, 1970). This was, historically, the reason for allocation (Johnson
and Kaplan, 1987; Kaplan, 1984). This is the full costing view, or absorption costing
view, which is heavily influenced by the rules and regulations of financial accounting.
Wells (1970) argues that allocation may be redundant if the conventional practice of
reporting the value of inventory of finished goods at year end is reported at market
value rather than the lower of market and cost; that market value is equally acceptable
when prices are above market value and below it; and that market values are equally
objective as cost because the value can be verified.

Given the view that overhead should be a part of unsold stock under absorption costing
or full costing view, it has two important implications: first, an asset is created from
which benefits can flow, either in the form of future revenues or costs savings, from
holding such stocks (Horngren and Sorter, 1962 quoted in Innes and Mitchell, 1993,
20); and second, to influence reported income by including the closing inventory value
as an asset. The implication of the second issue is that overhead has to be part of
product costs (Innes and Mitchell, 1993, pp. 19-20). There are two alternative views on
inventory valuation: a variable costing view, and an absorption costing view. In
53

variable costing, allocated fixed overhead are excluded from inventory costs; in
absorption costing, fixed overhead costs are included in inventory (see Horngren et al.,
2003 for details). Drury and Tayles (1995) summarised the results of a few surveys on
the use of full costing for inventory valuation and found that in practice full costing is
widely used. The justifications for its popularity are its convenience, multiple uses,
credibility and the technical superiority of the figures. Their conclusion was based on
the surveys conducted in Australia, Britain, U.S., and Japan.

3.3.2.2 PRODUCT PRICING

Cost allocation is useful for pricing (Beckett, 1951, p. 329; Bourn and Ezzammel,
1987; Anthony and Young, 1994; Horngren et al., 2003; Shim and Sudit, 1995; Wells,
1970). The general argument is that allocation is necessary to determine the full cost of
a product, and then to establish its selling price. Even though allocation is arbitrary
(Thomas, 1969; 1974), it serves a useful purpose in setting prices. Beckett (1951, p.
330) points out that:
(t)he main point here [in pricing] is that “arbitrariness” is not necessarily a vice. If indirect costs
have been incurred to sell certain products, management has a perfect right to expect those
products to carry such costs. If management wants certain products to carry a substantial share
of the overhead (and there may be many different and justifiable reasons for so wanting), then
the failure of the product to carry that indirect cost is an indication of weakness as management
wishes and has a right to interpret weakness.

However, there are also arguments that prices can be set without allocating common
costs, When prices are set on the basis of direct costs, they are set in such a way that the
contribution margin (that is, the difference between sales revenue and the direct costs)
can cover the periodic fixed costs (Beckett, 1951, p. 330). Wells (1970) further argued
that, depending on a firm’s status (e.g. price taker or price maker), cost allocation might
be necessary. For a price taker firm (e.g., a firm operating in a competitive market),
cost allocation is redundant. On the other hand, for a price maker (that is, firm
operating in other markets), overhead allocation may be necessary to determine prices.
In other situations, pricing of public goods is subject to regulation, and in these cases
also, costs don’t play a significant part in setting prices. This is more useful when the
prices are to be based on cost plus a certain percentage mark-up on costs. The danger,
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though, with cost-plus pricing is that the prices charged may be higher than the
prevailing market price of the same product or service (Wells, 1978). However, defence
procurement in US is highly regulated where cost figures rarely exceed market prices.

3.3.2.3 THIRD-PARTY REIMBURSEMENT

Third party reimbursement is another purpose for which costs are allocated. Instances
include Medicare reimbursements from governments to local and state authorities for
public utility services costs (Horngren et al., 1994, p. 498; Zimmerman, 1995, p. 289).
In public utilities, costs including share of allocated cost form the basis of rates payable
by the users and are subject to the regulations of government. In some cases costs,
including the share of allocated costs, form the basis of charging prices (Baumol et al.,
1987; Cardullo and Moellenberndt, 1987). Although third party reimbursement is one
important reason for cost allocation, cost allocation practice is also prevalent in firms
without non-cost based revenue (Zimmerman, 1995, p. 289).

3.3.2.4 EVALUATION OF MANAGERIAL PERFORMANCE

Cost allocation is necessary for managerial performance evaluation (Beckett, 1951;
Horngren et al., 2003; Wells, 1970). Normally costs are allocated to divisions in a
decentralised organisation to evaluate the performance of responsibility centre
managers. Costs are allocated on some basis- sales dollar, divisional assets, or other
forms suitable for allocation, without much regard to the cause and effect relation
embedded in all common costs. Allocated costs can obscure the performance of
divisional managers (Beckett, 1951). There are suggestions that only controllable costs
should be allocated for managerial performance evaluation (Gordon, 1951, pp. 214-5;
Wells 1970, p. 485).

3.3.2.5 COST ALLOCATION AS A TAX SYSTEM

Common costs are allocated as a tax system (Zimmerman, 1995, p. 291) to control the
supply of common resources or indirect costs from other departments (Beckett, 1951,
pp. 328-329; Gordon, 1951, pp. 217-218). Without cost allocations, input factors are
cheaper to the users and hence users will be inclined to use more of these inputs
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without even considering alternatives cheaper to an organisation. The input factors
attract the use of some support services and hence deserve some share of those support
costs. The allocated share of such costs discourages the use of such resources and
encourages users to substitute them with cheaper inputs (Zimmerman, 1995, p. 291).

3.3.2.6 TO REPORT THE CORRECT FACTOR PRICE

Cost allocation creates externalities (Zimmerman, 1995, p. 289). Without allocation,
therefore, input factors are under costed and externalities are overlooked. In
quantitative terms, it is hard to measure the costs of such externalities. Cost allocation
proxies for externalities, and such a proxy varies within ranges. Zimmerman(1995, p.
289) concludes that costs should be allocated when marginal costs are less than average
costs, because it is better to allocate some positive amount for such externalities than
not to allocate at all. This is done to stop people from over consumption of costly input
factors that is wrongly perceived as 'free'. The opposite happens when average cost is
lower than the marginal costs. In such a case, allocation at a marginal rate overcosts a
factor input, distorts profitability, discourages its profitable use, and hence can affect
long run profitability. When the marginal cost is equal to average costs, the real cost of
consumption of resources is reflected, and it is the most desirable level of resource
usage (Zimmerman, 1995, p. 289).

3.3.2.7 PRODUCTION CONTROL DECISIONS

Allocated costs have important implications for production control decisions (Silvester,
1992, p. 23). The primary purpose of a production control decision is served by
analysing the variances at different phases of production to know the efficiency or
inefficiency of manufacturing processes. The other decision areas are: (a) whether to
make a desired product internally or to buy it from outside, (b) whether or not a given
product line is profitable enough to be continued in production, (c) the allocation of
scarce resources to competing product lines, and (d) the use of product cost information
to choose the optimal production quantity level
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3.3.2.8 PROFITABILITY ANALYSIS

Analysis of profitability is another important reason for allocating joint and common
costs. Kaplan and Wellam (1974) proposed a linear programming model that captures
overhead allocation of scarce resources and provides an unbiased estimate of
profitability of products. According to them, it is important to allocate the cost of
scarce [common] resources as it proxies for positive opportunity costs of such
resources, and ignores cost of non-scarce [common] resources (Kaplan and Wellam,
1974, p. 482). When allocated, this acts as a gauge for comparing alternative products
and their profitability, enhancing strategic decision choices to management, such as the
product emphasis or de-emphasis decision (Beckett, 1951; Anthony and Young, 1994,
p. 179; Kaplan and Wellam, 1974; Wells, 1970). Avery (1951) argued that although in
general terms, [joint] cost allocations are arbitrary, large firms could nonetheless use
allocation to know their product profitability. Public sector entities allocate costs in
order to know the extent of cross-subsidy in the services provided, or the presence of
such subsidy where it is consistent with their corporate strategy (Anthony and Young,
1994, p. 179).

3.3.2.9 ALLOCATION FOR DECISION MAKING

In general, costs are allocated, either at divisional or company level, to make decisions
(Skinner, 1990). Such decisions may be contemplated for the short term, such as
‘alternative appraisals’ (Beckett, 1951, p. 331), which can include adding or dropping
decisions, make or buy decisions, deciding on selling prices (Beckett, 1951, p. 331;
Horngren et al., 1994, p. 498) or over the longer term (Skinner, 1990). Shim and Larkin
(1994) found empirical evidence about the order of importance of allocated costs in
decision-making. Their survey ranked, in order of preference, product costing, product
line profitability, product pricing, divisional performance measurement, make or buy,
and finally, external reporting, as areas where allocated costs play an important role in
decision making (p. 28). When alternative appraisals are made for decision-making,
costs vary according to contexts (Beckett, 1951, p. 332; Clark, 1923; Skinner, 1990).
Zimmerman (1979) provided a behavioural explanation of allocating costs for decision
making, and suggested that cost allocations proxy for certain difficult to observe costs
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that arise when decision-making responsibilities are assigned to managers. Cost
allocation, in such a setting, solves control and co-ordination problems within a firm.
Merchant and Sheilds (1993) and Wagenhofer (1996) argue that costs may be
deliberately distorted to motivate managers of profitable segments.

3.3.2.10 COST ALLOCATION TO MOTIVATE MANGERS

Costs are allocated to motivate and control behaviour of people within organisations
(Bondar and Lusk, 1977; Horngren, et al., 1994, p. 498; Rajan, 1992; Zimmerman,
1979, 1995, p. 289). The literature on cost allocation, in agency setting, discusses it in a
principal (owner) and agent (manager) setting, and concludes that cost allocation can be
used as a motivational tool to encourage resource usage in the best interest of the
principal (owner). In return, the principal agrees to compensate the agent an amount
commensurate with a firm’s goal, and perceived benefit from the cost reduction effort
by the agent (manager) (Zimmerman, 1979).

3.4

THE MECHANISMS OF OVERHEAD ALLOCATION

Mechanisms of overhead allocation are simply the technique of allocation either to
products or to different time periods (Thomas, 1969; 1974). The decision to choose any
basis of allocation should follow some theoretical prescriptions. These theoretical
prescriptions are rationales for choosing between allocation and/or abandoning
allocation. Thomas (1969) argues that if managers decide to allocate costs, they should
justify their stance by considering both the theoretical and technical requirements (see
also Ahmed and Scapens, 1991 for details). If there are no theoretical justifications, the
costs can be excluded from the allocation scheme. Thomas (1969) prescribed three
theoretical justifications before allocating costs: ambiguity, defensibility and additivity.
Thomas (1969) maintained that a cost allocation method should be unambiguous. He
also argued that the method should be clearer enough over all other competing
methods. It should also clarify the allocation procedure to be adopted to allocate a
certain level of costs. Allocation methods that are not contextual are not unambiguous
and should not be used to allocate costs. Defensibility refers to the justification for a
choice of a single method among all available methods (Thomas, 1974; Vatter, 1945, p.
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167). In order to be acceptable, the results of cost allocation must be acceptable
objectively (Vatter, 1945, p. 167). Vatter (1945, p. 167) points out: that “…the results
of cost allocation must be logically defensible if they are to be acceptable as objective
and acceptable data.” The arguments of Thomas (1969, 1974) clearly reveal that cost
allocation revolves around the exploration of the allocation methods, choice of methods
from the available methods, and the justifications to choose a particular method or
several methods. So, it is hard for accountants to choose one method without criticisms,
or one that has enough justifications. This is because it is not possible to explore and
consider all the alternatives objectively. Thomas (1969, p. 8) maintained that
…accounting's allocations cannot be defended by kinds of physical proofs that are possible in
some of the sciences... Therefore, it should rest upon certain axioms or assumptions before any
conclusion can be drawn as to theoretical justification or arbitrariness.

To resolve this, he suggested appealing to practitioners in other disciplines. The last
theoretical requirement, additivity, suggests that the total of allocated costs must be the
sum of their parts. Otherwise the allocation is incorrect. There are various ways to
divide up these total costs, even though there is no justification for the choice of a
single method. If the input 'interaction effect' (Thomas, 1969) is present, allocation
becomes complicated. The interaction effect has been defined as the interdependence of
inputs to produce outputs. Thomas (1969) argued that the presence of interaction of
input factors might cause additivity problems.

3.4.1 CRITERIA FOR ALLOCATING OVERHEADS
The criteria for overhead allocation enhance decisions to allocate costs to cost objects,
and provides justifications for choosing a specific method. A review of the literature on
cost allocation, and widely used texts (for example, Horngren et al., 2003), suggest five
criteria for cost allocation: cause and effect, benefit received, fairness and equity,
ability to bear, and neutrality.

The cause and effect as a criterion suggests that allocation of common costs be made on
the basis of the causes of such costs. Vatter (1945) labels this as the criterion of origin,
to mean the sources of the cost. Horngren (1995, p. 282) identifies it as the most
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important sought after research topic during the 19th century. Fregrman and Liao
(1981) suggested that this criterion is most dependable and hence the most objective to
guide cost allocation. The association of causal factors and costs is normally
determined by simple correlation. However, if there is more than one input factor, and
if they interact with each other, it obscures any cause and effect relationship (Thomas,
1969).

The benefits received criterion suggests that costs be allocated to cost objects according
to the 'benefit' that these cost objects or intermediate cost objects receive from the
common facilities provided (Ahmed and Scapens, 1991; Horngren et al., 1994, p. 500;
Vatter, 1945). Although ‘benefit received’ is a vague concept (Vatter, 1945), this
method is considered as fair and objective (Fregman and Liao, 1981, p. 13). Fregman
and Liao’s (1981) contention is that the benefit can be measured in some form of
physical good or measurable services.

The fairness and equity criterion suggests that common costs should be allocated to the
cost objects on some fair or equitable basis (Fregman and Liao, 1981; Horngren et al.,
1994, p. 500). The meaning of fairness implies unbiased allocation of common costs to
the recipients. It is a judgmental rather than operational criterion in the cost allocation
process.

Empirical evidence on defence procurement in the US suggests that this criterion was
debated and deemed unacceptable to the purchasers of defence products from suppliers.
This was because the suppliers allocated costs which were beyond the scope of the
‘contract’ and hence labelled as ‘inequitable’ allocation or charging of costs to
contracted goods (Verrecchia, 1992).

The ability to bear criterion or the ‘criterion of ability’ (Vatter, 1945), suggests that
costs be allocated to cost objects according to the ability of those cost objects to absorb
those costs. The ability to absorb is in turn determined by some metrics easily available
from the operations of a business such as divisional sales, divisional costs, divisional
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asset base or any other suitable measure (Fregman and Liao, 1981; Horngren et al.,
1994, p. 500; Vatter, 1945). This criterion is suggested only when a better allocation
method is not available (Fregman and Liao, 1981, p. 14), because the ability to bear
may not reflect the true consumption of resources by a recipient. The recipient may be
an inelastic product, an uncontrollable factor that may be erroneously used to allocate
costs. Even though this criterion is widely practised, it does not reflect the true resource
consumption pattern of the recipients (Fregman and Liao, 1981, p. 14).

The neutrality criterion suggests that the allocated costs should be free from bias. In
other words, it is fairly done or it is 'sterile' (Thomas, 1969). However, costs that are
decision specific are not neutral to other choices of allocation methods. Moriarity
(1975) proposed a method to ensure the neutrality of common cost allocation.
According to this method, department managers are encouraged to consume internally
provided services when outsourcing those services is more expensive, but done at the
discretion of the decentralised managers. Under this method, a quote is gathered for all
the services intended to be outsourced. Then the total cost of receiving these services is
deducted from the aggregate of all the quoted prices for the services considered for
outsourcing. The total cost savings are then credited proportionally to all the divisions
in proportion to the quoted external prices. This ensures that at any time the cost of the
internally generated services will not exceed the external cost. Louderback (1976)
criticised Moriarity’s (1975) method for its conceptual errors. He argued that, because
of the nature of the model, the allocation of common costs might result in negative
allocation to some of the divisions. He proposed that a division should be allocated a
share of incremental cost of receiving such service, and a share of the difference
between the incremental costs of outsourcing it and receiving it from internal sources.
Thus the total cost to a division for receiving any internally generated services is
always equal to or greater than the incremental costs of internal generation, but below
the cost of the outside provision (Ahmed and Scapens, 1991).

Patton and Littleton (1940, p. 121 quoted in Vatter, 1945, p. 163) evaluated the
limitations of the results of cost allocation by noting that “…cost allocation at best is
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loaded with assumptions, and, in many cases, highly arbitrary methods of
apportionment are employed in practice. Certainly it is wise not to take the results of
the usual process of internal cost computation too seriously.”

3.4.2 THE PROCESS OF CONVENTIONAL OVERHEAD ALLOCATION
Vatter (1945) suggested three important caveats for allocation: subjectivity,
reasonableness and

inaccuracy in averaging.

These

caveats are

important

considerations before allocations are made. The steps in allocation involve a) selection
of cost objects, b) choice of cost drivers or allocation bases to allocate costs from
service departments to production departments (first stage allocation), and from
production departments to final cost objects (second stage allocation), and c) the
allocation of costs to final cost objects such as products or services (Anthony and
Young, 1995; Atkinson, 1987; Horngren et al., 2003; Zimmerman, 1995, p. 283).

3.4.3.1 DETERMINATION OF COST OBJECTS

Horngren et al. (2003, p. 30) define a cost object as “anything for which a measurement
of costs is required”. Determining the cost object is the first step in the process of
common cost allocation. The determination process involves identifying the
final/intermediate recipient of common costs. Determining the cost object is important
for two reasons. First, it establishes an input (expense) and output (final product/
intermediate product) relationship, indicating the efficiency of usage of resources.
Second, it controls resource flow and future costs. Without correctly defining the cost
objective, the cost allocation process cannot proceed.

3.4.3.2 DETERMINING A SUITABLE FIRST STAGE ALLOCATION METHOD

There are three common methods of allocating overheads (or common costs) in the first
stage: direct allocation, step down, and reciprocal allocation. The second stage allocates
overheads in a straightforward manner using volume related measures, either a plantwide overhead rate or individual departmental rates. Joint costs, however, are allocated
using different methods. Before discussing common cost allocation methods, joint cost
allocation is discussed.
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3.4.2.3 ALLOCATING COST TO COST OBJECTS

Once overheads are allocated to production centres using any of the above methods, the
next task is to assign departmental overheads to product lines by some measure,
depending on the causal relationship between the departmental overhead and the
products. The most commonly used bases for the allocation of overheads in the second
stage are: direct labour hours, direct labour dollars, machine hours, direct materials, or
direct-material dollars (Horngren et al., 2003, p. 486). Empirical evidence suggests that
multiple allocation bases are used (Shim and Larkin, 1994, p. 21). Direct labour hour is
the most commonly found basis of allocation. This is because primitive production
technology was dominated by direct labour content in the total cost, products were
simple and very similar, and were produced in mass volumes (Johnson and Kaplan,
1987; Sharman, 1990). Direct material is the second next common alternative used for
allocating overheads. When allocated this way, overheads are directly proportional to
volume. Recently volume based measures to allocate costs in the second stage have
been criticised (Cooper and Kaplan, 1988; Miller and Vollman, 1991; Shank and
Govindarajan, 1993).

Regardless of the uses of any of the allocation methods, the underlying assumption is
that the consumption of overhead and the volume produced are exactly proportional or
linear or variable in nature. This follows the assumption that total overheads are
divided by the volume basis, thus providing a unit cost per volume. The implication of
such unitisation is that it acts as a variable cost. This is methodologically flawed,
though it has been used over the years for its technical simplicity.

3.5

THE METHODS OF COMMON COST ALLOCATION

Though common and joint costs are used interchangeably, the processes are different.
Joint cost is very much associated with manufacturing concerns, though it is also found
in service organisations (Cohen and Loeb, 1989, pp. 165-166; Tishlias, 1992). The
technical processes therefore differ because of the differences in contexts. The
following discussion sheds some light on the common approaches to joint cost and
common cost allocation.
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3.5.1 JOINT COST ALLOCATION
The literature on joint cost allocation is more focussed on the technical processes of
calculating the amount of joint cost allocation than with the theoretical rationales
behind joint cost allocation (Avery, 1951; Billera et al., 1983; Hill, 1956; Cohen and
Loeb, 1990; Demski, 1981; Lawson, 1956, 1957; Lorig, 1955, 1958; Louderback,
1976; Moriarity, 1975; 1976; Shubink, 1962; Thomas, 1980; Tishlias, 1992; Manes and
Vernon, 1965; Wiliams and Kennedy, 1983). Authors have argued mostly about how
the ‘slices’ of joint costs can be assigned to cost objects. Some mathematical models
have been used to allocate costs, all of them considering the mechanics rather than the
philosophy of the debate over joint cost allocation. A review of the literature, textbooks
and practices suggest that joint cost allocation is a pervasive problem in the
manufacturing sector and in public utilities. Three major methods emerged from the
literature on joint cost allocation. They are: the physical unit, sales value, net realisable
value (NRV) method, and finally, the simultaneous estimation method (Cheng and
Liao, 1992). These methods are not relevant for analysing the research problems posed
in this thesis (see Horngren et al., 2003, and Cheng and Liao, 1992 for details about
these methods).

3.5.2 COMMON COST ALLOCATION METHODS
As opposed to joint costs, common costs are allocated to cost objects in two distinct
phases. In the first phase, the allocation is based on some corporate-wide guideline
mainly based on causal factors or other criteria discussed earlier in this chapter. The
causal relation is more reasonable and obvious in that there is less controversy
surrounding the location of the bases and hence the allocated costs. Unless there is any
other strategic objective, each recipient of the overheads receives a fair share of
allocated costs. There are three solution algorithms to allocate the common costs fairly
among the recipients of the services from common services. These methods influence
the end results due to differences in the assumptions made prior to allocation. The
choice of this method, in turn, is dependent on a variety of factors: the person doing the
allocation, the costing system in practice in any organisation, the economic climate in
which a company is operating, the legal requirements for allocation, and above all the
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strategic objective of an organisation. The methods below provide a brief overview of
different ways of allocating common costs in the first iteration of allocation process.
This first stage allocation process is also known as primary allocation. Three common
first stage allocation methods are: direct method, step-down method, and simultaneous
equation method. Only the latter two are most commonly used in complex
organisational settings.

3.5.2.1 STEP DOWN ALLOCATION METHOD

This method of cost allocation, which overcomes the difficulty encountered by direct
allocation method, is based on two assumptions. First, service departments also receive
services from other service departments. Second, there is no recognition of reciprocal
services arrangements. Instead, services flow in a step fashion in which the highest
number of departments served rank first followed by those serving fewer departments
(Anthony and Young, 1994, p. 185; Horngren et al., 1994).This process continues until
all the other service departments’ costs are eventually allocated to the production
departments or the mission centres. Eventually, the production departments or the
operations departments receive the burden of all the common costs incurred within the
organisation. This does not capture the efficiency level of the service departments.
Rather, it may show a distorted picture of product/ departmental performance as a
result of poor efficiency in service departments. This method is widely used because it
overcomes the incorrect assumptions of the direct method, which assumes that service
departments don’t consume common costs.

This method has, however, a few disadvantages. The main disadvantage of this method
is that the ordering of service departments in the ladder of allocation may cause
different levels of allocated overhead costs (Zimmerman, 1995). The second most
frequently encountered disadvantage is that there is no recognition of reciprocal
services between the service departments. The simultaneous equation method
overcomes this problem.
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3.5.2.2 RECIPROCAL SERVICE ALLOCATION METHOD

The reciprocal service allocation method assumes service flow in both directions within
service departments, and from service to production departments (Horngren et al.,
2003, p. 529). In the process of transfer of services, interdependencies are recognised
and considered as part of the total variable cost of service departments whose costs are
contemplated for allocation. It is a complex process to allocate costs from service
departments to production departments. As a general rule, the allocation enhances the
measurements of variable costs of services generated from the service departments (see
Horngren et al., 2003 for details).

The variable cost of a service department, calculated by the reciprocal service
allocation method, may vary, and depends on the production function of the service
departments (Kaplan, 1973; Kaplan and Wellam, 1974, p. 477; Lambert and Larker,
1989, p. 449). Few variations of variable costs of service departments are possible.
Kaplan (1973) argued that when all interdependencies among service departments are
considered, the reciprocal allocation rate equals the marginal cost of providing a unit of
service to other production departments. This model assumes a linear production
function and a relevant range of output. Lambert and Larcker (1989) extended Kaplan’s
(1973) work to incorporate non-linearity and uncertainty into their reciprocal cost
allocation model. Their conclusion is that the marginal cost of providing services to
production departments may be biased, and can be any random variable, given the
presence of various levels of capacity resources and uncertainty.

3.6

SURVEY OF COST ALLOCATION PRACTICES

Accounting theory and practice have always been separated by a wide gap. Cost
allocation, among other accounting practices that showed such gap, was not an
exception (Atkinson and Shaffir, 1998; Scapens, 1994). The gap between theory and
practice has been attributed to the lack of information about the benefits of using a
particular theory. Scapens (1994) argued that this was a norm and should not be taken
seriously. Other academics also defended the divergence between theory and practice
differently.

For

example,

Zimmerman
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(1995)

defended

any

long-standing

organisational practice as ‘benefiting’ phenomena to an organisation. He also pointed
out that the organisations must have received benefits from certain organisational
practices, otherwise they would not have stood the test of time.

Like other organisational practices, cost allocation was also a widely debated issue until
the seventies. While the academic accountants were dead against cost allocation,
mainly because of distortion from the use of allocated cost data, practice always refuted
academic prescriptions and endorsed cost allocation. The empirical studies below
evidence the prevalence of cost allocation, suggesting its importance in routine
organisational activities. Even Thomas (1974) lifted his earlier reservations of his
earlier work (that is, Thomas, 1969) about the use of allocated cost data, and suggested
that cost allocation was necessary to serve important organisational purposes.

The empirical studies examined different issues. First of all, the studies examined
whether costs were allocated in practice. Almost all of the studies found that costs were
allocated whenever there was a need to allocate common costs. Most of these studies
were conducted in the Western countries. Baumes (1963) examined 158 divisionalised
companies in the US and found that 53% made full allocations while 26% made partial
allocations. The study by Fregman and Liao (1981) revealed the most noteworthy
survey of cost allocation in the US. In their survey of 123 firms, 84% indicated that
corporate common costs were allocated to primary profit centres. Atkinson (1987)
conducted another study of 435 Canadian firms. Out of the 186 useable responses, he
found that 70% use cost allocations, 82% used transfer pricing and 90% used transfer
pricing or both.

Ramadan (1989, pp. 31-37) surveyed the cost allocation practices in the UK
divisionalised companies. Drawing mainly on Zimmerman (1979), he tested four
hypotheses and found support for two and no support for the other two. His first
hypothesis was about the role of cost allocation in informing managers about the
presence of common costs. He found evidence in support of this hypothesis - that is, the
null hypothesis was confirmed. The second hypothesis was about the role of common
costs in encouraging optimal resource usage. This hypothesis was also confirmed. The
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third hypothesis was about the role of cost allocation in reducing divisional manager’s
expenditure on perquisites. This hypothesis was rejected, indicating that cost allocation
does not have any role in reducing divisional manager’s perquisites. The last hypothesis
was about the use of costs allocation in discouraging divisional managers from
inserting slack in performance budget. The hypothesis was also rejected, indicating that
cost allocation did not have any role in discouraging managers from inserting slack in
performance budgets.

Bourn and Ezzammel (1987) conducted in-depth case studies on nine UK public sector
firms. They concluded that most organisations use cost allocation for pricing, shortterm tactical decision-making, and for absorbing perceived environmental uncertainty
surrounding the firm. They further found that the more the intra-organisational conflict,
the more sophisticated the cost allocation system. The perceived usefulness and
feasibility make a cost allocation system complete. However, they found that an
increase in variable costs is positively associated with a decrease in average cost.

Following these surveys in the UK, Dean et al. (1991) conducted a major survey on
cost allocation practices among Australian firms. They also found strong evidence
about, and history of, cost allocation among Australian firms. Apart from the direct
studies on cost allocation, other studies were conducted on product pricing
mechanisms. These studies notably found that cost allocation is the primary
determinant of different strategic decisions such as pricing, make or buy, and add or
drop product lines. These studies, thus, evidenced that cost allocation was a prevalent
practice.

The studies also found different reasons for cost allocations of different magnitudes.
Most of these studies found important reasons for cost allocations, and found that cost
allocations were triggered by common organisational purposes. The most common
reasons cited were: to remind profit centre managers that common costs exist and
divisional earnings should be enough to cover such expenses (Atkinson, 1987; Baumes,
1963; Bourn and Ezzamel, 1987; Fregman and Liao, 1981), to encourage the use of
central resources (Atkinson, 1987; Baumes, 1963; Bourn and Ezzammel, 1987;
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Fregman and Liao, 1981), to act as a guard against the use of central resources
(Baumes, 1963; Bourn and Ezzammel, 1987; Fregman and Liao, 1981), to set prices of
products or services (Atkinson, 1987; Baumes, 1963; Bourn and Ezzammel, 1987), to
motivate and control behaviour (Atkinson, 1987; Fregman and Liao, 1981), to
determine cost of services (Atkinson, 1987), to make short term decisions, and for
performance evaluation (Bourn and Ezzammel, 1987). These reasons are selfexplanatory and provided evidence of the variety of purposes served by the allocation
of common costs.

The allocation process in these surveys revealed different allocation bases, and was
purely mechanical in nature. Baumes (1963) discussed the allocation bases at length in
his study and used single base allocation or blanket allocation (35%) ratio of divisional
sales to total corporate sales, forecast sales, cost of sales, and number of employees,
labour cost and fixed costs. In general, the bases were volume-based, implying a
proportional relationship between the costs and the cost objects. In most of the cases,
the cost objects were products or services.

3.7

CHAPTER SUMMARY

Cost allocation has been a widely debated issue during the last century (Horngren,
1995). Most textbooks and academic research revolved around the traditional cost
accounting methods. In general, the prescription about cost allocation is mixed, in that
the academics argued against cost allocation, while the practitioners and a small
fragment of academics endorsed cost allocation in general. Among the most common
reasons given against cost allocation were arbitrariness, incorrigibility and distorted
product profitability. The influence of these on the reported costs is so severe that the
academics strongly argued for avoidance of common cost allocation. On the other
hand, the academics and the practitioners who endorsed cost allocation defended their
position by accepting the result of allocated cost data for different organisational uses.
Their main argument was that there must be some benefits flowing from common cost
allocation. Otherwise it would not have withstood the test of time. Because of the
nature of the arguments for and against cost allocation, the overall position is largely
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inconclusive and widely debated. The main thrust of research and practice is the
mechanics of resource usage by the cost objects and the costing for this resource
consumption. This progressive inclination towards the acceptance of cost allocation
paved the way for another cost allocation method, Activity Based Costing (ABC). The
next chapter will discuss the developments in Activity Based Costing.
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CHAPTER 4
COMMON COST ALLOCATION: THE ACTIVITY
BASED COSTING APPROACH
4.1

INTRODUCTION

The failure of traditional cost allocation practice discussed in the previous chapter
produced a number of new approaches to rectify the situation. Some plausible
explanations include obsolete technology, the production environment, organisational
structures, and the attitudes of consumers etc. This has made earlier conclusions
redundant in that there is a big gap in the advancement of technology to improve
factory floor operations and a corresponding need to reflect these changes (a form of
administrative changes) through accounting information systems. Managers and
organisations alike have to think in a different dimension to solve the cost allocation
issue, vis-à-vis the new Management Accounting System (MAS), and in keeping with
the changes in operating characteristics of the factory floor, of the competitors, and of
the environment in which they are operating.

In response to such problems, much research was done during the late 1980s on
Activity Based Costing. Although the need for allocating overheads in more detail was
felt for a long time, the well-articulated and complete concept of Activity Based
Costing (ABC) is a phenomenon only one and a half decades old (Turney, 1991a).
More research is being carried out to refine its conceptual underpinnings.

Research on ABC has focused mainly on manufacturing entities. However, in recent
times there has been a growing body of literature on ABC in service and not-for- profit
sectors (Antos, 1992; Carter et al., 1998; Goddard and Ooi, 1998; Harr, 1990; Lambert
and Whitworth, 1996; Lapsley, 1995; Pirrong, 1993; Rotch, 1990). The contextual
differences in these studies did not reflect any significant differences in the application
of the concepts and the uses of ABC information. The overall findings suggest that
ABC is a better-cost measurement system that can capture approximate cost data about
products and services in these sectors.
71

The objective of this chapter is to introduce the concept of Activity Based Costing. The
justifications for introducing this body of literature are that ABC is a better allocation
method that overcomes many of the pitfalls of traditional overhead allocation. It
addresses the changing needs of organisations’ progressive operating environment, and
it provides better information about resource usage in producing goods and services,
and in aiding better decision-making.

This chapter has been organised as follows: in section 4.2, the background for changes
to ABC is discussed; in section 4.3 the ABC concepts are discussed; in section 4.4 the
ABC allocation process is discussed; in section 4.5, the purposefulness of ABC are
discussed; in section 4.6, the implementation issues of ABC are discussed; and section
4.7 rounds off this chapter.

4.2

SETTING THE SCENE FOR ACTIVITY BASED COSTING

Johnson and Kaplan’s (1987) monumental work (Noreen, 1991; Wells, 1991)1 pointed
out the irrelevance of traditional costing for today’s production environment, as
information provided by it is too aggregated and too late. Though this awakened the
interest of practitioners, the ideas contained in Johnson and Kaplan’s (1987) work was
just a good articulation of some of the earlier works by some notable academics (e.g.,
Vatter, 1945; Wells, 1976). The major emphasis in their work, and that of others,
converges on a few common points: the change in global competitive environment; the
change in production environment towards more automation; and customers as the
focal point for efficient production and distribution of goods and services (Brimson,
1991; Lewis, 1995; Turney, 1992; O’Guin, 1991).

Changes in the manufacturing environment were instrumental in shaping much of the
costing systems in use in organisations. Lewis (1995, p. 100) pointed out that the crises
in the US economy after World War two were the major reasons for reviewing the
costing systems used in US organisations. The changes were driven by technological
and economic pressures on US industries after the war when the US decided to co1

Ezzammel et al. (1990) criticised their work as having no influence on contemporary practice because
they did not consider the social context of the manufacturing or the production system.
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operate with the war ravaged countries such as Japan and Germany; and also from the
competition from other countries producing high quality products; and finally, the
effect of globalisation forced these organisations to produce high quality products.
Lewis (1995, p. 100) sees these as challenges facing US industries. Controversies
abound as to the efficacy of traditional costing in capturing the modern-day production
environment. Some see the costing system as the main culprit for the setback in the
production environment, and some view the opposite (Lewis, 1995). At the industry
level, the change in production environment is more towards automation through CIMS
(Computer Integrated Manufacturing systems) 2 that warrant changes in cost allocation
systems and inclusion of all costs in the value chain as product costs (Horngren et al.,
2003; Lewis, 1995, p. 109). The implication is that costs should be ‘full cost of
production’, or that they can be unitised as variable costs (Aiyathurai et al., p. 61). All
these make the costing system not only obsolete but also incapable of reflecting the
production environment. There is also a need for change in the performance
measurement system in such areas as quality and service, customer profitability, and
improvement opportunities (Turney, 1992, p. 44).

Though Activity Based Costing is envisaged as a way out, some believe that it will not
be a perfect replacement for the standard costing system, and claim that the ABC
system is an overhead allocation system. Despite this, there is overwhelming support
for ABC as a better overhead allocation method than the traditional costing system,
which can be used from cost control to producing financial reports. Surveys on
adoptions of ABC in different countries show that it has been increasing (Allnoch,
1997; Corrigan, 1996; Innes and Mitchell, 1990, 1995; Wayne, 1994). However, the
Australian survey by Corrigan (1996, pp. 51-52) showed support for the traditional
costing system, and the respondents did not yet regard ABC as a revolutionary costing
system. Recent evidence on the adoption and usage of ABC reveals mixed results.

2

CIMS (Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems) include: Computer Aided design (CAD),
Computer Automated Manufacturing (CAM), Flexible Manufacturing Systems (FMS), Production and
Inventory Management systems (PIM), Material Requirement Planning (MRP), Just-in-Time (JIT)
Manufacturing Resource Planning (MRP II) (Lewis, 1995, p. 100, see also Lee, 1987)
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One of the most comprehensive surveys by Kiani and Sangeladji (2003, p. 174)
examined the usefulness, attributes, and obstacles of using ABC as a management
model among the top Fortune 500 companies in the US. Out of 85 respondents, 44, or
over 51%, revealed certain precedents for using ABC: primary method of operation,
number of employees, sales volume in dollars, frequency of modifying/enhancing or
redesigning products, and cost allocation methods. The survey also found that
inadequacy of management support, unwillingness of people to change, shortage of
competent personnel, and complexity of process design, were the main concerns about
the adoption of ABC system. They also found that eight out of 44 users were using
ABC over five years.

Cotton et al. (2003) replicated Innes and Mitchell’s (1999) UK survey in the context of
New Zealand companies. They found evidence that ABC adoption among New
Zealand organizations was slower than the UK companies. However, the use of ABC
was more expansive among the New Zealand companies. They also found that over
60% of the adopters use ABC for cost reduction, pricing, performance
measurement/improvement, and cost modelling. Firm size was found as a significant
explanatory variable in this study.

Although the empirical studies show the popularity of Activity Based Costing as a
management tool, in recent times other complementary management tools are also used
to assist management in decision-making. Kidwell et al. (2002) conducted a survey on
the extent of use of ABC and five other management tools - activity based
management, total quality management, benchmarking, process reengineering, and
balanced scorecard in the context of cities and counties in the US. Out of 392 cities and
counties surveyed, 140 responded. They found that ABC as a management tool ranked
fourth among the tools, and that the popularity of ABC as a management tool was
decreasing. The study also revealed that the local government bodies using ABC were
more satisfied with their overall performance. They found that inadequate educational
background and improper training were the major reasons for the stymied
implementation of ABC and other management tools. They observed the decline in the
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use of ABC as attributable to the availability of other complementary management
tools.

4.3

THE CONCEPT OF ACTIVITY BASED COSTING

Activity Based Costing (ABC), as described by Robert Kaplan, has two versions: the
‘scientific ABC’ and the ‘ad-hoc’ (Macintosh, 1994, p. 43). Troxel (1990, p. 15) argued
that scientific ABC is the third, and the ‘ad-hoc’ version is the second stage, of an ABC
system. The ‘scientific version’ has four distinct steps and uses multivariate regression
analysis and linear programming to derive total marginal cost of the overhead
component of a product. The overhead rate is then added to direct material and direct
labour to calculate the total cost of a product. Managers can use the resulting cost
figures for planning and decision-making. In the ‘ad-hoc version’, which uses a
subjective method to calculate overhead rate, the overheads are subjectively bundled in
cost pools, often by activity areas of a department. Then by dividing it by the activity
volume, an average cost of overhead per activity volume is derived and arbitrarily
assigned to products. Decisions based on allocated overheads, under this method, are
less dependable than by the scientific method.

The modern or ‘first generation ABC’ (Turney, 1991b) was articulated to make it more
useful than the ABC concept posited by Cooper and Kaplan (1988). These authors
essentially endorse Cooper and Kaplan’s (1988) views of Activity based costing3. Prior
to that, the CAM-I project of the US defined ABC as “…the collection of financial and
operational performance information tracing the significant activities of the firm to
product costs” (quoted in Raffish, 1991, p. 37). According to Cooper and Kaplan
(1988, pp. 96-97), the idea behind ABC is simple. They argued:
(a)ctivity Based Costing (ABC) is a system of assigning cost to activities instead of cost centre
or departments in conventional overhead allocation system, and from activities to the final cost
objects such as products or customers. The cost assignment is a two-step process. In the first
stage, costs are allocated to the activities on a cause and effect basis. In the second stage, the
costs are allocated to the cost objects on the basis of ‘activity drivers’.

3

Such authors include: Drury, 1989; Harvey, 1991; Hayde, 1990; Horngren et al., 1997; Jeans and Morrow,
1989; Lapsley et al., 1995; Raffish, 1991; Scapens, 1990; Williamson, 1996; Sharman, 1990.
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Harvey (1991, p. 42) argues that the activity based cost allocation is a refined
absorption costing and it resembles traditional costing, except that in an ABC system,
more cost drivers are used to allocate overheads to cost objects.

In assigning overheads, the boundaries of production and of other overheads are
removed. The justification for such removal is that other fixed overheads are incurred
to support production, and that products should, therefore, bear a share of those
overheads (Cooper and Kaplan, 1988, p. 96; Harvey, 1991; Horngren et al., 2003).
Cooper and Kaplan (1988, p. 96) contended that “virtually all of a company’s activities
exist to support the production and delivery of today’s goods and services. They should
therefore all be considered product costs.”
The inclusion of non-production overheads is a fundamental departure from the
external reporting mindset, which dictates that inventories should only bear production
overheads (Harvey, 1991). To facilitate external reporting using ABC costing, other
non-production related overheads are excluded. ABC advocates also suggested that all
the costs are variable in the longer term. To them the classifications of variable and
short-term are not necessary, as these classifications are based on a short-term time
horizon such as months (Cooper and Kaplan, 1988b, p. 25).

4.4

THE ACTIVITY BASED COST ALLOCATION PROCESS

The ABC cost allocation process, as shown in figure 4.1 below, is based on three
distinct phases- identification of activities, identification of cost drivers for the
activities, and finally assigning the costs to final cost objects (Cooper and Kaplan,
1988; Horngren et al., 2003). There may be numerous intermediate iterations within
these steps, their number depending on the complexity of an organisation and its cost
structure.
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FIGURE 4.1: THE ACTIVITY BASED COST ALLOCATION PROCESS

Service Department
and factory overheads

Activity Cost
pools

Product Lines

Stage 2

Stage 1

Assigning costs to
individual activities

Application of Cost
driver rates

Source: Scapens (1991, p. 189), Issues in Management Accounting.

4.4.1

IDENTIFICATION OF ACTIVITIES

The first step in ABC is the identification of activities instead of products (Cooper and
Kaplan, 1988 a, b; Morrow and Hazell, 1992; Keegan and Eiler, 1994; Turney, 1991).
In line with Cooper and Kaplan’s (1988 a, b) proposition, ‘activities cause costs,
products consume activities’, activity identification involves choosing the first stage
cost object, a methodology to cluster those activities into homogenous groups for
aggregation of costs, computational assistance to find out the most relevant and feasible
activity driver for the costs.

Usually activities or transactions drive indirect costs in an organisation (Cooper and
Kaplan, 1987, 1988; Miller and Vollman, 1991; Shank and Govindarajan, 1993).
Therefore, information on activities is necessary to enable a firm to allocate costs to
those activities. Cooper and Kaplan (1988) argue that the identification of activities is
crucial to group activities into homogenous cost pools. They argue that it is similar to
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first-level allocation processes in traditional costing where the costs are allocated to
cost objects (e.g., products) on the basis of acceptable causal relationships.

Morrow and Hazell (1992) suggested a process of mapping of activities in an activity
based costing environment. They argued that the process of mapping of activities
begins with the identification of activities horizontally across the departments within an
organisation, and then to lay a map of all the major activities of an organisation (see
Morrow and Hazell, 1992 for details). This process of mapping may be further filtered
by coupling activities from cross sections into value adding/non-value adding activities.
Ferrara (1990) and Turney (1991) argue that in a typical business, the rule to filter
value adding/non value adding activities, is to track activities following their ‘80/20’
rule which suggest that in a typical business, 80% of the costs are driven by 20% of the
activities. Therefore, efforts should be made to track these 20% of the activities.
However, this is not easy, as it may involve rigorous study of the operations of an
enterprise, the cooperation of managers, and, above all, getting data on the overall
structure of the organisation.

The profiling of activities may be accomplished by interviewing the operations people
(Keegan and Eiler, 1994; Horngren et al., 2003; Morrow and Hazell, 1992); by
analysing activities manuals (Keegan and Eiller, 1994; Morrow and Hazell, 1992); or
by observation. All these entail collecting information about the work processes
involved within activity areas. Usually the operations people are the best source to
provide an exhaustive list of activities (Keegan and Eiler, 1994; Morrow and Hazzell,
1992). Therefore, primary discussions with them will be the most reliable source of
information about the activities. This can be accomplished by either physically
observing the work process or by listening to their description (Morrow and Hazell,
1992), or by studying the activity dictionary (Foster and Gupta, 1990).

In activity analysis, the last task is to group similar activities within or across crosssections of an organisation. The objective of this is to find out total costs by activities
without regard to organisational boundaries. It is also done to save time and effort to
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record and assign costs to repetitive activities in different departments of an enterprise.
However, Datar and Gupta (1994) argued that aggregation for greater accuracy might
have dysfunctional consequences for the quest for accuracy in product costing. They
found that the greater the level of aggregation, the greater the chances that indirect
costs are incorrectly assigned to cost objects. They suggested maintaining a
manageable number of activities, and a trade-off between accuracy and aggregation of
indirect costs. This is because the final cost assignment to products is based on the
aggregated sum of costs in activity or cost pools.

4.4.2

SELECTION OF COST DRIVERS

Cost drivers are the trigger points of costs in an organisation. They cause the costs, and
vary by volume of production or other activities in the production process. In other
words, the drivers have a cause and effect relationship with the activities of different
parts of an organisation. Turney (1991, p. 87) defined cost drivers as ‘factors that
determine the workload and efforts required to perform an activity.’ There are mainly
two categories of cost drivers: volume, and non-volume related cost drivers (Cooper
and Kaplan, 1988 a, b; Miller and Vollman, 1991; Shank and Govindarajan, 1993;
Turney, 1991, p. 57).

The whole idea of activity based cost drivers rests on the premise that volume related
drivers are inadequate (Cooper and Kaplan, 1988 a, b), and should be supplemented by
other non-volume related overheads (Cooper and Kaplan, 1988 a, b; Miller and
Vollman, 1991; Shank and Govindarajan, 1993). Empirical evidence also suggests the
use of a diverse range of overhead drivers commensurate with the state of technology
in use, production complexity, and volume diversity (Babad and Balachandran, 1993;
Foster and Gupta, 1990). These range from manufacturing to service sector, and
generally support the theoretical prescription by Cooper and Kaplan (1988 a, b) about
the selection and use of cost drivers to curb the anomalies in cost information for
planning, control, and decision making in organisations.
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Cooper and Kaplan (1989, p. 383) suggested a theoretical model to guide the selection
of cost drivers for ‘activity’ pools, and recommended three factors for selecting them:
cost of measurement, degree of co-relation, and behavioural effect. Cost of
measurement depends on the viability and willingness of management to store cost
driver information in a central database. Where data on drivers are not available, or
gathering information on a suitable cost driver is problematic, an alternative cost driver
may be used as a surrogate. Regarding the second factor, that is, the degree of corelation between the cost driver and the activity pools or cost pools, the greater the
degree of co-relation with a cost pool the better the driver for that cost pool. The third
factor is the involvement of the person in a particular activity. If performance
evaluation is based on the cost per unit of a driver, the responsible person may have a
tendency to misstate or seek other avenues to distort cost information to his advantage,
or look for input substitution (e.g., variable cost for fixed costs) within his control.
Cooper and Kaplan (1989, p. 385) also added:
…(a) cost driver that induces beneficial behaviour but is expensive to use and has relatively low corelation may still be selected- if behavioural effect dominates. …(A) driver that is expensive to
measure and induces harmful behaviour that has high degree of co-relation may be selected if the
cost of error dominates.

Cooper and Kaplan (1991, p. 385) maintain that the above are true when there is a oneto-one relationship between cost driver and activity pools. Cooper (1989, p. 385) argues
that to improve the accuracy of product costs, multiple cost drivers may be needed.
This may be necessary when more than one cost driver has an association with an
activity pool. Their four conjectures in considering multiple cost drivers are as follows
(Cooper and Kaplan, 1989, p. 385):
Degree of accuracy of reported product costs: The higher the accuracy desired, the
more cost drivers required.
Degree of product diversity: The greater the degree of product diversity, the more cost
drivers required.
Relative cost of different activities. The greater the number of activities that represent a
significant proportion of the total cost of the products, the more cost drivers required.
Degree of volume diversity. The greater the range of batch sizes, the more cost drivers
required.
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Use of imperfectly correlated cost drivers. The lower the correlation of the cost driver to
actual consumption of the activity, the more cost drivers required.

While the above theoretical prescriptions are derived from practice (Drury and Tayles,
1995, p. 267), practice also suggests that different cost drivers be used in different
contexts. Bjornenak (2000, p. 194) divided cost driver analysis into two groups, and he
maintained that cost driver studies are conducted by researchers using two distinct
approaches. The first category emerged from the work of researchers adopting
economic techniques, and the second emerged from the work of academics adopting a
strategic management accounting (SMA) approach. The second category is further
divided into structural and executional cost drivers. The executional cost drivers also
encompass case studies using a holistic approach, and cost driver analysis as an integral
part of overall ABC systems (Cooper and Kaplan, 1991). Structural cost drivers focus
on product attributes (Bromwich, 1990) and the approach is based on the work of
Lancaster (1966).

The empirical evidence for cost driver is drawn from cross-sections such as
manufacturing firms (Anderson, 1995; Banker et al., 1995; Datar et al., 1993; Foster
and Gupta, 1990), service firms (Banker and Johnston, 1993; Evans et al., 1996;
Noreen and Soderstorm, 1994), and the public sector (Bjornenak, 2000). While these
studies exclusively examined cost drivers, the ‘case based studies’ using a holistic
approach are too diverse to categorise into any of the categories listed above (for
details, see Cooper and Kaplan, 1991). Nearly all of these studies attempted to examine
two fundamental tenets of ABC: that activities consume costs, and that non-volume
related costs also drive corporate overheads. Table 4.1 below shows the summary of
cost driver studies:
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TABLE 4.1: ABC COST DRIVER STUDIES
Referenc

Study

Objective/s

Major findings

Foster and
Gupta
(1990)

Study on 37 plants
of an electronic
manufacturing plant
in the US.

To determine the significance
of volume, complexity, and
efficiency related drivers, in
driving overhead costs.

Greer and
Moses
(1992)

Examined data from
18
satellite
programs in the US.

Datar et al.
(1993)

A quantitative study
on a plant producing
parts
for
automobiles
and
trucks.

Anderson
(1995)

Three plants of a
major US textile
manufacturing plant.

To study the association
between development costs
(overheads) and technology
based cost drivers.
To determine the relationship
between overhead costs and
volume,
product/process
related complexity variables
and
other
controllable
activities.
To examine the association
between variable overhead
costs
and
complexity
variables.

Volume related cost drivers
significantly drive overhead
costs.
Efficiency
and
complexity related drivers did
not
have
significant
association with overhead
costs.
Technological
complexity
significantly
drives
development costs.

Banker and
Johnston
(1993)

Flight data on 28 air
carriers operating on
US domestic routes.

To test the importance of
volume-based and operationsbased cost drivers.

Noreen and
Soderstorm
(1994)

Study on
Washington State
hospitals.

To test the hypothesis that
overhead costs are strictly
proportional
to
selected
measures of services.

Evans et al.
(1997a)

Study
on
hospitals.

MacArthur
and
Stranahan
(1998)

Study using data on
5352 US hospitals
for the financial
period 1988-90.

e

US

Study
on
276
Norwegian public
primary
and
secondary schools,
3442 classes and
79,518 pupils.
Source: My own compilation.

Bjornenak
(2000)

To study the association
between overhead costs and
adoption of technological
activity as the driver of costs.
To examine the association
between complexity related
variables,
and
hospital
overhead costs.
To study the impact of
different cost drivers in
analysing cost differences
between schools.
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Volume related drivers are
insignificant, and complexity
related variables are the
strongest drivers of overhead
costs.
Only two-product mix related
complexity variables have a
strong
association
with
variable overhead costs.
Ten volume-related overhead
cost drivers were found to be
significant;
found strong
association between strategy
related operations based cost
drivers and overhead costs.
Strict proportionality was
rejected at the 5% level of
significance for the majority
of the services; partial
proportional
relationship
between
services
and
overhead costs was found.
The adoption of technology is
a cost driver for overhead
costs in hospitals.
Volume
related
and
complexity related variables
were significant drivers of
hospital overhead costs.
Product attribute, institutional
factors,
and
government
policy
were
the
most
significant cost drivers.

In sum, the studies above used actual or budgeted data from sample sites. Most of these
studies except Bjornenak (2000) used the economists’ approach to study the causality
of costs and the underlying activity drivers. The studies are consistent with the ABC
methodology that non-volume related drivers also drive overhead resources, though
Foster and Gupta (1990) failed to determine that in their study. Although nothing was
explicitly stated about the rate per cost driver, which is a linear function of overhead
costs and the activity drivers, MacArthur and Stranahan (1998) and Noreen and
Soderstrorm (1994) found evidence of non-linear ABC drivers. This raises the question
of the validity of the ABC assumption to use linear rates for all ranges of products. In
other words, the marginal cost is assumed constant in most of the studies. MacArthur
and Stranahan (1998) call for a review of the linearity assumption of ABC cost driver
analysis.

There are few studies of the optimal number of cost drivers in an ABC system.
However, the number of cost drivers is an important determinant of the complexity of
the system and its effect on subsequent uses, and the design issue should therefore
incorporate this important issue. The study of the number of drivers is also important,
as too many drivers are costly to use and maintain in the real world. There are
suggestions that cost drivers to be used depend on the type, the number of activities,
size and complexity of an organisation (Babad and Balachandran, 1993, p. 565;
Sharman, 1990; Turney, 1991). In general terms, the number of drivers should vary
between ten and thirty, although in rare cases the number can range from two to 100
(Turney, 1991, p. 57). The empirical evidence is mixed, and therefore inconclusive, as
to the optimum number of drivers.

MacArthur (1992) provided some evidence on two decentralised ABC cases where the
companies used a decentralised approach in selecting cost drivers. In John Deere
Component Works (JDCW), the company used only six to fifteen cost drivers, which
was in keeping with their own need in the decentralised plants locations, and the
dimensions were expected to adjust the number with any future changes in production
processes. In Fisher Controls, the same old cost system was updated and the six cost
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drivers were kept. The decentralised approach to the selection of cost driver was part of
the overall ABC system design by these companies.

Babad and Balachandran (1993) used an integer-programming model to examine two
interrelated decisions regarding the optimal number of cost drivers and the selection of
which ones should be used in an ABC system. They tried to determine the relative,
rather than the absolute frequency of cost drivers associated with a product. They argue
that the optimal number is determined after taking into consideration the trade-off
between benefit from increased accuracy and the cost of maintaining a complex system
(that is data collection, storage and processing). Their solution algorithm provides tools
to choose the optimal number of drivers and the process of ordering activities according
to priority of an organisation, combining low priority order activities with their
associated drivers without sacrificing accuracy (p. 575). They also endorsed the use of
a minimum number of drivers, which is evidenced in big companies in the US (p. 565).

Homburg (2001) extended the work of Babad and Balachandran (1993) by developing
an econometric model. He examined the possibility of substituting one driver with
many for the same cost pool, and in extreme cases removing costs from cost pools
when cause and effect cannot be established between the cost driver and the activity
pools. However, his work did not give any guide as to the selection of the number of
cost drivers.

In sum, cost drivers can be selected by studying the context of an organisation. In an
ABC environment, two generic categories of cost drivers are prescribed in theory and
found in practice: the volume and non-volume related cost drivers. Most of the
empirical evidence supports the use of non-volume related drivers. These studies,
however, did not examine the process of selecting the optimum number of drivers.
Evidence suggests that companies should limit cost drivers to less than 100.
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4.4.3

ASSIGNMENT OF COSTS TO COST OBJECTS

Once the cost drivers are selected and the cost pools are coupled with them, the next
task is to cost the activities consumed by the cost objects. Innes and Mitchell (1995)
argued that two distinct steps must be followed before applying cost drivers to cost
products. First, the driver must have association with the product; second, the rate must
be either predetermined or to be taken from past periods. Once these are successfully
done, the driver can be applied to cost products. The driver information must be
regularly monitored for integrity of the system (p. 121).

4.5

THE PURPOSEFULNESS OF ACTIVITY BASED COSTING

ABC assumes that all costs ‘in the value chain’ (Horngren et al., 2003) need be
allocated to all the activities performed in a given year. This is an absorption costing
view in traditional costing, except that practical capacity is used in ABC (Cooper and
Kaplan, 1988) to allow for uniformity in product cost calculation intra and inter
accounting period. ABC has numerous potential applications in different areas, and a
scanning of the literature on its application reveals the usefulness of ABC in: cost
behaviour modelling, budgeting, customer profitability analysis, and make-or- buy
decisions.

Cooper and Kaplan (1987) criticise the traditional fixed and variable cost classification,
arguing that those are short-term focused, and argue that in the long run all costs are
variable. Therefore, there is no need to classify costs into variable and fixed. Unlike
traditional costing, ABC assumes a ‘linear relationship’ (Noreen, 1991) between costs
and volume. This in turn presupposes an insignificant amount of fixed costs, perhaps
the facility sustaining costs (Cooper, 1990b; Innes and Mitchell, 1993; Masoud, 1999),
as opposed to traditional costing. Cooper and Kaplan (1991, p. 6) propose a cost
hierarchy model for segregating costs in relation to their interface with products. Their
five-layer cost hierarchy enhances cost driver rate determination, product cost
determination, and decision-making by referring to cost driver rates of the respective
cost hierarchy. These classifications are further refined by Horngren et al. (2003) as
shown in Table 4.2 below:
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TABLE 4.2: COST HIERARCHY IN ACTIVITY BASED COSTING

Cost category

Definition and characteristics
•

Output-unit level costs
•
•
Batch-Level costs
•
•
Product/Service sustaining costs
•
Facility-sustaining costs
•

Cost of activities performed on each
individual unit of a product or service
Similar to variable costs.
Costs of activities related to a group of
units or products or services
Unitised by batch and similar to
variable costs (at batch level).
Support costs to individual products or
services to maintain the production or
products or services.
Corporate level common costs
incurred to stay in business
Similar to corporate level overheads

Source: Horngren et al. (2003), pp. 143-144

Such a cost classification scheme is more detailed and enhancing to different
organisational uses. The main thrust of ABC proponents was to establish a clearer
cause-effect relationship between costs and activities. Among the four levels of
activities, only facility sustaining costs lacks a clearer cause and effect relationship to
the activities. Given inadequate research in this area, the magnitude of such costs in the
total overhead costs is yet to be determined. The potential of ABC in decision-making
will be fully exploited if these costs are immaterial or insignificant.

Unlike traditional line item budgeting, ABC budgeting introduces the concept of
activity into budgeting for resources. By simply putting the planned activity level for a
given year, a rate for each of the activities, an activity-based budget is a numerical
representation of aggregate level of planned expenditure in a given year (Bjornenak,
2000; Cooper and Kaplan, 1988; King et al., 1994). Budgeting in such an ABC
environment is done in more detail- from functional level to a more candid activity
level, and is therefore more conducive to planning and control. It enhances capacity
planning, attention directing for cost reduction possibilities, and re-engineered cost
estimation purposes, simply by comparing, reassessing and negotiating with staff
members. For example, in a competitive market scenario, there is incentive to reduce
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costs either to meet constrained budget or to improve the bottom line by reducing or reengineering activities. Reduction in activities may enhance efficiency or save costs or
both. Though the primary focus of activity measurement is on manufacturing
organisations, ABC concepts and practices are almost the same in the service sector
(Antos, 1992; Lapsley, 1995; Rotch, 1990). ABC cost data can be used to manage
capacities both in the short and in the longer-term (Morris and Noreen, 1994).

Activity based costing helps in analysing customer profitability (Drury and Tayles,
1998; Gering, 1999; Bellis-Jones and Hand, 1989). Unlike traditional costing, which
assumes a uniform level of costs regardless of distance or other variables, ABC
assumes that distribution and selling costs can vary because of embedded complexities
such as distance, time, complexity, and diversity of sales, made to diverse a range of
customers (Bellis-Jones, 1989; Drury and Tayles, 1995; Gering, 1999). Therefore, due
consideration is necessary to determine the mix of customers and resultant profitability
from the sales. ABC enhances these by facilitating the analysis of profitability by
customers, products, channels of distribution, and other methods suitable to an
organisation. Such analysis enhances decisions to introduce or discontinue products,
customers, or channels of distribution. However, if sales are strategically important,
some products may be sold even at a loss, given that a customer is needed to introduce
products to a new locality or to a new economic regime.

Activity Based Costing can be used for make-or-buy decisions in an organisational
context (Kaplan and Atkinson, 1998; Radhakrishnan and Srinidhi, 2001). The cost data
can be used for short term and long term sourcing decisions. ABC provides more
accurate cost data in make-or-buy situations. Kaplan and Atkinson (1998) argue that
avoidable costs are relevant for a make-or buy situation. Except for unavoidable facility
sustaining costs, all other costs are relevant. While short-term make or buy decisions
are normally based on avoidable costs, ABC assumes all costs from a long-term point
of view. Therefore, all the costs are long term in nature. Regardless of the time horizon
of the contract, ABC will therefore, provide better cost data and a better price for
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competitive bids. Radhakrishnan and Srinidhi (2001) argue that ABC provides better
cost data both in the short term and long term.

In recent times, there is a growing body of literature on government procurement
through competitive bidding. This body of the literature is predominantly published by
government agencies in the form of white papers or guidelines. These guidelines
endorse ABC as a preferred costing method to calculate internal bids (Commonwealth
of Australia, 1997; Council on the Cost of Government, 1997; Department of Finance
and Administration, 1998; Industry Commission, 1996; Office of the Auditor General
of Western Australia, 1995).

4.6

ACTIVITY BASED COSTING IMPLEMENTATION

ABC implementation introduces new knowledge in an entity, or changes the
Accounting Information System, either totally or partially, and enhances decision
making for better production and operations management, and supplements financial
reporting systems (Argyris and Kaplan, 1994; Bhimani and Pigott, 1992; Brausch,
1992; Fisher et al., 1990; Henning and Lindahl, 1995; Kleinsorge and Tanner, 1991;
Mangan, 1995; Norkiewicz, 1994; Bruesewitz and Talbot, 1997; Turney, 1990). ABC
implementation literature can be grouped into three distinct categories: one dealing
with the prescriptions about the ABC system implementation; a second examining the
issue of implementation in an actual setting; and a third examining the issue of the state
of implementation in companies or organisations. These three strands of literature,
however, confined discussion to a limited number of organisational variables found
either in the literature or in practice. In the prescriptive group of literature, the
theoretical aspects of ABC implementation have been discussed.

Burns (1987) performed an early descriptive study of the implementation of a new
costing system. It was one of the ‘failure’ studies of a costing system change (or
accounting system change) in which he found the failure of the implementation was
due to (a) lack of a sponsor and associated lack of progress, (b) the stimulating role of
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crisis in developing new information systems, and (c) the difficulties in dislodging the
existing system because of resistance.

Cooper et al. (1992) provided a detailed account of eight case studies of ABC
implementation. Although sample bias may have precluded a conclusive trend in the
implementation, they provided stories of successful companies implementing ABC.
Their descriptive account emphasised technical implementation rather than the
organisational variables. They concluded by prescribing a plan of implementation as:
(a) a clear assignment of responsibility, (b) an influential sponsor, and (c) a suggestion
to use staff beyond accounting/finance.

Bhimani and Pigott (1992) explored the unintended and unforseen effects of ABC
implementation in a British pharmaceutical company. This study traced the shift in
power base of accountants following ABC implementation. Prior to implementing
ABC, factory managers rarely used numbers produced by accountants. However, after
the implementation of ABC, factory managers and higher-level management came to
acknowledge ABC cost information as “legitimate” and “more reliable” for managing
and decision-making. As a result the power base of accountants was enhanced.

Henning and Lindahl (1995) examined the theoretical validity of earlier studies on the
exclusion of workers’ involvement in ABC implementation. Their contention was that
both textbooks and cases emphasise Vroom’s (1964) expectancy theory to implement
ABC, and argued that Bass’s (1988) leadership theory better met the requirements of
the study of major change in an ABC system, and argued that the users’ or the workers’
engagement is needed more than aligning the incentives to use ABC systems.

Turney (1990) suggested ten myths about implementing ABC systems and argued that
they are true only in limited circumstances. Therefore, companies should assess their
own circumstances, make a value judgment about costs and benefits from
implementing ABC systems, and then proceed to implement ABC.
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Kleinsorge and Tanner (1991) proposed eight questions before implementing ABC
systems. They argued that companies that can answer these questions are likely to
succeed if ABC is implemented. Management should ask a few questions about the
feasibility of implementing, and about the chances of success or of failure once it is
implemented. Norkiewicz (1994) derived eight different steps based on field evidence.
The steps are: planning, resolving issues, training, expense analysis, collecting first
stage drivers, collecting second stage drivers, automating process, and management
training. Argyris and Kaplan (1994) provided a detailed account of guidance to
implement an ABC system in an organisational context. Using a holistic approach, they
argued that ABC is a new knowledge in organisations, and should be implemented in
two different steps: choosing a theoretically valid technical theory, and an education
and sponsorship process. They suggested different alternatives and consequences of
implementing an ABC, with much emphasis on staff involvement, ways to overcome
resistance, and to its use.

Various patterns emerged from field studies on ABC implementation. The case
evidence reflects the same level of generalisation as suggested in normative literature.
Fisher (1990) examined the implementation issues in a study of a US polymer product
company, and he argued that information technology should go hand in hand with
production technology, to get accurate information about costs, and to compete
successfully in the market place. He found some lessons from this case. First, ABC
philosophy holds equally to traditional manufacturing companies as to high technology
companies. Second, functional management teams are best to help successfully
implement ABC. Third, internal resources are available to implement ABC, so internal
help should be sought initially. Finally, the involvement of staff from a cross-section of
an organisation helps acceptance of a new system quickly and successfully.

4.7

CHAPTER SUMMARY

ABC as a concept emerged with changes in the technological and production
environment after the 1970s. ABC is useful for large organisations, having a complex
nature of operations and diverse range of heterogeneous products. Instead of allocating
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costs by cost objects, ABC allocates common costs after considering the activities; it
virtually removes the departmental/divisional boundaries of

workflow,

and

concentrates on the generic activities within an organisation. It uses both qualitative
and quantitative cost drivers to allocate overheads to activities. The ABC costing
process is more detailed, and, therefore, it is claimed, that the aggregation process
could lead, at times, to incorrect cost estimation, which would outweigh the benefits
and costs of implementing the ABC system.

ABC is used for various organisational purposes, and those purposes are growing with
the passage of time. For instance, it is not restricted to the manufacturing sector; it is
also extended to the not-for-profit sector of an economy. Though the uses of ABC have
been increasing in practice, inclusion of ABC in the academic curriculum is rather
slow, and it is currently experiencing a transitory period.

ABC implementation in the organisational context is challenging in that it is new
knowledge to the employees (Argyris and Kaplan, 1994). To be able to succeed in the
implementation process, care needs to be taken from the outset, and the new knowledge
should be sold across the organisation, either from the top to bottom or from bottom to
top. There is contrary evidence about the successes or failure of ABC (Brausch, 1992).

In the next chapter, a conceptual framework will be introduced, blending the theory and
practice of contracting out (Chapter 2) and cost allocation (Chapters 3 and 4). This
framework is necessary because no holistic framework exists that can explain
outsourcing decisions in multi-year time horizon, from an organisational point of view.
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CHAPTER 5
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR
UNDERSTANDING OUTSOURCING
OUTSOURCING DECISIONS

5.1

INTRODUCTION

In the previous three chapters, the literature on contracting out and overhead allocation
has been discussed. The purpose of drawing on the literature from public
administration, economics, and management accounting, was to build a conceptual
framework for the research problem discussed in Chapter 1. This chapter will blend
theories from three disciplines to develop a conceptual framework. Conceptualisation
based on theories from different disciplines is warranted when a single theoretical
strand is insufficient to explain the phenomena under investigation. Marshall and
Rossman (1999) argue that this reinforces the research findings because a single theory
may be insufficient to guide the research questions and subsequent analysis. Patton
(2002, p. 562) labels this as theoretical triangulation. Denzin and Lincoln (1998) argue
that theoretical triangulation reinforces the conclusions reached and increases external
validity.

The research problems stated in Chapter 1 suggest that the thesis will examine
outsourcing decisions and the role of overheads in pricing internal bids in competitive
bidding situations. The research problem has been organised from the general to the
particular. At the general level, outsourcing practices and overhead allocations will be
examined, followed by the use of these practices in two different sites of the same
organisation. Chapter 2 discussed the outsourcing processes from multiple theoretical
perspectives- that is, transaction cost perspectives and the public choice perspectives.
The research discussed in Chapter 2 revealed the lack of rigour in cost calculations in
general and overhead allocations in particular. To enhance understanding, some
perspectives on cost calculation are therefore warranted. In Chapters 3 and 4 attempts
were made to respond to the issues raised in Chapter 2 by introducing the debates about
overhead allocation and the processes of such allocations to different organisational
purposes including internal bid pricing. The debates about overhead allocation, until the
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early 1990s, were discussed in Chapter 3, and new dimensions of overhead allocation
processes, and their usefulness in practice, have been discussed in Chapter 4. This
discussion has been made in the newly emerged ABC environment.

The research problem introduced in Chapter 1 has two distinct aspects - the
management aspect of sourcing of services in the particular research context, and the
costing aspects necessary to facilitate the managerial decisions about the sourcing. In
this chapter, pricing aspects will be stressed. The literature suggests that costing for
contracting out is under-researched. For example, Sciulli (1996, p. 29) cites the survey
results of 120 municipal Councils in the United States which suggest that in 50% of the
cases the Councils did not have any methodology to compare the in-house and external
bids. This sheds some light on the importance of having a sound methodology for
comparing bids. In Chapter 2 it has been mentioned that the economists dominate in
this area of research, though in recent times work by accountants is also emerging
(Auditor General of New Zealand, 1989; Auditor General of Western Australia, 1995).

This chapter has been organised as follows: in section 5.2 the service costing
environment will be discussed; in section 5.3 the rationales of costing for contracting
out will be discussed; in section 5.4 the conceptual framework will be discussed; and
finally, the chapter summary will be presented in section 5.5.

5.2

THE SERVICE COSTING ENVIRONMENT IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR

In this section, the generic term “public sector” is used to mean all the layers in the
public sector. Though reference is not made to any specific country or public sector
organisation, it is assumed that the discussion relates to the public sector of western
countries, which have similar layers of administration.

It has been indicated in section 4.6 that costs of services in the public sector are
measured very crudely, either by third parties, or by interest groups appointed by
relevant public sector bodies (see for example, Evatt Research Centre in Australia,
Adam Smith Institute in the UK, Urban Institute in Washington, USA). Cost
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calculations in these studies are derived by the researchers’ own choice of method
rather than those calculated by the organisation contracting the services. To reinforce
conclusions, more realistic data were necessary. Nevertheless, data from practicing
organisations is seldom available. There are two primary reasons for this. First, the
information about actual costing practices is confidential. Organisations consider each
other as competitors, in that performance of Senior Managers is closely coupled with
their ability to deliver good management practices. One indicator is the efficient
utilisation of budgets in a year. Second, less emphasis was placed on costing of services
because of the specific regulations affecting these public sector organisations.

The absence of costing does not mean that there was no need for or use of costing
information in these organisations. Rather, it is inconsistent with their reporting
requirements. For example, Tierney (1994) argues that the costing of government
services is necessary, but the late nature of financial transactions is the main obstacle to
not having any output costing system. He further maintains that, to manage better,
costing and reporting on outputs, service levels, and outcomes, are necessary. Tierney
(1994) further argues that commercial style accounting for meeting the information
needs of government is not only incompatible with the uniqueness of public sector, but
also costly to maintain for reporting of outputs, costs and other management needs.

5.2.1

THE MONOPOLY NATURE OF SERVICES

The costing environment of the public sector is mainly dominated by monopoly
provision. This can be attributed, in part, to the nature of social obligations of these
organisations, and, in part, to the nature of the services. In a monopoly environment,
the government regulates the production/provision of services, either at a subsidy or at
marginal cost, through one or a few large organisations. The production of the services
is unattractive to many providers because of poor profit prospects or the nature of the
services. In such an environment, service provision is taken for granted by the ultimate
consumers, and provided at a throwaway price, or with significant subsidy. Because of
the monopoly nature of the services, tracking of resources, and the costing of the
consumption of those resources, were hardly used (cf. Helden, 1997). The stakeholders
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(e.g. government, the ministers or the taxpayers) rarely demanded such cost data on the
services provided. This is the usual scenario for costing of services. However, the
introduction of competition in the government sector changed the scenario, which
requires competitive and strategic costing to determine the cost of most of the services
(Canez et al., 2000; Cavalluzzo et al., 1998).

5.2.2

THE INTERNAL REPORTING NEED

The provision of government goods or services is taken for granted by citizens or
recipients. In the public sector reporting environment, the stakeholders and their vested
interests are different from those of the private sector. For example, rather than
following up investment, stakeholders are more concerned about the effective and
efficient utilisation of social resources. The requirement to disclose cost data to the
stakeholders is not needed because of the high demand placed on the external reporting
(e.g., the annual reports of activities). Rather, the reporting requirement is more aligned
to budgets. This can be attributed to a long held tradition of aligning performance with
the budgets (inputs) rather than the outcomes of the expenditures.

5.2.3

THE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION ENVIRONMENT

Public sector bodies often use performance evaluation on the basis of inputs used in the
delivery of services. Because of the absence of concrete output measures for such
spending, or the difficulty of measuring the outputs (e.g., Brignall et al., 1991), this
performance measurement technique stood the test of time until recently, when some
attempts were made to translate input measures into tangible output measures. In such a
performance measurement system, there is no relationship between the funds spent and
actual delivery of services in these organisations. So there are more inclinations to
overspend to make performance look better. This trend dominated the costing
environment of the public sector, although ad-hoc costing exercises were not
uncommon. This trend was also sustained because of the lack of expertise or the
necessary skills of staff to undertake highly technical costing exercises.
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5.2.4

THE SKILL LEVEL OF EMPLOYEES

The skill levels of the employees in the public sector are also bottlenecks for the
costing of services. It has been argued that public sector employees were largely
underpaid and that because of this the sector failed to attract people with necessary
skills in the technical aspects of costing (see Pusey, 1991, p. 59 for example). Instead,
the sector was run by people with a more general background rather than qualifications
in commerce or accounting. Since costing of services requires a high level of expertise
in accounting, the public sector may have difficulty in coping with this demand for
costing of services.

In summary, the unique position of the public sector in an economy makes it difficult to
maintain a system of accounting that facilitates the calculation of costs of services.
Because of the very nature of this sector, service provision is monitored mostly by the
amount of funds spent in each program, a narrow view of costs, based on input
utilisation rather than output achievement. Since the operating environment of this
sector is rapidly changing because of the reduced level of funding, there is a growing
need to be cost efficient in providing the necessary services.

5.3

THE RATIONALES OF COSTING FOR CONTRACTING

With the change in emphasis from an input based resource allocation system to an
output based measurement of fund utilisation, there is an increased need to cost
services. In the absence of competition, this need is subservient to financial reporting
requirements. When a service or group of services is contemplated for contracting out,
there is a perceived need to cost services. This need is reinforced when the existing
provider of a service is required to contest for the delivery of the services. In other
words, when competition is introduced in any area of service delivery, costing of
services becomes a necessity (Helden, 1997; Cavalluzzo et al., 1998). This section will
discuss costing for contracting in the context of local government. In the discussion
process, it will be taken for granted that commercial accounting principles are equally
applicable to the public sector. The influence of reforms in the public sector around the
globe, the scrutiny of social resources, fiscal constraints, and lastly, for benchmarking
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of services, were some of the influencing factors for embracing the costing exercises in
the public sector organisations.

5.3.1

PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM AROUND THE GLOBE

The public sector is often condemned as inefficient and ineffective in its utilisation of
funds (Funnell and Cooper, 1999; Osborne and Gaebler, 1993). To make it efficient
and effective, various countries have introduced reform initiatives to remove the
inefficiency and to improve utilisation of public funds. Quite often these reforms were
undertaken under the rubric of ‘entrepreneurialism’ (see for example, Donald and
Rohan, 1996, p. 1; Wanna et al., 19961). Although the focus of those reforms was to
run the sector commercially, they were not free from the political influence of
bureaucrats. These reforms were primarily initiated at a technical level, such as
improvement of accounting systems, of reporting systems, or improvement of
accountability.

As part of the improvement of Accounting Information Systems at a very technical
level, public sector bodies also considered introducing an ‘output costing culture’ to
capture resource consumption patterns. For example, Helden (1997) showed that as a
result of reforms, product costing, overhead allocation, and improved budgeting
systems, emerged as norms in the Dutch Local Governments. These changes were part
and parcel of broader management control within those organisations.

In these change processes, the dominant theme is that private sector commercial
accounting principles are equally applicable to the public sector accounting
environment. Edmonds and McCready (1994) show how the costing practices of the
private sector are reshaping the resource allocation system in the Canadian police
service. Their study shows that the commercial accounting dichotomy of variable and
fixed costs is a useful tool for classifying the costs incurred in police operations and
this process facilitates product costing. They also demonstrated that there is a shift in
1

Wanna et al., (1996, p. 34) in particular cites such reforms in the US (the Gore report), Canada (the
Canadian Public Service 2000 initiative), the UK (the ‘next steps’ or the agency model), New Zealand
(‘State Sector Reform Program’), Nordic and other continental European countries (manifold reform) as
part of this ‘entrepreneurial’ initiatives.

97

emphasis from input focused operations to output focused ones through more detailed
calculation of the total volume and the cost per unit of these services. It is also evident
in their study that private sector provision of services facilitated resource utilisation in
Canadian police services. Kory and Rosenberg (1984) show how private sector models
could facilitate the costing of services in the public sector. Geiger (1999, p. 53) showed
how inaccurate costing could create resource allocation problems by triggering cross
subsidisation problems. So, a shift in emphasis has clearly been apparent in the
emerging trends of costing of government services. Contracting out is just an offshoot
of such a process in that the same data may be used to cost services and also to prepare
competitive bids.

5.3.2

SCRUTINY OF SOCIAL RESOURCES

A survey by Mouritzen (1992) shows that fund availability to the public sector around
the globe is diminishing. As a result, public sector bodies have been experiencing
increased pressures to provide services within limited budgets. To improve efficiency
in service provision, these entities are also introducing commercial style management
and accounting systems. While competition and performance measurement through the
use of Key Performance Indicators (Kaplan and Norton, 1992), and benchmarking, are
gaining popularity as proxy measures of outputs (Donald and Rohan, 1996, p. 3). The
introduction of competition reinforced the cost management issues, and public sector
bodies are also introducing private sector style cost management systems, such as cost
allocation systems, to cost their services (see Cavalluzzo et al., 1998).

5.3.3

BENCHMARKING OF SERVICES

The benchmarking of services has become a norm in the public sector in recent times
especially in the wake of reforms (Donald and Rohan, 1996, p. 3). This involves the
comparison of costs of an organisation with those of the benchmarked organisation
(Donald and Rohan, 1996, p. 3; Rose, 1994, p. 7). The costing implication is that the
benchmarked costs work as a standard for comparison and there is a minimal need of
formal costing of services. In the absence of a fully-fledged costing system and
resultant full costs, ad-hoc costs can be used as a proxy for these benchmarked costs
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(Howes, 1994). However, this also requires a good understanding of the underlying
principles of costing of services, or of relating the inputs (budgets) to the outcomes
(services) in a public sector environment.

In summary, the rationales for the costing of services are many. In the wake of reforms
in the public sector around the globe, public sector costing of services is becoming
increasingly dependent on sophisticated cost management systems (including software
based overhead allocation systems e.g., Activity Based Costing, Life Cycle Costing).
This is to ensure that valuable social resources are spent in the most efficient manner.
Instead of formally costing the services, there is another passive way of knowing the
cost of service provision for competitive reasons. Benchmarking, which provides a
valuable tool to managers working in the public sector, suggests that an organisation
should attempt to match the costs of the best organisation in the clan, after factoring the
size (e.g., capital, machinery and human resources).

5.4

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK TO EVALUATE PUBLIC
SECTOR OUTSOURCING DECISIONS

It has been indicated in earlier chapters that contracting out does not have any suitable
methodology to evaluate the decisions from a holistic perspective (e.g., from an
organisational point of view). The following section blends the literature on contracting
out and cost allocation to develop a conceptual framework. The main objective is to use
this as the focal theory for analysing the case study evidence of two competitive
tenders, to be discussed in Chapters 9 and 10. Kumar (1996) and Maxwell (1996) argue
that a conceptual framework is necessary where one single theory does not explain a
case or data collected from the field.

Contracting out introduces a challenge similar to costing for ‘make or buy’ in the
commercial sector (Drtina, 1994; Kee et al., 1997; Kelly, 1989, p. 97; Morris and
Noreen, 1994; Prager, 1997; Sciulli, 1996; Walsh, 1995). This usually involves the
costing of services earmarked for contracting out. Without an organisation-wide
overhead allocation system, costing of a single service becomes too complex and
inaccurate (Howes, 1994, p. 36). Though management accounting texts discuss ‘make
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or buy’ of products with a short term focus, in practice ‘make or buy’ stretch to multiyear time horizons (see Drtina, 1994; Miranda, 1994, pp. 261-262; Council on the Cost
of Government, 1997). Costing and decision-making of multi-year ‘make or buy’
contracts are, thus, complex tasks. This decision has a bearing on an organisation’s
bottom line.

This ‘make or buy’ decision is historically ingrained in economics. In costing for
services, this strand of the literature calculates costs using the principles of public
economic theory (e.g., Transaction Cost Economics, Public Choice Theory) (see, e.g.,
Domberger and Rimmer, 1994 for details). However, in recent times, alternative
costing methods are also suggested which draw on the principles and practices of
managerial accounting (see for example, Ahmed, 2000; Donald and Rohan, 1996;
Drtina, 1994; Kee et al., 1997). Chapter 2 examined some issues identified by
economists in the contracting out of services. In sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 the cost figures
are not derived by the researcher’s choice of methods but were reconstructed from the
field data. Recent literature on public sector contracting suggests that contracting out
decisions demand a holistic framework. A synthesis of literature on outsourcing
suggests that such a framework follows some key steps: identification of activities,
determination of the full cost of internal production, establishing relevant cost for
internal production, and evaluating bids and decision making about the delivery
services (Kee et al., 1997; Office of Public Management, 1991, p. 12; 1992, p. 6;
Office of Public Sector Management, 1995; Sciulli, 1996, p. 29). These steps are
discussed next.

5.4.1

THE SPECIFICATION OF ACTIVITIES

As with the costing of services (see for example, Brignall et al., 1991; Bates and
Brignall, 1993), specification of activities contemplated for contracting out is the first
step in costing for contracting out. This step requires input from top management and is
found to have political influence of bureaucrats (Miranda, 1994; Osborne and Gaebler,
1993; Walsh, 1995). In specifying the activities, some qualitative characteristics are set
before being translated to monetary terms. Some of the qualitative characteristics are:
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asset creation or service provision; intensity of the service- that is, capital vs. labour
intensive; skill vs. technology intensive; type of risk- that is, high vs. low; barriers;
resource allocation; potential for development at regional level; competitiveness of
businesses; social welfare, and equity consideration; and lastly, potential of savings that
is low, medium, or high, and these are aligned to the objectives of the service provision
(Council on the Cost of Government, 1997, pp. 18-19; South Australian Health
Commission, 1995, p. 8).

Because of the traditional input oriented view of public sector services (Auditor
General of New Zealand, 1989; Edmonds and McCready, 1994, p. 7; Helden, 1997;
Osborne and Gaebler, 1993), the specification development process has been
challenging. It requires an organisation to develop outputs in concrete terms.
Specification can be either in functional or in output terms (New South Wales Service
Competition Guidelines, 1997; Office of Public Management, 1991, p. 12; Office of
Public Management, 1992, p. 7). Unlike manufacturing firms, outputs in the public
sector are intangible in nature, and possess the characteristic of simultaneity and
perishability (Sheridan, 1996, p. 44). Since the public sector falls under the category of
service industries, it is difficult to determine its output in tangible terms; rather, its
output is intangible. In recent times, this problem has been overcome by the use of Key
Performance Indicators (see, e.g., Steering Committee for the Review of
Commonwealth/State Service Provision, 2000, pp. 1-19).

Key Performance Indicators reflect the expectations of customers, and of the
governmental body responsible for the delivery of the services (cf. Department of
Finance, 1991; Gering, 1999, p. 27; Office of Public Management, 1991, p. 12). They
also capture the qualitative aspect of service delivery to citizens- for example, the
number of complaints received about the bus services, the on-time arrival of trains, the
quality of rubbish removal, and the quality of pothole repairs. As performance
indicators are related to the quality of the services, it becomes easier to translate inputs
to some measurable terms (Council on the Cost of Government, 1997). The greater the
number of Key Performance Indicators, the greater is the likely cost of production.
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Evidence suggests that rigorous expectations about services lead to higher costs in the
public sector (Szymanski and Wilkins, 1993). Once a specification about a service is
made, the next step is to translate it into monetary terms. This requires a sound cost
management system. In the public sector, the determination of product costs is
challenging and difficult because of the presence of too many services and the
magnitude of joint costs (Cohen and Loeb, 1982).

5.4.2

DETERMINING COST OF INTERNAL PRODUCTION

Once the activities or ‘cost objects’, e.g., a bus shade or a pothole, have been identified,
the next step is to calculate the cost of the cost object. A well-developed Accounting
Information System is necessary to capture the resource consumption and collate the
final cost data of the outputs. This is because the Accounting Information Systems will
not only calculate the cost of the internal production but also other costs. For example,
Sciulli (1997, p. 55) found some key costing areas where accounting information was
extensively used, including the development and costing of in-house bids, the
comparison of bids with external parties, the calculation of cost savings, the evaluation
of cost savings from in-house efficiencies, the calculation of fund adjustments between
agencies and central finance, and controlling costs during the periods. Costing of
internal transactions is also vital for the internal organisation of departments so that the
departments can know the competitive strengths of their services (Gregory, 1993, p.
42).

The costing of services based on the Key Performance Indicators has been discussed in
the previous section. With the surge in the process of implementing commercial style
Accounting Information Systems, there is an increased tendency to introduce
commercial style accounting systems (e.g. accrual accounting, transitory accounting) to
cost public sector services (Steering Committee for the Review of Commonwealth and
State Service Provision, 2000, p. 19). The costs measured in the public sector bodies,
however, are disaggregated, or process oriented, because of the difficulty in translating
all the Key Performance Indicators to quantitative terms.
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Some public sector bodies have a special type of cost classification rather than the
traditional dichotomy of variable and fixed costs (cf. Chan, 1996; Helden, 1997; Kory
and Rosenberg, 1984). For example, public sector bodies in Australia use the direct
cost and fixed cost type of classification to cost services (e.g., Department of Finance,
1991; Department of Local Government, 1997; Steering Committee for the Review of
Commonwealth/State Service Provision, 1998).

Whether the activity or the service will be costed using full or variable costing depends
on the entity, the requirement of such costing, and the costing environment existing at
the time. In general, it is imperative to know the full cost of the services, as it provides
insight about the resource requirements for the delivery of the services. This full cost
includes a fair share of overheads and other identifiable direct costs (Commonwealth of
Australia, 1997, p. 8; Management Advisory Board 1997, pp. 73-74). For example,
state governments in Australia require local governments to subsidise meals provided
to senior citizens. Full costing is necessary for benchmarking purposes (Council on the
Cost of Government, 1997, p. 45) as a first step in determining the amount of subsidy
receivable from the state/federal government. Subsidy in the public service refers to the
difference between the stand-alone cost and marginal costs (Faulhaber, 1975, p. 297).
Ellwood (1996) argues that to be subsidy free, the incremental cost of a service must be
equal to or greater than the stand-alone cost of such service. Because of the diverse
nature of public sector organisations, the approaches to subsidy calculation are also
diverse.

Public sector reform around the world has demanded the bodies to be self sufficient in
funding of service provision, and to minimise the amount of subsidy in a resource
constrained environment. As a result, full costing of services is canvassed as a way to
ensure informed decisions about setting priorities for public spending, and determining
subsidy targets. Full costing in turn requires overhead allocation. Though there are
criticisms of arbitrary allocation of overheads (Baxter, 1947; Thomas, 1969; Vatter,
1945; Wells, 1970), there are counter arguments that endorse allocation (Department of
Finance, 1991; Horngren et al., 1996; Zimmerman, 1979). Except for the direct costs of
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the operational departments, central service costs or Common Costs (Biddle and
Steinberg, 1984) are important factors in arriving at the full cost of a program.

Because of the regulatory nature of the public sector, the overhead allocation issue was
largely ignored in the past (e.g. Auditor General of New Zealand, 1989; Helden, 1997),
meaning that citizens received significant subsidies from governments. However, in the
wake of the reforms, and the changes in the competition environment (Glynn, 1993;
Halonen and Propper, 1997, pp. 4-6; Walsh, 1991), the cost allocation culture is
becoming a routine for public sector organisations. The huge number of services
provided by public sector organisations means that overhead allocation is receiving
increasing attention as the goals of the public service are increasingly being replaced by
the profit motive (cf. Chua, 1995; Cavalluzzo et al., 1998; Dent, 1991).

There are two common approaches to cost calculation: traditional, or volume-based
costing, and ABC (see Chapter 4, Horngren et al., 2003 for details). In textbooks,
overhead cost comparison in a make or buy decision is based on these two approaches.
Volume-based costing is the simplest form of allocation commonly used in a make or
buy situation. A product in a make or buy situation receives a volume-based share of
overheads. This is argued as sufficient when the services are mostly regulated or in the
domain of government. The use of volume-based overheads (e.g., direct labour hours)
is justified because of the extent of use of direct labour in the provision of a service or
of the production of a public good. However, when the regulatory nature of the services
is changed, by internal or external factors or catalysts, (Cobb et al., 1995), a public
sector organisation is required to follow complex allocation procedures to maintain the
status quo of those services. Complexity of production and a huge number of services
are the other pressures that further the demand for more sophisticated allocation
systems (e.g. ABC) (Bourn and Ezzammel, 1987; Cavalluzzo et al., 1998).

ABC is becoming an increasingly popular costing tool in public sector (Antos, 1992;
Harr, 1990; Helden, 1997; Hoban, 1995; Lapsley, 1995). It is also becoming popular in
local governments in various parts of the world. For example, Hoban (1995) in
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Australia, and Anderson (1993) in the US, and Helden (1997) in the Nederlands
showed the relevance and potential of ABC for local governments. In all the cases, the
number of services, their diversity, complexity, and competition in service areas, are
canvassed as the major reasons for rationalising the use of ABC. The studies showed
how ABC was used to calculate costs in a competitive environment, and how ABC
costs were used for scrutinising the efficiency and effectiveness of local government
services. Technically, ABC has been canvassed as a superior costing method that
reduces the distortion in product costs. It establishes a better cause and effect
relationship (see, e.g., Cooper and Kaplan, 1988 a, b, 1992; Lapsley, 1995), and
assumes that the inputs used are mostly separable (Bromwich, 1997). The implication
of the use of ABC for public sector costing is that it can more accurately portray
resource consumption. Especially when overheads are a sizeable proportion of the total
budgets, exclusion of overheads can lead to significant distortion of product costs.

ABC based allocation can give a significant edge to an in-house provider in pricing
internal bids. Radhakrishnan and Srinidhi (2001) showed that ABC can be used for
short-term and long-term bid pricing. Other literature suggests that ABC bid pricing is
not a straightforward process. It requires calculation of relevant costs before any
adjustments are even contemplated. Relevant cost calculation entails factoring in costs
within the in-house provider, and those imposed from other internal departments, in the
form of allocation of common costs and/or internal transfer prices. It is a full costing
method that tries to unitise all costs as variable costs. Where the facility sustaining
costs are insignificant, ABC can establish a cause and effect relationship and allocate
overheads more accurately. The product costs used in the public sector show that the
cost of a service is simply the direct costs and a share of common cost calculated on the
basis of a number of cost drivers. The number of cost drivers actually determines the
accuracy or inaccuracy of the costs so calculated. From a contracting out point of view,
the cost allocation poses a different challenge because the calculation of common costs
attributable to a product or service contemplated for contracting out is calculated the
opposite way from the method by which the cost of a product is calculated.
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In addition to these, there are several factors that influence the costing of a service
contemplated for contracting. These are important, because improper use of any of
them has the potential to distort the costing exercises. These factors are: the use of
accrual method of accounting, the valuation of assets, the depreciation of assets, the
choice of capacity levels, and the use of discount rates for determining the present
value of the cost streams.

5.4.2.1 ACCRUAL VS. CASH BASIS OF ACCOUNTING

With the introduction of public sector reforms, accrual accounting has become a norm
for financial reporting. For example, some local governments in Australia now use
accrual based accounting and others are in the process of implementing it (Hazell,
1997, p. 20; Sciulli, 1997, p. 52). Capital budgeting, (the longer version of the make or
buy comparison), in an accrual accounting environment, is more appropriate, as it
reflects the future consumption of resources or the committed resources in a program or
output as opposed to the real spending of funds in a cash based accounting system.
Hazell (1997, p. 20) argues that accrual accounting has pushed the public sector in
Australia towards better costing and financial reporting.

In the absence of significant changes in demand for resources to meet contemplated
service costs, this accrual basis will fairly portray potential cost flows over a contract
period. This accrual cost estimate may be adjusted for inflation or remain in nominal
terms, depending upon the discount rate or opportunity cost of funds used in arriving at
the present cost of the services.

5.4.2.2 ASSET VALUATION APPROACHES

Asset valuation approaches have important implications for determining the
depreciation amount. For example, historic cost based depreciation does not reflect the
opportunity cost of resources used (King, 1997). The implication of such a depreciation
method is an understatement of the costs of resources committed for service provision
and a significant amount of subsidy is passed on to the recipient of services. Some
plausible solutions include the use of deprival value, or replacement cost (King, 1997),
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so that the share of depreciation based on such values reflects the opportunity cost of
resources consumed. For internal provision of services, deprival value, or any other
valuation method, may be highly undesirable when a service is a core service or the
existing provider has specialised expertise in providing the service. If the transparency
of the decision is highly desirable, this situation may be reversed. A solution to such a
dilemma is to use any proxy variable that can capture the true use of the resources. The
use of proxy variable would provide an estimate of the consumption of resources from
an arms length source (e.g., use of lease rental as a surrogate measure of depreciation).

5.4.2.3 DEPRECIATION ON FIXED ASSETS

Depreciation of assets in the public sector was largely ignored in the past, at least in
local government (Hoban, 1995). The main argument for exclusion of depreciation
from the cost calculation is that the cost of the use of an asset is a sunk cost, so it is not
relevant for calculating the cost of service provision (Council on the Cost of
Government, 1997, p. 43; Sciulli, 1996). But the wave of reform of the public sector
around the world and the introduction of market disciplines in public sector operations
rejuvenated the thinking that infrastructure assets are also subject to normal wear and
tear and should be subjected to depreciation (cf. Hoban, 1995). Robinson (1998, p. 359)
argues that the inclusion of depreciation is justified on the premise that it is a partial
opportunity cost of the funds in non-cash form. The implication of depreciation in the
public sector is that it should be a part of the cost of service provision and needs to be
added to those costs. In the process of considering depreciation as part of the cost of
service provision, public sector bodies should use replacement cost based depreciation
as opposed to historic cost based depreciation (Johnstone, 1997; Robinson, 1998;
Sciulli, 1996, p. 30). The justification for this is that the wear and tear of assets is better
accounted for. This in turn reflects the true consumption pattern of the fixed assets in
the delivery of services. As opposed to this, historical cost based depreciation is
plagued by the criticism of sunk costs.

In depreciating assets or equipment, the use of the economists’ approach dominates in
the public sector. Though the depreciation concept proposed by the economists or the
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accountants provides the same result (Johnstone, 1999), the economists’ concept is
predominant in public sector bodies largely because of the influence of economists (cf.
Pusey, 1991, p. 59). If depreciation is considered as expenditure in the provision of
services, the magnitude of such depreciation is dependent on the asset valuation
approaches. The type of asset and the technological state of the asset determine the
magnitude of depreciation.

5.4.2.4 CHOICE OF CAPACITY LEVELS

Capacity concept is used to mean all capacities, both of machines and of human
resources to provide goods and services. Capacity costs are costs necessary to produce
a predetermined level of services. Unlike manufacturing firms, the development of
work standards in the public sector, and hence the use of suitable capacity, is difficult,
if not impossible, as the services may demand resources in different volumes. The cost
of support services is perceived as free, and user departments don’t realise the impact
of the use of these free resources. This was the scenario before the ongoing reform in
the public sector.

To utilise the capacity of support departments to the fullest extent, some sort of cost
allocation, following Zimmerman (1979, 1995), is proposed to the user departments so
that they don’t perceive the cost of such central resources as a free good. Since the
introduction of competition in service delivery, there is an increased uncertainty about
the choice of provider. In such a situation, some sort of cost allocation will act as an
uncertainty absorption mechanism (Bourn and Ezzammel, 1987). In a longer term it is
necessary to adjust the capacity to the right level so that all the independent units are
equally efficient and the organisation has no slack in it.

Normal capacity, in a traditional costing system, and practical or long term capacity, in
an Activity Based Costing system, may resolve the issue. The objective of charging for
the capacity costs is to charge the user with as much cost as possible so that the full
recovery of cost is ensured. This charge is commensurate with the demand for services,
type of services, and their strategic importance to the community. To achieve this
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objective, some tiered rates may be used to reflect ‘ability to bear’ (Fregman and Liao,
1981) type of recovery of costs. If the removal of slack causes any adverse impact on
human resources, the surplus human capacity, in terms of extra hours of work or extra
levels of services, can be translated to surplus demand to improve the bottom line.
Multi-skilling of surplus human resources is another possibility, so that those people
can work anywhere in an organisation. For idle equipment, surplus capacity can be
ruled out or sold to external purchasers.

5.4.2.5 ALLOCATION OF OVERHEADS

This issue is reiterated in this section because it determines whether common costs
should be allocated. The use and practice of overhead or common cost allocation was
not necessary because of the special regulatory nature and the monopoly characteristic
of the public sector. Since the changes in the regulatory nature to competitive market
disciplines, there has been an increased need to know the full cost of services (Auditor
General of New Zealand, 1989; Helden, 1997). The implication of full costing is that
common costs, that were absorbed as governance costs before public sector reforms,
are now considered a part of the cost of the programs or services. This, in turn, implies
that the operating units of public sector bodies have tighter budgets to provide services.
In a traditional functional form of organisation, this type of approach is quite common.
But if the operating units are split into purchaser and provider units to mimic an
internal market, and all the units of the public sector bodies are profit centres instead of
cost centres, the support services’ cost affects the overall cost structure of the cost of
service provision when provided by the entity.

In a purchaser-provider scenario, the functional operating department may be split to
enhance accountability and efficiency, and to separate control of services from actual
service delivery (Walsh, 1995). The independent business units, within an internally
created market, operate under a contractual arrangement which mimics the market
transaction. When central services are considered a part of the cost of the final service
of this business unit, a dilemma arises as to the value of the support services supplied or
allocated using any principle such as ‘ability to bear’ or ‘fairness’ (Fregman and Liao,
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1981). Ability to bear simply suggests that costs be allocated according to the
profitability of a revenue centre. For a public sector organisation, departmental or
divisional budgets may be used to allocate the common costs. Cooper and Kaplan
(1992) argue that ‘a resource usage view’, based on practical capacity, is more
appropriate than ‘a resource supplied view’, because the former takes into
consideration the strategic positioning of the services and enhances its competitiveness
by charging a lower share of resources’ costs in the production process. The balance of
the total capacity, if any, not used in the production process is simply treated as a
periodic waste or loss to be matched against the periodic revenue. Gal-Or (1993) also
argues that cost allocation can be made strategically to improve the competitiveness of
a service that is already subject to competitive market pressures. Efficiency in central
services departments, however, is crucial in this costing process. When no mechanism
exists, market price of a service (if available) may be used as a benchmark to measure
the efficiency of a support department.

5.4.2.6 CHOICE OF DISCOUNT RATE

Long-term contracting out poses similar challenges for discounting relevant cash
outflows (Drtina, 1994; Johnstone, 1997; Kee et al., 1997; Miranda, 1994), and no
common consensus is found in literature. Generally, a discount rate (e.g., opportunity
cost of capital) is required to calculate the present value of cash flows. The opportunity
cost stems from two sources: one is depreciation related to the fixed assets used in the
production process, and the other is interest imputation relating to working capital or
other cash equivalent investment. Though depreciation and debt servicing costs are
explicitly recognised (Robinson, 1998, p. 359), there is no recognition of equity capital.

In normal circumstances, the appropriate discount rate is dependent upon the cost flow
and the asset valuation approaches (King, 1997, p. 5). If the cost flow is unadjusted or
if there is an insignificant amount of inflation in an economy, the accrual cost flow
stream would not carry many costs for alternative uses, and therefore use of the
nominal discount rate or a real discount rate would not significantly change the present
cost of the results. However, if the influence of the inflation is significant, cost flows
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should be adjusted for inflation to make it real ‘cost flow’. In such a circumstance, the
right discount rate should be the real discount rate, free from any inflationary effect
(King, 1997, p. 5).

Generally, the literature is not unanimous about the use of a discount rate. Different
justifications are put forward for the choice of discount rates. For example, the Office
of Public Management (1991, p. 14) refers to 7% real rate, Sciulli (1996, p. 30)
recommends the 5-year government bond rate of 8%; Donald and Rohan (1996, p. 8)
recommend long-term bond rates and marginal costs of borrowing which are usually
lower in the public sector. All these imply that, in contracting out, a risk free rate of
interest should be used, based on the reasoning that the project contracted out is risk
free. In fact, any contracted out service is risky, in that any provider can fail in the
middle of a contract period. For example, the Department of Finance (1991) proposed a
Capital Asset Pricing Model for discounting the cost streams in contracting out
situation, the justifications of which are (a) to picture a level playing scenario, and (b)
to reflect the risk perceived by a private investor in similar businesses. These are the
general prescriptions, and it is recommended that the choice of discount rate to
calculate the Net Present Value be based on the funding sources. Once the above
factors are taken into consideration, the next step is to take a discounting approach to
convert the cost streams into present values. Some spreadsheet package can be used to
calculate these costs.

In sum, the full cost calculation process is fairly complex because of the issues
affecting it. The long-term nature of public sector service contracts complicates these
calculations further. In order to resolve these problems, public sector bodies refine the
full cost calculation and calculate relevant costs before awarding a contract to the
winner of competitive bids.
5.4.3

DETERMINING THE RELEVANT COSTS OF INTERNAL
PRODUCTION

In an everyday sense relevant costs are the appropriate ones for decision-making. In a
contracting out situation, they are the costs of ‘make’ in a ‘make and buy’ situation
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(Johnstone, 1997; Morris and Noreen, 1994; NSW Service Competition Guidelines,
1997; Siegel, 1999). Relevant cost is also influenced by the time horizon over which
the ‘make or buy’ decision is contemplated. Since, in the longer term, all costs are
variable (Cooper and Kaplan, 1987) the relevant costs for long term contracting out are
the attributable costs (Shillinglaw, 1963) or the ‘avoidable costs’ (Department of
Finance, 1991; Kee et al., 1997; Kelly, 1989; Morris and Noreen, 1994; NSW Service
Competition Guidelines, 1997, p. 40). Shillinglaw (1963) argues that except for a small
portion of fixed costs, all the costs of services can be avoided, and therefore these are
the attributable costs of a product or service for the purpose of decision-making. Kee et
al. (1997) argue that the relevant costs can be calculated after arriving at the full costs
of a service or product and deducting the unavoidable part from it. The Office of Public
Management (1992, p. 8) suggests that two types of costs are avoidable in costing for
contracting out- those that are automatically avoided, and those that may be avoided,
but need management action. The other types of costs, usually unavoidable overheads,
remain there, and are not relevant in costing calculations.

The first component, the direct costs of the department/s, is a straightforward collation
of service related production costs of an in-house provider. However, costs imposed
from other divisions, both support and production, are crucial in bid pricing. Two types
of external costs can be imposed. The first category is the transferred-in costs from
other operations departments (e.g., production departments), and the second category is
the cost of support departments. In principle, both these costs create the cost allocation
dilemma discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. Depending on the nature, size and complexity
of the organisation, the transferred-in costs (or the internal transfer prices) can be
treated in a purchaser-provider arrangement.

Direct costs associated with activity are easy to identify but those that are indirect or
require allocation are difficult to measure or identify. These indirect costs include
overheads, and require precise calculation so that the total costs can be determined with
a reasonable level of accuracy. The costing calculation becomes too complicated when
an organisation operates in an internal market environment.
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An internal market mimics the actual competitive market where the purchasers buy
services at a marked up price from the support department/s. In the public sector, the
internal market idea emerged as a consequence of calls for reform initiatives under the
rubric of entrepreneurialism (Wanna et al., 1996). In such an internal market, the
‘process view’ of Turney (1992) is adopted. This view suggests that costs flow
horizontally across the processes, from input to the final output. In the context of the
public sector, a similar analogy can be used to show that the end user of a service
receives the services from the previous department in the process. Previous
departments are usually the service departments, and the end users the operations
departments. In this cost transfer process from the service departments to the operations
departments, a premium is charged. This premium is charged for two reasons. First, the
service department needs to know its efficiency in the market for similar services.
Second, it needs to justify its autonomy as an independent profitable department (cf.
Cooper and Slagmudler, 1998b, p. 17).

In the process-oriented organisation just mentioned above, the end user departments
may also receive services from other operating departments. Since the purchasing
departments have the sole discretion to buy the level of services needed from other
operations departments there is little room for inefficiency to be passed on because all
the operations departments have the compulsion to be efficient in an internal market
environment. The problem arises when the common costs are a sizeable part of the
annual budget of a public sector entity.

Since the interdependencies of operations departments are efficiently managed for the
sake of the survival of each independent operating unit, the only problem that needs to
be addressed is the transfer pricing of central support services in such an internal
market. To make it more relevant, a resource usage view of the central services is
proposed, meaning that the allocated cost on some basis be avoided if demand for such
services is known with certainty, or the re-engineering of service generation can be
made to reduce demand for such support services. In other words, use of support
services is costed on demand (resource usage view) rather than by using the fair share
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of such resources (resource supply view). When there is a mismatch between supply
and demand for such services, a problem may arise as to the treatment of the excess
supply of services.

There are arguments that excess capacity costs or idle capacity costs can be treated in
two different ways. First, they can be adjusted to various productions or productions in
processes (Horngren et al., 2003). In a public sector setting, all the unabsorbed fixed
costs or under-applied fixed costs can be added to the existing level of services. This is
because the public services possess all the characteristics of a service organisation and
cannot be inventoried (e.g., Brignall et al., 1991 for details). Second, excess capacity
costs can be treated as the cost of doing business (Ganty, 1994). The implication of
this, for public sector organisations, is that the resources are wasted during a budget
year. In other words, a certain level of services is not generated because of such
treatment. In the short term this sort of capacity costs (Kee et al., 1997) may be
absorbed as an operating loss to the entity. But in the long run, if the capacity levels are
not adjusted to reflect the real usage, some efficiency loss in the form of a lower level
of services may be inevitable. In the public sector, capacity resource acquisition is not
only a matter of social need but also the choice of bureaucrats responsible for the
delivery decisions (for a discussion, see Miranda, 1994).

To sum up, the internal production cost of a service, contemplated for contracting out,
is a mere compilation of all the direct costs (that is, direct material, direct labour and
other direct overheads) of the division/department of the in-house provider and a share
of transferred-in costs (or transfer prices) from other departments. Table 5.1
summarises the cost elements commonly used in costing bids in Australia.
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TABLE 5.1: COST ELEMENTS IN CONTRACTING OUT CASES
Cost elements

Recognition criteria and treatment

Direct costs

those traced directly to the activity being costed

Indirect costs

those costs which are not traced directly to the activity

Opportunity costs

relevant when funds are used from internal sources

Imputed tax on borrowing

may be appropriate for fair comparison

Source: Office of Public Management, June 1992, p. 11

When the long term contracting option is contemplated, it poses an additional problem
in such areas and influences costs in different magnitudes. This may be critical because
if such a technical exercise is done incorrectly, the services may be delivered from the
wrong source, if the services need to be internalised in future. This is because the
acquisition of machinery, the building of infrastructure and/or the hiring of necessary
personnel are not only time consuming but also require enormous resources.

5.4.4

COMPARISON OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL BIDS

After the cost of a service of internal bid is calculated, the next step is to compare the
bids, using one of the three options: the external, the in-house, and /or the status quo
(Office of the Public Sector Management, 1995, p. 35). Ideally this comparison should
be on an equal footing to portray ‘a level playing field scenario’ (Commonwealth of
Australia, 1997, p. 10; Council on the Cost of Government, 1996, p. 8; Office of Public
Management, 1992, p. 13; South Australian Health Commission, 1995, p. 8). In the
costing process of the internal bids, some additional costs need to be included to the
internal bid in compliance with competitive neutrality principles (Council on the Cost
of Government, 1997, p. 35). The additional cost elements for inclusion in internal bids
are discussed in Table 5.2:
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TABLE 5.2:ADDITIONAL ADJUSTMENTS TO BE MADE TO INTERNAL BIDS
ITEM
Taxes

Rate of return

Cost of bid preparation
Redundancy, retraining and
relocation costs
Contract monitoring costs

DESCRIPTION
Payroll tax, sales tax, land tax, local government rates and
stamp duties, financial institutions duty and relevant excise
charges
Long term opportunity costs representing funds tied up in
investment of activities. May include depreciation and cost
of debt financing.
Not relevant because it is sunk cost
Should be incorporated within various options
Should be amortised over a longer period, usually within
10 years
Should be considered only when there is a difference
between the costs of internal and external contractors.

Contract transition costs

Includes shifting costs in contracting and should be
included in the evaluation of competing bids

Contract rollover costs

May include specific costs such as removal of equipment
or formal contract reviews

Work cover Liability

If relevant, should be anticipated and included in estimates
of competing bids

Sources: Donald and Rohan, 1996, p. 6;
p. 35 and author’s own compilation

Council on the Cost of Government, 1997,,

After the internal cost of a service is calculated, an evaluation may be made as to the
competitiveness of the internal services in the market. This is analogous to the
comparison of two products produced by two producers. The contestability of the
service is crucial for the success of the competitive tendering process. If there is a
sufficient number of providers in the market, the competition is intense and it is better
to outsource the services (Commonwealth of Australia, 1997, p. 21; South Australian
Health Commission, 1995, p. 9). In such a situation, the evaluation of the bids becomes
difficult without detailed knowledge about the cost structure of the competitors.
Research to date does not provide any guidance about this issue. However, it is implied
that total costs are used for a bid evaluation. When the market is competitive, the bid
prices are likely to be competitive and very identical (e.g., Hilton et al., 1988;
Louderback, 1976).
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The costing of services in a competitive bidding environment is one of the major
considerations before a decision is finally made. Cost comparison may be misleading if
the costs, the organisation structure, and the technological state of the bidders differ. In
such situations, the presence of non-counterpart costs2 may make the cost comparison
illogical and meaningless. Without the knowledge of detailed costing information about
all the producers, the comparison will show a difference of costs but will not portray
the underlying reasons for such differences (Young, 1988, pp. 69-70). In addition to
costs, other qualitative criteria may also be used. The Office of Public Sector
Management (1995, p. 37) suggests six criteria for evaluating a bid: costs and benefits,
overall compliance with tender requirements, managerial capability of the tenderer,
human resource management, financial and commercial considerations, and
management buy out (MBO) proposals. Above all these, the final decision about the
choice of provider depends on the top-level management of an organisation.

Cost is a significant means to a decision about the choice of service delivery. Unless
the cost differential is substantial, a decision can be made either way to reflect the
political pursuit of the top management.3 Some decisions may be made in keeping with
political and ideological factors of the decision-makers (see, Niskasen, 1971, Miranda,
1994 for more details).

5.4.5

DECISION ABOUT THE SERVICE PROVISION

Once a comparison between external and internal bids is made, the next crucial step is
to select the winner. It has been mentioned above that costs play a major role in the
decision making process. An assessment of both quantitative and qualitative factors is
needed to reach a decision. The qualitative factors include: the reputation, financial
position, past performance, the quality and reliability of the supplier, expertise,
technical supremacy, flexibility, knowledge, employee morale, loss of control over a
support service, and integration of the operations of the business with those of the
outsourcing firm (Drtina, 1994, p. 61; Hazell, 1997, p. 21; Kee and Matherley, 1996, p.

2

Young (1988, p. 69) defines non-counterpart costs (NCCs) as the difference in costs because of differences in the
level of resource usage by two entities.
3
In Australian local councils, Councillors make final decisions about the delivery of services.
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29; Kee et al., 1997; Office of Public Management, 1992; Paruoush and Prager, 1999,
p. 383; Sciulli, 1996, p. 31). Though no apparent value is placed on these qualitative
considerations, a notional value is implied. The notional value is the difference between
actual costs (the perceived value of the services- that is, willingness of a firm to buy
similar services from arms length sources at a certain price) and actual cost of the bid.
In other words, the cost savings ex-post decisions can proxy for the qualitative factors
before contract failure costs can be factored into the decision process. The contract
failure costs can be treated as an option value.

The idea of building contract failure as an option stems from the fact that there may be
a failure of contacts at any stage. For public sector entities, contract failure is an added
cost in that the transitory changes of service provision arrangements must be made
before internalising or organising alternative provisions. Johnstone (1997) posited an
option value for such an alternative and labelled it the ‘option of doing (not doing)’ a
certain thing. He argued that if the contracting is done with the vision that there will be
a certain amount of savings, an option emanating from contract failure should be
matched to the estimated savings. If, after the comparison, the estimated savings are
significant, the service should be contracted out. The notional value of such an option
may be equal to, or as great as, the estimated savings from the contracting out. Some of
the costs that may be included are the cost of internalising those services, further
tendering, retraining, or re-acquiring the necessary expertise, equipment and
infrastructure, for the resumption of the service internally. Alternatively, when the
internal production is inefficient, there may be a need to contract out the service to the
outsiders. Contracting out decisions in a single year term, and over a multi-year term,
varies. Usually, contracting out over the multi-year time horizon is more complex than
that of a single year term.

5.4.5.1 CONTRACTING OUT IN A SINGLE YEAR TERM

Contracting out in a single year term is rare in the public sector, except for smaller
dollar value items or services that are one-off in nature or the services are not provided
from internal sources. Such use of the variable cost is justified because in the short term
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the fixed costs are sunk and therefore not relevant for calculation of the costing of
services. If the business is not a repeat business, there is no justification to charge or
apportion any share of fixed costs, as the assignment of such costs may essentially be
arbitrary and there is no point or apparent benefit achieved from such an allocation
(Cooper and Slagmudler, 1998 a, b). Moreover, the cost allocation system in public
sector bodies may be totally absent because of its monopoly nature (cf. Helden, 1997).
This view will hold true until the public sector body remains controlled or regulated.
However, when the regulated nature is changed to a competitive one, costs should be
allocated, (Cavalluzzo et al., 1998; Ferguson, 1996, p. 34; Rogerson, 1992) on the
reasoning that variable costs may not portray the level playing field scenario. Second,
this essentially understates the costs of goods or service contemplated for contracting
out, which may trigger a cross-subsidy problem. When the services are believed to be
subsidised, it essentially creates a resource allocation problem. The inclusion of an
allocated share of fixed costs in a competitive situation ensures the minimisation of
subsidies, and portrays the full cost of services. Third, the decision to not allocate costs
is not equitable and does not meet ‘fairness criteria’ (Fregman and Liao, 1981) if all
other departments or programs bear a portion of allocated costs. In a competitive
market for a product, the relevant costs of production include all variable costs (or
direct ones). Since fixed costs are not relevant, no problem arises as to the allocation of
overheads.

5.4.5.2 CONTRACTING OUT IN MULTI-YEAR HORIZON

In recent times, there has been a growing body of literature on the public sector
organisations that advocates the use of capital budgeting principles to calculate the
present value of cost streams (see, e.g., Drtina, 1994; Johnstone, 1997; Kee et al., 1997;
Office of Public Management, 1992). This body of literature suggests that contracting
out over a longer term is analogous to analysis of capital budgeting of fixed assets (e.g.,
constructing a hotel, a bridge) (Drtina, 1994; Johnstone, 1997; 1999; Kee et al., 1997).
If the cost streams are not adjusted for the time value of money, those streams may be
distorted, leading to incorrect sourcing decisions. In order to make an informed
judgement about the potential of savings, a contract can be evaluated using some
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popular capital budgeting techniques (e.g., Net Present Value (NPV), Annual
Equivalent Cost (AEC) or Profitability Index (PI).

Johnstone (2002, pp. 155-156) also suggested that the use of option value be considered
when a decision is made to contract out a specific service. He adds that if a service is
contracted out over a long term, and if internalisation is necessary after a few years in
the wake of poor contractor performance, it adds tremendous costs to the organisation.
These added costs might offset the savings envisaged when the initial contract is signed
with the contractor. Utilising the same discounting principles, the option value can be
estimated. Though this option value is an arbitrary estimate, an intelligent guess can be
made. The final cost saving figures may thus be reduced by factoring in implied
contract failure costs (in the form of options). The implication is that the quantification
of contract failure costs will be difficult to measure or may not exist from secondary
source/s.

5.5

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter has advanced existing research on contracting out by integrating research
done by economists, public administrators and accountants. The conceptual framework
factored the issues and principles applied in the commercial sector to the unique
environment of public sector. This chapter endorses the view taken by both practicing
and academic accountants in determining the cost of services contemplated for
contracting out. In typical textbooks (e.g., Horgren et al., 2003; Atkinson et al., 2004),
the perspective taken for evaluating short-term make-or-buy decisions is not suitable
for evaluating longer term make-or-buy decisions. The concepts and techniques of
evaluating longer term make-or-buy decisions are important for the public sector
organisations because longer term contracting out is very common in these
organisations (see for example, Woodland et al., 1995; Drtina, 1994; Johnstone, 2002).
In a subtle way accrual accounting is taken for granted. The capacity choice issue is
largely ignored or considered unimportant. By sharp contrast, capacity concept in the
public sector is important in understanding the efficiency and effectiveness of funds
spent on the delivery of goods and/or services.
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The costing for contracting out follows a pattern similar to that of product costing. In
contracting out situations, four to five steps are followed. They are identification of the
service to be contracted out, determining the cost of internal production, identification
of relevant costs, comparison of costs with those of external suppliers, and making
decisions about the delivery of the services. These are the generic steps as far as the
costing of services is concerned.

The other steps that may be undertaken are of an administrative nature (see for
example, Council on the Cost of Government, 1997, p. 10; Office of Public
Management, 1991, p. 10). Overhead allocation hinges on the costing of internal
production and determination of relevant costs. In calculating the cost of internal
production, the general prescription is that full cost is necessary for at least knowing the
cost of resources necessary for the provision of a service. Though overhead allocation
is strongly discouraged in normative literature, it is still done for outsourcing decisions.
But the inclusion of overheads is more refined to reflect relevant cost of services that
exclude the longer-term unavoidable portion of overhead.

The next chapter will focus on the methodological aspect of the thesis. Detailed
discussion about site selection, data collection and analysis will be provided in the
chapter.
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CHAPTER 6
RESEARCH METHOD
6.1

INTRODUCTION

Research in organisations requires the appropriate tools and techniques. The first tool is
the tool to investigate the research problem. The research method provides the initial
guidance as to what to do once a researcher is permitted to enter into a field, establish
rapport with the participants of an organisation, and finally collect evidence on the
research problem. Qualitative and quantitative techniques are the two different strands
of research used to study research problems. Case studies, both qualitative and
quantitative, can be used to study research problems.

Qualitative case studies can be used to study the problems of a single organisation with
multiple embedded units (Yin, 1994). In a case study with multiple units of analysis,
the conclusions reached from the embedded units (the particular) represent the findings
from the case study organisation (general). That is, the conclusions reached from the
sample units of analysis are generalised about the population (the overall organisation).
These conclusions can be imposed on organisations facing similar situations (Berg,
2001; Bryman, 2004). However, Yin (2003, p. 37), Ryan et al. (1992, p.117) and
Silverman (1997, p. 249) argue that case studies provide generalisations at theoretical
level, which may remain valid to explain similar cases in other settings. They imply
that such theoretical generalisation is specific to a single site or multiple sites studied
by a researcher. Stake (1995, p. 8), however, prefers to use the term ‘particularlization’
to mean the theory emerging from a case study, and argues that such emerged theory
either modifies or improves confidence in prior theoretical generalisations. Case studies
have been particularly useful in understanding this particular-general pattern of inquiry.
They are especially powerful tools for researching organisation-specific problems
(Burns and Kaplan, 1987; Hamel et al., 1993; Hartley, 1988; Jensen and Rodgers,
2001; Lee, 1999; Llewellyn, 1992; Otley and Berry, 1994; Scapens, 1990, 1992; Smith
and Whipp, 1988; Stake, 1995; Tellis, 1997). As a branch of qualitative research, case
studies provide an opportunity to understand research problems in a particular research
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site and they have become popular for studying management accounting problems.
Otley and Berry (1994) argue that case studies are suitable to study research problems
where large databases or significant theories don’t exist to carry out survey research.
Hartley (1988) argues that case studies in organisational contexts are preferred over
other methods, that is, survey or experiments, due to the large the number of
observations made. He also suggests:
…in any case study research, there are unique features due to organisational characteristics, the
personalities, and roles of the individuals. These can give a case study a richness, immediacy,
and graphic quality which engage the mind and the imagination of the reader in a way which is
often more difficult with concepts operationalised in a questionnaire (p. 209)

Hartley (1988) also argues that case studies provide the opportunity to maintain
constant contact with the staff members of the researched organisation. A one-off
interview or contact with an organisation may not provide ample opportunity to study
research problems and capture the temporal changes of organisational life, thus
precluding survey or scientific research methods from consideration (Hartley, 1988, p.
214).

6.2

AN OVERVIEW OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH

Most writers trace the origins of qualitative research to ‘Leplay’s observational study’
(Bogdan and Taylor, 1975, p. 3) of European families. It became a popular research
tool in European and American anthropological research during the later part of the
nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth centuries, at which stage qualitative
methods started to influence the Chicago School of Sociology. From the 1920s to the
1940s, personal documents and participant observations were the popular qualitative
research methods. During the 1940s and into the 1950s the popularity of the qualitative
research method waned after the emergence of positivistic theory and quantitative
methods. Qualitative methods started to re-occupy their original position during the
1960s and 1970s, and their popularity has been increasing since then (Bogdan and
Taylor, 1975, pp. 3-4; see also Denzin and Lincoln, 2000 for details).
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The definitions of qualitative research are diverse because of the range of methods
available within it. Denzin and Linclon (2000, p. 3) defined it as:
…a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of a set of interpretive,
material practices that make the world visible. These practices transform the world. They turn
the world into a series of representations, including field notes, interviews, conversations,
photographs, recordings, and memos to the self. At this level, qualitative research involves an
interpretive, naturalistic inquiry approach to the world. This means that qualitative researchers
study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in
terms of the meanings people bring to them.

Creswell (1994, p. 15) suggests that it emphasises as a priori approach grounded in
interpretive, naturalistic philosophy. Creswell (1994, p. 15) defines qualitative research
as:
…an inquiry process of understanding based on distinct methodological traditions of inquiry that
explore a social or human problem. The researcher builds a complex, holistic picture, analyses
words, reports, detailed views of informants, and conducts the study in a natural setting.

Creswell’s definition emphasises a complex, holistic picture as a springboard to
enhance the analysis of multiple dimensions of a problem or research issue. Patton
(1982, p. 22) suggests ‘qualitative measurement has to do with the kinds of data or
information that are collected’. The emphasis of this short definition is on ‘data’. Patton
(1982, p. 22) suggests that:
(q)ualitative data consist of detailed descriptions of situations, events, people, interactions, and
observed behaviours: direct quotations from people about their experiences, attitudes, beliefs,
and thoughts; and excerpts or entire passages from documents, correspondence, records, and
case histories ...The data are collected as open-ended narrative without attempting to fit program
activities or people’s experiences into predetermined standardized categories such as response
choices that comprise typical questionnaires or tests.

Denzin and Lincoln (2000, p. 15) narrow down the description of the data sources to
the studied use and collection of empirical materials: case study, personal experiences,
introspection, life story, interview, artefacts, cultural texts and productions,
observational, historical, interjectional, and visual texts- to describe and attach
meanings to problems of individuals. The relevance of sources of data is dependent on
the tradition or type of qualitative inquiry being pursued to study the phenomena. The
main purpose of qualitative research is to develop theory that can be extended to other
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cases (Maxwell, 1996, p. 97). Table 6.1 below outlines the justifications for carrying
out qualitative research.

TABLE 6.1: CONSIDERATIONS FOR QUALITATIVE RESEARCH
Authors

Considerations/justifications/reasons

for

qualitative

research
Miles and Huberman (1994)

Marshall and Rossman (1999)

1.

Local grouping

2.

Richness and holism

3.

Sustained period and causality

4.

Lived meanings

1.

Explanatory purposes: case or field studies

2.

Explanatory

purposes:

multiple

case

studies,

historical

reporting, field studies or ethnography
3.

Descriptive

purposes:

field

studies,

case

studies

and

ethnographies
Maxwell (1996)

1.

Conceptual considerations

2.

Pragmatic considerations

1.

Nature of the research question/s

2.

Topic to be explored

3.

Need to present a detailed view of the topic

4.

Need to study people in their natural settings

5.

Interest in writing in a literary style

6.

Sufficiency of time and resources

7.

Receptivity of audience to qualitative research

8.

Active learner role of the researcher

Rossman and Rallis (1998, p.

1.

Takes place in the natural world

9)

2.

Uses multiple methods that are interactive and humanistic

3.

Is emergent rather than tightly prefigured

4.

Is fundamentally interpretive

Creswell (1998)

Sources: Lee (1999, p. 38); Marshall and Rossman (1999, p. 3) adapted

In critiquing the considerations, Lee (1999, p. 43) suggests that Miles and Huberman’s
(1994) considerations are the ones most comprehensively followed in qualitative
research. The main considerations that emerge as genres of qualitative inquiry can be
clustered into description, interpretation, and explanation; all of these are done from the
perspective of the organisation under investigation. Besides these the researcher’s skill,
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expertise and training in the area of research determine the selection of either
qualitative or quantitative methods.

6.2.1

QUALITATIVE RESEARCH TRADITIONS AND THEIR DOMAINS

Qualitative research domains are diverse and too subjective to choose. Depending on
the field of the research (e.g. anthropology) or the type of research question (e.g. “how”
or “why”), a single method, or multiple qualitative methods, may be used. Researcher
consideration, objectives and prior theory in any area determine the choice of a single
method, or multiple methods (Lee, 1999, p. 43; Patton, 2002, p. 556). Table 6.2 below
provides a summary of the domains of qualitative research methods:
TABLE 6.2: QUALITATIVE RESEARCH DOMAINS
DOMAINS
AUTHOR

Miles and Huberman (1994)

Marshall and Rossman (1999)

Creswell (1995)

•
•
•
•
1.
•
•
•
•
•
•
2.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Participant observation
No participant observation
Interviewing
Archival
Neutral domains
Human ethnology
Ecological psychology
Holistic ethnography
Cognitive anthropology
Ethnography of communication
Symbolic interaction
Political domains
Democratic evaluation
Neo Marxist ethnography
Feminist research
Participatory research
Ethnography
Grounded theory
Case studies
Phenomenological studies
Ethno methodology

Source: Lee, 1999, p. 22

The choice of a particular domain depends on the methodological and epistemological
assumptions about a research problem (Otley and Berry, 1994, p. 47). Therefore, it is
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important to weigh the suitability of each method and choose the most appropriate one
only after comparing the alternative methods (Yin, 1994).

6.3

CASE STUDY AS A QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHOD

Case study research has been a popular research strategy in medicine, psychology,
business and law, criminology and sociology (Berg, 2001, pp. 225-226). Case study as
a tool of managerial accounting research has also been emerging as a very strong
strategy in recent times (Ahrens and Dent, 1998, pp. 1-7; Atkinson and Shaffir, 1998;
Baxter and Chua, 1998; Burns and Kaplan, 1987; Covaleski et al., 1996; Hopper and
Powell, 1985; Kaplan, 1986, 1998; Keating, 1995; Llewellyn, 1992; Otley and Berry,
1994; Scapens, 1990, 1992; Spicer, 1992; Young, 1999; Ferreira and Merchant, 1992).
Otley and Berry (1994, p. 48) argue that case study research is preferred over other
methods to study management accounting phenomena because alternative methods are
clearly unsuitable. In their defence of this argument, they suggest that the lack of a
large database in the research area might require a researcher to use other methods
(e.g., case study) (Otley and Berry, 1994, p. 48). Stake (1995, p. 8) and Hartley (1988,
p. 210) argue that case studies are used to study unique organisational problems over a
length of time. This requires interaction for a longer time period with the staff members
of a research organisation (Hartley, 1988, p. 214). Gaining access and getting data on
such research sites are difficult and time consuming. Therefore, the consensus view of
some of the researchers (e.g., Ahrens and Dent, 1998; Hartley, 1988; Ryan et al., 1992;
Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003) is that if the objective of a study is to test, generate or modify
existing theory, cases studies are the most appropriate technique.

Case study is defined as: “…an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary
phenomenon within its real-context, especially when the boundaries between
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin, 1994, p. 13).” Yin (1994, p. 13)
also provided a rejoinder to the definition by incorporating a technical perspective as
follows:
(t)he case study inquiry copes with technically distinctive situation in which there will be many
more variables of interest than data points, and as one result relies on multiple sources of
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evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result benefits
from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis.

This technical perspective provides detailed guidance about the data collection and
analysis methods.

There are numerous definitions of case studies (see for example, Berg, 2001, p. 225;
Stake, 1995), with some authors agreeing or endorsing the definition of Yin (1994).
The authors are unanimous about two elements of a case study research. First of all,
case studies are studies of phenomena in a contextual setting, and secondly, case
studies use multiple sources of evidence. Yin (1994, p. 14), however, cautions that case
studies are often confused with qualitative research or ethnography. Ethnographic
studies are more suitable to study a research problem to explore the influence of culture
on an organisation. Ethnographic studies also require participant observation.

Case studies are classified by their relation to the context under study (Stake, 1995) and
by differences in design aspects (Ryan et al., 1992; Tellis, 1997; Yin, 1994). Stake
(1995) classified case studies by their purpose: intrinsic case studies, instrumental case
studies, and mixed form of case studies. Others (e.g., Berg, 2001; Scapens, 1990,
Tellis, 1997; Yin, 1989) have classified case studies by their design types: exploratory
case studies, explanatory case studies, and finally, descriptive case studies (Tellis,
1997). This typology is widely used in literature. Table 6.3 below shows the nature of
these studies and the main attributes of the categories.
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TABLE 6.3: TYPES OF CASE STUDY RESEARCH AND THEIR ATTRIBUTES

Case study types

Attributes

Explanatory

•

A pilot study done as a prelude to a large
social inquiry
• Data collections are done before framing
a research question
• Must have an organisational framework
before designing the research.
• May use exploration as a supplementary
method
• Test prior theory to generate new theory,
modify or validate existing theory
Exploratory
• Useful for causal studies
• Pattern matching is commonly used to
corroborate evidence
• Used to examine plurality of influences
on causes
• Internal validity is the major threat
Descriptive
• Based on prior theory
• Definition of units of analysis is to be
done before commencing the research.
• Theory guides the data collection and
analysis.
Intrinsic
• Useful for descriptive studies
• Case chosen to study the particular
aspect/s
• Intrinsic interest is the main factor in
choosing a case
Instrumental
• Study of a case to gain insight into an
issue or redraw generalisation/s
• A case is looked at in-depth to understand
specific or general issues
• The insights gained from a case may help
a researcher pursue external interests
Collective
• Involves study of multiple cases
• The
main
objective
is:
better
understanding
of
similarities
or
dissimilarities between the cases
• May result in better theories or better
understanding of more cases
Sources: Berg, 2001, pp. 229-230; Scapens, 1990; Stake, 2000, p. 437; Yin, 1994.

Scapens (1990) argues that two approaches to case study methods are employed in
management accounting literature. The first one is informed by a variety of theories.
The most commonly used theories are drawn from the sociology literature (Humphrey
and Scapens, 1996, p. 91; Scapens, 1990). One of the major problems with this method
is that the theoretical lenses used to analyse the case may be biased. Therefore,
subsequent changes in research design may be needed to analyse the case/s (Hartley,
1988; Humprey and Scapens 1996, p. 91). The second one is purely descriptive in
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nature, and is not based on prior theory (e.g., Burns and Kaplan, 1987). Eisenhardt
(1989), Humphrey and Scapens (1992, p. 91) and Yin (2003, pp. 28-29), however,
argue that any case study must have some prior theoretical grounding, either at the
initial stage or progressively, as the case study data are collected from the field. The
type of case study normally determines whether a prior theoretical framework may be
necessary or whether a simple literature survey is sufficient to prepare a researcher to
enter the field and collect evidence for the research.

The distinction between the popular case study methods is not clear cut (Ryan et al.,
1992, p. 115). So it is difficult to identify the nature of a case without making a visit to
the actual field and gather preliminary information about the case study organisation. A
case study design may have to be changed after an initial visit. In spite of these, case
studies are a popular method in certain circumstances. Other choices may be
impracticable or inappropriate, given the time and resource constraints.

It has been indicated in chapter one that an explanatory case study method has been
chosen to study the research problems. There are a few justifications for this. First, the
research questions posed in chapter one are contemporary in nature and fit into the
‘why’ and ‘how’ structure of inquiry posited by Yin (1994, pp. 5-8). Second, literature
on public sector cost allocation and outsourcing practices was not well developed. Few
case studies were done in the past on observed reasons for and the processes of
outsourcing practices, in local governments in Australia, over a multi-year time
horizon. Ryan et al., (1992, p. 115) argue that explanatory case studies provide
opportunities for understanding observed accounting practices in light of existing
theory. They also argue that where available theory is not sufficient to provide
explanations for an observed phenomenon, refinements of existing theory will be
necessary to explain the observed practices. The explanatory case study in this thesis is
aimed to test, build, and refine, as appropriate, theories on outsourcing and cost
allocation methods used in the context of private sector firms, to address the problems
of the researched site being examined in this study. Third, the theory which emerges
from this case study may be replicated or used in other case studies and in other tiers of
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public sectors. Ryan et al. (1992, p. 117) argue that theories that emerge from case
studies can be used to test the strength of generalisation (at theoretical level) when such
theory is replicated in similar cases. The theory development or theory refinement
process is a continuum, and is restricted by the boundary conditions- that is, constructs
to be examined, and the timeframe set for a particular case study (Ryan et al., 1992, p.
124). In this thesis, only two observed cases of past outsourcing, and the role of cost
allocation in these outsourcing cases in particular, were set as the main boundary for
examining the research questions. The theories will be built inductively and along
Hartley’s (1988, p. 211) line of reasoning as: “…the opportunity to explore issues in
depth, in their context, means that theory development can occur through systematic
piecing of evidence to generate theories of more general interest”. The section below
summarises the main arguments for and against conducting case study research.

6.3.1

ARGUMENTS FOR CASE STUDY RESEARCH

The case study method has certain advantages as a research strategy. Yin (1994, pp. 911) suggests at least three advantages of doing case study research, and argues that case
studies are preferred to other qualitative research strategies. He points out that a case
study is preferred when: “…a “how” or “why” question is being asked about a
contemporary set of events over which an investigator has little or no control”.

First of all, case studies are suitable for answering ‘how’ or ‘why’ types of research
questions (Yin, 1994, pp. 5-8). Though other research strategies may be possible, case
studies are preferred because a researcher can carry out detailed and in-depth
investigation into the selected number of research constructs over a longer time period
than is possible in survey and experimental methods. Before commencing a case study,
therefore, the research questions must be carefully crafted. Research questions in turn
emerge after spending a significant amount of time reading the research issues and
finding the most suitable question to be studied. A good literature review is an
antecedent condition to find the suitable research question (Cooper, 1984 quoted in
Yin, 1994, p. 9). If the questions fit into ‘how’ and/or ‘why’ categories- that is,
processes and explanations of processes- then the case study is the suitable approach to
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adopt. Yin (1994, p. 6) further contends that the research question alone is not
sufficient, as other competing methods, such as historical analysis and survey research,
may answer these questions. He argues that the ‘contemporary nature’ of the research
issue/s delineates the method to be employed.

The second important issue in a case study is the inability to establish control over
behavioural events (Yin, 1994, p. 8). In a case study, the researcher has little or no
control over the behavioural events (of the staff of the research site, or the events
itself). A researcher explores the issues, and describes these as would a journalist
(Burgess, 1991). This contrasts with experimental or quasi-experimental science where
a researcher can influence an investigation by manipulating data. The availability of
multiple sources of evidence on the research events reinforces the efforts of the
researcher in completing the case study, and multiple sources of evidence converge on
the desired outcome from the investigation which in turn strengthens the credibility of
the research outcome.

The final strength of the case study research is that it is a preferred strategy to study
contemporary research phenomena (Yin, 1994, p. 8). Though other methods can be
employed to study the contemporary phenomena, the case study is preferred because it
supplements the sources of evidence by adding systematic interviewing. Other sources
of evidence, for example documents, and artefacts, are also available to strengthen the
findings.

6.3.2

ARGUMENTS AGAINST USING CASE STUDY RESERACH

The main arguments against case study research in accounting are: (a) problems in
defining the boundary of the case (Ryan et al., 1992, p. 125; Yin, 1994, p. 10); (b)
problems in interpreting the data; and (c) maintaining confidentiality of the data (Ryan
et al., 1992, p. 125).

The first argument against the case study method is that it may be difficult to define the
boundary of the case, either in terms of time or space of the subject case, or a number
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of cases (Ryan et al., 1992, p. 125; Yin, 1994, p. 10). In order to be able to manage the
research project within time or space, it is necessary to draw a boundary and continue
the study within it. Even though access can be gained in both areas, defining the correct
boundary is a difficult task, as the researcher must have a good focus on the research
problem before commencing the study. Yin (1994, p. 11) argues that the difficulty in
completing a study within a set time can stem from the lack of guidelines about the
skills of a researcher.

The second difficulty of a case study is the objective interpretation of the meaning of
the data. Ryan et al. (1992, pp. 125-126) argue that the study of a social phenomena is
not independent of the human beings, neither are the researchers isolated from the
social systems. The interpretation, or the meanings attached to the research issues, are
therefore subjective, and may be biased (Humphrey and Scapens, 1996). This is
particularly a problem when case studies are done using a holistic approach and the
research issues are seen as integral parts of the broader social systems.

The third difficulty of a case study is the difficulty in maintaining confidentiality
required of a researcher once data are collected (Ryan et al., 1992, pp. 125-126). The
organisation participating in a research project may allow access subject to the
agreement that the data collected is used confidentially. If the data represent highly
valuable and commercially sensitive documents, some precautions may be necessary.
For example, concealing the identity of the organisation studied. Once data collections
are finished and the analyses are made, the researcher faces the dilemma of trading-off
between the extent of disclosure through research publication and the confidentiality
requirement imposed on the researcher. Case studies are plagued by such dilemmas
and, therefore, are much narrower in scope in terms of acceptability by wider audience.

6.4

ACCEPTABILITY AND APPLICABILITY OF CASE STUDY
FINDINGS

Case study research has been labelled as a softer research approach in that the research
is conducted on one to few research sites; the constructs are limited but intensive, and
finally, the research findings may not be applicable to other settings unless they have
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structural similarity (Hamel et al., 1993; Lukka and Kasanen, 1995; Stake, 1995; Yin,
1989). Despite these admonitions, case studies are still carried out on organisations,
thus known as small sample studies. The validity and applicability of those conclusions
depend on the nature of the constructs related to the research problem (internal
validity), and the presence of similar constructs related to similar research problem/s in
other organisations (external validity). There are other considerations which precede
internal and external validity, but they are not as forceful as internal and external
validity. In the study of a research problem, therefore, these two issues must be
carefully considered to increase the credibility of the case study findings.

6.4.1

INTERNAL VALIDITY

Internal validity is common in establishing causal relationships in exploratory or causal
case studies (Yin, 1994). Yin (1994, p. 35) argues that to be able to check internal
validity, a case study must satisfy two conditions: (a) all the constructs have been taken
into account in understanding causal relationships; and (b) the case study findings can
lead to inferences in analogous situations.

To ensure that all the constructs of a case setting have been considered construct
validity must be satisfied (Yin, 1994, p. 34). In order to increase construct validity,
three sources are suggested: (a) using multiple sources of data (data triangulation); (b)
establishing a chain of evidence or objectivity (see also, Maxwell, 1996, p. 97); and,
finally, (c) getting the case study report reviewed by the key informants. Quite often
these three conditions may not be met. Only the first condition can be met by using
multiple sources of data to study particular phenomena. While the researcher may have
access to the internal documents, citing those for the write-ups may breach the
confidentiality requirements of a case study protocol. The researcher may manage the
third condition. Therefore, an external person reading the research would assume that
the case study report has been verified by the key informants of the researched
organisation. Because of the nature of the problems with the second two conditionsthat is (b) and (c) above- only data triangulation has been widely canvassed as an
antecedent condition to increase the validity of case study findings. Patton (2002, p.
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556) also mentions other types of triangulation, which can increase the reliability of the
results of a case study.

In data triangulation, multiple data sources are used to study a particular research
phenomenon (Fielding and Fielding, 1987, p. 24; Patton, 2002, p. 556; Yin, 2003, p.
97). The main objective is to find a point of convergence for the studied phenomena,
and if the convergence is reached, the phenomenon gets wider acceptability. Burns and
Kaplan (1987, p. 3) and (Berg, 2004) argued that the strength of internal validity is
poor because of the demand for greater generalisability or external validity. Even
though a data triangulation technique is used to strengthen the internal validity of the
constructs, triangulation is not without difficulties. The major problem of triangulation
is that different theories and data sources may have overlapping issues, not allowing a
researcher to generalise from a case study to wider contexts (Berg, 2004).

6.4.2

EXTERNAL VALIDITY

External validity, also known as generalisation or generalisability, is the key to judge
the findings from a case study (Bogdan and Biklen, 1982; Bogdan and Taylor, 1975;
Bryman, 2004; Eisenhardt, 1989; Hamel et al., 1993; Lee, 1999; Lukka and Kasanen,
1995; Marshall and Rossman, 1999; Patton, 2002, p. 245; Scapens, 1990, 1992). It
implies that the findings from a case can be applied to similar cases. If the same
research design is used and the same set of data is used, future researchers are likely to
get the same results. Berg (2001) and Stake (1995, p. 112) argue that replication of a
similar study in similar situations should lead to similar conclusions.

The ability to generalise from case studies is debated at least for two major reasons.
First of all, the small sample size, and secondly, the nature of theory generated or tested
through the case study research. It is often argued that the small sample size in a case
study precludes generalisation for wider acceptance or testing for scientific inquiry.
Patton (2002, pp. 242-246) argues that small sample size is not a problem as long as the
problems are investigated in-depth. Yin (1994) compares the findings of a case study to
the findings of a single experiment in a scientific study. Like a scientific experiment,
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the findings of a single case study can be used cumulatively for strengthening the chain
of findings from similar cases. This chain of findings can be later tested in a survey
research for making ‘statistical generalisation’.

Some critics (e.g., Lukka and Kasanen, 1995) also argue that the generalisation made
from a case study is not acceptable, as it is not statistically valid and should not be
used. It is argued that the main thrust of case study research is to make ‘theoretical
generalisation’ rather than ‘statistical generalisation’ (Scapens, 1990; Yin, 1989). Case
studies make theoretical inferences while scientific research is based on sampling logicthat is, making inferences about a population by studying a representative sample from
a population. Case studies provide an explanation of the theoretical phenomena by
addressing ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions.

So, case study findings have sufficient arguments for acceptance and further use in
replication, or as a basis for future statistical survey research. There is, however, a
trade-off between the level of external and internal validity. Burns and Kaplan (1987,
p.13) argue that internal and external validity are negatively related. That is, if the
findings have more internal validity, then those must have less external validity and
vice versa. From a research point of view, external validity is more desired than
internal validity.

6.5

DESIGN OF THE STUDY

In a case study, the design aspect is important and it follows a sequence of phases.
Some authors (e.g., Berg, 2001, p. 29; Patton, 2002; Yin, 2003) prefer to design a case
study in a few steps. Patton (2002, p. 310) suggests three main steps to complete a case
study: negotiating access; completing the evidence collection from the field; and
finally, analysing the evidence before writing the reports. Several other authors
described these steps in more elaborate terms. A careful analysis of their steps can be
grouped into the three main steps suggested by Patton (2002). Therefore, the discussion
below will follow the steps suggested by Patton (2002).
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6.5.1

SELECTING A SUITABLE CASE

Designing a case study is difficult before commencing the study. Even though
numerous organisations are approached, not everyone is willing to provide access to
collect evidence or complete a research project. A field may be very rich and very
attractive for completing the case study but access may not be possible for
confidentiality reasons. So the case study site has to be realistic. The site should be
suitable in all respects such as access, the phenomena to be studied, and the case.
Marshall and Rossman (1999, pp. 67-9) suggest:
…a realistic site is where (a) entry is possible; (b) there is a high probability that a rich mix of
the processes, people, programs, interactions, and structures of interest are present; (c) the
researcher is likely to be able to build trusting relations with the participants in the study; and (d)
data quality and credibility of the study are reasonably assured.

In order to gain access, ten municipal Councils were contacted by mail and telephone.
The Councils were targeted based on the theoretical sampling principle. Theoretical
sampling is purposive in that the sample may be representative of a selected population
where rich and interesting data may available for studying a specific research problem
(cf. Baxter and Chua, 1998, p. 71). Only two municipal Councils responded and
showed their willingness to provide relevant data for the thesis. The first city Council
was a smaller budget city Council in New South Wales and it was implementing the
changes in its organisation structure and accounting information systems examined in
this thesis. Though they co-operated during the earlier part of the data collection
process, they did not allow study of other units where contracting was extensively
practiced. The Finance Manager stated that for confidentiality reasons, further data
could not be provided in detail. Thus, the data collected from the first Council was
deemed partially useful but was not sufficient to investigate the research issues.
Therefore, the data collection and analysis was discontinued after spending five months
in the site.

The second municipal Council was contacted after three months following the decision
not to use the data collected from the first municipal Council. Following the request
from The Head of the Department of Accounting and Finance at the University of
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Wollongong, the second city Council responded in writing showing their willingness to
provide access and for collecting the data for the thesis (the correspondences is shown
in Appendix 6.1 of this thesis).

The Finance Services and People Services Manager of the researched Council informed
me in writing of the consent of the City Council’s President. He also requested a list of
data considered to be necessary for the thesis. Accordingly, a familiarisation meeting
was arranged. In the first familiarisation meeting, my supervisor, the Financial Services
Manager, the Management Accountant, and I, attended and discussed the research
issues. Before engaging in subsequent visits, the staff were briefed about the research
issues so that they could organise people for the interviews and other data collection
procedures. Because of the time of the data collection and the ongoing work on the
implementation of a new accounting system, the evidence collection phase was
squeezed into three months. The issues proposed for investigation were focused on only
a small fragment of the functioning of the cost management system. Then followed a
vertical analysis of two divisions actively providing services under a contracting
arrangement- one with an outside supplier and the other with an internal provider
department.

So, the second organisation satisfied all the requirements necessary to complete the
study: it had been going through a new cost allocation system; it had used contracting
out in the past; and, finally, it agreed to take part in the study for its own sake- that is to
get some feedback on their revamped accounting systems. The proximity of the
research site was another consideration for choosing this site.

The second important design aspect of this study was the units of analysis. The tabular
design of Yin (1994) suggests a matrix design structure. Thus, a single organisation
with two embedded units was chosen for this study. Equal emphasis was placed on the
units of analysis, from general to specific structure of inquiry of the organisation and
analyses within the organisation. The data collection aspects are covered in the next
section of the chapter in more detail.
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One big-ticket bid was selected from each of the divisions. These were later used as the
units of analysis within the research site. Those two departments were studied because
they were competitively providing services to the local ratepayers. In the wake of
ratepayers concerns over the value for money aspects of the services, the services were
market tested and then contracts for delivery were signed for a fixed term. These units
of analyses were rich, complex, and representative of the emergent practice of
contracting out, following the UK, New Zealand, and Canadian practices.

In the design stage, it is important to have a timeframe for collection of evidence. Even
though the researcher wants to be familiar with the site and the units of analysis, the
researched organisation may not allow prolonged access as it has time and staff
constraints. In the preliminary discussion, these issues surfaced and the representative
of the site informed that a shorter but intensive data gathering timeframe could be set to
complete all the evidence collection processes. The Finance Manager also compiled a
list of staff who could be interviewed. Some of the staff was not interviewed because
they did not work for a long period of time in any particular area; the interviews with
those staff proved either irrelevant or useless in the end. The interviews were
completed within three months. The stages of the evidence collection process are
shown in Figure 6.1 below:

Figure 6.1: Timeframe for data collection from the researched City Council
Stage 1
Familiarisation
communication

Stage 2
Extensive data collection

May 1998- July 1998

July 1998-December 1998

Stage 3
Follow up and

December 2000

The second stage in the evidence collection process is the timeframe of the data
relevant for the investigation. Because of the nature of the units of analysis that were
contracting out of big-ticket items, there were few divisions who could provide relevant
data. Only two divisions practiced contracting out in a manner consistent with the
research problem studied in this thesis. The data collected covered historical data over
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14 years and an analysis of other issues over a 30-year period. The interface between
accounting and organisational change was the subject of special interest that directly
related to the research problem. For comparison purposes, the units of analysis were
divided into two distinct periods of significance to the Council. The first time frame
was a period when the Council operated in a monopoly environment, and the second
time period was a period when the Council had to prepare for a transition from a
monopoly service environment to a segmented competitive environment. In order to
study the latter, three years of data and other evidence were collected. The data were,
thus, historical in nature. However, the procedures for conducting case study research
using historical data are exactly the same as those of different forms of case studies
(Yin, 2003).

The boundary of the case is another important variable in the design stage. The Council
did not agree either to allow access for a prolonged visit to complete the study or visit
as many departments as possible for researching the contracting practices. Thus, the
boundary of the case, in terms of time and departments studied, was imposed by the
Council. The research site itself is one of the largest city councils in Australia. Its
internal organisation, accounting system and other operational systems are very
complex in nature. Therefore, it was not possible to collect data from every part of the
Council, though an overall familiarisation was made progressively to understand the
complexity of the research issues. Instead of breadth, depth of analysis was preferred.
So the specific focus was on two sub units of the organisation where the evidence was
collected about the research issues. The Finance Manager advised me to gather
information from the Waste Services Department and the Leisure and Recreation
Centres. Following his advice, data were collected from these two departments and
from other divisions of the organisation to get an overview of the operational and
general aspects of external significance to the Council, such as election of the
Councillors, the political affiliation of the Council, and ratepayers’ perceptions, beliefs,
concerns, and demands, about the Council’s activities.
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6.5.2

PREPARATION FOR ENTERING THE FIELD

Prior to engaging in the research process, the primary task of any researcher is to
review relevant literature of a study (Scapens, 1990, 1992). Humphrey and Scapens
(1996) argue that a theoretical framework guides a researcher to collect evidence in a
systematic manner. Yin (2003, pp. 28-31) also argues that even if a case study is
explanatory in nature, prior grounding in theory may be necessary to be able to ask
relevant questions of the participants or for collecting suitable evidence. Otley and
Berry (1994) argued that relevant reading of prior literature before entering the field is
not only crucial, it is also important for shaping the subsequent evidence collection
process, and the researcher should be flexible enough to make changes in his/her
theoretical grounding after engaging in the research process. Besides these, other
preparations are required on the eve of entering the field. First of all, access should be
negotiated in such a way that it is not terminated prematurely. Baxter and Chua, (1998,
p. 71) argue that getting an approval from the highest level of the organisation is the
best solution to ensure that access does not end prematurely. Second, maintenance of an
ongoing relationship may be crucial to ensure that the project can be completed. Baxter
and Chua (1998, p. 71) recommends maintaining a trust-based relationship through
negotiation and renegotiation. This trust-based relationship should enable the
emergence of rapport between the researcher and the organisation until the research
issues are unfolded and ended in a complete research report (Baxter and Chua, 1998,
pp. 71-72).

6.5.3

COLLECTING EVIDENCE

In a case study, sources of data determine and improve the generalisability (at the
theoretical level) from the data sources. Therefore, it is imperative to collect data from
as many sources as possible. Because of the nature of the research project, historical
data were collected and supplemented by interviews with the key persons responsible
in the relevant units of the Council. The other data sources were considered
unnecessary. Therefore, no attempts were made to collect data from other sources. A
brief account of the data sources are detailed below.
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6.5.3.1 SECONDARY DOCUMENTS

The nature of the research problem was such that temporal data had to be collected
about the history of the organisation, its internal documents such as memos, annual
management plan, internal letters and other public documents such as annual reports.
These documents were supplemented by published press clippings from local and
national newspapers.

The researched organisation published nine historical monographs on different aspects.
These documents were available from the Council’s Community library and focussed
on the development of the Council since its inception in 1901. The internal documents
provided valuable insights about the changes in the Council over 10 years (from 19881998). The internal documents comprised mainly the copies of internal reports and
memos, correspondence within the departments to the Councillors, and to other
external bodies. Because of the nature of the research problem, much emphasis was
placed on the accounting aspects such as resource allocation and distribution (through
budget related internal documents, and handouts of presentations). This phase of
document collection mainly provided information about the general aspects of the
organisation discussed in Chapters 7 and 8 of this thesis. This data was not collected
chronologically; rather it was stored by the theme of the chapters. In this second
episode, focussed data was collected on the contracting out practices of two divisions,
the Waste Services Department, and the Leisure and Recreation Centre of the Council.
The Waste Services division experienced its first competitive bidding task in 1989. The
data on this bid was collected and comprised archival copy of the internal bid, the
internal memo on this bid, and a copy of the report from the auditor, KPMG, about the
financial evaluation of all the bids (seventeen in total). In addition, some press
clippings were also collected on this controversial bid. Data from the second division,
the Leisure and Recreation Centre, was collected on one of their bids submitted in
1997. The data comprised documents related to the in-house bid and other internal
memos about the bid.
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6.5.3.2 INTERVIEWS

Interviews were considered the primary source of data for this thesis. So a series of
interviews were planned on two broader aspects of the organisation- the general aspects
and the specific aspects. The general aspects comprised data on the history of the
organisation, its transformation over ten years (that is, 1989-1998), the accounting and
budgeting system and other peripheral areas. The specific aspects comprised focussed
interviews on two divisions where the divisions submitted competitive bids for the
provision of their services. All of the interviews were arranged prior to meeting the
persons listed in Appendix 6.2 of this thesis.

The meetings were held intensively over a six-month period, from June 1998 to
December 1998. The general managers of all the divisions were the target group of the
interviews. The justification for interviewing these general managers stemmed from the
duration of their services with the Council. The Manager of Financial Services
confirmed, in the first meeting, that the managers would be the best persons to discuss
the research issues. Accordingly, the interviews were planned. Before meeting the
managers, some general questions were sent by email for them to be able to prepare for
the answers. The list of the questions is attached in the Appendix 6.3 of this thesis.
During the interviews, some questions were skipped, and some were added, in keeping
with the background of the person or the division. Some managers were met more than
once to follow up unfinished issues or to elaborate on the selected research issues.

The objective of the first phase of interviews was to gather general information about
the organisation and its structure, its accounting, and resource allocation system.
Each interview lasted for one to one and one-half hours. All the interviews were taperecorded and brief notes were taken simultaneously. The interviews were transcribed
later (see Appendix 6.4 of this thesis).

In the second phase, focussed interviews were conducted. This time a total of seven
interviews were held. The manager of the Financial Services and the management
accountant of the Council participated on behalf of the Waste Services Department, to
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discuss the internal bid. Their participation was justified because they prepared the first
internal bid for the Waste Collection services. They also possessed all the archival
documents relating to the internal bid. The objective of the meeting was to discuss at
length the background, the costing aspects, and finally the decision-making processes
involved in the bid. In addition to these interviews, the managers of the Leisure and
Recreation services were interviewed about their internal bid. The managers of the
centres, one from the internal provider department and the other from the internal
purchasing department, of the centre were interviewed. The interviews were conducted
separately and jointly to corroborate evidence. The objectives of the interviews were to
determine the role of competition in the provision of services, the processes of internal
bidding and costing of bids, the role of the researched organisation’s Internal
Competition Policy in streamlining the competitive services, and finally, the decision
making processes involved in the bidding. The interviews were tape recorded, and field
notes were taken whenever necessary.

6.6

ANALYSING DATA COLLECTED FROM THE FIELD

Analysing qualitative data in general, and case study data in particular, is most crucial
for making valid conclusions for the wider audience. Stake (1995) and Tellis (1997)
argued that analysis of data in case studies is the most underdeveloped area. In fact, no
systematic procedures exist to analyse qualitative data. Rather the analyses closely
follow the broader analytical techniques used in qualitative research genres. Quite often
multiple techniques are used to analyse the data, and there are mixtures of data analysis
techniques.

Some

commonly

used

case

study

data

analysis

techniques

are:

pattern

matching/modelling; explanation building; time series analysis; program logic model;
embedded unit analysis; making repeated observations; and, finally, a case survey
approach (Ryan et al., 1992, 1990; Stake, 1995; Tellis, 1997; Yin, 1994).

Pattern matching is the most common analytic technique in case study research (Ryan
et al., 1992, Scapens, 1990; Stake, 1995; Tellis, 1997; Yin, 1994, 2003, pp. 26-27). In
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pattern matching some data are analysed for patterns, then the patterns are compared to
predicted patterns. Predicted patterns are based on a prior literature review and are
normally completed before engaging in the evidence collection processes (Ryan et al.,
1992 Yin, 1994). Patton (2002) argues that patterns are ‘descriptive in nature’ and can
be replaced by the abstract versions, ‘themes’, emanating from the patterns.

Explanation building is the second type of analytic technique that can be used in a
case study (Yin, 2003, pp. 120-121). In explanation building, causal links or theoretical
propositions are made as part of explanation building process. Causal links are
established to explain the data in an explanatory case study. In such explanation
building process, links are established between a dependent variable and a multitude of
independent variables (Yin, 2003, p. 120). In an exploratory case study, explanations of
hypotheses are made for further advancement of work, so this is the explanation of a
particular case that leads to future cases. The eventual outcome of explanation building,
in an exploratory and explanatory case study, is to make theoretical propositions (Yin,
2003, pp. 120-121). Ryan et al. (1992) argue that the explanation building, as part of
data analysis, is done to build new theory. Eisenhardt (1989) adds that the explanations
derived from data analysis are checked for theoretical fit to see the convergence or
divergence from extant research. If convergence is reached, good theories emerge
whereas divergence leads to further refinements to the constructs or expanding of data
collection to capture more constructs for explanations (Ryan et al., 1992).
Time Series Analysis is the other method used to analyse case study evidence (Yin,
1994, pp. 113-118). Time series analysis is similar to the technique used in quantitative
methods. The objective of time series analysis is the same, but in case studies the
relationship between variables or changes in constructs or events are studied over time,
for building cause and effect relationship. In the comparison process, prior research is
used to compare the constructs which emerge from the case study evidence over a
range of periods. Sometimes, events are studied over a period to understand the
behaviour of changes in events in a certain direction that may follow the predicted
pattern emanating from prior literature (Yin, 1989, pp. 113-114). Yin (1994, pp. 113118) suggested three common time series analysis techniques for case studies: simple
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time series analysis, complex time series analysis, and finally chronological time series
analysis. All of these methods suggest the analysis of variables or search for
explanations through narratives using a fixed timeframe, and using a prior theory. In
this thesis, a chronological time series analysis technique is used to study the eventthat is, cost allocation and contracting practices over a twelve-year period.

The last method, Program Logic Model, is a combination of pattern matching and
time series analysis (Yin 1994, p.118). In a program logic model, causal relationship
patterns between independent and dependent variables are studied over a span of time
(time series). The program logic strategy tests the existence of the relationship between
dependent and independent variables in a program or event. Empirical data are
compared to the predicted relationship and the causal links are either confirmed or
rejected. If the relationship is rejected, then it is assumed that the causal links between
dependent and independent variables are spurious, and there are some external events
that may have better causal links (Yin, 1994, p. 118).

There are three other less commonly used methods of analysis: Analysing Embedded
Units, Making Repeated Observations and finally, doing a Case Survey (Yin, 1994,
p. 119). Analysis of embedded units is particularly useful for the research problem of
this thesis. Therefore it is discussed below. It is cautioned that these three units are to
be used in conjunction with the other methods of data analysis to complete a case study
analysis (Yin, 1994, p. 119).

The Embedded Case Analysis is an approach to analysis where multiple cases are
involved as part of a broader case study (Yin, 1994, p. 118; Patton, 2002, p. 448). For
the analysis of multiple units, individual cases are analysed, then pattern matching or
explanation building are done across the cases, and finally, a conclusion reached in the
individual cases are aggregated to the organisational level for making overall
conclusions about an organisation (Yin, 1994, p. 118; Patton, 2002, p. 448) The
diagram below shows the analytic structure of the embedded units of analysis to study
the research problem of this thesis.
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FIGURE 6.2: THE ANALYTIC PROCEDURE USED IN THE STUDY
Broader case study program
(Cost allocation for Outsourcing Practices of the Council)

Embedded units

Case One
(Cost allocation/outsourcing in Division One)

Case two
(Cost allocation/Outsourcing in Division two)

Source: Adapted from Patton (2002, p. 448) and Yin (1989, p. 118).

Two units of analysis (or embedded units) were used in this thesis to examine the
research problems outlined in Chapter 1. They relate to the contracting out of two bigbudget services over a ten-year period. Waste collection services bidding in 1989 and
the Leisure and Recreation Services bidding in 1998 were, respectively, the first and
the second units of analysis. Following the research focus discussed in Chapter 1, the
‘why’ and ‘how’ aspects of contracting out, and overhead allocation, are discussed in
later chapters of the thesis. The case study evidence on these two bids is described and
analysed, independently of each other, in Chapters 9 and 10. In the concluding chapter,
the reflections from the case study units, (the specific), are imposed on the overall
organisation. The purpose of this imposition was to generate theory that emerged from
the case study. In other words, the concluding chapter will provide theoretical
generalisation, on observed outsourcing practices and the processes of overhead
allocation in bidding and other routine organisational tasks, at the organisational level
(or the case level). The theory generated from this study may be used as a basis for
studying similar cases in other tiers of public sector organisations, or even other local
government bodies observing similar practices (cf. Stake, 1995, p. 8).
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6.7

CHAPTER SUMMARY

Case studies provide an excellent opportunity to study a particular phenomenon where
the phenomenon is not studied extensively or the available literature is deficient, to
conduct rigorous survey based research. Case study conclusions that are rich may not
be applicable to other organisations unless the other organisations are similar in nature
or belong to the same industry. Stake (1995) specifically suggests that the conclusions
from case studies are ‘particular’ to that case and may not be applicable to a wider
number of cases. Despite all these problems, case studies have become a popular tool
for researching in organisations and providing a rich slice of organisational reality.

Case studies rely on prior theory. Where prior theories don’t exist, new theories are
developed from existing concepts and practices (Kumar, 1996, p. 32). Depending on
the nature of a case, prior theories may be required to a certain extent. In management
accounting research explanatory and exploratory forms of case studies are the most
commonly used methods to conduct case study based research. In this thesis an
explanatory case study method is used to study the research problems. Prior theories
are required to analyse and explain the constructs in explanatory case studies. The
conceptual framework developed in Chapter five is aimed to be used as the focal theory
to analyse and explain the data collected from the field.

The data collection period was intensive and short. The justifications are few. Firstly,
the time frame was imposed on the researcher. Secondly, the level of detail agreed
upon by the researched organisation was restricted to a few areas only. Thirdly, the top
officials stated that the nature of my research problem would require them to provide
access to commercially sensitive and extremely confidential information. The Council
did not have many instances of bigger budget bidding when the data was collected.

The data sources collected on the cases comprised interviews, official documents (that
is, Council’s financial records, internal memos, correspondences), and finally, press
clippings on issues related to the research problems. In analysing the data, the program
logic model (Yin, 2003) was used to make generalisations about the specific levels of
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the cases discussed in later chapters. The researched organisation, its resource
allocation systems, and the bidding practices are described and discussed in the
empirical chapters 7-10.
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CHAPTER 7
A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE RESEARCHED
ORGANISATION AND IT’S RESOURCE
ALLOCATION SYSTEMS
7.1

INTRODUCTION

Calls for research in an organisational context has been made by some researchers in
recent times (e.g., Ahrens and Dent, 1998; Hopwood, 1987; Lapsley, 1994).
Zimmerman (2001) argues that case study based research in an organisational context
had not progressed over the last 15 years. Context based studies are carried out in an
organisational setting to capture the rich slices of organisational reality, organisational
practices, the complexity of processes, and the effect on the employees of the complex
functioning of various tasks and routines (Hopwood, 1983; Kaplan, 1984; Puxty, 1993;
Zimmerman, 2001). Kaplan (1984) specifically emphasised that the study of the
management control systems should focus on the administration, accounting
information systems, and the interrelationships among various organisational subunits,
to understand how organisations function in a complex environment, and achieve their
goals. Zimmerman (2001) evaluated the recommendations of a colloquium at Harvard
Business School about the role of case based studies in an organisational context. He
concluded that case studies did not advance as expected because of the lack of good
data and the reluctance of the organisations to release confidential information to the
researchers.

In describing the empirical accounts from the field, this chapter will firstly introduce
the historical background of the researched organisation; it’s administrative and support
activities, other activities, and its resource allocation systems during the years 1989 to
1998. The justifications for selecting this timeframe have already been mentioned in
Chapter 1 and Chapter 6. In describing the process, the stance of a journalist has been
taken following the conjectures of Creswell (1994) that researchers should describe
their field data in this manner. This is also to ensure that there is no ‘hermeneutic bias’
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in the description process that can potentially mislead the audience (see Atkinson and
Shaffir, 1998 for details).

The objectives of this chapter are:
•

to provide an overview of the resource allocation system of the researched
organisation;

•

to provide some insight into the budgeting system before and after the reforms
were implemented;

•

to shed light on the exogenous and endogenous forces causing the resource
allocation system changes;

•

to provide a detailed account of the outsourcing practice in the researched
organisation and the underlying reasons for those; and

•

to shed light on the extent of the use of overhead allocation in the preparation of
bids as a pretext for the analysis of two tender documents to be discussed in
Chapters 9 and 10.

The organisation of this chapter is as follows: in section 7.2 the historical background
of the organisation is discussed; in section 7.3 the resource allocation system of the
organisation over the period of investigation is discussed, and finally the concluding
remarks are made in section 7.4.

7.2

THE ORGANISATION

The Council changed its organisation structure, reporting structure, and accountability
systems, several times since its inception at the beginning of the last century. The
changes were more apparent since the early 1990s when the Council had began to
transform its organisation structure and reporting structure to demonstrate the usage of
the taxpayers’ money better and clearer. The transformation of the Council, from the
historical to the recent time periods, is discussed below.
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7.2.1

BACKGROUND AND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE

The researched Council is located at the southern edge of the City of Sydney. The total
land area is 370 square kilometres and the geographical boundary spans from rivers to
creeks to bays to the Pacific Ocean. Because of its diverse geographical location and
historical importance, the municipality has been a major tourist attraction in New South
since the late nineteenth century.

As a local government body, it started its journey in 1906 with only 1500 tax paying
residents. The population grew in response to developments in the agricultural, fishing,
and manufacturing industries. By 1995 the population had grown to 201,500. With the
increase in population, the Council started to grow exponentially and now it is the
second largest in New South Wales, and one of the largest city councils in Australia in
terms of population and area.

The Council is managed democratically through an elected panel of members, the
Councillors, from the geographical jurisdiction surrounding the Council. The election
of the Councillors is very crucial for the Council because they actively take part in
decision-making. Each Councillor represents one particular geographical location or
ward. The total geographical boundary of the research site is divided, for election
purposes, into five different wards (formerly ridings), A to E. Three Councillors are
elected from each ward, making 15 Councillors in total. They are elected for a term of
four years. The election is held in the last Saturday of September every four years. The
very last election was held in September 2003. Voting in local wards is compulsory for
the local residents. To be eligible to be elected as a Councillor, the person must be on
the electoral roll for a particular ward or must prove that his/her name has been
removed from the roll by mistake. The proportional voting system is used in deciding
the winner.

The Councillors are the counterparts of the Board of Directors in a commercial
organisation. The Councillors nominate one of their members as shire President to
work for a one-year term. S/he is held responsible for the decisions made by the other
Councillors.
152

The Councillors work in different committees, along with Council staff. The
administration section of the researched organisation provides guidelines and directions
in these decision-making processes. A committee normally comprises three
Councillors, a representative from relevant departments, and sometimes experts from
the relevant fields.

In 1999, 1000 employees were working in the Council. Half of them worked in outdoor
activities providing services to the residents. In the organisational hierarchy the General
Manager is the CEO of the organisation. The other positions in the hierarchy are
Directors and Managers of Divisions, who manage activities within their divisions and
programs.

Historically, the Council adopted organisational reforms in the wake of economic
pressures or other waves of changes such as the introduction of commercial style
management and accounting practices, contracting or privatisation of public services,
benchmarking, and measuring value for money, best value approaches, in other
countries. These changes were made in keeping with the objectives of increasing the
efficiency and effectiveness of the services. The chronology of the reforms suggested
that the approach to organisational reform was focused on planning, decision-making,
controlling and coordinating functions for service delivery. During the 1970s, the
Council adopted a corporate approach to management, increased delegation of duties to
staff, and established various committees. These changes were made in response to the
needs to address difficulties in growth, financial difficulties, the need to follow the best
practice, and a feeling that there was a lack of cohesion between departments. During
the early to mid 1980s, some minor changes were made to the structures of the services.
Following this change process, the Council introduced a commercial style corporate
plan in 1982. These changes were made in an era of abundant funds, growth
experienced by the Council, recognition for its pioneering role in embracing
innovations in services’ provision, and a feeling that there was a need to review
services and costs.
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From the mid 1980s to the late 1980s some major changes took place internally to the
corporate model, such as changes in the accountability and organisational structure, and
the creation of new positions to enhance the performance of the Council. These
changes took place in response to a review of the researched organisation by the
Department of Local Government, which indicated that the structure did not reflect
service provision levels, and that there were financial difficulties and internal
managerial problems relating to planning and funding. The researched organisation
found that 1989 was a major turning point for the organisation when industrial disputes
surfaced over management authority and the outsourcing of waste services was
finalised. These changes were also influenced by worldwide changes in the public
sector.

From the early to mid 1990s, the Council undertook a major job redesign, introduced
total quality management (TQM) and benchmarking practices. Other changes included
the acquisition of new computer systems, introduction of a program budget format, the
establishment of a consultative committee, and increased contract employment of
senior management staff. The reasons for such changes were continuing financial
pressures, compliance with public sector performance expectations, and various clauses
of the Local Government Acts. While the Council also adopted a "no redundancy
policy” and, work practices were improved, the work environment was significantly
disrupted because of changes in information technology. The Council also started
gathering information to assess performance. The benefits flowing from these changes
were many and the researched organisation perceived these changes as laying a strong
foundation for future reforms. This was evidenced by the strong support by the staff,
endorsement by the Council of consultative approaches to decision-making and other
changes such as improved financial reporting.

During 1993, a revolutionary era began when a new Local Government Act was issued.
As a result of this Act, some important changes took place such as performance based
contracts for senior staff, increased power for the General Manager, reduction of the
President’s power, and performance reporting to the community. The benefits of the
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reform were that the Council has been able to make a smooth transition from a
bureaucratic organisation to a flatter organisation where staff input was used to
improve the quality and quantity of service provisions.

7.2.2

THE DIVISIONS AND THEIR ACTIVITIES

The researched organisation is a hierarchical organisation led by an elected Shire
President. The President represents the Councillors, and a General Manager, the next
position in the hierarchy, who is responsible to the Council. The next two positions in
the hierarchy are the support arms of the General Manager. The first comprises three
units, the Communications, the Corporate Development, and the Strategic Planning
unit, which are headed by managers who report directly to the General Manager on
policy matters. The other arm is an independent position, the internal Ombudsman, who
was recently added to the organisation structure. Creation of this position in 1999 was
the first of its kind in New South Wales and only the second in Australia, to facilitate
complaint-handling procedures. Two part time officers also assist the Internal
Ombudsman. The position is significant in improving the efficiency, transparency and
accountability of management. This position is perceived as crucial, both to internal
management and to the community. Table 7.1 shows the key roles of this Ombudsman.
TABLE 7.1: THE ROLES OF THE OMBUDSMAN
RESPONSIBILITIES
•
•
•
•

handle complaints about Council's administration, perceived as adversely affected persons or
parties
investigate and report on these complaints
resolve complaints in a fair and effective way
promote improved administration
Source: Annual report 2000, p. 16

The Ombudsman cannot overturn any decision already made by the Council. To assist
the Ombudsman, the Council is contemplating the preparation of working guidelines to
provide direction, powers and jurisdiction. The Ombudsman reports to the Council on a
six-monthly basis.
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The overall responsibilities of the Ombudsman are to assure the transparency of
decisions by Council and to act as the ratepayers’ watchdog. From November 1999 to
June 2000, the Office of the Ombudsman received 66 complaints largely about
Council's defective development application process. Among those, 28 were about
operational issues affecting the local ratepayers (Annual Report, The Council, 20002001, p.16).

7.2.3

THE SUPPORT DIVISIONS

At the time of data collection for this thesis, the Council had ten support divisions
assisting the operations divisions and reciprocating services among the other service
departments. The roles and the functions of these divisions are discussed next.

7.2.3.1 COMMUNICATION AND CORPORATE DEVELOPMENT DIVISION

The first unit is the Communications unit, which mainly liaises with external bodies. Its
principal areas of work include the distribution of information to the media, managing
publications, acting in precinct committees, providing education services in waste
management, holding citizenship ceremonies, and the official opening of events and
occasions. The Corporate Development Unit is headed by a manager who is responsible
for planning administration. This involves the systematic long range planning,
monitoring and reviews of Council’s activities. The Strategic Planning Unit, which is
headed by a manager reporting to the General Manager, facilitates planning for the
future. In the planning process, the unit encourages and seeks support from the local
residents. It also carries out research and development activities, and develops
strategies to achieve planned outcomes. Finally, the unit develops performance
indicators for the activities performed by different divisions. The unit also produces a
yearly Community Report and distributes it to the ratepayers.

A Director holds the top position in the Council’s organisational structure shown in
Figure 7.1 below (see also Appendix 7.1 for details). The divisional directors are
responsible for the functions performed within the divisions. The divisions are further
sub-divided into departments and headed by managers. The directors report to the
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General Manager for all the activities during a year. A brief discussion about the
divisions and their activities will shed some light on the functions of each of the
divisions.

FIGURE 7.1: THE ORGANISATION STRUCTURE OF THE COUNCIL

Mayor

Office of the Internal
Ombudsman

DirectorCorporate Services

Communications
Corporate Development
Strategic Planning

General Manager

DirectorCommunity and
Recreation services

Director- Environmental
Services

Director- Engineering

Director- Property

Source: Adapted from the annual report of the Council, 2000

7.2.3.2 THE CORPORATE SERVICES DIVISION

The Corporate Services Division has ten departments performing specialised functions
in five major areas of activities: Administration, Records, Finance, Information
Services, and Personnel.

The administration activities revolve around the Council’s policy matters and decisionmaking processes. The division coordinates all the technical advices and services of all
divisions. These are mainly minutes of meetings and reports. The administration
officers coordinate the preparation of these and forward them to the Councillors for
decision making. The Record Section keeps records and maintains computer files and
157

correspondence and is mainly responsible for the receipt and delivery of internal mail.
It processes 1300 postal articles every day.

The Finance Department is fully responsible for all the financial affairs of the Council,
it prepares the annual budget and estimates, and it collects income, and controls
expenditure. The main sources of revenue collection are: rates on rateable land and user
charges on waste collection and sullage services. The Information Services Unit is
responsible for handling the data storage, retrieval and analysis functions related to the
Council’s activities. The unit maintains records of library catalogues, memberships,
rate information, dog registrations, building and shop licences, and accounts. The
Personnel Department deals with staffing and training issues, workers’ compensation,
health, and safety functions.

7.2.4

PRODUCTION DIVISIONS

There are four service provider divisions within this Council, which provide services
directly to the local residents, though some part of the support services divisions above
also provide services to the local residents. The discussion below shows the main
activities carried out by the provider departments.

The Environmental Management division’s main responsibilities include checking
compliance in building construction, maintenance of public health through
immunisation, air and water quality monitoring, and dog registration. The unit also
ensures the protection of the natural environment and the build environment; it prepares
the planning instruments in consultation with the local community, and coordinates
Council’s planning policies with various external bodies.

The Engineering Division is mainly responsible for construction works, overseeing and
guiding construction carried out by other subdivisions, maintenance of beaches,
bushfire management, and waste services. Construction works include construction and
monitoring of construction of roads, footpaths, gardens, kerbing and guttering,
drainage, parks, wharfs and jetties and public building. Bushfire management is the
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most important other activity carried out by this division. Before the Fire Fighting Act
in 1930, the Council did not have any fire fighting facility. Today, the bushfire brigade
consists of 700 members, including four permanent staff, seven crewmembers and
numerous volunteer fire fighters.

The Community and Recreation Services division is mainly responsible for sport and
recreation work, maintaining libraries, providing community services, maintaining
children's services, and managing entertainment and planning. The Sports and
Recreation department oversees participation in sports and recreation and looks after
the diverse sporting facilities for the ratepayers. The department also manages ovals,
sports grounds, tennis centres, golf courses, swimming and leisure centres, and beaches
to attract users. The Library Department provides library services including lending
books and other reference materials, maintaining newspaper and periodical collections,
cassettes and large print book collections. The department also provides books in other
languages, information videos, local studies collections, maps and photographs of local
areas, and keeps an archive of microfilmed early local newspapers. The library has a
collection of 348,000 books and lends 1.728 million books each year to the users. The
Community Services Department provides consultancy and planning services to local
youth, as well as aged and disabled people. It also co-ordinates all other community
services at local levels. The Children Services department is responsible for caring for
children. It provides day care, and family day care services. Ten long day care service
centres care for 419 children. The department also operates six vacation day care
centres and operates an Entertainment Centre. The centre is a venue for plays,
conferences, concerts, dinners and exhibitions.

Property Division is the fifth and the newest division of the Council. It was set up in
1989 in the wake of shrinking revenues from traditional sources such as rates and
grants. This division is primarily responsible for managing assets owned by the Council
and redirecting investment in property to generate extra income from those assets. This
income complements the Council’s income from other sources, which eventually
enhances the range or the level of services to the ratepayers.
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In sum, the divisions provide different services through different functional
departments (see Appendix 7.2 for the full list of divisions and their services). The
departments provide services, which are too numerous to describe here. It has been
reported that these departments provide more than 400 services. A complete list of
these services is contained in the annual budget of the Council. Appendix 7.3 shows a
sample service provided by one of the departments. As the thesis is about the
accounting aspect of services, the costing aspects of services will be discussed in this
chapter. The budgeting system is an integral part of accounting and the costing of
services and is discussed next.

7.3

THE BUDGETING SYSTEM OF THE COUNCIL

The budget preparation process will be examined here in light of the interviews,
records and artefacts supplied by the organisation. Both the technical processes and
their impact on its users, in their daily work practice and behaviour, will be discussed,
which will then lead to the specific context of overhead allocation practice. The budget
process in general has been standardised over the years. However, the facets of the
budget have changed over the years, leading to different emphases on the usage of
resources and the accountability patterns.

The preparation, revision and adoption of budgets in the Council follow a time frame as
shown in Figure 7.2 below. This time frame in the cycle has been fairly standardised
over the years, although the budget in a given year may be initiated at different times.
The Finance Services Department sets the time frame after endorsement in Council’s
meeting. As part of the management plan, the staff in each of the divisions prepares
their budgets. Finance Resource Management circulates and invites the divisions to
prepare and submit their own budgets in the prescribed format (Council’s slide
presentation, 1997; see Appendix 7.4 for details).
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FIGURE 7.2: THE BUDGET PROCESS IN THE COUNCIL
Prepare draft budget in prescribed format

Submit the draft budget to Finance Dept.

Receive draft budget and distribute budget to
Directors for review/consideration

Distribute draft budget to Councillors
for review

Adoption of draft budget at Council level

Advertise the draft budget for 28 days for public comments

Arrange Council meeting to formally adopt the final draft budget

Source: Council’s internal memos

The budget is initiated from the bottom, prepared in draft form in consultation with
staff within divisions and departments, and submitted to the Finance Services
Department. Once the draft budget has been prepared and submitted to the Finance
Services Department, it is forwarded to staff and committees for comment and review.
The divisional directors review the draft budget for approximately two weeks, after
which the budget is forwarded to the Councillors. Before any review takes place, the
Councillors are briefed about aspects of the budget and the rating strategy for the
budget year. After completing the briefing and review process within a fortnight, the
budget is then forwarded to the Council for adoption (Council’s minute).
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Following the completion of the review by the Councillors, the draft budget is adopted
as part of the Annual Management Plan and is then advertised for 28 days for public
comment. After the deadline of the advertisement period, the budget is forwarded to the
Council’s meeting for formal adoption along with the management plan and the rating
strategy (Council’s minute).

Once the budget is prepared, it is reviewed once in the first quarter of any financial
year, followed by six-weekly reviews. The objective of the review process is to adjust
estimates on the basis of actual income and expenditure. Any revisions are formally
endorsed in the Council meetings (Council’s minute).

In sum, the budget preparation is a routine process and is assisted by staff from every
department of the Council. The budget has been a sourcebook that shows the resource
availability to the users (e.g., by divisions, programs). However, the way it has been
structured and used has varied over the years. The following two subsections will
provide a detailed discussion of budgets prepared during two distinct times of
significance to the Council: the first was prior to the introduction of Local Government
Act of 1993 and the introduction of National Competition Policy, and the second is
after their introduction.

7.3.1

THE OLD BUDETING AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION SYSTEM

The budget of 1991 has been chosen to explain the budgeting practice during the old
era. This is deliberately done, as it was the year when one of the bids, discussed in
Chapter 9, was prepared by the Council. This old system of budgeting was used until
1997/98 when a reform in the competitive and the financial reporting environment
changed the way the Council carried out its operations and showed its accountability to
the funders. The budget is seen from two different perspectives: first as a technical
process during the old budgeting era, and second in relation to its impact on the users.

The first aspect shows the budget preparation process. It commences from the initiation
to the final approval of the budget by the Councillors. The budget document was
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circulated to the Divisions after the final approval in a Council meeting. It was an
‘input based budget’ suggesting the combined existence of resources (expenses) and
outcome/s (the services received by citizens) into one, the ‘expenditures’. That is, the
relation between input and /output was obscure. One respondent described the
attributes of the old budget as:
My view about the old budgeting system is that the main focus was on inputs, that is, the money
available for spending on the programs of each of the departments. Because of the regulatory nature
of councils, we never had to account for the spending in relation to outputs. The only focus was,
therefore, on the way the money was spent and the time frame of the spending. No unspent amount
was permitted to carry forward to the next period. So there was an incentive to the mangers to spend
it quickly and within the allocated period, which was usually one year. The budgets were prepared
on a base figure plus a certain percentage difference from the base year (Interview, Director of
Corporate Development, 1998).

The old budget was prepared first in a summary format, shown in Table 7.2, to
determine the working fund situation at summary budget level.

TABLE 7.2: THE OLD BUDGET FORMAT
Estimated income
Less: estimated expenditure
Operating results-deficit/surplus
Source:
The fund
budget
(1991)
+/-working
surplus/deficit
during the year
Working fund for the year (net)

*******
*******
*******
*******
*******

Source: The budget of the researched Council (1991)

The program budget format was a summary format of the budget at functional
departmental/divisional level. It combined the Operating and Capital Expenditure
budgets in the expenditure side and the sources of meeting the expenditures on the
revenue side. The objective of preparing this program budget was to know, on a
periodic basis, the expected level of working funds.

For ease of understanding and allocation, the budgets were also prepared by functional
departments (see Appendix 7.5 for details). The functional divisional budget was
aggregated. Capital and operating budgets were also combined for each
divisional/departmental budget.
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After this level, the budget was further broken down from the divisional to the subprogram (the lowest level of detail activity performed within a division) level shown in
Figure 7.3 below. Overall, the divisional budget had four steps and was aimed to
facilitate the measurement of funds spent on programs at divisional level by
accumulating cost data (the expenditure from allocated budget) from the bottom (the
sub-program) to the top level (the divisional program).
FIGURE 7.3: BUDGET FORMAT AT DIVISIONAL LEVEL
Divisional program

Major program

e.g. Financial and Accounting Services

Component Program

e.g. Financial Services

Sub Program

Source: The Budget (1991)
For each of these structures, the program objectives were set, as were corresponding
outputs or the Key Performance Indicators. In order to meet those objectives, resource
requirements were also estimated, and the person responsible for the programs was
clearly indicated. Since the services were continuous in nature, service levels were also
clearly spelled out. That meant that the way of achieving the objectives was also clearly
spelled out. Longer -term considerations in each of the areas of the programs were also
considered carefully.

To calculate program costs, in an input sense, the components were further segregated
into sub–programs (see Appendix 7.5 for further details) whose costs were further
divided into Operating costs and Capital expenditures. The aggregate costs of these two
were the cost of the sub-programs. The sub-program cost calculation shown below
always carried a share of labour on-costs. In the old budgeting format, however, no
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attempts were made to allocate the common or the centralised support department
costs.

The cost of the programs provided the building blocks for the sourcing of funds for
meeting costs. The usual process was to deduct any direct income from the services at
the beginning to determine the need for further financing. Rates and General Revenue
were the most common sources of meeting the program costs (see Appendix 7.5 for
further details). The other common sources were grants from the Federal and the State
Governments.

The difference between the two sides of the budget and the surplus of revenue from
past years resulted in a working fund surplus/deficit for the budget year. Figure 7.4
below shows the trend in the working fund surplus/deficit situation over the last 10
years.

FIGURE 7.4: TRENDS IN REVENUE SOURCES 1988-‘99
Sources of budget revenues

revenues in million dollars
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Source:The Internal Competition Policy of the council, 1997

In sum, the technical process of the old budget was a series of steps followed to
determine the expenditure and the revenue estimates. To facilitate clarity and
understanding, the budget was prepared in two different formats, the program format
and the statutory format, shown in Appendix 7.5. Further, the expenditure and income
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estimates were prepared in greater detail to know the fund estimate at sub-program
level and to establish a relationship between the allocated funds and the progressive
spending of those funds, ignoring the relationship between the desired outcome and the
level of spending. This technical process of the budget had obvious impacts on the
users on their purposes.

The second aspect of the budget, its impact on users, shows how the budget was
perceived by them, how it served their purposes, and how it enabled them both to
determine the efficiency, and effectiveness of resource usage and to exact their
accountability to the providers of funds such as the ratepayers and/or the state/federal
governments.

The users mainly used the old budget for two distinct purposes- to calculate the costs of
programs and to determine the transfer pricing of services. The calculation of cost of
programs was done using departmental sub-programs. The ‘cost’ included all costs of
direct material, direct labour and labour on-costs but excluded other overheads. The
calculation process was cumulative in nature and did not have any relation to the stage
of completion of the specific cost object (e.g., completion of a bus shelter). A few
justifications were advanced by the respondents: the monopoly nature of the service,
the nature or reports demanded by the users, the nature of internal information
requirements, the absence of a sophisticated accounting information system, and the
person with requisite skills to be able to process the information. These imply that the
operations of the Council were not congenial to calculating the cost of outputs or
programs very accurately, let alone precisely.

The cost calculation was perceived as a defective system, as it did not meet the costing
requirements of the operations departments. In some divisions of the Council, the
system was needed for job costing but the users could not use it because of the absence
of complete information. Some operations departments reported the inadequacy of
calculating on-costs of the programs. The users of this crude ‘cost’ calculation process
described it as an ‘awful system’ capable of doing nothing for them. One of the major
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users indicated that the system was ‘under costing’ (inaccurately costing) services
because there was no system of calculating overheads for the ‘cost objects’. Though
these perceptions were realised only recently, after the new budgeting system emerged,
some users gave a retrospective account endorsing the old budget.1 One respondent of a
major operations division stated:
For my purpose it is fine. It provided enough information that I needed. I needed the information
and income on the sports centre and the golf courses. That’s what I used the budget for plus it is
in the right structure. So I didn’t have any problem with the [old] budget.” (Interview, Manager
of Leisure Centre, 15 September 1998)

Though calculation of cost was not necessary in the old regime of budgeting, the
accounting implications of the old budget for users were many. The accountability
structure was defective, and second, the efficiency of the resource usage and
effectiveness of the fund usage could not be correctly known. Even though these issues
and the cost calculation were inextricably linked, the Council still used other ‘crude
methods’ to supplement its daily costing needs. One such system was an internal
transfer pricing system for recurring transactions.

Under the transfer pricing system, transfer prices were charged for intermediate
outputs, either from one operations department to another or from one support
department to another support or operations department. In the old budgeting system,
transfer pricing was the recognition of intra-divisional resource allocation when a unit
sold services to the others at a cost plus a mark-up. The cost of the seller usually
included the direct costs of the inputs used, such as direct material, direct labour, and
labour on-costs. Other costs including overheads were excluded from such calculations.
The mark-up usually covered the notional profit element to the seller departments.
Because the budget was input based, the recipients were sceptical about the accuracy of
the transfer prices and the charging of the services. Some users, therefore, perceived the
existence of such transfer prices as counterproductive.

1

Interview with various personnel within the Council between September 1998 and December 1998. For
details, please see Appendix 6.2 of this thesis.
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There were obvious limitations of such transfer prices. First, even though the Council
made it compulsory to use the transfer pricing system, some of the recipients of the
transferred services remarked that the system was deficient in showing the resource
flows. Second, it was also revealed that the system made the services expensive, as
inefficiencies in selling departments were passed on to recipient departments. Though
the Council’s defence was ‘rationalisation of integrity’, the affected divisions
demanded more ‘autonomy’ in sourcing the same services from the market at a cheaper
cost. Third, the input based budget did not allow tracing of the relationship between the
transferred cost and the level of the services transferred. This was necessary to know
the volume/cost relation. The monopoly status of the Council also hindered the
exploration of inefficiency or other attributes of the transferred costs. 2

The impact of the old budgeting system on efficiency, effectiveness and the resultant
impact on accountability was the last issue revealed from the field data. The efficiency
aspect of the old budget was seen in terms of inputs because of the monopoly nature of
the services and the inadequacy of the Council’s accounting information systems. The
resources used (i.e., funds utilised) on the day of the budget were the gauges of
efficiency of the unit/program under study. The implication of such a system was that
the users tended to join in a spending spree rather than focus on achieving the goals of
particular programs or services. The effectiveness issue was an offshoot of the
efficiency issue, because, without a sound system of measuring efficiency, the
effectiveness issue (relating to achieving goals, e.g., outcome of a program at a given
cost or given time) could not be measured or used meaningfully. The accountability
issue was dependent both on efficiency and effectiveness issues and was perceived as
providing incorrect signals to the users of such information. The allocated budgets to
divisions and accountability were inextricably linked, and accountability was tied to
spending of funds against the allocated funds. In other words, cost control was the
focus. One of the respondents summed up all the aspects of the old budget as:
The accounting implication of such a budget was terrible. It had a vacuum in terms of ensuring
accountability of the departments/managers responsible for the budgets. In terms of efficiency
2

Interviews with various managers in operations areas recorded between September 1998 to December
1998. For details, please see Appendix 6.2 of this thesis.
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and effectiveness of the old budget, corporate control did not help at all. In the old budget
format, dependencies were completely ignored. I mean the reciprocity of the services was
completely ignored (Interview, Manager, Corporate Development Unit, 1998).

In sum, the old budget was an input-based budget, having a narrow focus on linking
funds to the outcomes of spending of such funds. The cost calculation was the major
reason for using it, though it was useful, to some extent, to calculate approximate
transfer prices, to determine efficiency and effectiveness, and accountability. The key
features of this system can be summarised as follows:
•

it was a fund based accounting system, not related to the outcome of the spending of
funds;

•

monopolistic supply of services restricted the full potential application of the fundbased system to calculate cost or determine subsidy in services;

•

performance measurement was difficult;

•

separation of ‘individual performance’ and ‘total performance’ of the departments
was absent;

•

accountability was ambiguous;

•

gauging the efficiency and effectiveness of fund utilisation was not possible because
of input-centred reporting, and absence of incentives for containing resource
utilisation;

•

support services costs were never accounted for in program costs; and

•

inefficiency of support and corporate departments was never scrutinised.

There were no provisions for a citizen-organisational interface through the accounting
system. That is, it was too inward looking a system. The old budgeting system was
replaced in 1997/98 by a new one to address the deficiencies of the old budgeting
system.

7.3.2

THE NEW BUDGETING AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION SYSTEM

The new budgeting system became operational in1997/98. This new budget was
markedly different from the old one in that it embraced ongoing organisational change,
the changes to private sector commercial management and accounting principles in the
conduct of day-to-day activities, and established a better overall accountability
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structure in the newly created funder/provider arrangement. Though the change was
evolutionary, the change itself had a revolutionary impact on the accounting and
financial reporting systems. The discussion below describes the technical processes of
the new budgeting system and its impact on the users.

The new budget was firstly sold to the staff as a superior technical document to assist in
using the funds more efficiently and effectively. The budget was introduced for the
following reasons:
•

to comply with the requirements of the national competition policy and the internal
competition policy of the council;

•

to improve managing the resource allocation in a purchaser/provider system;

•

to improve accountability, efficiency and effectiveness of the utilisation of the
allocated budget;

•

to improve performance measurements at individual, team, divisions, and programs
levels; and

•

to monitor input-output relationships, progressive spending of budgets, and the
competitive costing of services.
Sources: Interviews with staff members, 1998; Council’s internal documents.

The new budget is very similar to the old budget. That is, it is prepared in program, and
the organisational formats. The objective of each is to determine the working fund
situation at the end of the financial year. The budget is further broken down into
budgets for funding and providing departments. The funding department’s budgets
show the fund availability and the providing departments’ budget show the cost of the
service provision.

The new budget is printed in two different formats - one in a summarised version of the
funder’s budget (or the Planning Unit’s budget) while the other is for the provider
unit’s (commissioning unit’s) budget. The budgets also show the division of funds by
nature e.g. capital and revenue expenditures. The funder unit’s total budget is also
classified by modifying the ABC cost hierarchy posited by (Cooper, 1990) to suit the
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Council’s reporting environment. The classifications of these costs are: Corporate
costs, Governance costs, Planning and Commissioning Unit's funding budgets, and
finally, indirect income. It also shows the following:
• the Planning and Commissioning unit's direct costs;
• the Planning and Commissioning unit's labour overheads;
• internal provider costs (the funding provided to internal units);
• external income; and
• nett expenditure (funded by Indirect income).
(Source: The Council’s slide presentation)

The second part of the budget (printed on blue pages), on the other hand, shows the
details of expenses and income of those units where the service is provided internallythat is, from in-house sources.

Both documents show all items in summary-detail format. In the summary pages, the
budgets are shown by items and corresponding aggregate dollar amounts in each areas
of expenditure. The detailed part, which follows the summary parts, shows the
breakdown of items and their corresponding dollar amounts, listed in the summary part.
The detailed part of the budgets normally shows the following:
• direct unit costs;
• labour overheads;
• internal service costs (from support departments and also from other operations);
• external direct income;
• nett expenditure; and
• the funding supplied from the Planning unit.
Sources: The interviews with staff, 1998; Council’s budget document 1998-99.

There are a few implications of preparing the budget for funders and providers. First,
the Council wanted to separate funding from service provision to avoid duplication of
roles and /or the jobs of the same unit or the person. This is part of the Council’s
171

ongoing reform program. Second, service provision is distanced from decision-making
in line with the objective of the National Competition Policy, which required the
Council to be transparent and efficient in service provision. The argument is that if the
provisions of the National Competition Policy were to be effective, services should be
market tested for sourcing from the best provider, which may be the in-house team or
an external contractor. Until a decision is made with respect to a supplier, the supply of
funding is a redundant activity and the Planning Unit took the stewardship
responsibility of those funds. The third implication was that the controllable and noncontrollable performance of the staff in the service provider departments was separated.

The budget was also prepared in detail for all the provider divisions in order to
determine and reconcile funding needs. The objective of preparing the budget in this
manner was to determine both the nett expenditure on programs and the aggregated
costs of all programs at divisional level. Like the old budget, this budget was also
categorised into Operating or recurring budgets and the capital budgets. By combining
the operating and capital budgets and deducting direct/indirect income, the Council
determined the nett expenditure representing the funding need. In other words, in the
new budget, the program costs were calculated in two distinct steps as shown below.

Step One: The Calculation of Expenditure on Programs
Direct unit costs (i.e. Costs of the provider units)
+ Labour overheads
+ Internal provider costs
Total expenditure
Step Two: The calculation of Nett Expenditure (or Funding from Funders)
Total Expenditures (calculated in step one)
- External direct income
Nett expenditure on programs

(Source: The Council’s budget, 1997/98).
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The elements of the new budget for cost calculation purposes were also similar to the
old budget. However, in this budget the internal provider cost was different and
comprised two cost elements. The first element was the direct cost of the provider
units, either the other operations areas or the support areas or both, and a transfer price
on top of that. In the new budget, overhead was loaded into the internal provider
divisions/departments and was part of the program expenditure (step one). Overhead
allocation is discussed in Chapter 8.

The users’ perspectives about the uses of the budget are also important to know to
understand the usefulness of budget. The perspectives stemmed from the reasons for
implementation, perceptions about the usage, the impact of the new budget on the
efficiency and effectiveness of the funds spent, and the resultant accountability
emanating from the efficiency and effectiveness issues. Discussion and interviews
revealed performance evaluation to be another important use of the budget document.

The retrospective view of cost calculation was that the budget could be used to
calculate the cost of programs or sub-programs. Though the Council has a separate
section to deal with costing issues, the user departments were also able to use
information supplied to them to meet their costing needs. The budgets show how the
cost of programs comprised all direct costs of units and the internal provider costs to
calculate the gross expenditure of the programs (see Appendix 7.6 for details). The
internal provider costs included the support unit costs, which included the information
about the transfer prices of goods. As the costing issues will be discussed at length
later, transfer prices from the user point of view are discussed briefly here.

The users of the new budget are able to get information about transfer prices from the
provider unit’s budgets. It is included as part of the internal provider costs. Transfer
prices were extensively used by the operations departments to receive intermediate
services from support and/or other operations departments. The new budget contained
information in brief about the dollar value of services and also a breakdown of the
transferred items and their corresponding costs. The suppliers of such services are able
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to charge profits on top of their costs. Unlike transfer prices in the old era, transfer
prices now carry a share of overheads according to the ABC methodology. As the
management accountants dealt with the overheads as part of the newly developed ABC
systems, the discussion of them is included in the overhead allocation section in
Chapter 8.

There are other perceptions about the new budget. It was revealed as a better budget in
terms of showing the resource flow, and it was easy for the users at department level as
they could clearly identify their needs and the means of getting those resources to
perform their tasks. This is further enhanced by the clear separation of funding (the
supply side) from commissioning (provider) of the services. One respondent
summarised the added benefit of the new budget, especially the purchaser/provider split
as:

The technical aspects of the new budget are quite noteworthy. It is very easy to follow for our
own departmental use. There is clear separation between provision of funds (supply side of
budget) and the expected outcome from programs for the funds held (demand side of the
budget). To facilitate and ensure accountability and pinpoint responsibilities, the demand side is
vested with the Commissioning units and the supply side is vested with the Planning units. Even
though both the units need to report to the same departmental or divisional directors, they will
work independently as agents of management and the community (Interview, Manager, Building
Services, 8 October, 1998).

Another respondent commented on the implications of resource flows on accountability
and cost control:

Obviously the new system is lot better than the old system. I mentioned earlier and reaffirming
my position that the new system sheds ample light to pinpoint the resource flows. This is very
much needed when we use very complex structure to provide the services. Previously we missed
lots of costs because we clearly did not know where the money was spent. This new system
addresses this issue and makes the resource flow more visible. We are clearly able to identify the
persons responsible for the incidence of costs (Interview, Managers, Children’s Services, 1998).

The efficiency of resource usage builds primarily on the clear visibility of resources,
persons spending resources on services, and the mechanism of capturing the usage
information. Both the discussion and interviews suggested that the competition brought
in by the National Competition Policy and the purchaser-provider split have added
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pressure on the users to identify wastage and improve the efficiency of the workforce to
‘do more with less’. One of the respondents made the following remarks about the
efficiency aspect of the new budget:
It has improved a lot since the introduction of the new costing system. … We are able to identify
areas where we can do the same job but at a lower cost. Recently we have identified “0.8
million” dollars worth of efficiency in different areas. We are delivering the same level and the
same quality job but managed to save “0.8 million” dollars per annum. (Interview, Assistant
Manager, Corporate Development Unit, 1998).

The Council was actually gauging the efficiency of the fund utilisation in terms of
quantitative savings without sacrificing quality. The efficiency issue is considered
particularly important because of the declining revenue bases over the years. If funds
can be efficiently used against the stated criteria of the programs or functions by the
planning units (or the purchasers), the effectiveness issues can be guaranteed in that the
services can be measured and compared in terms of the service specification. It was
revealed that the Council was taking every step to ensure that the users of services had
their say in specifying their needs. For example, the business units of the Council
specified their services in consultation with the local ratepayers and/or users of similar
services. The Council ran satisfaction surveys and the surveys provided excellent
feedback. Though it is not an exhaustive picture, the Council perceived such feedback
as indicators of effective service delivery.

The accountability issue emanated from the efficiency and effectiveness of services.
Under the new budgeting system, there were systems of clearer and transparent
accountability in the cost centres. It was stated that the business units were cautious
about their outputs and that they were striving to become competitive. In particular, the
separation of purchasers from providers ensured greater accountability on both sides
within the Council. The providers were also more cautious about their accountability to
the ratepayers. To ensure the discharge of accountability, the Council published
satisfaction surveys, set up a call centre to receive complaints from the ratepayers, and
also appointed an Ombudsman to handle issues of non-compliance and/or grievances of
ratepayers.
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It was also revealed that the new budget was suitable for cost comparison purposes.
Cost comparison was possible because of the acceptable costing of services. One
respondent reported:
As far as the comparison of costs is concerned, the new budget is a better one at least. Because it
attempts to allocate overheads, the transfer pricing system has been better addressed and more
streamlined. These portray a better environment to cost services. The old costing system was
somehow biased in this regard (Interview, Manager, Survey and Design, 1998).

In sum, the technical aspects of the new budget were shown to be better than those of
the old one. The new budget also better portrayed resource flow across the
organisation. This was perceived to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the
services. Cost and the transfer pricing aspects were better dealt with in the new budget
because of the inclusion of all costs incurred within the Council. Finally, the new
budget provided a unique opportunity to compare costs. This cost comparison,
however, was done differently from past practices when the Council was operating in a
monopoly environment.

7.4

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter has provided a brief overview of the organisation, its structure, its
functions, and the budgeting and resource allocation systems in two different eras,
before and after reforms were implemented in 1995.

The Council embraced reforms in the early 1990s to address ongoing problems with its
governance structures and costs. The main aim was to cut down costs and be more
efficient in providing services to the residents. While such changes were undertaken
following similar changes in the UK and other Western countries, the reforms were
repeatedly undertaken in hindsight. Intellectual currents, reforms in other tiers of the
public sector and the pressure from within local government helped consolidate the
organisational reform process. The central theme of cutting down costs was reinforced
by other peripheral changes such as those in accounting and budgeting systems,
planning, corporate styles of management, competitive provision of selected services,
tiering of services according to annual budget, and scrutiny of services for efficiency.
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These were broadly considered as ‘accounting changes’, affecting the overall
accounting and resource allocation system of the Council.

The old resource allocation system was in vogue before the Council undertook the
public sector reforms in 1995. Prior to this date, this allocation system was used
interchangeably for service provision and departmental fund holding for service
provision. This was indeed an input-based system, which was intended to contain costs,
rather than aligning costs and services. Accountability, efficiency and effectiveness
issues were difficult to measure, and no formal system was in practice to ensure that the
recipients of the services were receiving the correct level of services for their rates. The
loopholes in the Local Government Act, as well as the lack of regulatory control, and
oversight function by the relevant governmental bodies, also contributed to such
neglect.

When the new resource allocation system was introduced, the changes took place in
regard to the management of budgets to include the introduction of competition from
business units, the aligning of inputs to outputs, by adopting Key Performance
Indicators, compulsory market testing, benchmarking of services where a service is a
critical service to the community, determination of full cost prices for all the services,
and tighter scrutiny of contracted out services.

In the next chapters, the use of resource allocation and its accounting for various
decisions are elaborated on. Especifically, the transition from cash-based accounting to
accrual-based budget; the costing of services after the local government reforms, and
the costing for outsourcing issues will be discussed.
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CHAPTER 8
THE OUTSOURCING AND OVERHEAD
ALLOCATION POLICIES AND PRACTICES: THE
PRE AND POST REFORM EXPERIENCES
EXPERIENCES
8.1

INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter it was indicated that the budget was the main hub of all the
activities in the Council. The budget allocation and the overhead allocation process
were intertwined. Prior to the introduction of the new budgeting system, overhead
allocation, while perceived as a problem, was never practised. Rather, the Council
followed its own policies until 1995 when competition for the provision of services was
introduced. Once competition was introduced, the practice of overhead allocation was
reshaped after commercial practices. This change was an organisation-wide change and
was done in phases. The reasons for introducing an overhead allocation system were
treated differently in response to needs in two different areas: the regulated segment
and the non-regulated segment of the services. The non-regulated (or competitive)
sector of the Council was targeted as the prime user of the changed system on a
recurrent basis, and especially for sourcing services from the most efficient provider/s.

Following the earlier discussion about the cost cutting measures through an
organisational reform process, the Council also embarked on accounting changes. In
implementing accrual accounting and commercial style cost management practices the
Council sought assistance from other city councils, professional firms, and its corporate
development unit.

This chapter will draw an overall picture of the outsourcing policies and practices in the
Council, the costing system in use since it began outsourcing, and the overall overhead
allocation practices before and after the public sector reforms were implemented. The
specific objectives of this chapter are:
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•

to explore the overall cost allocation process prior to 1995;

•

to explore the organisational reasons for using the old resource allocation
system;

•

to explore the defects of the old resource allocation system;

•

to evaluate the perspective of the users of the old budgeting system;

•

to discuss the background to the change to an improved resource allocation
system;

•

to provide a brief discussion about the new overhead allocation system and the
methodology employed to allocate overheads under the new system;

•

to provide an overview of the perspective of the users of the new system;

•

to introduce the practice of sourcing of services;

•

to explore the roles of the overhead allocation system in preparing internal bids,
if any, for publicly tendered services; and

•

to investigate the role of overhead allocation in costing of competitive in-house
bids, if any, of the competitive business segment of the Council.

The chapter is organised as follows: in section 8.2; outsourcing policies and practices
will be discussed (between 1989-1998); in section 8.3 overhead allocation practices
will be discussed; in section 8.4 accounting and cost management changes after the
public sector reform will be discussed; in section 8.5 the overhead allocation in the new
era (after 1995) will be discussed, and finally this chapter will be summarised in section
8.6.

8.2

THE OUTSOURCING POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN THE
RESEARCHED ORGANISATION

The Council followed a two-pronged approach to outsource the services. One was
recurring smaller dollar value services, and the other was big-ticket non-recurring
services. Some rationales were put forward for and against the sourcing policy. The
Council used outsourcing for a range of services and the practice dated back to the
early 1970s. Most of the services outsourced were either small in dollar value or
occasional in nature. These smaller value items did not require any rigorous process
before contracting out. The interviews revealed that the Council had a policy of
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outsourcing some items based on either cost savings or irregular demands of the
ratepayers.
8.2.1

THE ARGUMENTS FOR CONTRACTING

Outsourcing has long been claimed to provide specialised skills, cost savings, and
strengthening core competencies of an organisation (Langfield-Smith et al., 2000).
Data were gathered from at least three sources, the interviews, the secondary
documents, and from newspaper clippings about contracting out practices within the
researched Council.

8.2.1.1 ACCESS TO SPECIALISED SKILLS

It is argued in outsourcing literature that outsourcing provides access to specialised
skills, which in turn reduce costs. The contractor or external supplier may not only
possess state- of-the-art technology, expertise and the benefits of economies of scale,
but may allocate the full utilisation of investments, capacities and innovations that may
be unaffordable to the outsourcing firm (Langfield-Smith et al., 2000 pp. 4-5; DavisBlake and Uzzi, 1993).

The Council reported similar arguments for contracting out. Most respondents
interviewed stated that the contracting out was sought when the needs were one-off or
non-recurring in nature. It was also reported that in some areas, a service was
contracted out to satisfy the stakeholders about issues of public concern. For example,
environment related services were investigated and reported on by independent parties
(e.g., external consultants) before they were contracted out. This was done to ensure the
trust of the stakeholders in the Council’s role in important service provision.

Since 1989 numerous services were outsourced on a regular basis to get the benefit of
specialised knowledge. Because the focus of this study is on two sub-units, especially
on bidding methods, a detailed list of all services contracted out was not collected. A
handful of services listed in the Table 8.1 below show the extent, the popularity, and
their underlying reasons for contracting out.
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TABLE 8.1: SERVICES CONTRACTED OUT BY AREA AND THE REASONS FOR
CONTRACTING
Department

Services contracted

Financial
services
Children’s
services

•

Nothing at the time of data collection

•
•
•

Nappy wash
Gardening needs
Disability teams

•

•

Tennis playing facilities

•
•

•
•

•
•
•

Road construction
Specialist design work e.g. landscape
designs
Specialist advice
Environmental impact studies
Design services sub contracting
Structural engineering
Maintenance contracts
Road construction
Design specialists
Expert advises, geo-technical advice and
storm situation
Management and legal advise
Environmental impact study
Specialist works

•
•
•
•

Road construction
Construction of concrete kerbs
Gutter
Asphalt on roads

•

Specialised construction labours

Sports and
Leisure Centre
Civil and Parks
services

Survey and
Design
Building works

Corporate
Development
Civil Works

Building Works

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Reasons for
contracting/not
contracting
• As a matter of policy
•

•
•
•

Employment
difficulties
Lack of scale
economy
Odd working hours
Guaranteeing best
value for money
Work overflow
Expert advice
Secure community
faith

•
•

Specialist expertise
Work overloads

•
•
•
•

Work overflow
Lack of expertise
One-off ness
To gain credibility in
the community

•

Expertise

•
•

Work overload
Specialised
knowledge
Benchmarking with
external providers
Cost savings
Work overload
Specialised skills and
expertise

•
•
•
•

Sources: Interviews, and Council’s internal documents

8.2.1.2 COST SAVINGS

Cost savings alone provides a major rationale for outsourcing. These savings stem from
numerous sources such as efficiency improvements through greater work intensity,
lower wage payments, and economies of scale.
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The Council reported cost savings as a major argument for contracting out. Though the
outsourcing literature predominantly reports cost savings in the commercial sector,
Domberger and Hall (1995) provided evidence of similar cost savings in public sector
organizations in Australia and the UK. Though cost savings calculated in outsourcing
literature directly attributed savings as the difference between the cost of in-house
provision and the cost of external provision, many variables in these studies were not
controlled for complexity, size of contracts, and costing methodology. The respondents
in the Council reported that the method used to calculate cost savings was different
from conventional practice, that is recent literature on local government contracting.

The respondents mentioned that the legislative framework of the Council, the reform in
the competitive environment and competition provisions of the Local Government Act
of 1993 required rigorous market testing and cost comparison before a sourcing
decision was made. The field evidence confirmed that the cost savings were envisaged
by ’sourcing’ from the most efficient source/s. That is, the focus of the sourcing after
market testing was on finding the best possible source to provide the services, at the
cheapest cost for a pre- specified level of quality, and volume of services. For the
Council, the ‘aim was to provide as many services as possible’ from in- house sources,
keeping in mind its role in meeting community service obligations (Internal
Competition Policy, 1997). The efficiency of the services was also coupled with this
agenda. Thus the cost savings revealed by the Council was in sharp contrast to the
previous literature. Whereas earlier literature took the position of external contractors
as a taken for granted source of savings, the field evidence suggested that cost
reduction was possible even through in-house provision. In one of the recently
outsourced services, the Council claimed that cost savings were yet to be achieved. The
respondents revealed that the community service obligations, requirements of the
National Competition Policy and the Local Government Act of 1993, pressure from the
internal workforce, and pressure from the ratepayers put enormous pressure to provide
services from internal sources at the cheapest possible cost. Such savings were
achieved through the competition processes and contracting with the selected best
bidder (according to the Council’s decision makers). This recently emerged trend in
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sourcing decisions influenced the Council to undertake a massive program of market
testing and benchmarking of services.

For the waste services contract in 1989, the bidding process was very much
conventional. Thirteen bidders, including the in-house bidder, bid for waste collection
service. The service was eventually contracted out to an external provider on the basis
of envisaged cost savings, without paying attention to other factors such as the
reputation and capability. The decision to outsource the service, discussed at length in
Chapter 9, later proved to be a disaster and was in-sourced again at minimal cost
savings to the Council. The respondents stated that the cost comparison methodology,
employed in the contracting out decision, was defective and untimely. The decision to
award the contract was prematurely taken without a complete assessment of the merits
of other bids, including the internal bids.

In summary, the Council used cost savings as the dominant rationale for outsourcing
services. The approach to cost savings, however, varied from conventional practice.
Two instances of contracting out, in 1989 and in 1997, were attempts to provide
services from the most efficient sources. In the first instance, cost savings to their
fullest extent were not achieved because of other intervening variables. In the second
case, the contracting attempt proved to be a fiasco because no outsiders bid for the
service. Cost savings, however, were achieved through the competitive bidding process
as the in-house team submitted a bid cheaper than the previous budget level on the
existing level and quality of the services.

8.2.1.3 STRENGTHENING CORE-COMPETENCIES

Quinn and Hilmar (1994) argue that outsourcing allows firms to focus their resources
and efforts on developing or strengthening their core competencies. Outsourcing also
creates advantages through the creation of strategic coalitions with the world’s best
suppliers (Langfield-Smith et al., 2000, p. 5).
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The Council reported a contrasting picture of its philosophy to maintain its core
competencies, blocking competitors and also creating strategic coalition with external
suppliers. In the waste services contracting case, core competency was the key issue
surrounding the outsourcing decision. The Council maintained close ties with the
contractor throughout the contract period but did not endeavour to block the competitor
in any way. In fact, the Council supported the competitor after their engagement by
supplying local knowledge, in-house expertise and knowledge of the staff working in
the waste service area. It also worked as an arbitrator in settling complaints from
residents and liaised with the competitor to perform the services in the best possible
manner.

In the second case the purchaser of the service, the director of the Leisure Centre,
contracted the leisure centre for a term of three years. Though the aim was to save costs
the revamped in-house provider attempted to innovate service delivery methods, reduce
slack in staffing levels and above all develop its ‘core competencies’. At the end of the
market testing and tendering process, the in-house provider, the sole bidder, had won
the contract for a three-year term. Though the potential bidders alleged decision-maker
bias, the bid, as claimed by the interviewee, cut nearly one million dollars through its
innovative approaches in the core service areas.

The other offshoots, the strategic alliance with external parties, as argued by Quinn and
Hilmer (1994), however, did not eventuate. In contrast to their argument, the
philosophy was to consider external providers as ‘competitors’ in the same niche
market.
8.2.2

THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST OUTSOURCING

The downside of outsourcing has many facets. Most especially, it can hollow out an
organisation, which can lose skills and control over key process and technology
(Langfield- Smith et al., 2000).
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8.2.2.1 HOLLOWING OUT OF THE COUNCIL

Eroglou (1994) (quoted in Langfield-Smith et al., 2000) argues that outsourcing can
cause hollowing out in terms of technology and human resources leading to loss of
long-term competitiveness. The Council reported that the hollowing out effect was a
major concern. In the waste services contract, the Council experienced a massive
hollowing out effect. In the wake of poor performance, the contract had to be cancelled
and the services in-sourced again. This controversial contracting episode attracted lots
of public anger and media criticism. The post contracting evaluation of this contract
revealed that the Council lost key staff and the skills to do the job.

However, contrary to Eroglou’s (1994) proposition, the contracting did not hollow out
the technology because the Council had access to state of the art technology. In fact, to
reap the benefit of newer technology and to shift the cost of a huge up-front investment,
contracting out was considered the best alternative. Though this scenario provided an
optimistic picture about the waste contract, the actual objectives of better performance,
cost savings, and efficiency improvements did not eventuate.

In the wake of dissatisfaction from local residents and also of the contractor’s
unwillingness to serve further, the Council had to resolve some problems surrounding
the waste services contract. The problems mainly revolved around the tendering, the
decision making process, the control of the contract after its award, post contract
monitoring of performance, and the remedial measures for contract failure issues.
These issues are dealt with later in the chapter.

In view of the lessons learned from this contract, the Council adopted a different
approach to contracting. This was further enhanced by the recent introduction of the
Local Government Act, the National Competition Policy and also Australian
Accounting Standard 27, all of which affected the second wave of contracting in
different ways, although the National Competition Policy affected the contracting out
the most. The categorisation of services into category I and category II differentiated
the extent and mandate of the contracting procedures.
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Learning from past mistakes, the managers adopted a policy of ‘staying in business’
and ‘making in-house services competitive or at par’ with outside providers and not to
contract out services until significant cost savings were realised. During the data
collection phase, the Council was reshuffling all of its service delivery arrangements
according to its competition policy guidelines (see Appendix 8.1 for an itinerary of its
market testing activities). As a test case, the Council market tested and invited tenders
for its Leisure Centre activities. The in-house team was invited, among others, to bid
for the job. The contract was awarded to the in-house team even though the internal bid
was the only bid for this job. Though no bids were received, it did cause a reduction in
the number of staff working under the contractual arrangement. The contract stipulated
the agreement be between the director of the department (the Purchaser) and the
Provider (the manager of the in-house team) about the level, the quality and the cost of
the services, the penalty for non-performance and other important clauses. The provider
of the in-house team reported that they managed to reduce the number of full-time
equivalent staff through the tendering process and by assigning multiple roles to the
existing staff. Because of the nature of the contract, the loss of human or technical
skills could not be known till the end of the contract.

8.2.2.2 LOSS OF SKILLS, KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERTISE

It is argued in the literature that contracting out may cause loss of physical and human
assets. Once outsourced, a service may be difficult to re-establish, as the expertise and
intellectual capital may be lost well before a reversal decision is made (LangfieldSmith et al., 2000, p. 6; Johnstone, 1997).

The evidence from the field suggests that the Council had gone through an episode
similar to the one mentioned above. However, the staff maintained that the core
competencies were not lost due to contracting. For example, in the past the commercial
and household waste collection was contracted out. A sizeable number of staff lost their
jobs, and were later employed by the contractor. The remaining staff within the service
areas were considered able to maintain core competencies although they were
transferred to other departments. The respondents reiterated that the policy of the
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Council was to provide the maximum number of services from the in-house sources,
and to use contracting as a last resort. Therefore, the evidence collected is contrary to
the proposition of Langfield-Smith et al. (2000).

8.2.2.3 LOSS OF CONTROL

It is argued that contracting out causes loss of control over the services. Once
contracted, information about a contracted service and the technology to provide the
services are shared by the contractor which eventually leads to loss of competitive
strength (Langfield Smith et al., 2000).

The field evidence shows contrasting pictures about the control aspects after
contracting out. In two different cases, the control issues presented contrasting pictures.
The evidence on smaller value services is, however, different and therefore not
discussed in this thesis.

The first contracting out decision was made in 1989, when the waste collection services
were contracted out, the contracting decision was made quickly. Keeping a skeleton
level of core staff in the waste services area, the contracting out decision was made
without giving adequate consideration to costing and staffing issues. The contractor
provided the services to 1990 when they sought permission from the Council to subcontract part of its services. The unwillingness of the contractor to perform according
to the contract specifications, the complaints from the local residents, and other
grievances from the in-house staff led the Council to contemplate the internalisation of
the service. This attracted criticism from the media and from the staff working in the
department previously providing the services. Those criticisms were concerned with
loss of control, and lack of resources to establish control over the service in future, if
needed. Eventually, the Council had to terminate the contract at a massive cost and
assume control over it. The skeleton level of staff helped re-establish the service and
the Council started providing the service once again. The loss of control argument of
Eroglu (1994) above, therefore, is refuted by the evidence. The evidence also revealed
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that instead of gaining a competitive edge, the contractor lost a competitive strength,
and eventually the control of the service was returned to the Council.

In the second contracting out case, the in-house provider won a contract to provide
leisure and recreation services even though no external bidders bid for the service
provision. The minimal loss of control was actually a change in the way the unit was
functioning within the structure of the Council. Under the contractual arrangement, the
unit would be deemed to be an internal contractor, owned and managed by the Council
for the contract period. It would be responsible for the delivery of the service and
manage its own affairs as a business unit, raising revenues from the clients and
reporting back to the director of the department. While there was no significant loss of
human and physical assets there was a minimal reduction in the number of staff
working in the area. But it was reported that the loss of the staffing would not
significantly affect operations in future if the services were again internalised under the
Council’s old structure.

8.3

THE OVERHEAD ALLOCATION ISSUE IN THE COUNCIL

Prior to the introduction of Local Government Act 1993, the researched Council did not
have any overhead allocation culture. It was revealed that the staff members were
unaware of the ‘overhead’ terminology. The staff members reported that the absence of
reporting requirement of cost data, monopoly nature of the activities of the Council,
and the absence of management accounting system, were the three major reasons for
the absence of overhead allocation culture. Though overhead allocation culture did not
exist, the documentary evidence suggests that the accounting staff were practicing
overhead allocation in hindsight. When asked to explain the concept of ‘overheads’,
some of the respondents suggested that overheads comprised all corporate services
department costs. It is a common finding in the management accounting literature that
accounting terminologies are interpreted differently from their literal meanings.
Therefore, their treatments also differ from their deserved treatment (Ellwood, 1996).
In the researched City Council overheads were also interpreted and treated differently
before the introduction of the Local Government Act of 1993 and the public sector
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reform. After the reforms, that is, after 1995, the management accounting control
system changed in response to a competitive environment, the Local Government Act of
1993, and the reporting requirement under Australian Accounting Standards 27. The
new overhead allocation system, a part of the new management accounting control
system, followed commercial sector accounting principles. The overhead allocation
systems prior to 1995, and after local government reform (after 1997/98) are discussed
next.
8.3.1

OVERHEAD ALLOCATION DURING THE OLD ERA (BEFORE 1995)

It has been pointed out earlier that the Council maintained a single budgeting system to
track expenditure on programs or divisions. To calculate the cost of programs requires
a system which recognises elements of costs as expenses. This did not exist in the
Council and it was reported that there were arguments against having a costing system
to accumulate and distribute overheads to numerous Council programs. This was a
monopolistic production environment that used an input based budget. The Council
lacked staff with the expertise and a cost measurement system to calculate costs in an
input based budget environment. In addition there was no need to report the costs of
services to any of its stakeholders. The combined impact of all these forces was that the
overhead allocation system was perceived as useless by the Council. Even though the
share of overheads during 1991 was nearly 35% of the annual budget, the Council
never took the issue seriously. The description, analysis, and implications below, will
shed some light on the overhead allocation issue with specific focus on its role in the
costing of services during the old budget era and its role in the outsourcing of
decisions.

Unlike direct material and direct labour, the two common inputs for any operation,
overhead or common costs in Councils, was not recognised until the budgets were
allocated across the board and the allocation of total resources to the support
departments and corporate departments was known. Without an efficiency check, there
was a tendency in this Council to have a bigger-budget support department, a notion
argued by some authors (e.g., Cooper and Kaplan, 1988; Zimmerman, 1979) as a
common feature of organisations where efficiency checks are poor. This Council
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historically had two support departments, Corporate Development and Finance
Services. The total cost of these two departments accounted for about 35% of the
annual budgets (operating costs), a common finding in studies in cost allocation in
general and the public sector in particular (Bourn and Ezzammel, 1987; Dent, 1991).
When asked about the perceived need for overhead allocation, one respondent replied:
Historically we maintained an input based costing system. Our operations departments used to
cost their own services occasionally but they did not bother adding support department costs.
Because the departmental performance was based on funds spent rather than program outcomes,
they developed a tendency of overspending or spending the entire amount of the budget
regardless of the program outcome/completion. Moreover, accountability was too poor and
ambiguous. We had little interface with the residents about program outcomes. So we did not
know how well we were performing. We never had the mechanism to capture our costs for
comparison purposes because we did not have the technology to do that. I remember 10 years
ago we contemplated one service for outsourcing. That was the first time we realised the need
for allocation. We grappled with that costing exercise, we had to seek advice from one of the big
six accounting firms in Sydney to verify our cost data. Despite all these we did not win the
service and eventually it was contracted out for seven years. We made a conclusion that
overhead allocation must be arbitrary and there is no unique way of allocating it to cost
programs or services. (Interview, Manager of Financial Services and People Resources, 1998)

Some of the respondents also replied that they used overheads to cost programs without
understanding or realising the need for allocation or need for inclusion of support costs
in their program costs. Thus, the costs they calculated comprised the direct costs of
their departments only. This was, however, not the ‘variable cost’ of the programs.
Rather it included the traceable portion of overheads of the service provider
departments. One respondent remarked that such practice encouraged some in-house
provider departments to consume free support services. This practice put enormous
pressure on the support departments; they had to grow to an inefficient level, a point
beyond the needs at the organisational level. The respondent also remarked that they
could address this problem by sourcing cheaper services from external providers. The
respondent strongly argued in favour of introducing disincentives to consume fewer
amounts of support services so that they could realise that the support services were not
free goods (cf. Zimmerman, 1979).

All these tendencies changed when the public sector reforms were introduced and
councils were also hit by the wave of reform to be efficient, effective and economic in
providing their services in competition with the private sector. The National
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Competition Policy reinforced these needs more in that it mandated the councils to
subject most of the services to market testing. Though it was not mandatory in New
South Wales (Jones, 1999), Councils believed that it was the right time to rationalise
deunionisation of their workforce through this tendering exercise. Allocation issues
were at the forefront of this new shift in paradigm, which is discussed next.
8.3.2

COSTING FOR CONTRACTING OUT IN THE OLD ERA (PRIOR TO
1995)

As has been mentioned earlier the Council used budgeting and costing systems
interchangeably for all purposes. It has also been indicated that because of the
monopoly nature of some selected services, the costing of those was not required. Thus,
prior to 1996, no detailed system was in place to cost services for any purpose.

The Council did not maintain any costing system that can be compared with similar
systems used in the commercial sector. The employees provided a few justifications for
not having one. First of all, the Council was the sole provider and was fully responsible
for the provision of the services according to the old Local Government Act. Second, it
did not experience a significant shortfall of revenues from the local residents to meet its
expenditure requirements. Third, the focus of the budgeting system was on control of
costs within the parliamentary approved expenditure limit (see for example, Henderson
and Peirson, 2000). Fourth, there was no mandatory requirement on the Council to have
a detailed costing system along with the budgeting system. The accountability structure
of the Council was centred around the variance analysis of the expenditure and
feedback control on costs. Despite these, the Council contracted out services on a
regular basis when it felt that in-house provision would be either costly or not
necessary in the longer term. Thus costing played very little role or no role at all in
making outsourcing decisions with respect to the recurring but smaller value services.
However, it made a big impact and tempted the finance staff to implement a detailed
costing system when one inefficient service was contemplated for contracting in 1989.

In 1989, the Council first confronted the dilemma of costing the services. The in-house
provider had been hindering the delivery of the services. The unionised workers
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refrained from carrying out their assigned work unless their pay rise claims were met
and workload reduced significantly. The Councillors contemplated contracting out as a
rationalising tool to break the deadlock. The staff in the Financial Services Departments
was approached to assist the Waste Services Department in preparing an internal bid.
This exercise was the first of its kind in the Council; it was labelled as an ‘ad-hoc’
exercise in that the Waste Services department did not have any prior knowledge about
the costs of its services. The Financial Services Department, the Engineering
Department and the Waste Services Department together formed an ad-hoc committee
to complete this ‘ad-hoc’ costing exercise. The final cost figures were, however,
compiled by the Financial Services Department.

The Financial Services staff prepared the ad-hoc bid and had the following steps:
•
•
•
•
•

all the material and labour costs from the Waste Services departments were
clearly identified;
all the transfer prices from other areas were also factored as ‘transferred in’
costs. These transferred in costs carried a mark-up;
all labour on-costs were charged on the direct labour used in the Waste Services
Department;
a part of support department costs was identified on a notional basis; and
the opportunity cost of the funds tied up in the provision of services was loaded
onto the service costs.
(Sources: Internal documents, interviews, and press clippings.)

Even though the bid was prepared on an ad-hoc basis, the preparers were convinced
that the figures were accurate. Later they sent the figures to a specialised accounting
firm for detailed verification. After receipt of confirmation the internal bid was
submitted; it had 16 different options. The cost calculation was later shown to be
incorrect. Howes (1994) argues that an ad-hoc costing system is dangerous in costing
for contracting out situations, as the figures may be incorrect or significantly different
because of the ad-hoc or one-off nature of the exercise. He also contended that a
costing system across the board, especially a complete overhead allocation system, was
necessary to prepare a competitive bid. The Council, however, found that ad-hoc
costing was the only means to calculate a precise bid for the waste services. For the
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time being, the ad-hoc bid proved sufficient to serve the competitive bidding
requirement. The internal bid was submitted within the submission deadline.

8.4

MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING SYSTEM CHANGES
AFTER LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORMS

Following the organisational reform and restructuring that began in the early 1990s, the
Council completed its second wave of changes in accounting, resource allocation and
concomitant changes in other areas, notably in costing for outsourcing. This subsection
will deal with such changes.
8.4.1

THE NATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY

The National Competition Policy is one of the major policy documents used in
Australia in recent times to boost both the international competitiveness of Australia
and the performance of Australian industries (Dollery and Marshall, 1997; Lane, 1997).
The public sector in Australia, being one of the largest in the world1, is also targeted to
come under the purview of this policy, which was also imposed on Australian Local
Governments. The National Competition Policy earmarked some of the services for
delivery in a commercial or businesslike manner (Drollery and Marshall, 1997). To
meet these ends, various policy documents and guidelines, either in the form of
professional publication, Commonwealth Departmental Guidelines, or official
publications from the Auditor General’s offices of each of the states2, steered the
respective units or organisations to cope with the changes pursuant to the National
Competition Policy. The National Competition Policy mandated the adoption of the
guidelines into an entity’s own guidelines.

Local Councils were also given the option to prepare or adapt the National Competition
Policy to suit their particular organisational environment. The Council was a proud
advocate of many of the public sector reforms in Australia and it adapted the National
Competition Policy to suit its own requirements. The adopted version of the National
Competition Policy, the Internal Competition Policy, had the following features:
1

See Stiglitz (1988) for a survey of public sector contribution to GDP and employment.
See various auditor general office’s documents about these and also the Auditor general’s office of
New Zealand
2
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•

the adoption of accrual accounting across the board for financial reporting and
budgeting;

•

the services were divided into category one and category two services3 from a
business perspective;

•

the full costing of services delivered to the ratepayers;

•

the provision of depreciation for some of the infrastructure assets not done
previously;

•

the quality, value for money, effectiveness and efficiency of services were
assured by implementing an ABC system;

•

the key performance indicators in important service areas were developed and
quantified for customer feedback purposes. Internal trading accounts were
prepared within the internal market (in a purchaser-provider scenario); and

•

multi-year forecasts of budgeted income and expenditure were used.

These changes were brought in by the organisational reform program of the early
1990s. The Internal Competition Policy followed the organisational change and
advanced the cost cutting efforts by requiring the Council to refine its Accounting
Information System and the Management Accounting System.
8.4.2

THE ISSUANCE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT 1993

In New South Wales, the old Local Government Act was replaced by the Local
Government Act of 1993, which accommodated some changes in competitive aspects of
service delivery, rules of contracting of services, and the management of assets. In the
researched Council, the major implication was for competition of services and guidance
about tendering. The new legislation also required mandatory supply of some services.
The implications of this legislation were that it put pressure on Councils to produce and
generating cost data for internal use as well as an input to compliance and governance
in the form of published reports to the stakeholders.

3

This is done for market testing of the services. The threshold level of category one and category two
services are two million dollars and one million dollars respectively (Department of Local Government,
1997, p. 7).
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8.4.3

THE AUSTRALIAN ACCOUNTING STANDARD 27

Australian Accounting Standard 27 is one of the specific accounting standards issued
for Local Government bodies in Australia. It encapsulates components of improved
financial reporting to the stakeholders. It requires the councils to improve reporting to
the stakeholders through the adoption of accrual accounting, though the pressure is
more on compliance to various sections and sub-sections of financial reporting. The
implications of this guideline are that the staff will be busier for compliance reporting.
An extensive user of Australian Accounting Standard 27 stated:
The AAS 27 is a pain in the backside. I will explain that to you, it provides good accounting
information and allows us to show our councillors what we should be spending to maintain our
assets. The information required and getting that information is really horrific degree of work for
us. As a manager, that only covers a certain amount of information at the end of the year when
the auditors arrive in the Council. What we actually want to do is that managers take that step
forward and rather than simply having an inventory and some way of modelling costs over time
of some variables…. So out of the AAS 27 came a scientific based methodology for determining
ongoing programs basically independent of any political interference. I finally have a scientific
way of doing this…
At the moment we are providing the data for AAS 27 for all of our assets as required, except for
our drainage assets. We are putting the data on our drainage assets because we haven’t
confirmed the deadlines for AAS 27 as we got an extension of a couple of years. So the greatest
impact of AAS 27 on us as an organisation and the staff involved is really on the Internal
Competition Policy and the impact probably that we see flowing through from the National
Competition Policy and obviously what happened in Victoria. And the desires I believe of both
parties of NSW are to ensure that the local government is seen to providing good services for us.
The employees’ attitude has basically changed. They are now more aware of their costs, they
tended to be more efficient because they understand that they have a threat, a subtle threat. And
if they don’t seem to be efficient, then they will lose their jobs. It’s not a compulsory thing in
New South Wales but that has already been adopted here [in this Council]. If the Survey Office
doesn’t get the job, then the Design Office becomes redundant, they lose their job.
The attitude of some people is very positive and for other people it is significantly negative.
Some people are quite reactive to that, some are worried about the impact of the competition
policy, others have embraced the challenge and have taken that, and other people see it as a
threat. Generally in this Council, most people have seen it as a challenge (Interview, Manager,
Civil Assets, 1998).

This standard also required reporting of non-financial indicators of performance.
However, Council staff perceived the requirements as redundant. Some respondents
also raised concerns about the use of the improved reporting. The debate was consistent
with similar debates in other tiers of Australian public sector financial reporting (Conn,
1996). The concerns revolved around the usefulness of local government financial
statements and the understanding of the contents by the stakeholders.
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In sum, the three policies and standards have a combined impact on changes to the
accounting information system of the Council. These policies and standards reinforce
each other. The National Competition Policy exerted pressure to gain efficiency of
resource usage, to make necessary structural adjustments and to set up infrastructure, in
terms of human resources and other logistics, to embrace the challenges of providing
services through the shrinking revenue bases. On the other hand, the Local Government
Act of 1993 simply outlined and guided the agendas brought in by the National
Competition Policy, specifically the competition rules, and the tendering processes.
Lastly, the Australian Accounting Standard 27 was a ‘watchdog’ for the stakeholders to
ensure external reporting using an accrual accounting format and also to supplement
financial reporting by requiring publication of Key Performance Indicators.

In the wake of the introduction of the above, the staff within the Council added the
‘internal factors’ to the ‘accounting change agenda’. To the employees of some of the
divisions, these are the ‘internal catalysts’ for change to a new system, while to the
employees of the other divisions these are the precursors for change to a system to the
newly emerging organisation structure. Some of the interviewees stated that this was an
‘unnecessary exercise to maintain another white elephant’.4
8.4.4

THE NEED FOR COSTING OF SERVICES

The external catalysts, namely the National Competition Policy, the Local Government
Act of 1993 and the Australian Accounting Standard 27, prompted the Council to
change its accounting system in general and the costing system in particular. These
changes mainly addressed the deficiencies of costing of services under the old regime
and provided valuable data for other areas of management need. Management needed
two specific types of cost data about services in the non-business areas, or those
governed by regulation, and about business activities. This follows the National
Competition Policy guidelines of grouping services according to the annual allocated
budget. For the purposes of mandatory or voluntary competition, services were
categorised according to their annual allocated budget. Services over $2 million dollars
4

One respondent labelled the software as a ‘white elephant’ to mean that it has been an expensive system
to maintain and operate.
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were labelled as Category 1 services and those below $2 million dollars as Category 2
services. Category 1 services were labelled as ‘business activities’ and Category 2 as
‘regulated or non-business’ or ‘monopoly activities’ (Internal Competition Policy,
1997).

Costing of business services was crucial, as the National Competition Policy required
the Council to meet competition from external providers. Seven units were categorised
as business units of the Council, which were required to cost their services either to
face competition or to lose the right of provision. The other Category 2 services were
monopoly in nature and accurate costing of them was not as crucial as for Category 1.
As the old budgeting and accounting systems were incomplete as to costing of both of
these types of services, the Council had to refine its accounting system to meet its
costing needs. The allocation of common costs across the board, which was not done
before, was perceived as the most important area for consideration. The budget of
1998/9 showed that common costs accounted for 35%, or $63 million, of the annual
budget of the Council. Except for the allocated corporate costs, other costs were
previously factored into service cost calculation. The challenge, therefore, was to
address the allocation problem of the common costs incurred under the banner of
‘corporate costs’.
8.4.5

DETERMINING SUBSIDY FOR SERVICES

It is argued in the utility literature that a subsidy is inevitable in the public sector
(Faulhaber, 1975) and that costing systems aid in subsidy determination (Cohen and
Loeb, 1990; Heald, 1996). One offshoot of the costing of services is a determination of
subsidy for the services. Subsidy determination was crucial for the Council in view of
declining revenue bases over the years and recent reforms in the public sector in other
states. These required the Council to look for alternative ways of meeting the
expenditures, because grants from government to meet subsidy needs were declining in
value and in different areas of services. Therefore, it was imperative for the Council to
have an accurate calculation of costs in order to request subsidies from the Federal and
State Government. The implication of this for accounting system change was that
incorrect calculation could direct funds and attract subsidisation internally, or put
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pressure on the current budget in other areas, mostly the neglected or overlooked
regulated areas of service provision.
8.4.6

COSTS FOR DECISION MAKING

One of the major uses of cost data is for decision-making (Horngren et al., 2003). This
Council needed information to make decisions in at least two areas: market testing and
tendering, and benchmarking. Costs for decision making in these areas required the
Council to consider its strategy of ‘providing as many services as possible from internal
sources’ (Internal Competition Policy, 1996).

Tendering and market testing of Category 1 services was the first need for cost data.
The Council decided to adjust its ad-hoc data for use in the bidding or market testing
exercise. The cost data needed to be comparable to the potential bids. The second need,
benchmarking, also required comparable cost data to facilitate service benchmarking.
The objective was to retain the in-house provision of a maximum number of services,
so the staff needed cost data to rationalise the in-house provision of the benchmarked
services, whenever appropriate. As a pilot case, one of the service areas, the Childcare
Services, had used such data to benchmark its services. The service was eventually kept
in-house after rigorous analysis and testing (Interview, Managers, Children’s Services,
September, 1998).

In sum, external and internal pressures required the Council to update its accounting
system. Overhead allocation was the major change area. Other areas were ignored
because of the focus of this thesis and the agreement with the staff of the Council.

8.5

OVERHEAD ALLOCATION SYSTEM IN THE NEW ERA
(AFTER 1995)

Partly because of internal influences and partly for compliance reasons discussed in the
previous section, the Council decided to update its computer software to allocate
resources. The overhead allocation issue received prominence because of the need to
set transfer prices of the in-house support services, to determine full costs of service
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provisions, to benchmark services, to prepare internal bids, and to remind operations
people that support services exist.

In meeting these objectives the Council grappled with the allocation problem because
of the complex nature of the departments, exacerbated by the Purchaser-Provider split.
In this Purchaser-Provider market, transfer pricing created an additional dilemma as to
the charging of the services to other departments. The Council had ten service
departments, which did not allocate costs to the operations departments. The efficiency
of these departments, therefore, was not scrutinised properly. It was revealed during
interviews and discussion with the staff that managers were well aware of the arbitrary
nature of overhead allocation (Baxter, 1947; Thomas, 1969, 1974; Vatter, 1945; Wells,
1970). However, they were also familiar with recent developments about the usefulness
of overhead allocation in cost control, performance evaluation and efficient resource
allocation systems, and cross subsidy determination (cf. Heald, 1996; Horngren et al.,
2003; Zimmerman, 1979). Accordingly, a shift in focus from ‘no allocation’ to
‘allocation’ was gradually emerging.

Within this accounting change agenda, the internal accounting or management
accounting area was emphasised. The principles and techniques used in the support
service or common cost allocation were incomplete at the time of the data collection for
this thesis. The ABC team indicated that the Council would complete the organisationwide implementation of Activity Based Costing by 2000 to meet the demands brought
in by public sector reform.

The Council was finalising the ABC project for implementation across the board and
was planning to use the system to capture overhead consumptions by activities, then by
the divisions and finally, to aggregate the overhead at the organisational level. The
revelation was that the ABC was adopted to suit the internal information needs in a
unique way. Few modifications were done to the system before integrating it within
their decade-old CITIPAC software. The system mainly focused on two aspects: the
organisation-wide common cost allocation and the transfer pricing system from one
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department to the other internal users. The features of the customised ABC system are
discussed next.
8.5.1

THE COST POOL DETERMINATION AND THE COST DRIVER
SELECTION

The Council followed the theory and prescriptions of ABC literature on cost pool
formation. As it defined the cost pools by divisions, it had the tendency to duplicate
cost pools (by divisions or subdivisions or departments). The other characteristics of
their cost pools at the time of the data collection was that they did not consider drilling
down all the activities across the Council and then form the cost pools. This essentially
led them to have the same drivers across different departments. An examination of the
data, however, revealed that the cost driver rates were different.

As the common costs were huge within the diverse and complex resource flow of the
Council, they tested only three division’s common costs for allocations in their pilot
program, and declared their intention to incorporate the other seven department’s
overheads in subsequent years. This was decided to avoid duplication of efforts and
also to test the cost data for accuracy and usefulness in different areas after the support
departments selected the cost drivers shown in Table 8.2 below. It was reported that
they were planning to have about 100 cost drivers for all the support departments.
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TABLE 8.2: LIST OF COST DRIVERS USED IN SUTHERLAND SHIRE (IN THREE SUPPORT
DEPARTMENTS ONLY)
Units
Finance Unit

Fleet management unit
Risk Management unit

Cost drivers
Number of accounts
Per asset account
Per bond
Per collection
Per committee
Per contribution
Per costed account
Per debt
Per grant
Per lease
Per loan
Per project
Per receipt
Pro-rata net expenses
Rate notice
Plant
Vehicles
Claims

Source: Compilation from the Council’s internal documents

8.5.2

THE COST ALLOCATION TO COST OBJECTS

Cost allocation to cost objects was based on the limited number of experimental cost
drivers uncovered at the time of data collection. Only three divisions’ common costs
were allocated across the board. The manager of Financial Services indicated that the
other support departments’ costs were neglected because of time constraints which
stemmed from the urgency of pricing internal bids for submissions. The internal bid
submission was brought into the agenda by the National Competition Policy and the
Internal Competition Policy. In order to comply with the requirements, therefore, other
unallocated divisions’ costs were simply approximated and included into the cost
estimates.

Though there were allegations from a few users about the lack of benefits from the
ABC system, most of the users expressed their satisfaction with the availability and
usefulness of cost data through this new system. They stated that they could at least
relate the inputs to the outputs of their departments/divisions. Though the organisation201

wide use of the common costs was not integrated within the software-based system,
users developed their own ad-hoc estimates of other common costs. Some of the users
showed their indifference to the new ABC system. Overall, this system was perceived
to be a better system and something promising for their future purposes.

In the ABC system, some unique features were used to capture the resource
consumption by services or by divisions. These were: a matrix form of allocation,
transfer pricing based on the ABC system, a negotiated level of services between the
provider departments and the Corporate Development unit to the fullest extent possible,
and resource consumption and resource production for making support services
competitive within three years, treating unabsorbed central support costs as costs of
governance (treating these as capacity costs) (Cooper and Kaplan, 1992; Ganty, 1994).
8.5.3

MATRIX FORM OF ALLOCATION

The matrix form, also known as the reciprocal service allocation system, recognises the
presence of reciprocal services among support departments. It uses simultaneous
equations to determine the marginal cost of an operating department, and the allocated
cost approximates opportunity cost of such services when the cost of production is
linear and there is certainty in the cost model (Kaplan, 1973; Horngren et al., 2003).
Non-linear allocation of overheads can also be done in a complex setting (Kaplan and
Wellam, 1974). Organisations producing a wide range and a huge volume of products
supported by numerous support departments may find this method useful as it has the
potential to capture resource consumption at support centre and operations centre levels
(Zimmerman, 2003).

The researched Council provides a high volume and a wide range of services that
require the support of ten support departments under the new organisation structure.
These departments worked under the ‘Corporate Support Department’. The matrix form
of allocation was planned for full-scale operation from 1 July 1997. This change, in line
with the National Competition Policy, Internal Competition Policy and the Local
Government act of 1993 changes, means that the services required accurate
measurement acceptable to both the users and the providers of support service costs.
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The Corporate Development unit and the Financial Service Department were fully
responsible for the implementation of the reciprocal allocation model (Council’s
internal memo on overhead allocation; Interviews, Manager of Financial Services and
People resources; Manager, Corporate Development Unit, 1998). The interviewees
commented that the support services (of ten support departments)5 were to be sold to
other internal users, mainly the production centres or the external service providers.

The Finance Services Manager reported that they had reciprocal service consumptions
across the support units (Internal memo on overhead allocation; Interview with the
Management Accountant, 1998). This pattern of usage required them to a use matrix
form of allocation. The objective of the matrix form of allocation was, however,
different from the academic prescriptions. Whereas academics prescribe that the end
product of this allocation is to determine the product costs or service costs (Horngren et
al., 2003), the Council took the issue one step further. Their objective was to develop
‘charge out principles’ (Johnson and Loewe, 1987; King et al., 1994) and sound
transfer pricing policies across the Council for services generated in those support
units. The cost of support units was targeted to facilitate comparison with similar
services available from arms length sources e.g. market. The process of allocation
followed two sequential phases.

First, all the costs incurred to support functions were summed up. The summed up cost
comprised all the support services costs within each of the support departments. In the
second step, the summed up costs were divided into four distinct cost categories (cf.
Cooper, 1990; Council’s internal document, 1997). The Council followed the same
principles and categorised all the support units’ costs into four distinct categories
(Council’s internal document, 1997). Cooper (1990) classified activity-based costs into
four distinct categories: product level costs, batch level costs, product sustaining costs
and facility sustaining costs (see also, Horngren et al., 2003, p. 144) The Council

5

The support department are: Finance, Personnel, Information Technology, Corporate Administration, Land
Information, Risk Management, Fleet, Stores and Supply, Property and Non-Divisional Costs (1998-99 Budget of
the Researched Council, p. 2).
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adopted this typology in dividing the support costs in the second step of their cost
classification system as shown in Table 8.3 below.

TABLE 8.3: COST CLASSIFICATION UNDER THE NEW ABC SYSTEM IN THE
RESEARCHED CITY COUNCIL

Group of costs

Definition for allocation purposes

Governance

Resources consumed in supporting Elected
Councillors

Corporate

Directorate, statutory, legislative or costs which have
an unidentified paying customer

Commissioning

Identifiable with the cost centre plus share of
allocated common costs to each of the support area

Support/service units
Resources consumed by support and service units.
Source: Compilation from the Council’s budget 1996/97 and an internal memo on support unit
cost distribution

Their challenge was to translate the costs in Table 8.3 to conform to the ABC cost
classification posited by Cooper (1990). The researched Council perceived the
governance costs as equivalent to facility sustaining, costs that were completely
unavoidable until the closure of the Council’s operations. The Financial Services
Manager suggested that they preferred to expense the governance costs (the last
category of the support costs) as the cost of running the operations of the Council. This
typology is comparable to the cost classification practice of the Council. The
classification has clear objectives and one of the objectives was not to allocate the
governance costs to the service provider departments. The accounting implication of
this was that the cost of the programs was underestimated by the amount of unallocated
support costs. The extent of the distortion may vary with the annual budget, the amount
of support department costs, and the amount of governance costs, derived from the
support departments.
8.5.4

THE TRANSFER PRICING ISSUE

The transfer pricing issue is important for all the departments within the Planning and
Commissioning unit structure. For other non-revenue generating departments, transfer
pricing did not have any implication for their budgets. The Council defined transfer
pricing as a system whereby any department (support or operations) provides services
to another department. The transfer pricing system is a gauge of efficiency of a
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department’s service costs, which will ultimately be benchmarked with similar services
available from a competitive market for such services, if any exists. This was
rationalised as a strategy to push for improving productivity in all areas of the Council.
However, the Council placed a moratorium of three years for this transition. This
timeframe was allowed so that all the divisions could prepare themselves for
competition or improvement in productivity. During this moratorium, the internal users
of services were directed to consume internal services.

The Council required compulsory use of transfer pricing under the new overhead
allocation system introduced after 1 July 1997. The guidelines on transfer pricing
required that the operations departments use internal support costs for at least three
years or until such time as the market testing would be completed for all competitive
services (Council’s internal document; Interview, Manager, Civil Works, 1998). The
support departments, on the other hand, were urged to gain efficiency by improving
productivity and possibly downsizing their departments. Under the transfer pricing
arrangement, transfer prices were charged by the support departments on the basis of
costs plus a mark-up on such costs. The cost of the support departments was based on
the activity drivers and costs calculated according to the activity drivers under the
newly developed ABC System. Once completed, the transfer prices were charged to
operations departments. The recipient department then used these costs as inputs and
added them to their direct costs at program level (see Appendix 8.2 for details). The
recipient departments, however, raised concerns about the practice because some
respondents claimed that the support departments’ inefficiencies were transferred to the
operations departments, which had to pay for the services from their allocated budgets.

Although there were concerns about this transfer of inefficiency the respondents
mentioned that the use of internal services was compulsory, leaving no room for the
refusal of unacceptable transfer prices. This treatment suggests that inefficiencies of
internal services were transferred to the recipient departments. This made the “whole of
service cost” (Annual Budget, 1998/99) uncompetitive in comparison to similar
services in the market. The managers of different divisions thought that accepting the
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changes in the costing system and using transfer pricing might jeopardise the in-house
provision in the long run and make some of the services candidates for mandatory
market testing. Other respondents from business units also expressed these concerns.
However, remedial action was taken in only one of the recently contracted services.
The business unit accepted the support service costs only after benchmarking the costs
with market data, and negotiating transfer prices on the basis of ‘usage’ instead of
‘supplied’ services (cf. Cooper and Kaplan, 1991). The unit also made
recommendations to review the policy of transfer pricing to accommodate strategic
issues and the long-term vision of the Council as a service provider (Interviews,
Provider, Leisure Centre Services; Manager, Civil Works, 1998). To resolve the issue,
the Council used ‘service level agreements’ (Council’s internal document, 1998;
Interview, Manger, Leisure and Recreation services, 1998) to capture the consumption
of support unit costs and allocate those to the user departments.
8.5.5

THE SERVICE LEVEL AGREEMENTS

The new overhead allocation system required the users of support services to negotiate
the service levels with the providers. This was reported as an important step both to
reduce waste at Corporate Support Division level and to improve the competitiveness
of the support services. Finally, the support services departments could adjust their
capacity to their future needs, and become effective and efficient in their service
delivery.

The service level agreements were an integral part of the negotiation of services
between the support departments, and the operations departments directly responsible
for the delivery of regulated or business services. This agreement emerged in response
to the need to be competitive and to do business like other businesses in the
marketplace. Under the arrangement, the level of service needed to be agreed upon
between the suppliers and providers. This service level agreement had implications for
(overhead) cost reduction in that the suppliers would supply only the required quantity.
This view is consistent with the ‘charge out’ models suggested by some authors
(Johnson and Loewe, 1987; King et al., 1994) and local governments in particular
(Kloot, 1999). Though this was not fully operational at the time of the data collection
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for this thesis, there were schedules to implement the system by 2001. The support
departments were working towards adjusting their capacity levels for the longer term
(Interviews, Manager, Civil Works; Manager, Financial Services, 1998).

It is argued that the concept of capacity is important in overhead allocation as it
determines the share of allocated costs to be borne by the departments (Fregman and
Liao, 1981). Under the ABC system, the long-term capacity is used to allocate costs to
pinpoint inefficiency in the shorter term (Cooper and Kaplan, 1992). Such a focus
allows a business to adjust its capacity to provide services efficiently in the long term.

The service level agreement in the researched Council was focused on two
perspectives. The first was the requests of the user departments who negotiate the
required services from support departments. These departments demand support costs
only to the extent of their usage. The second perspective was that of the suppliers of the
support services, who held a long-term view and suggested that they should not get any
oversupply of overhead resources. This was because they believed that the
inefficiencies in other departments were being transferred to the operations departments
through mandatory transfer pricing. The recipients firmly believed that the support
departments were inefficient and their services were more expensive than those
available from the market. Therefore, the transfer prices of the internal support
services, which comprised cost plus a mark-up on cost, were also overcharged. It is
argued in the literature that capacity can be managed in the long term either by getting
rid of some of the surplus capacities or creating an environment to utilise them (Morris
and Noreen, 1994; Ganty, 1994). It is also contended that in the short term, the surplus
capacities should be treated as a loss at the corporate level and no specific segment
should be penalised for slack in another part of an organisation (Cooper and Kaplan,
1992; Ganty, 1994). The discussion and interviews showed that the Council adopted a
long-term view of utilising the excess capacity, by selling the support services to
external parties at a profit (e.g. payroll, information technology, design, ad-hoc
consultancy in all areas etc.). The Council’s view was that this would not require
downsizing the support departments or re-establishing larger ones later. The crucial
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question, however, was over the treatment of unused surplus capacity in the short term.
Some staff members expressed different opinions about this, one of which was to enter
into a contract with the users of support services.
8.5.6

ALIGNING SERVICE PRODUCTION AND SERVICE USAGE

The Council’s concerns over the inefficiency of support departments’ performance
continued because of the lack of allocation and the perception of the users that these
support costs were free. The corporate development unit, while negotiating the volume
of supply of support services to the recipients, noticed the dissatisfaction of the user
departments and kept track of the surplus supply of support services. The concern of
the users was that they could buy the services from outside or they could generate their
own services independently.

The ABC costing system was providing relevant cost data both to the users and to the
providers of services. The Council was trying to align the support resources’ supply
and support resources’ consumption in the longer term (cf. Cooper and Kaplan, 1992;
Morris and Noreen, 1994). This was an effort to transform yellow capacity (excess
capacity) or inefficiency in support service’s department, either to green capacity (that
is creating demand for the excess capacity) for further use (e.g., sale to outsiders such
as selling payroll services, mapping services) in the long run, or to red capacity (that is,
unwanted surplus capacity). The red capacity is clearly unwanted capacity and could be
avoided by retrenching people or transferring them elsewhere over the longer term.
During the interviews, the Finance Manager revealed the Council’s plans to right size
the support departments in the longer-term in order to live with limited resources.
Before resolving the inefficiency issues arising from the surplus capacities (that is,
from the supply of excessive support costs), the Corporate Development unit
recommended expensing (or absorbing) these excess capacity costs as normal operating
expenditures.
8.5.7

ABSORPTION OF SURPLUS SUPPORT SERVICES COSTS

The Council took the view that there would be ways to utilise surplus capacities in the
longer term. They were considering the absorption of support services as a cost of
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governance. Such a view is endorsed as a temporary solution before any longer term
alternatives can be found (Cooper and Kaplan, 1992; Ganty, 1994). The implication of
such a view is that it changes the bottom line unfavourably in the short term. In the
absence of work standards in service industries, it was very difficult to establish a
measure of efficiency and surplus capacity.
8.5.8

THE ABC IMPLEMENTATION PROJECT

Ideally, an ABC implementation project should come before formally introducing the
system. In contrast to ABC implementation literature, the organisation changed its
ABC in the opposite direction. The two key leaders in the ABC project were
interviewed to shed light on the ABC project. These interviews suggested that the ABC
project was initiated at the top level of the Council with the Corporate Development
unit and the Financial Services units working together to perform the groundwork. The
initiative to implement the ABC was part of the Accounting Information Systems
update, which stemmed from calls for compliance with the National Competition
Policy and Internal Competition Policy requirements.

The purpose of the ABC project was to address the accounting agendas imposed by the
public sector reform process in general, and the local government reform process (e.g.,
improving efficiency, competitive tendering etc.) in particular. To disseminate the ideas
of ABC, the Council held familiarisation sessions with the staff. In the first phase, the
integration of ABC with their existing CITIPAC system was contemplated and later
refined. The vendors of the CITIPAC software assisted the Council in customising the
software to cater for the needs of the users. In the second phase, the developers
presented the project to a few of the out-of-state city councils for feedback and
suggestions. One of the Queensland-based city councils provided valuable feedback
about implementation (The Council’s slide presentation, 1998). After the presentation
series, refinements were made to update the software once again. In the final phase of
the dissemination of the ideas, induction sessions were introduced for the employees in
batches, and by areas of operations. Some formal documentation was made available to
the potential users to minimise confusion and maximise the benefit of the usage of the
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software. The ABC project was imposed on the users partially, and also implemented
on demand.

The users were asked to describe the utility of the new ABC system and rate the overall
success of the implementation project. A majority stated that they were happy with the
ABC implementation project. Recalling their past input based budgets and the cost
calculation environment, they stated that ABC was a significant change in showing the
clear visibility of the resource flows across the Council. Common cost allocation was a
major problem in the past, but ABC overcame that by ensuring the inclusion of almost
all the common costs. The users of transfer pricing (within the internal organisation)
reported that they were more satisfied with the provision of the transfer prices within
their CITIPAC software. A few users were unhappy about the inefficiency of some
support departments and expressed their desire to outsource services from arm’s length
sources. To ensure a smooth transition to ABC, the internal users were instructed to use
in-house support services for at least three years. This period was rationalised as the
time period to improve efficiency in the support services departments.

8.6

COST ALLOCATION IN BID PRICING- THE POST
REFORM STORY

Costing for contracting out in the new era put enormous pressure on city councils in
Australia to update their costing systems or to introduce commercial accounting
systems. The introduction of an accrual accounting system and reporting requirement
under Australian Accounting Standard 27 and the introduction of the Local
Government Act 1993 were the other factors that shaped the costing system in general
and expedited the implementation of ABC based bid-costing system in particular. The
new costing system attempted to overcome the deficiencies of the old costing system
following the organisation-wide implementation of the ABC system. During the data
collection, the implementation of ABC in the Council was in progress. The Council
was implementing the new system as a full-fledged system for all purposes, especially
for the costing of bids.
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The new bid costing system was not an independent one. Rather, it was a subset of the
overall costing system implemented in response to the new organisational reform.
According to these changes, the Council mainly addressed the need to transform its
input based resource allocation system to one that was output based. In implementing
such changes, the Financial Resources and Corporate services Departments jointly
developed an organisation-wide overhead allocation system, disregarding the nature of
services provided from each of the divisions/departments. Interviews revealed that such
a system was perceived necessary to bring equity and fairness in allocating budgets and
relating them to outcomes, measured through the Key Performance Indicators in each
area. This information was supplemented by feedback from the complaint-handling
department of the Council. The bid costing system was heavily dependent on the
availability of data from the central system, especially the overhead allocation system
managed by the Management Accountant. It was revealed that the prime users of such
systems, the business units, were reluctant to use them without further refinements or
adjustments.
8.6.1

THE COST CALCULATION PROCESS

The Council used the ABC based overhead allocation methodology to cost the in-house
bids. The corporate development unit developed this new system in-house, using a
Purchaser/Provider split, to deliver most of the competitive services. Accordingly, the
competitive bids prepared reflected the bargaining position of the providers to contain
the cost of service delivery to a competitive level. The role of the purchaser was simply
to supply the funds to the winners of the competitive bids (either the existing in-house
provider or the external provider).

From the in-house provider’s point of view, costing was, therefore, a crucial issue for
survival. Even though the internal service providers did not have the expertise in
costing calculations, they had the necessary expertise in operational aspects to collate
an in-house bid after receiving assistance from the Financial Services Department.
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8.6.2

DETERMINATION OF THE USAGE OF SERVICE LEVELS

In the preparation of competitive bids, the cost allocation problem was given serious
consideration. The transition from no allocation to full-scale allocation across the board
was widely accepted and the users appreciated the move in that they could cost their
calculations accurately to reflect the usage of all the services. For the purpose of
calculating costs and using the cost information, the users were divided into two
groups, one of which did not have to use cost information for any competitive provision
of services while the other was very much dependent on the accuracy of the cost
information. This second group was obliged to compete for its existing provision right
through competitive tendering and their services were categorised as business services.

For the second group, cost information was vital for the integrity of the Council in
general and for their own survival. They did not accept the allocated costs based on the
equitable principle used by the Financial Services and People Resources Department,
contending that they did not require the equitable allocation of costs because it did not
reflect the actual usage of resources. Rather it was based on some arbitrary principle
that assumed ‘the ability to pay principle’ (Fregman and Liao, 1981) and the allocation
made on the basis of the departmental budget. They explored some alternative
arrangements to ensure that the bid was competitive.

The literature on cost allocation, especially that factoring in competitive provision,
suggests that strategy should be integrated in decision-making where the survival of a
business segment is at stake (Cavalluzzo et al., 1998; Gal-Or, 1993). Gal-or (1993)
argues that, for the sake of survival, or maintaining integrity of a business, costs can be
strategically allocated to the segments facing competition while the non-business or
monopoly segments can be allocated the extra costs of the business segments.
Cavalluzzo et al. (1998) also endorsed such stance and suggested that this could
provide an excellent opportunity for the organisational sub-unit facing competition with
external suppliers.

Following such stances, the sub-units, to be competitive, negotiated for a lower share of
overheads (approximately 35% of the cost of the services). Because the Council did not
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allow internal sub-units to buy intermediate services from arm’s length sources, the
Corporate Development unit agreed to allocate surplus allocated costs, the difference
between the allocated costs, based on ability to pay principle, and the usage shown by
the providers, to the other monopoly sub-units as an interim solution until all the
market testing exercises were completed.
8.6.3

NEGOTIATION OF TRANSFER PRICES FOR SUPPORT SERVICES

In the second step, the user departments were involved in the negotiation of the transfer
prices of the interdependent units. Evidence suggested that the three-year moratorium
was perceived as an obstacle to the use of cheaper services from external sources. The
top management defended the moratorium by arguing that the transition period was
necessary to remove slack from most of the support departments. Evidence suggested
that the users of the internally transferred services expressed their concerns about the
prices charged and the quality of the internal services. The users also requested to be
allowed to source the required intermediate services from the market at a lower cost.
They demanded this in order to prepare a competitive bid. They contended that without
including competitive costs, the internal bid would not win any competitive tender.
Because of the nature of the problem, the corporate development unit mediated such
negotiation and agreed to allocate a lower share of overheads and transfer prices. This
reduction in costs was perceived as a proxy for the inefficiencies of the transferring
department/s.
8.6.4

ADJUSTMENT OF THE BIDS OF THE BUSINESS UNITS

The next task in the costing process was to make the bids as lean as possible. Besides
transfer pricing issues, other issues also impacted cost calculation. These included
human resources, and work processes redesigning and introducing multi-tasking.

One of the respondents revealed that the business units chose to utilise less labour and
utilised it at an optimum level. This was considered to be an alternative to reduce direct
labour costs and labour related overheads. Multi-tasking was considered an alternative
to reducing labour usage. Under this arrangement, the staff in some areas was trained to
perform multiple tasks within their working hours so that idle time was minimised,
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resulting in cost savings from increased efficiency and less labour and labour related
on-costs.

Redesigning the services was the second issue that surfaced during the data collection
process. The objective was to reduce the costs at a given quality while managing the
tasks within the same budget. Interviews showed that the business units considered a
process to redesign their systems to reduce the overall cost of the services. Business
process redesigning is a vast concept, beyond the scope of this thesis, but the
implication was that it had enormous potential to save costs from different sources. It
was more about job redesigning than ‘cost saving’ and had implications for the
accounting numbers.
8.6.5

A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW BID CALCULATION PROCESS

Finally, the job of the in-house provider department was to collate all the numbers,
adjusted for anomalies, disputes and debates so that the in-house bidders were not
disadvantaged, and the business units did not become bankrupt by providing the
services from internal sources. In order to facilitate the preparation of the adjusted bid,
the Financial Services Department developed a template for all the potential bidders of
the Leisure Centre services. The bid was based on the in-house ABC cost driver based
overhead costs of all the services used internally, transfer prices charged for services,
after factoring in the negotiated level of services and the unavoidable costs of services
such as electricity, gas, water, or other materials that are fixed in nature. Some of the
costs in the bid template remained fixed for all the potential providers. This was done
to compare ‘apples with apples’ (Interview, Manager of Financial Services, 1998;
Interview, Manager of Leisure Centre Services, 1998). The interviews revealed that the
bid was a total cost bid that added up all the costs of providing services. The
comparison phase follows this filled in pro forma bid sheet.

8.7

CHAPTER SUMMARY

In this chapter, the outsourcing practices and policies, the overhead allocation issues,
and finally the bid pricing system of the Council in two distinct eras were discussed.
The discussion refers to a ten-year period, from 1989- 1998.
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During the monopoly provision era (before 1995) the Council’s internal documents,
interviews and observations revealed that there were two distinct patterns of
outsourcing practices- small dollar value recurring services, and an ad-hoc outsourcing
of big-ticket services. The first category did not have much impact on the workforce of
the Council, which never wanted to provide those services from in-house staff. The
sourcing decisions were made after a reasonable search for the least expensive
suppliers. Rigorous and systematic calculations were not perceived as important and
the Council did not have access to the technology to generate cost data for those
services. Allocated budgets in the particular service areas were used to pay for these
services. The payment to the external suppliers proxied the cost of the services
provided to the local residents.

The second category of outsourcing decisions were much more formalised, more
demanding in terms of expertise, resources, and the time required to make the
decisions. Little evidence was provided in support of this rigorous process of sourcing
decisions. These justifications can be clustered into two broader categories: the
exogenous factors and the endogenous factors. The exogenous factors included the
National Competition Policy guidelines, the Local Government Act of 1993 mandates,
and the Australian Accounting Standard 27 requirements. These provided pressures to
streamline efficiencies of fund utilisation. The endogenous pressures came from within,
mostly from the employees, to meet the pressures from the external sources. These two
pressures converged on improvement of efficiency, effectiveness of service provision
and finally the accountability aspects of fund utilisation. Few intermediate steps were
taken to outsource the services.

The changes in the Accounting Information Systems, development of the across the
board Key Performance Indicators, the benchmarking process in different service areas
and the compulsory transfer pricing in an integrated networked system were the
changes made prior to embracing the new sourcing era. These changes were, in effect,
the aftermath of public sector reform in general, followed by the local government
reform. In this chapter, emphasis is placed on two distinct aspects of the change
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process, the resource allocation system (or the budgeting system change), and the
overhead allocation system.

The resource allocation culture shifted from its traditional focus on input measurement
and control to goal achievement vis-à-vis outcomes using commercial style
management practices. The old resource allocation or budgeting system heavily
focused on cost control and restructuring spending within the parliamentary approval
limit. This situation was not suitable for linking input to actual outcome achievement.
This problem was addressed by the introduction of an accrual-based measurement and
reporting system. In particular, Australian Accounting Standards 27 was issued as a
means to achieve these objectives. The resource allocation under the new system also
accommodated changes for transfer pricing of goods within divisions/departments and
allocation of overheads to determine full cost of services, and also to aid in sourcing
decisions. The overhead allocation issue occupied an important position within the
agenda of efficient and effective management of resources.

The overhead allocation culture in the Council experienced a major reshuffle in the
wake of changes in its competitive environment and financial management practice. On
only one occasion, overheads were allocated to cost one of the Council’s services being
contemplated for contracting. Apart from that, overheads were not allocated across the
board until 1995 when the National Competition Policy was introduced to local
government bodies in Australia. The National Competition Policy specifically required
competitive provision and market testing of services by their category. For Category 1
services, market testing was mandatory. To cope with these changes, the Council
adopted an ABC system to cost its services and to prepare internal bids. The field study
showed that the ABC system was perceived as a better approach to cost service and
prepare bids.

Finally past lessons about contracting out cautioned the Council about its approaches to
preparing bids, evaluating human resources, and technological state before sourcing
decisions were made. It adopted a policy of ‘a service provider in all services’ as much
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as possible. However, the mandates of the competition policy documents, especially the
National Competition Policy doctrines, are not ignored. The next two chapters will
focus on two contracting out cases to elaborate on two big-ticket bidding exercises.
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CHAPTER 9
TAILOR MADE COST DATA FOR DECISION
MAKING IN THE ERA OF MONOPOLY
PROVISION: THE CASE OF WASTE SERVICES
BIDDING IN THE RESEARCHED ORGANISATION
9.1

INTRODUCTION

In Chapter 2 the numerous types of alternative service delivery arrangements (ASDAs)
were discussed. In this chapter, the first big ticket bidding, the waste collection services
bidding, of the Council, in a competitive bidding environment, will be introduced. The
literature on contracting out is replete with evidence on the contracting out of numerous
services (see for example, Zeller et al., 1999; Osborne and Gaebler, 1993). A survey by
Touche Roche and Co (1987) found that solid waste collection ranked top in the list of
commonly contracted services (Martin, 1988, p. 236). Ranald (1992, p. 33) argued that
easy measurability was the main reason for the frequency and popularity of the
contracting out of solid waste collection.

As in other contracted services, a local government body is accountable for the ultimate
delivery of waste collection services. The delivery of such a service may be made either
directly from a local government body or in a competitive regime. There are arguments
that cost reduction can be achieved to its fullest potential when competitive tendering is
used to provide waste collection services and other contracted services (Boyne, 1998a,
p. 474; Szymanski and Wilkins, 1993). The cost reduction in a competitive bidding
environment is primarily attributable to the competition between the internal and the
external suppliers (Prager, 1994, p. 181). Market testing is one option to test the
competitiveness of the internal and the external providers, and a means to provide
services at the lowest possible cost and at a pre-specified level of quality. The idea of
market testing is that an internal team is invited to compete with outside competitors. In
this chapter, the waste collection services bid will be described and analysed in light of
prior theoretical and empirical literature. The objective is to the test the theoretical fit of
the case with earlier evidence and theory on contracting out. Yin (1994) argues that the
218

theoretical fit (convergence and divergence) is necessary to extend extant research, and
establish the groundwork for subsequent researchers or for replicating the case.

Chapters 2 and 5 suggested that costing methodology in contracting out is flawed in
different respects. In section 2.6, the methodological flaws of the works by economists
were discussed. To address the gap, a conceptual framework was introduced in Chapter
5. In this chapter, an attempt is made to analyse the bid described in this chapter. Later
discussions are made about the case in light of the literature reviewed in Chapters 2, 3,
4 and 5.

The Chapter is organised as follows: in section 9.2, the background of the waste
services contracting will be discussed; in section 9.3 the rationale for and against
contracting out will be discussed; in section 9.4 the bidding process will be discussed;
in section 9.5 the debates about the bid decision will be described; in section 9.6 the
aftermath of the debate on the waste services bid will be discussed; in section 9.7 the
bid will be analysed in light of theoretical and empirical literature bearing on
contracting out decisions; and finally the chapter will be summarised in section 9.8.

9.2

BACKGROUND OF THE WASTE SERVICES BID

Historically, waste collection service was deemed an essential service by the Local
Government Act in New South Wales and it is still deemed so under section 24 of the
Local Government Act 1993 (Interview, Manager, Finance Services and People
Resources, September, 1998; Stuckey, 1994, p. 15). Like all other local government
services, the researched organisation had been providing this service to the residents
living within its jurisdiction. However, it was a poorly provided service until 1988,
when concerns over unionist activities and the deteriorating quality of the service raised
questions about the efficiency of the internal workforce. Despite complaints, there were
no apparent improvements in its quality.

Due to the increases in the number of the complaints, about the quality and the
frequency of the services, by residents, the stakeholders (that is, the Councillors, local
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lobby groups, and the Council’s employees, and the management) decided in early
1988 to introduce competition in this area. The unanimous decision was to introduce
market testing of the service (Interview, Manager, Finance Services and People
Resources, September, 1998). There were two aims behind this decision. First,
management wanted to de-unionise the workers working in the Waste Services area.
This was similar to a move in the UK during the 1980s. In the UK, competition was
introduced in some areas of service provision under the auspices of their local
government act where most of the blue-collar works were subjected to competition
(Paddon,

1993).

Second,

employees

were

to

be

informed

about

the

inefficiency/efficiency of the internal provision. This reason was also used as a
rationalising tool to discipline the internal workforce working in the area. Management
discussed this competition issue with the staff in the area and told them that the service
could be outsourced if the internal workers could not improve their productivity and the
quality of the service. The employees apparently endorsed this view. As a result, they
were given the opportunity to compete with the potential external bidders for the job.

The Council formed a committee of five staff – one from administration, one from the
health area, one from the waste services area, one from the panel of the Councillors and
a representative from the Transport Workers Union. The committee did not have any
prior exposure to such a market testing exercise, so it was a challenge to them. The
specification of the contract, the consequence of competition, and the threat of losing
jobs, were all issues of concern. The biggest challenge to the committee was to
establish a true cost estimate of the in-house bid. This was because the Council had no
output costing system (that is, cost of providing a service) in its old fund based system
(Interview, Manager, Finance services and People Resources, 1998; Interview with
Assistant Management Accountant, 1998).

In Chapter 5, the service costing environment and the rationale for costing were
discussed before introducing the conceptual framework in section 5.4. It was shown
that the costing of services in fund-based systems was merely a replication of funds tied
to provision of services. The staff interviewed revealed that there was no provision for
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costing of services. Rather than doing this, the Council used periodic variance reporting
to determine progressive spending from allocated departmental budgets. When the bid
was prepared for submission, staff tried to check the existing Accounting Information
Systems and see whether any input based estimate of the cost of waste service could be
avoided. This did not happen. The next alternative, an ad-hoc cost calculation, was
considered. The rationales for the outsourcing are discussed below.

9.3

THE RATIONALE FOR AND AGAINST THE WASTE
SERVICE CONTRACTING

The Council preferred waste services contracting with the external bidders in the wake
of falling productivity, illegitimate claims (according to Council) from the unionists, its
workforce, and lack of adequate equipment to provide the services from the in-house
sources. They considered some of the arguments for contracting and factored in various
caveats about contracting out. Before embarking on this, key staff involved in the
contracting out process consulted similar practices in the UK, USA, and New Zealand.
Discussions were held about the arguments for and against this big ticket contracting
out exercise. It has been revealed that the pilot project was prompted by public sector
reforms in other tiers of the Australian Government at that time. The data sources on
this bid revealed the following arguments for and against this bidding exercise.

9.3.1

THE RATIONALE FOR CONTRACTING

The Council debated the merits of contracting out before the introduction of
Competitive Tendering and Contracting practice to the Waste Services Department.
The evidence revealed the following rationales for the contracting out exercise.

9.3.1.1 COST SAVINGS FROM THE SERVICE

The Council had information about ongoing developments around the globe about
contracting out and its potential to save costs. Consistent with such practice, they
envisaged significant cost savings from the sourcing of the service from the most
efficient source. It was believed that the cost savings would stem from productivity
gains, as agreed on the contract, use of newer technology, and work process reengineering (Interview with Manager, Finance Services and People Resources, 1998).
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Though the magnitude of such cost savings was not known, it was envisaged that
contracting out was the only potential means to achieve cost savings and still provide
the service efficiently.

9.3.1.2 TAPPING THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENTS

In the area of garbage collection, new technology is always considered for its
efficiency. At the time of market testing, the Council considered that the technology in
use was obsolete, and that the service was not efficiently provided. It was therefore
considered that existing waste service trucks and old bins be replaced with newer trucks
and bigger bins respectively. The use of contracting out was seen as a means to tap
these benefits of this collection method and the potential to increase the efficiency of
the garbage services.

9.3.1.3 IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF GARBAGE SERVICES

The waste services contract also stipulated improved employee productivity. This was
to be achieved through negotiation with the contracted parties over the term of the
contract. The employee productivity improvement was in addition to the improvement
forecasted in other areas of the services mentioned earlier. It was also revealed that the
tender required productivity improvements of the day labour in phases over the sevenyear contract period.

9.3.1.4 DEUNIONISING THE TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION

One of the significant problems faced by the Council was that a significant number of
waste services staff belonged to the transport workers union. They were demanding a
pay rise, a lesser number of working hours, and independence of job security from
productivity improvements (Interview, Manager, Finance Services and People
Resources, September, 1998). As a strategy for deunionising the workforce, the market
testing option was put forward to rationalise the service provision from the most
efficient provider/s. The arrangement was reluctantly agreed to by the in-house staff.
The Council argued that the local residents were not getting the value for money from
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the internal waste collection services. Therefore, contracting out was contemplated to
improve the quality of the waste collection services.

9.3.1.5 IMPROVING OVERALL EMPLOYEE PRODUCTIVITY

The final rationale of the Council was to improve the overall productivity of the
manpower working directly in the Waste Services department and to set a standard that
could be transferred to other inefficient services areas, since the consideration to
transfer the lessons to be learned from the waste services contracting was envisaged as
a means to improve the productivity in those inefficient areas. Before the bidding
process had started the staff in the waste services areas were assured of their job
security even if they lost the contract. This was also rationalised to minimise side
effects in other inefficient areas where staff were apprehensive of losing their jobs.

9.3.2

THE RATIONALE AGAINST GARBAGE CONTRACTING

The rationales against contracting out that emerged from the data sources concurred
with the theoretical and empirical view/s about the hindrances of contracting out in the
researched organisation. A summary of these obstacles have been prepared from data
sources and discussed below.

9.3.2.1 FEAR OF LOSING CORE COMPETENCIES

The first concern of management was that if the service was contracted out, it might
have to dismantle all the existing facilities for its provision. That meant that there
would be a fear of losing core competencies of skilled and expert workers, a shortage
of necessary equipment, and other technical knowledge necessary for waste collection
services. This was seen as a threat because if the Council lost its core competencies
because of outside contracting, it might cost them more if there was a need to
internalise the service in future. The cost of such internalisation was included as part of
the total bid price. But the perception of one interviewee was that the cost of internal
and contracted provision would be almost the same. In fact, the cost of internalisation
might outweigh the cost savings from the contract. Therefore, the staff and the
Councillors strongly resisted the outsourcing.
223

9.3.2.2 STRONG EMPLOYEE AND UNION RESISTENCE

The second concern of the management was the probable resistance of the strong
unionised workers. As discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.3.2.2, contracting out should
not be considered if there is strong union resistance because of the likely impact on
employee morale, productivity, or a fear of more resistance from other areas. The union
disputes were over pay, working hours and method of waste collection at that time.
Management reported these as illegitimate claims (according to Council’s
management) because the researched organisation could not monitor the quality or the
effort levels of workers. However, the employees claimed that a job in a public sector
body should be secured forever, regardless of the performance. These claims essentially
had repercussions for upper management and the contracting was perceived as a
possible remedy.

9.3.2.3 LOW BALLING EFFECT

In contracting out, low-balling refers to submitting low bids to win the initial contract
(Domberger and Hall, 1995; Domberger and Rimmer, 1994; Ogden and Anderson,
1999; Sciulli, 1996). If this low bid continues to be made until all savings disappear in
the long term, contracting out disadvantages the internal workforce. The waste
collection service was an essential and ‘profitable service’ (Interview, Manager,
Financial Services, The researched Council, October, 1998) because the market was
contestable and competitive. There is evidence in the literature that ‘low-balling’ is
widely practiced and that the same providers raise the price at a later stage, when the
internal monopoly is completely destroyed (Ogden and Anderson, 1999). The
management of the Council was concerned that the same might happen to them, so the
market testing was accepted with scepticism.

9.3.2.4 HIGH OPTIONS VALUE AGAINST CONTRACTING

The field evidence and the discussion about the bid revealed that management was too
sceptical about the success of the contract and the estimated cost savings, because the
cost savings from contracting were based on the cost estimates derived from an ad-hoc
calculation of costs. The Council was concerned about the possible mistakes in the cost
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estimates and the resultant loss of savings discovered once the contract expired.
Besides, it might de-stabilise the internal organisation structure. The notional value, as
indicated by one of the interviewees, of the contracting and not contracting option, did
not differ significantly, meaning that the inside and outside provision were almost the
same in terms of cost. Therefore, the internal staff were not happy about the contracting
decision.

9.3.2.5 CHALLENGE OF THE COSTING CALCULATION

As explained above, the Council did not have the relevant expertise to calculate the cost
of the services. At that time there was no need to calculate cost of services and the
Council mainly operated on a fund based system that looked at the progressive
expenditure on programs. Performance was also based on such spending. Because of
this, the costing of outputs such as this waste service was never done. This raised
serious concern among all the stakeholders because if the decision to contract out was
based entirely on costs, a simple mistake could translate into joblessness, the
dismantling of facilities, and could adversely affect other parts of the organisation. This
concern was also voiced in national newspaper headlines and some newspapers
commented that ‘it is all an accounting trick’ (Misevic, 1989). As explained later, these
also raised lots of debates on the political front and almost all of those involved in the
internal bidding process raised their concerns over the cost calculation and its relevance
to decision-making.

9.4

THE BIDDING PROCESS

As noted earlier, the bidding of the waste services was aimed to improve the efficiency,
effectiveness, and the quality of the services. The source of provision was considered
irrelevant at the time of this decision (Internal memo from Financial and Accounting
services, 1990). The bidding process followed the sequences discussed below.

9.4.1

MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING OF THE IN-HOUSE BID

This phase required the Council to plan for the activities considered primarily
important for the successful preparation of the in-house bids. In order to manage this
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phase effectively, the Council formed a multi-disciplinary team drawing people from
three different areas- Financial and Accounting services, the Health Department, and
the Waste Services Department (Internal memo, Financial and Accounting Services,
June 1989). The objective was to gather information on all aspects of the tender.

9.4.2

SPECIFICATION OF SERVICES AND PERFORMANCE CRITERIA

In Chapter 2, it was observed that the market testing process begins with the
identification of the activities or services to be contracted out. The specification of the
services was completed before the tendering of the service. The in-house production
team was given the opportunity to compete with the potential external competitors for
the right to deliver the service. It was the first step in the process of establishing the
internal bid. In determining the service to be contracted out, care was taken as to the
ease of measurement of output, and the competitive regime of the service in the market.
The first issue was important because if outputs were difficult to measure, the outcome
of contracting out would also be difficult to evaluate. The second element, that is, the
degree of competitiveness in the market, was important because if the market for the
services contemplated for contracting was not sufficiently competitive, then there
would be no apparent benefits from the contracting process. Evidence suggests that
lack of competition may turn public monopoly to private monopoly (see Ogden and
Anderson, 1999, p. 96)

The waste services was one of the most visible and measurable services provided by
the Council. It was one of the primary services contemplated for contracting because of
easy measurability of its outcome. It was also evident in documents that waste
collection was one of the first services that the Council considered for competitive
bidding and market testing during its old regime. The ad-hoc bidding team designed the
specification for the contract. The formal specification documents had the following
stipulations:
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TABLE 9.1: SUMMARY OF THE WASTE SERVICES SPECIFICATIONS
A brief overview of the terms of the garbage services
•

Collection method that is, single shift, one day or multiple shifts multiple days of the week, is wide
open

•

Garbage be collected from kerbside/rear side of the properties

•

There should be minimum number of missed services

•

New 240-litre bins should be used to collect the garbage

•

New technology has to be used to collect the bins

•

Cost per bin should be charged to the customers as per the contract signed with the winner of the
contract

•

The provider of the service must use new rapid rail trucks capable of collecting bins from backyard
or from properties. The bin size may vary but the stipulation was for a 240-litre bin instead of the
old 55-litre bins.

•

The provider is responsible for the pick up of missed services and should be penalised for the
missed services by extra pick ups
Source: My own compilation based on the interviews with the Manager, Financial and
Accounting Services, official documents and memos of the Council, and Woodland et al. (1995).

A contracted service works better if the specifications are written (Hazzell, 1997),
because it can be compared objectively with the specifications. This eventually ensures
better conformance to the terms of the contract. The waste services contract was also
written in detail so that maximum efficiency of service was ensured, the cost per
collection was as least as possible, and, above all, the collection met the quality
standard set in the contract. Arguably, it is not possible to write a perfect contract. It is
a common finding in the literature that because of lack of good specification, contracts
sometimes tend to fail or that the savings projected at the outset don’t eventuate
(Hazell, 1997). This is because the bidders take every opportunity to make money by
manipulating contract specifications or they claim for extras beyond the contract
specification when any service is provided (Interview, Manager, Corporate
Development unit, September, 1998).

While discussing the issue of contract design and the consequences of a bad design, the
following comments were received. They essentially signified the need of the right
specification of contracts and the possible consequence of a bad one (Interview,
Manager, Leisure and Recreation facilities, September, 1998):
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You have to wait for some time to see whether you have designed a good contract or a bad
contract. You need to wait and see whether the contractor charges you for the extras, or they
argue about any specific provision or try to manipulate the contractual terms. It takes a few years
to know whether you have made some mistakes in your contract design. It is not possible to
design a perfect contract because we had never confronted such a situation. We used to provide
our own service, we were the funders, and we were the providers. When it came to write the
contract, we thought it might be impossible to write it for everybody, including the internal
team. We marginally managed to do it with our expert employees.

The specifications of the contract were issued to the potential bidders, who had been in
the waste collection business for a long time. Some of the companies were the
franchises of US waste collection companies and had an enormous amount of
experience in this field. The Council formally issued the contract specification or
Request for Proposals to these companies along with invitations for quotations. One of
the stipulations was that the services needed to be performed ‘on a per unit basis’ or ‘a
variable cost basis’. This was because variable cost payment was easier to handle than
fixed cost contracts where the population within the jurisdiction might vary during a
rate assessment year.

9.4.3

THE REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS

The Request For Proposals (RFPs) in a contracting out situation is similar to written
requests to provide a service at some stipulated price. This is the formal written
invitation in a contracting process whereby written submissions are made addressing
the criteria or specifications set out in the contract specification document.

As competition in Local Government services was only at a nascent stage in those days,
the staff stated that the benefit from the competition was not fully exploitable. Some
plausible reasons were cited, such as lack of sufficient competition, uneven
competition, and lack of accurate cost data. Some of the staff also expressed concerns
that the lack of competition could replace public monopoly with private monopoly.
This is also evident in the UK, where the privatisation of water utilities were turned
into private monopoly after some years (Ogden and Anderson, 1999).
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The staff involved in the bidding took it as a learning exercise. They perceived the
process as a one-off exercise, and looked mainly at the technical areas of the service
provision, with secondary emphasis on quality aspects of the service. As explained in
the previous section, the main features that were emphasised were the appropriate
technology to collect garbage, the frequency of pick up, the introduction of new bins,
instead of old 55 litre bins, and above all, the efficiency of the collection measured in
terms of number of bins collected.

Literature on contracting suggests that the criteria for choosing contractors is the ability
of the contractor to provide a service, the financial soundness of the provider,
experience in this area, the provider’s reputation to provide the service, the quality of
agreed services and flexibility in providing the service/s. The Council mostly
emphasised expertise, frequency, cost and quality of the services. In response to the
request by the Council to some of the large waste collection companies and to the inhouse team, the Council received formal proposals from eight potential providers and
one from the Waste Services Department of the Council (which included 12 options of
providing the service in one single bid).

The proposals submitted by the in-house team and by another bidder were different
from the majority of the bidders in that these two bidders submitted a single bid each,
having numerous options and the corresponding costs, to win the contract. The
researcher, being intrigued by this event, asked one of the personnel involved in the inhouse team about several in-house submissions. The Manager, Finance Services and
People Resources recalled (Interview, Staff from Financial Services Department,
September, 1998) the following:
The contracting out decision prompted heated debate among the staff; the Labour Party
politicians viewed it as a political expedition at that time as well. They wanted to retain the
service in-house and as a result, the in-house team submitted several bids so that they didn’t lose
the service. In other words, these people were determined to keep the service in-house. They
determined to win the contract no matter what and they were so confident that they would win
the contract. The formal invitation to tender followed this event.
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9.4.4

INVITATION TO TENDER FOR THE SERVICE

The most crucial step in a contracting out decision is the preparation of costs of bids by
a potential supplier. This is because the cost aspect is only half of the contract and the
other half consists of the qualitative criteria set out in contract specification documents.
The Council invited submissions from eight short-listed potential suppliers of services,
including the in-house team. The in-house team decided to submit 12 different options
and therefore 12 different sets of cost data for the bids. These are based mainly on
different shifts, frequencies and days of the week (see Appendix 9.1 for details). These
are the general requirements to be fulfilled and expected of all the bidders for the
garbage collection contract.

9.4.5

PREPARATION OF IN-HOUSE BID

In response to the invitation to tender, the Council engaged its own people to submit a
bid for the job. The in-house team comprised three staff- one from finance, one from
the Health Department, and another from the waste service area. The objective of the
committee was to prepare a competitive in-house bid given the highly controversial
nature of the job. The internal team prepared a single bid with 12 options to providing
the services (Interview, Manager, Finance Services and People Resources, September
1998; report by Peat, Marwick and Hungerfords, 1998; report by Manager, Finance
Services and People Resources, June, 1989, p. 1). The bid team began their work early
in 1989 for submission in April 1989. The bid was prepared in two phases: first, to
calculate the full cost of the waste collection services, and, second, to find out an
adjusted cost of the services- that is the cost of the internal bid for submission.

9.4.6

THE COSTING OF THE IN-HOUSE BID

In section 7.4.1 it was mentioned that the Council used an input based cost of the
services, a common form of reporting such costs of services in the bureaucratic
production environment. Moreover, the Council used the cash basis of accounting in
the past. The implication of this for the ratepayers and other residents was that they
were significantly undercharged for the services. The management accounting or
internal accounting system, as perceived by management, ‘was subservient’ (Johnson
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and Kaplan, 1987) to financial accounting. Information gleaned from discussion and
interviews, along with documentary evidence, suggested that there was less need for
costing of services as the control and delivery of the service was vested with the inhouse provider. The issue of product costing was further exacerbated by the absence of
overhead allocation. While discussing this issue, one of the personnel in the finance
area stated:
Actually, the idea of capturing overheads by programs was not practiced because there was no
such need at that time. The allocated budget in the waste services area was perceived to
represent the cost of the waste services. The Council actively started thinking about allocation
on some rough basis when the waste service was considered for tender (Interview, Management
Accountant, 1998).

Overhead allocation at that time was not considered because of the high level of
complexity of operations of the work and the operations carried out by the Council, the
interdependence of the departments, the absence of boundaries for work between the
departments, absence of business units and stand alone departments in providing the
services (Interview, Manager, Finance Services and People Resources, 1998). Because
of the nature of the situation and the existing tension within the Council, the finance
personnel developed some approximate formulas for allocating the overheads, to cost
the garbage collection services. As one team member involved in the costing of the
services pointed out:
We had only one PC at that time; we were not proficient in using spreadsheet programs. Within
such constraint, we had to develop some ways to cost the services. We had an extremely difficult
situation in that overheads were not allocated across the board. Therefore, there was every
possibility of mispriced services. We had to do the allocations with lots of caution and we
eventually succeeded in calculating the cost of the internal bid (Interview, Assistant
Management Accountant, 1998).

In the bid preparation process, the team considered the appropriateness of the bid oncosts, including a share of allocated overheads for support services such as computer,
personnel, and administration. The statement below, by one of the senior staff,
suggested the importance of overhead allocation (Internal report, June, 1989, p. 1):
I took the view that we should treat the costing of the Council’s service in the same way as an
external contractor would, and that is to include costs which were real costs to Council in
providing the service but have not traditionally been shown as part of the garbage service in the
garbage accounting statements. In this category I refer to such costs as financing costs (loan
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payments) and overheads such as accounting, computer time, personnel management, workers
compensation and superannuation.

The team treated overhead allocation with caution to avoid under charging for the
resources. The reason advanced was that over/under allocation of overheads might lead
to cross subsidisation, which had important implications for resource allocation
decisions. It is crucial for Local Governments, as these entities operate in an
environment of an austere budget.

The Council had to use an ad-hoc cost calculation in 1989 for its waste collection
services. It was a test case for discovering its competitiveness, and the efficiency and
effectiveness issues surrounding the waste collection services. The pricing of the
internal bid required the Council to allocate costs on a ‘cost per bin’ basis (Interview,
Manager, Finance Services and People Resources, September 1998; Woodland et al.,
1995; Report, Peat, Marwick and Hungerfords, 1989). The implication of this
requirement was that the Council needed a detailed allocation of the consumption of
resources to perform this service. Recalling the costing environment, one of the staff of
the Finance Services and Resources remarked that:
At that time we had only one PC in our department. We shared the computer to calculate the
costs, and to generate the reports. We never had the need to cost services. We did not have the
mechanism to capture the consumption of overheads to programs or sub-programs to cost the
services. At that time we started to allocate overheads on an on-cost basis to cost one of our
essential services. To ensure the accuracy of our calculations we consulted a consultant in
Sydney (Interview, Manager, Finance Services and People Resources, September, 1998).

However, the accounting information system was never geared to allocate overheads as
there was no need to allocate overheads except for monitoring and controlling support
costs. Cost control, in a working fund environment, was primarily accomplished by the
use of a six-weekly variance reporting system. Moreover, the Council did not have the
mechanism to capture the consumption of resources by each area of service provision.
All these made the task of overhead allocation more difficult, if not impossible. For the
purpose of the calculation of the full costs of the waste tendering exercise, the Council
needed to allocate overheads on a one-off basis. The Council decided to have the
calculations examined by one reputable Sydney firm. The verifications were criticised
by some of the Councillors and were taken so seriously that it led to heated political
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debate. This debate continued and it was resolved to investigate the matter further. This
aftermath of the debate is discussed below.

The Council selected its first stage drivers in different areas to calculate the costs per
unit of operating different processes. Besides, the support unit costs were also allocated
to different options of the in-house bid shown in Table 9.2 below:
TABLE 9.2: SUPPORT UNIT COST ALLOCATION TO IN-HOUSE BIDS

Support costs

Basis of allocation/attribution

Justification of the Council

Treasury costs

Head count

Estimated usage required for the
operation

Computer costs

Proportion of garbage to total staff

Support attributable to the expected
contract

Personnel costs

Proportion of garbage staff

Unavoidable if contract won

Health

Estimated to be one third attributable

Concomitant cost to perform the

Administration costs

to garbage collection
Garbage staff to total staff

waste service collection

Other costs

Peripheral support required to
perform the waste service operation

Source: Compilation from the Council’s in-house bid document and internal memo on garbage contract,
1990.

These first stage drivers were true reflections of the consumption of the resources for
the delivery of the services. To facilitate the calculation of the costs per unit as the final
outcome of this exercise, the costs at the final stage were unitised. Though this was
criticised later, it did not change significantly to reverse the decision in favour of the
Council.

The bid was thus a full cost bid. The elements of the bids were taken mostly from the
budgets of the respective departments and the estimates provided by the waste manager
of the Council. However, it excluded the full charge for overheads. Since the services
were considered for contracting over a seven year first phase followed by a three-year
renewable option, the management perceived the need to apply discounting formulas to
its cost streams over the first phase of the contract. Before discussing this issue the
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treatments of the cost of the use of the equipment and the cost of source of financing
are outlined below.

Literature on contacting out suggests that the cost of using equipment should always be
the cost of receiving the service from the market. In most cases the guidelines prescribe
that lease rentals be used as a proxy for the cost of such equipment. Some other
guidelines also suggest the use of deprival value (for details, see King, 1997) as a
surrogate measure. All these converge on a single point that the historical cost of the
equipment used for a service delivery is not the appropriate cost to be included in the
bid, because, it does not reflect the economic use of an asset in the service provision,
and it grossly understates the cost of a service. The implication of such a practice
creates a cross-subsidisation problem. However, the Council recorded the historical
cost of the trucks as if they had been purchased outright at historical costs (Internal
Report, Manager, Finance Services and People Resources, June 1989).

The second element is the cost of the funds used to provide the services. The cost of
financing services is the opportunity cost of funds tied up in the provision of the
services. This could equal, at least, the opportunity cost of funds invested in risk free
assets (e.g. government bonds) (Rimmer, 1993). As discussed in Chapter 4 this
‘opportunity cost of source’ determines the fate of a bid when it is considered in a
multi-year contract period. Some authors label it as an accounting game. While the
normative view suggests the use of a risk-based approach (e.g. Auditor General of
Western Australia, 1995) or 10-year government bonds (Sciulli, 1996), there is a
general lack of consensus as to the appropriateness of the discount rate to a specific
service such as waste collection. Since the waste collection service was one of the
services relating to property or benefiting the owners, its cost should be commensurate
with the use or provision of the service.

The city Council used a 15% rate to discount the cash flows over the seven-year term.
The respondents argued that the discount rate was commensurate with the opportunity
cost of the funds tied up in the waste service provision. It was contended that the
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discount rate was the appropriate opportunity cost during the late eighties. Some other
arguments put forward the notion that this type of exercise was new to the Council.
However, others argued that the interest rate was kept deliberately high to show a low
cost of the bid. The use of opportunity cost of capital was the subject of a heated
political debate at that time. One of the Councillors raised concerns about the
appropriateness of the rate. Peat Marwick and Hungerfords, the Consultant,
subsequently endorsed it in a report to the Council in 1989. In that report, they also
suggested that a 15% rate of interest was appropriate. Accordingly, the Council used a
15% discount rate to calculate the opportunity cost of the cost streams of the bids over
the contract period (that is, seven- years).

9.4.6.1 DETERMINATION OF SINGLE COST STREAM

After calculating the cost of bids on a total cost basis and on a per unit basis, the
Council determined a single cost stream of the waste services and later on unitised the
cost of the collections. The bids were actually prepared on two different levels. One
was for the cost of waste collection and the other was for the cost of waste collection
and clean-up operations (see Appendix 9.1). Since the contract was contemplated for a
seven-year term, the Council thought it was appropriate to discount the in-house bid to
determine the present value of costs of the bids as of the day of tender evaluation.

The cash flows were discounted at a 15% rate of interest. This 15%, as contended by
the Manager of Finance Services and People Resources, was the cost of financing the
waste collection service. Though the discount rate was a nominal one, the Council did
not adjust the cost streams following year one (that is 1991 through 1996). The cost
stream was thus real in the first year but in nominal dollar terms from 1991 to 1996.
The discounted cost stream as shown below was, thus, a mixture of real and nominal
dollars. Although this was discovered and investigated later, these discounted cost
streams were the present values as of the day of the tender submission in 1989.
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9.4.6.2 SUBMISSION OF BIDS

The bids were due for submission by 4 April 1989. Bids from the internal and external
applicants, as shown in Table 9.3 below, were submitted. Costs of all the external bids
were on equal footing and included overhead costs to a certain extent. Those were
calculated on the basis of a single shift operation, double shifts operation, weekly or
twice -weekly pick up of the waste services etc.
TABLE 9.3: NAMES OF THE COMPANIES SUBMITTING THE COMPETITIVE BIDS
1.

Frant Fretus Pty. Ltd.

2.

Linfox Transport (Australia) Pty. Ltd.

3.

Otto Australia Pty. Ltd.

4.

Pacific Waste Management Pty. Ltd.

5.

JJ Richards and Sons Pty. Ltd. (Zone 3 only)

6.

Ron Stafford and Associates Pty. Ltd. (Zone 1 only)

7.

The Researched Organisation’s ‘in-house’ team (12 different options)

8.

Theiss Contractors Pty. Ltd.
Source: Report from Peat Marwick and Hungerfords, 1989.

The Council used a 15% discount rate to discount all the bids. The detailed calculations
of the external bids were not available for evaluation. However, an extract of the first
five bidders, under single shift operation and double shifts operation, shown in Tables
9.4 and 9.5 below suggested that the bids were very closely costed.
TABLE 9.4: RANKING OF FIVE POTENTIAL BIDDERS (BASED ON NPV
COSTS OF SINGLE SHIFT OPERATION)
Company
Thiess
Linfox
Otto
Internal bid- option 5
Pacific Waste

NPV of single Shift (in million $)
16.0
17.4
17.1
19.7
20.2

Ranking
1
2
3

4
5

Source: Extract from the report by Peat, Marwick and Hungerford, 1989
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TABLE 9.5: RANKING OF FIVE POTENTIAL BIDDERS (BASED ON NPV
COSTS OF DOUBLE SHIFTS OPERATION)
NPV Of Single Shift
(in million $)

Ranking

Otto

15.5

Thiess
Pacific Waste-option 5
Pacific Waste- option 6
Pacific Waste-option 7

15.9
16.7
17.4
18.6

1
2
3
4
5

Company

Source: Extract from the report by Peat, Marwick, and Hungerford, 1989

The Net Present Values of the bids was used to evaluate the quantitative aspects of the
sourcing decision. The details of calculation of these were, however, not supplied. Only
a summary of the costs of all the bids was supplied (see Appendix 9.2 for the Net
Present Values and the ranks of all the bids).

9.4.6.3 THE EVALUATION OF THE BID AND THE SOURCING DECISION

As pointed out earlier, the bids received from the external parties were kept in strict
commercial confidence. So detailed information about the criteria of bid evaluation was
not available in the public domain. The respondents, however, revealed that the bids
were evaluated on an equal footing. The bids were evaluated by the Council against the
specifications released at the time of the contracting exercise. The Council stressed two
aspects of the bid. The first was the ‘unit cost’ of the bins to be collected. The Council
justified the unit cost submissions as appropriate because of the changes in the
population within its jurisdictions. Therefore, it rejected offers for fixed price contracts.
The second important criterion was the intention of the provider to use the most
technologically advanced waste collection vehicles at that time, which was to improve
productivity, minimise the cost per bins collected, and to improve the efficiency of the
service. Besides these two criteria, quality was also considered an important criterion
for bid evaluation.

The bid evaluation team ranked all the bids according to the pre-specified criteria.
Linfox Transport Australia and the bid number 9 of the in-house bid were ranked first
and second in order followed by the other bids (see Appendix 9.3 for a summary of the
unit cost of bin collection by each tenderer). Once the cost per bin was ranked, the bids
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were discounted using a uniform discount rate. The total cost of all the bids were
discounted for the entire life of the contract (Report to Council, Peat Marwick and
Hungerfords, 1989). The choice of discount method was the source of a much-heated
debate in that the users were naive and had not come across similar situations before.
The documentary evidence and the interviews suggest that the concept had been
incorrectly applied. In order to get around this confusion, they sought advice on the
discount rate to be applied, the use of the Net Present Value method, the choice of
depreciation and other relevant issues affecting the costing calculations of the bids.

Though the bid cost streams of the contract period were in nominal dollars the
decision-makers, especially the Councillors, were unhappy and some of the enthusiasts
challenged the notion of the discounting process, including the choice of the discount
method. One of the Councillor’s comments related to the choice of a faulty discount
rate. His contention was that since the cost streams were in nominal dollars, the
appropriate discount rate was the nominal discount rate of 16% (believed to be the
appropriate discount rate of servicing the debt). The other way of calculating the same
could be the inflation-adjusted cost streams and a nominal discount rate (Internal
Report, Financial and Accounting Services, June, 1989). Since the choice of discount
rate and the methodology of comparison were the source of such debate, an opinion
from one of the big six firms was also sought. The finding was that Linfox Australia
was the cheapest provider of the service with a unit cost of $1.35 per bin when the cost
streams were discounted. The Council’s bid no 9 ranked second among the 16
submissions. One of the Councillors, however, protested vehemently and requested a
second opinion from another accounting firm in Sydney. However, the decision process
for contracting out went on, and because of the tension (both political and behavioural)
at that time, the issue was deferred. Meantime, the President moved to resolve the
debate through Councillors’ voting. According to the recommendation of the Director
of the Technical services, the recommendation to the Council was to award the contract
to Linfox. The Council recommended the in-house option. The final vote was 8-7 for
Linfox. The then President of the Shire had to accept the result and it was resolved to
sign a contract with Linfox. Before signing the final delivery decision, the President
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remarked: The legal advice I have is that I must sign the contract in accordance with
the previous Council resolution or else defend any Supreme Court action as a private
citizen (Woodland et al., 1995, p. 66)”.
The president clearly showed his unwillingness to sign the contract and made this
outburst when journalists interviewed him over this disputed deal: I think [the contract]
will be pretty hard to justify (Woodland et al., 1995, p. 67).

The President wanted to provide the Councillors with more reports to convince them
that the in-house option was cheaper. As the contract decision was made, the other
bidders were informed that their bids were rejected primarily on cost grounds. The inhouse team, however, did not stop its attempts to solicit other professional advice to
convince the concerned parties inside and outside the Council. Their contention was
that the margin at which the bid was contracted out might be wrong if some corrections
were made. The next section presents a chronological analysis of the debates and issues
following the controversial contracting decision.

9.5

THE DEBATE ABOUT THE COSTING ISSUES OF THE
BIDS

The previous section discussed how the bid decision was made by the Council. This
section will focus on the debates surrounding the contracting decision in Linfox’s
favour. Various reports (both internal and external) raised concerns over the costing
calculations and it became evident that the revised estimate could have reversed the
decision in Council’s favour. In the wake of this discovery, some key issues surfaced
amid criticism, questioning and disbelief (Internal Memo, Manager, Financial and
Accounting Services, 1990, p. 1).

The first issue of concern was the base figures and their derivation on a cost per unit
basis. They were based on cash flows rather than on accrual cost estimates. The base
figures were not adjusted for inflation. This was deemed necessary, given the high rate
of inflation prevailing at that time. The base figures, after adjusting for inflation, were
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also necessary to calculate Net Present Value. This was necessary as the Council used
the nominal discount rate of 15%, which later proved to be misleading.

The second debate was about the choice of a 15% discount rate to calculate the Net
Present Values of the bids. The rate was defended as a representative rate prevailing at
that time (Misevic, 1991, p. 24; Internal Report, the researched Council). The Council
reiterated that a 15% rate was commensurate with the debt servicing cost aligned to the
waste collection service. This was subsequently challenged on the further premise of
‘Operating’ vs. ‘Financing’ costs of the services (Report by Coopers and Lybrand,
1989). In fact the Council included debt-servicing costs in all of its options, making the
costing calculations extremely susceptible to criticism and acceptability.

The third debate was about the inclusion of debt servicing costs. Though one of the big
accounting firms in Sydney did consider the issue and endorsed the calculations of the
Council, Coopers and Lybrand in its report of November (1989) clearly distinguished
‘financing’ from ‘operations’ and reported that debt-servicing costs should not be a part
of the costing calculation. They excluded the ‘debt servicing costs’ and other
opportunity costs of operations that is funds tied up in purchasing bins, and used a 16%
rate for discounting the cash flows. Their argument was that this rate captured both debt
servicing costs and the opportunity cost of operations. This revision, however, was not
acceptable given the base figures were still in estimated real dollars but the subsequent
costs were in nominal dollars.

The fourth concern was about the assumptions in different reports. The nonquantitative factors actually hinged on the costing calculations in different magnitudes.
Despite all these, the revised cost estimates showed distinct sets of figures. The old and
the new cost estimates converged on one single point- that the provision by day labour
was cheaper. This was evidenced in all the reports prepared by Coopers and Lybrand,
1990. The internal report, based on the data supplied by the Waste Services Manager,
prepared by the staff also endorsed Cooper and Lybrand’s (1990) calculations.
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In summary, the costing calculations were primarily blamed for inaccuracies. These
calculations were affected by the assumptions about cash flows and their conversions to
present values using appropriate discount rates. Accounting calculations are subjective,
so the debate was a never-ending one. To resolve these controversies, further reviews
were undertaken to locate the mistakes firmly in Council’s favour. The Council
initiated this inquiry and solicited further professional advice.

9.5.1

THE ‘SOOTHING’ REVIEW OF THE COSTING CALCULATIONS

The complaints by one of the Councillors and the staff responsible for the preparation
of the internal bids prompted the Council to undertake a second round of costing
calculations. This included a new report prepared on the basis of the estimates supplied
by the Director of Technical services, an audit of the figures to verify that the
calculations done for the bid during April 1989 and the bid prepared by Peat Marwick
and Hungerfords were accurate. As the negotiation was at final stage, there was some
urgency to get a second opinion from one of the big accounting firms in Sydney. It was
revealed that the second review was to convince the Council to make a sufficiently
informed decision after a review of more documents and calculations. This was because
some stakeholders were really concerned about the impact of contracting out on the
workforce working in the waste services area.

Coopers and Lybrand in Sydney prepared the first review report in November 1989, at
a time when the negotiation about signing a contract with Linfox was under serious
consideration. The report was prepared on the basis of the report prepared by the
Director of Technical Services of the Council. The report identified few problems with
the calculations made by Peat Marwick Hungerfords and the in-house bids submitted
by the Council. The first important objection was about the discount rate used by the
Council. This was alleged to be too high and it was proposed that a lower discount rate
be used when the cost flows were on real dollar terms. The other important issues of
concern, as stated in the report, were as follows:
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•

depreciation of existing trucks and bins;

•

debt servicing costs on existing loans;

•

opportunity cost for having to purchase bins from general revenue fund;

•

leasing costs for additional trucks.
Source: Internal memo, The Council, 1990.

Cooper and Lybrand agreed with most of the differences in treatment by Peat Marwick
and Hungerfords and resolved the following shown in Table 9.6:

TABLE 9.6: SUMMARY OF THE REVIEW REPORT OF PEAT MARWICK AND
HUNGERFORD BY COOPER AND LYBRAND
•
•
•
•
•

Revision of discounting rate to 16% instead of 15%. This included 8% inflation per annum.
Sunk costs were ignored.
Debt servicing costs were ignored because these were relative to financing decision
The value of all Trucks and bins used in the waste collection exercise were shown in their full
capital value over the seven-year period. The residual values of trucks and bins on hand at the end of
the seven year term were taken into account for the purpose of cash flow calculations
Opportunity costs were ignored because they were included in the discount rate within the NPV
methodology.

Source: Coopers and Lybrand Report to Council, 1989.

The Coopers and Lybrand report suggested that Net Present Value of the day labour
option (the in-house option) was $3.5 million cheaper than the Linfox bid over the
contract period. However, this calculation was not accepted. Some staff questioned the
assumptions and the NPV methodology used by Coopers and Lybrand. Specifically the
$3.5 million savings under the day labour option were perceived to be significantly
different. In view of this, the Council’s Manager/Shire Clerk requested the Manager of
Financial and Accounting Services to prepare a 7-year budget comparison of Linfox
and the in-house bids.

The Manager, Financial and Accounting Services, prepared a report in November 1989
on the basis of input supplied by the Waste Services Manager. The report attempted to
show the garbage operating costs over the 7-year period from 1990 to1996 as they
might appear in Council’s budget. It was based on the projected budget provisions,
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taking into account inflation and estimated growth in the service over the contract term.
The manager preparing the report was of the opinion that there was no need to use Net
Present Value methodology. In some respects this report differed from the earlier two
reports- the first report prepared by the Director, Technical Services, and Coopers and
Lybrand Report. The points of differences were reduced wages for the carters,
exclusion of opportunity costs, and a reduced inflation rate from 8% to 6%. The report
was prepared under two alternative scenarios- one with existing loan repayment and the
other without it. The results were that Council day labour was found to be cheaper by
$5.2 million and $7.2 million, respectively, in actual dollar terms over the forecasted
seven-year budget period. This report, however, was not beyond criticism and was
questioned by the Council. The Council then decided to get all the reports, prepared to
that date, verified by Coopers and Lybrand with particular emphasis on the validity of
the assumptions of the Coopers and Lybrand report. In fact that was a request for
‘audit’ of the estimates of the reports prepared by Coopers and Lybrand.

Coopers and Lybrand conducted an audit in January 1990, in which statistical evidence
and other documents were gathered and analysed. The Council conducted discussions
with its staff and agreed to change the assumptions shown in Table 9.7:
TABLE 9.7: THE MODIFICATIONS TO COOPER & LYBRAND REPORT
AREAS

DESCRIPTIONS

Growth in number of services

Linfox price per service

1.5% growth was considered instead of nil growth
under both options- the Linfox and the day labour
option of the Council.
The base date of discounting was changed from April
1989 to December 1989. This reduced the cost per
service.
Council This increased the operating cash flows

Reduced residual value of
vehicles
Reduced Council vehicle operating costs
Administration overheads
Phasing-in Costs

Targeted for achievement under various options
Adjustment made downwards for both Council and
Linfox Operations
Reduced for both Council and Linfox

Source: Report, Manager, Financial and Accounting Services, March 1990.
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The end result, as claimed by the Coopers and Lybrand report, was their “best
estimate” and showed that the Council’s day labour operation would be $4.3 million
cheaper in Net Present Value terms and this estimate would reduce by $0.8 million if
sales tax exemption were granted to Linfox. This was not the end of a series of
‘soothing’ reports initiated by the Council. In fact, Coopers and Lybrand was requested
to prepare another audit report.

This second audit report was based on internal reports prepared by the Director,
Technical Services dated October 1989, and the second report by the Manager,
Financial and Accounting Services dated November 1989 (the 7-year budget report).
The first report was actually adjusted by Cooper and Lybrand’s first audit review
report. The second review of the Report by the Manager, Financial and Accounting
Services, showed that the Council’s day labour was cheaper. The Manager, Financial
and Accounting Services claimed:
…in any event, if their adjustments are revised the result will still be that Council day labour was
shown to be cheaper. Coopers and Lybrand’s adjustments to both Council and Linfox costing as
reported showed Council day labour to be some $9.8 million cheaper in cash flows over the 7-year
period as opposed to staff’s calculation of $5.2 million (Report on Garbage contract, Manager,
Financial and Accounting Services, March 1990).

A summary of the reports above showed that the Council’s day labour was a cheaper
alternative than the Linfox option. For the 7-year term, the difference in Council’s
favour is shown in Table 9.8:

TABLE 9.8: SUMMARY OF COST SAVINGS REVEALED IN THE SECOND ROUND
OF BID INVESTIGATION
Reports

Estimated cost savings

Coopers and Lybrand report November, 1989-

$3.5 million

Manager, Financial and Accounting Services, November, 1989

$5.2/$7.2 m

Coopers and Lybrand report, January, 1990

$4.3 million

Coopers and Lybrand report, February, 1990

$9.8 million

Source: Report on Garbage contract, Manager, Financial and Accounting Services, March 1990, p. 8

244

The reports still showed that the day labour option of the Council was cheaper. If sales
tax exemption was subsequently gained, the gap would have been reduced by $0.8
million. Despite all this, the contract was already signed and the Council could not
reverse the decision. Even though the calculations above show that the Council’s day
labour option was cheaper, there were some fatal flaws in these reports too. They are
critiqued below.

9.5.2

A CRITIQUE OF THE BID EVALUATION

The bid was apparently prepared on a full cost basis. The following assertions made by
the manager of Financial and Accounting Services (currently Finance Services and
People Resources) in an internal report reflected the intention of the Council to cost the
bid on a full cost basis (Memo, Reports on Garbage Contract by the Manager, Financial
and Accounting Services, March, 1990).
I took the view that we should treat the costing of the Council’s service in the same way as an
external contractor would and that is to include costs which were real costs to Council in providing
the service but have not traditionally been shown as part of the waste service in the garbage
accounting statements. In this category, I refer to such costs as financing costs (Loan payments) and
overheads such as accounting, computer time, personnel management, workers’ compensation, and
superannuation.

While the above remarks clearly demonstrate the Council’s desire to include overheads,
among other things, into account, the other report prepared by the Director, Technical
services (1990, p. 2) suggested:
In doing so we took basically the same approach as had been taken with the previous tenders, that is,
to work out a price per service for the period of full ‘Rapid Rail’ taking into account all identifiable
overheads and actual financing costs.

The words ‘identifiable overheads’ imply that the overheads that were included in the
‘in-house’ bid carried the ‘attributable portion’ or ‘avoidable portion’ on the surface.
But this was not the case when discounting was applied. The extracts of the bid shown
in the Appendix 9.1 suggest that the overheads are in fact fixed in nature and were not
avoidable at all since overheads contained a portion of fixed costs. This issue was
further corroborated by documentary evidence and interviews with staff involved in the
preparation of the bid.
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The second criticism was over the inclusion of debt servicing or the financing costs.
The financing costs were set in keeping with the source/s of fund/s from which the
waste services were proposed to be financed at that time. The inclusion was justified
because of an above average rate of inflation during that year. But the contention of the
Council was that it was the cost of providing the service. Use of this high discount rate
could actually reduce the cost streams in Council’s favour. Though Coopers and
Lybrand subsequently identified this issue, it was not resolved. They argued that if the
discounting rate of 16% were appropriate, then changing the financing cost would be
double counting of the same change. After separating the financing from the operating
decision, the cash flows were not adjusted for inflation following 1991. This essentially
led to another level of distortion.

The third criticism is that the choice of depreciation was not appropriate. The Council
used historical cost to report of the equipment in financial statements. This
underestimated the depreciation amount and did not capture the true consumption
pattern of the usage of the trucks. The actual depreciation could have been the proper
lease rental of similar trucks from the market, which could effectively proxy
depreciation based on replacement cost.

9.6

THE WASTE COLLECTION SERVICE IN CAPTIVITY

The waste collection contract was finally awarded to Linfox Australia Transport Ltd.
Linfox envisaged it as an exercise to diversify its transportation business. It also wanted
to make inroads into this business and grow as a major provider of this service in
competition with other local providers. The Council retained control of the service and
provided funds to Linfox to perform the service. In turn Linfox signed a contract and
promised to phase in the bigger bins over the next three years and to introduce rapid
rail trucks. Only a few of the Council’s existing rapid rail trucks were sold to Linfox at
a negotiated price. Linfox was asked to phase in more rapid rail trucks over the contract
period.
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Due to the inexperience of Linfox, the initial performance did not conform to the
contract specifications. Though some experienced crews of the Council worked for
Linfox, there were lots of missed services and complaints from the customers. All these
made the contract difficult to perform. In the wake of these and a particular
Councillor’s request, the Council contemplated internalising the service. Finally, some
negotiations with Linfox were made to internalise the service. The Council agreed to
compensate Linfox and buy back the garbage fleet at a negotiated price, and promised
to settle all the claims to Linfox also indicated its willingness to sub-contract the
service to another provider. The Council did not agree. As a result there were
negotiations with the Council to terminate the contract for an agreed level of
compensation to Linfox. The Council duly paid the agreed compensation in October
1992 and the services were internalised. The Council commenced waste collection
services in November 1992 and estimated a cost savings of $0.9 million even after this
costly internalisation. As the second phase of the contracting was highly confidential,
data on the details of cost savings were not made available. The waste services
contracting out was unique in that it was internalised when the contractor failed to
perform and the estimated cost savings did not eventuate. Instead of saving around 20%
of the costs of the services, the eventual savings were a meagre $0.9 million. The
inexperience of the contractor was blamed as the major bottleneck surrounding this
contract. A brief overview of the events that led up to and following this bidding
exercise is summarised in the Table 9.9 below.
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YEAR

TABLE 9.9: CHRONOLOGY OF WASTE COLLECTION SERVICES
EVENTS

Until Mid 1980

Mid 1980s

March, 1987
August 1988

April 1989
December 1989

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Old fashioned equipment used for waste collection
Use of 55 Litre bins
Operations done by day labour
Council contemplated replacing equipment with rapid rail trucks
Council opted for one pick-up/week
Operation highly automated
Rapid rail trucks introduced
Households provided with 240 litre bins
Council poised for contracting out of waste collection
A seven-year two stage contract period was determined
Other alternative technologies are considered for the waste collection
Open tendering was considered
Five tenders from private contractors were received
Council submitted in-house bid offering 12 alternatives for waste collection
Council’s tender prepared, assessed by one big accounting firm in Sydney
Tender evaluation criteria set
Tenders were evaluated on the basis of offering services with rapid rail trucks
Two tenders were short listed- Linfox Australia and the ‘In-house’ Team’s bid
option 9
Linfox being the lowest bidder agreed to be the provider of the waste collection
service over a seven year period

•

January 1990

November 1991

September 1992
October 1992
November 1992

The contracting decision considered faulty, more investigations were
demanded
• In the wake of concerns, the issue was raised with the New South Wales
parliament demanding further investigation
• The issue of ‘wrong estimates’ condemned for the scandals
• Council President approved the contract after four counts of voting within the
Council
• The second consultant’s report was received
• Revised estimate showed that ‘in-house’ provision was cheaper by a significant
margin- even after sales tax exemption on bins and trucks. The second report
criticised by one Councillor
• Linfox started the contract work
• Bitter disputes arose, Linfox alleged the contract as too rigid and proposed subcontracting of some part of the work
• The unsuccessful attempt provoked Linfox to terminate the contract in return
for an agreed compensation
• A settlement sum agreed in September 1991
• One councillor indicated to Linfox, the Council’s desire to terminate the
contract
• Linfox agreed to end the contract on certain conditions
• Formal announcement of contract termination with Linfox, Council decided to
internalise the waste service
Payment to Linfox the compensation for the contract
• Council started day labour operation of waste service
• Initial shocks of retraining, reorientation of old works and deteriorating quality
felt within the organisation during November-December
• Service quality settled down
• Council estimated $0.9 million cost savings from operations
Source: Woodland et al. (1995) and my own compilation
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9.7

DISCUSSION OF THE WASTE COLLECTION BID

Case study discussion is necessary to confirm or refute the theory generated from a site
in light of extant research (Yin, 1994). The discussion below is aimed to fulfil this
requirement to see whether the evidence collected from the field converges or diverges
from the existing theory.

Two particular research questions were introduced in Chapter 1. The first question
relates to the ‘why’ aspect of overhead allocation (the reasons for outsourcing) and the
second is the ‘how’ aspect of a research problem (the process aspect of overhead
allocation). The discussion below will be in relation to these research questions.

9.7.1

THE ARGUMENTS FOR CONTRACTING OUT

The data from the field revealed the reasons for contracting out of the waste services
bid. They were: cost savings, tapping of new technology, improving efficiency of
services, deunionising workforce in the contracted area, and finally the improvement of
productivity in the waste collection services.

The first argument for introducing Competitive Tendering and Contracting in the waste
services area was cost savings. The Council was planning to reduce wastage in the area
because there were significant bottlenecks in operations of the waste services. A few
problems were identified as contributing to cost overruns: the older technology,
sluggishness of employee’s work, days of operations of the services, and poor pay
conditions. Competitive tendering and contracting was introduced to address these
problems by introducing competition into the waste services area. The main objective
was to change the attitudes of the employees ín a positive direction so that they could
contribute more. This particular cost saving argument conforms to the earlier works on
cost savings aspect of contracting out (see for example, Brooks, 1996; Domberger and
Rimmer, 1994; Evatt Research Centre, 1990; Ferris and Grady, 1991, p. 546; Miranda,
1992, Osborne and Gaebler, 1993; Sciulli, 1996).
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The second argument for contracting out was the use of better technology to improve
productivity by mechanised operations. Before introducing the Competitive Tendering
and Contracting into the area, the service was mainly labour intensive and the
operations were disrupted by the inherent problems of labour intensive production
processes. The Council wanted to change this situation by bringing in newer
technology. They had difficulty tapping the newer technology at that time: funding
constraints were blamed for its inability to purchase up-to-date equipment. Competitive
Tendering and Contracting was introduced as a means to facilitate the use of newer
technology without requiring the Council to invest in their acquisition. Prior research
on local government contracting out did not reveal the use of newer technology as an
argument for contracting. This argument, therefore, is an addition to the arguments for
contracting out.

The third argument for competitive tendering and contracting was the improvement of
efficiency of the resources. This was related to the first cost savings argument except
that the mechanism to capture efficiency in the Council did not exist prior to the
introduction of competitive tendering and contracting. This was exacerbated due to
other factors: absence of an input-output (that is, funds spent-services received by local
residents) relationship, a poor accountability structure and, overall, the absence of any
mechanism to capture the effectiveness of funds utilised in service provision. This
particular finding conforms to prior literature on public sector competitive tendering
and contracting (see for example, Domberger et al., 1986).

The fourth argument for contracting out was the deunionising of the workforce in the
waste services area. Union activity was typical of public sector organisations during
those days. The employees in the Waste Services Area belonged to the Transport
Workers Union of Australia, and were not exceptions to the norm. The union activities
placed demands on the employer for reduced working hours, inconvenient operating
hours (that is, very early in the morning), and higher pay for lower hours of work. The
decision-makers rejected those; the introduction of Competitive Tendering and
Contracting was seen as a rationalising tool to break the deadlock at that time.
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Competitive tendering and contracting was introduced to deter the employees from
participating in counter-productive activities. This argument is contrary to the earlier
works of Dehoog (1984), Rehfuss (1989), Osborne and Gaebler (1993), and Shulman
(1992).

The fifth argument for the Competitive Tendering and Contracting was to improve the
overall productivity of the employees working in the waste services area and show that
Competitive Tendering and Contracting could improve productivity in other areas of
the Council too. However, this particular stance was not welcomed initially, but was
accepted later as a sub-optimum solution. The employees working in the waste services
area were asked to bid for the job and show that they were providing the best value for
money. This particular argument is a peripheral argument of cost savings and an
addition to the sources of cost saving argument.

9.7.2

THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST CONTRACTING OUT

Some arguments against this particular competitive tendering and contracting exercise
were advanced: fear of losing core competencies, strong employee resistance, lowballing effect, high options value of internalising the services, and finally, scepticism
about the costing calculations.

The first argument of the employees and the management was that they could lose the
core competencies in the services area if the in-house team lost the bid and
subsequently had to leave the organisation. The implication of this argument was that a
lost bid could dismantle an entire department, causing joblessness of all the employees
working in that area. This particular argument is an addition to prior literature in
general and arguments against contracting in particular.

The second argument against contracting out was the employee resistance, within the
Waste Services Department and amongst the employees working in other areas of the
Council. The employees were organised and put enormous pressure on the management
to accept their ‘illegitimate demands’ (Interview, Manager, Financial Services and
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People Resources, October, 1998). Their demands were overlooked. This eventuated in
strikes and other disturbances. The workers resisted the introduction of the Competitive
Tendering and Contracting, which confirms the earlier works of Dehoog (1984),
Osborne and Gaebler (1993) and Rehfuss (1989).

The third argument against the competitive tendering and contracting exercise was the
low-balling effect. Low-balling refers to submission of an underpriced bid to win a
contract, subsequently reducing the quality of job and making the public monopoly into
a private monopoly (Ogden and Anderson, 1999). In this particular competitive
tendering and contracting exercise, the organisation was apprehensive of this lowballing effect and its aftermath on the waste services area. This confirms the earlier
work of Ogden and Anderson (1999).

The fourth argument against contracting out was fear of contract failure and the
resultant cost of internalising of the services at a massive cost to the Council. The
Waste Services managers feared that the contract failure could force them to internalise
the service and may outweigh the cost savings. This confirms the theoretical
proposition of Johnstone (1997) that contract failure can cause costly internalisation.

The final reservation about contracting out was that the cost numbers could be
misleading and inaccurate. If that proved true, then it could cost the Council huge sums
of money in dismantling the services. This particular finding confirms the earlier work
of Sciulli (1996) and Miranda (1992). However, the literature to the date of evaluation
had not focused too much on the accuracy of cost calculation in contracting out
decisions. The researchers’ choices of methods to calculate costs were either the choice
of the researcher or based on crude statistical techniques (see for example, Ahmed,
2000; Miranda, 1992; Rimmer, 1993).
9.7.3

THE REFLECTION OF THEORY ON WASTE SERVICES BIDDING

Yin (2003) suggests that case studies answer the ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions of a
research phenomenon. These essentially address the ‘explanation’ of case studies and
the ‘the process’ underlying the explanations. In this chapter the description of the
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aspects of contracting out, its costing and final decision-making have been described.
This section discusses the theoretical fit to see the convergence or divergence of the
explanations. Where explanations are inconsistent with an a priori theory, they are
additions to extant research (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). The aim of this section is to
evaluate the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 5 and see whether it explains
the competitive tendering and contracting in the waste services area. It is also aimed at
examining the convergence or divergence from the framework to reach a conclusion
about it as a ‘possible holistic framework’ to study and explain outsourcing decisions in
an organisational context.

In Chapter 5 the public sector costing environment was introduced as a prelude to
introducing the conceptual framework. Following the introductory background, the
process aspect was introduced. In this chapter, the competitive tendering and
contracting of the Waste Services has been discussed on the basis of the evidence
collected from the field. The discussion suggests that the Council appraised its
management control systems before embarking on the competitive tendering and
contracting project. It was also revealed that the steps followed in the pricing of the
internal bid and the rigorous review of the accounting numbers were in contrast with
the theories and evidence to that date.

First, it has been discussed that the costing environment within the Council did not
exist at all. This was because of input-centred reporting for all the costing calculations.
The paucity of costing systems in the government sector was posited in the earlier work
of Chan (1996) and Ahmed (2000). The costing environment of the Council confirms
to extant research that the public sector organisations did not have a sophisticated
costing environment in those days.

The second important aspect in the costing process affected the decision to embark on
competitive tendering and contracting. The process occurred in sequential phases: the
identification and the specification of the activities, the costing of the activities, the
determination of relevant costs before the final decision and, finally, the decision about
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the bid. This particular bid followed all the sequences and extended the conceptual
framework further by adding cost of contract failure as another explanatory variable in
Competitive Tendering and Contracting decisions.

The waste service area was chosen as the cost object in terms of traditional costing. The
identification of the activity (that is, waste collection services) for competitive
tendering and contracting contrasts with the identification process of activities for
costing in a manufacturing setting. The upper management of the organisation selected
the waste services in keeping with the political ideology prevailing at that time (that is
the economic rationalists’ view). It also followed the intellectual current at that time
that Competitive Tendering and Contracting could ensure cost savings and thus
mitigate the funding problems. The decision makers resorted to the Transaction Cost
Economics philosophy to provide the services. This particular process follows the
earlier works of Williamson (1985) and the New Public Management philosophy
(Dollery and Marshall, 1997; Hood, 1995) and the discussions made in section 5.2.

The second step in the process was the translation of the activities identified in step one
(that is, waste services) discussed above. This is part of the specification development
process once the activities for contracting were identified. In this particular bidding
exercise, a cross-departmental team was involved in setting the targets to be achieved.
The in-house Competitive Tendering and Contracting team managed to specify the
contract in minute detail, documented it in writing, and released it to the potential
bidders. Literature suggests that written specification is better and works better in
‘contracting situations’ (Hazell, 1997). This particular step has been discussed in
section 5.2.2.

The third step is the dispatch of tender documents to the potential applicants. This
process is common in Competitive Tendering and Contracting exercises because,
without formal documents, the written submission could not be completed in a similar
manner, thus inhibiting the comparison at a later stage.
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The fourth step is the costing of identified services in step one. The team members
stated that it was a challenging task, which they wanted to complete without having
access to all the necessary facilities (e.g. accounting and budgeting systems). The team
faced a few challenges, namely they had difficulty using the input based budgeting
system to cost and price for the bid. Their difficulties included applying dollar figures
to the specifications outlined in the tender documents, capturing the resource
consumption of the services, capturing the common costs (around 35% of the budget of
any department), collating costs consistently across the years because of the changing
nature of population around the area, calculating the cost streams as of the day of the
tender evaluation, and ensuring the accuracy of the cost calculations, and other
qualitative aspects. These difficulties were unique to the Council during 1989 in that
the Competitive Tendering and contracting of the waste services was one of the first
such exercises in Australia. Despite these difficulties, the Council managed to solve the
problems, not convincingly enough to itself, before the submission of the bid on 4 April
1989.

Common cost allocation created enormous problems in that the team did not have the
mechanism to capture the common costs and relate them to the outputs or even the
inputs. The separation of inputs and accountability hindered this in those ways.
However, the Financial Services Manager indicated that, with limited expertise, they
could capture the approximate consumption of labour related overheads and the other
common costs following the labour hour based overhead allocation process.

Howes (1994) argues that ad-hoc overhead allocation in contracting out is very risky
and that it can mislead decisions. This was confirmed after the evaluation of all the
contracts in December 1989. The other major controversy revolved around the
discounting methodology applied to translate the cost streams over the contract period.
A professional firm in Sydney reviewed this. However, the Councillors were not
convinced about the cost calculations and refused to endorse the decision in an external
provider’s favour. Though this cost calculation step was taken amid heated debate, the
decision had to be made within the deadline. The problems associated with the cost
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calculations discussed here could not be explained in light of the research done to 1989.
However, the framework developed in Chapter 5 can significantly explain the complex
nature of the Competitive Tendering and Contracting of the waste services.

The cost calculation process described in Chapter 5 suggests that the cost streams
should be calculated in two sequential phases: firstly, it should be calculated on a full
costing basis, and then the cost stream should be adjusted to reflect the relevant costs
(or the avoidable costs) only (Council on the Cost of Government, p. 40; Johnstone,
1997; Morris and Noreen, 1994; Kee et al., 1997; Kelly, 1989). The Waste Services
department performed this calculation in one step only. The second issue, the
discounting issue, was a rare event in those days, at least in the Australian public
sector. It was stated that the unavailability of expertise caused a serious bottleneck in
resolving this particular issue. It has been indicated in Chapter 5 that public sector
bodies use discount rates in keeping with the cost of the funds used up in a service area.
It was also argued in that chapter that the cost of capital (or the funding cost) could
significantly swing the decision in anyone’s favour. This was confirmed in this
particular competitive tendering and contracting exercise.

The decision making phase about this contract was the last step discussed in this
chapter. In this competitive tendering and contracting exercise, the Councillors made
the decision, which was actually endorsed by the Internal Tender Evaluation
Committee. The involvement of staff from cross sections of the Council supports the
fifth step suggested in Chapter 5. This step confirms the work of Drtina (1994, p. 61),
Hazell (1997, p. 21), Kee and Matherley (1996, p. 29), Kee et al. (1997), Office of
Public Management (1992), and Sciulli (1996, p. 31).

The final step, the consideration of the contract failure costs and the monitoring of
costs, were not found in this particular competitive tendering and contracting case. The
importance was, however, uncovered following the contract failure. The Council had to
internalise the contract after the payment of an agreed sum to Linfox. The framework
introduced in Chapter 5 suggested an extension of the theoretical model to include the
256

contract failure costs in the form of an option value. This ‘options considerations’ has
been posited by Johnstone (1997) at a theoretical level. The waste services contract
costs did not include any value for the ‘contract failure option’; therefore, it did not
confirm the theoretical conjecture of Johnstone (1997). One possible explanation could
be the unavailability of in-depth data about contract failure. The competitive tendering
and contracting presented in this chapter has provided a good opportunity to know that
the contracts can fail and notational costs in the form of ‘options’ should be factored
after cost calculations are considered. This may help an organisation avoid any
disastrous consequence of overestimating cost savings, and eventually ending up in
costly internalisation.

In sum, the conceptual framework introduced in Chapter 5 explains the evidence in the
competitive tendering and contracting process. The only exception is the consideration
of the options value which proxies the ‘contract failure costs’.

9.8

CHAPTER SUMMARY

The first competitive tendering and contracting exercise in the Council has been
described here. The purpose of introducing this bid is to show the philosophical
underpinning of the outsourcing as in 1989, when the Labour Party was in power in
Australia and preached the ‘New Rationalist’ philosophy in the public sector. In
Chapter 2, it has been indicated that the Competitive Tendering and Contracting
process in Australia followed similar stances in other countries; Western countries
topped the list in influencing Australian practices.

Before discussing the competitive bids, the arguments for and against competitive
tendering and contracting were uncovered. These arguments reflected the trend in
Competitive Tendering and Contracting at that time. Most of the arguments were
confirmed and they were analysed in the discussion section of the case.

The bidding process was then introduced to locate the decision within the conceptual
framework introduced in Chapter 5. The bid was introduced and discussed in
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qualitative terms. The discussions were based on data triangulation. That is, discussions
on different aspects were corroborated from multiple data sources: the archival records,
interviews, newspaper clippings, and discussion with staff from other areas of the
Council. The conceptual framework explained the decision process in that it confirmed
the sequences suggested in the literature. However, the literature to that date (i.e. 1989)
did not include any discussion about the consequences of a contract failure or the costs
involved in correcting past mistakes when contracts were internalised.

The revelation is that big-ticket bids require a more involved decision making process,
that accounting numbers be seen as instrumental in translating the aspirations of
management, and the numbers are recognised as the means, not the ends, to those
decisions. Costs and the processes of determining the costs in the longer term contracts
(including the share of common costs, Net Present Values, Accounting Information
Systems, and Capital Budgeting techniques) were seen as crucial in the decisionmaking process. Its importance was stressed at various stages of the contract until it
turned out to be a failure in 1992. The concerns of the Waste Services staff and the
Councillors about the accuracy of the in-house bid price proved true at the end when
the contracted service was internalised at a massive cost to the Council. Finally, the bid
showed that cost savings could have been realised only if extreme caution had been
taken, drawing people from cross-sections of the Council, asking for the participation
of the local ratepayers, and finally, taking more time to collate cost data. The
implication of this bid for practice suggests that cost was overemphasised and the other
qualitative aspects (such as quality, chances of contract failure, and changes in
economic and technical ability of a provider) were overlooked or compromised. Those
were perceived as essential for the success of the waste services contract.
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CHAPTER 10
SHIFTING THE PARADIGM: FROM ‘TAILOR MADE’ TO
‘STRATEGY DRIVEN’ COST DATA IN THE BIDDING FOR
FOR
LEISURE CENTRE ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL
10.1 INTRODUCTION
Reforms in the public sector arena all over the world have brought new dimensions in
service delivery. Services previously thought to be the wholesale business of
governments are no longer in the domain of governments, though market failure is
perceived as the major rationale of government service provision (Stiglitz, 1988). The
reforms in public sector services attracted attention from the private sector in that some
of the services provided by the public sector entities can be provided competitively and
profitably by the private sector. In other words, there are ample opportunities to make
profit from these services. During the late 1990s, reforms in different tiers of the public
sector in the UK required these sectors to rationalise in-house provision in the wake of
user dissatisfaction and budgetary constraints. Against such a backdrop, competitive
tendering was considered as a means to augment the efficiency of the public sector.
Among many reforms in the public sector, competitive tendering and contracting was
most popular in the UK for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of service
delivery. This then flowed to the rest of the world. In competitive tendering and
contracting in the UK, in-house bidders were allowed to compete with external bidders
for the rights of provision of the services. Cost data played a vital role in this bidding
process and the costing issues that were never previously addressed or needed to be
addressed suddenly captured attention through this competition process (Paddon,
1993).

While cost data were never deemed important by public sector bodies, there was a shift
in emphasis from no costing of services to a new costing environment to manage the
service delivery competitively. To improve the reporting of the costs and performance
of the funds used in the range of services of the sub-unit, the Council first restructured
its organisational structure, and then restructured its Accounting Information System.
These changes in organisation structure and the Accounting Information System were
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interdependent in that both were considered necessary. This was because of some
legislative changes imposed on Local Governments across Australia. In New South
Wales, this change was brought in by the amendment of the Local Government Act of
1922 by the Local Government Act of 1993. To facilitate the changes mandated by the
Local Government Act of 1993 and the Australian National Competition Policy,
Australian Accounting Standard 27 (a special accounting standard for Australian Local
Government bodies) was also issued. The impacts of these changes on the
organisational structures and accounting information system of the Council have
already been discussed in Chapters 7 and 8. This chapter will specifically explore the
application of these changes in the context of a particular bidding exercise in the
Council. This bidding took place in 1997, following the reforms initiated and being
tested in all the areas of the Council.

This chapter is organised as follows: section 10.2 discusses the background of the
bidding; section 10.3 discusses the rationale of the market testing exercise; section 10.4
discusses the technical aspects of the bid; section 10.5 discusses the pros and cons of
the bids received within the deadline; section 10.6 discusses the review process that
was undertaken in the bid evaluation phase; section 10.7 discusses the final decision
about the service; and section 10.8 summarises the chapter.

10.2 BACKGROUND OF THE SERVICE
The site for this particular bidding exercise was the sub-unit of the City Council
introduced in Chapter 7. The unit was the provider of leisure and recreational services
to local residents and those services were provided to three surrounding areas. Because
it had an allocated annual budget of $5 million, it was earmarked as a Category 1
business by the National Competition Policy (Department of Local Government, 1997;
Internal Memo, August, 1998, p. 1) and also as a competitive service by the Micro
Economic Reform Committee (Scott, 1996). Leisure Centre activities varied from
swimming to golf and other services as shown in Table 10.1 below:
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TABLE 10.1: PROVISION OF LEISURE CENTRE SERVICES (ON A USER-CHARGE
BASIS)
Areas

The services

Aquatic

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Dry Activities

Learn to swim/stroke correction/squad
Royal life saving
Flippa ball
Water polo
Aqua aerobics
Deep Water aerobics
Aerobics
Circuit
Boxing
Golf
Triathlon training
Self defence
Beach Volleyball
Fitness programme
Dance classes

Source: Internal flyers issued by the Leisure Centre, The researched Council, 1997.

These services are offered to the local residents and ratepayers on a user-charge basis.
One respondent in the Sports and Recreation area commented on the historical reason
for providing the service from in-house source as:
Historically the services were provided to make it affordable to the citizens. They [the
services] were there for the benefit of the citizens in the first place because of two reasons.
Firstly, we have a community service obligation and secondly, the Local Government Act
of New South Wales demands that we provide the services to the local residents. We can
make a lot of money out of this but that is not our objective at all. We always try to
maintain the quality of the facilities at an affordable price and charged the citizens
according to market principles of demand and supply (Interview, Purchaser, Leisure Centre,
September 1998).

The purposes of the establishment of the centres in the area reflect the ethos of market
failure responses of government intervention discussed in Chapter 4 and the
‘entrepreneurial initiatives’ (Wanna et al., 1996) in service provision following public
sector reform across Australia. The ‘market failure’ response dictates that government
is responsible for mitigating the failures of the market to provide goods or services to
its residents (Stiglitz, 1988). The ‘entrepreneurialism initiatives’ response dictates that
the services be provided on a commercial basis. The specific implication for councils,
however, was to comply with ‘community services obligations’ in the provision of such
services (Interview, Provider of Leisure Centre, September 1999; Internal memo,
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August 1998, p. 1). Accordingly, full costing for charging customers was perceived
necessary for this entrepreneurial initiative. This was rationalised by one respondent in
the Financial Services area by adding that it facilitated the recovery of all the costs and
avoided the need to subsidise the service.

The charging of full costs is necessary to reflect the long-term commitment of
resources, to minimise loss or to avoid subsidy (Department of Finance, 1991).
Faulhaber (1975) argues that to be subsidy free, charging full cost is a necessity.
Ellwood (1996) adds that to be subsidy free, the incremental cost of a service should be
greater than or equal to the stand-alone cost. The ‘full costing’ is, however, not
desirable where the government has ‘community services obligations’ in any
Community Service Obligations services area. In addition to all of these, demand is
another consideration in deciding on ‘full costing’ or ‘marginal costing’ of services. In
general, when demand is inelastic, full costing ensures full recovery of costs, including
the share of all types of overheads (Department of Finance, 1991).
In the wake of Public Sector reforms in general and local government reforms in
particular, the Leisure Centre services were identified as competitive services.
Moreover, some rationalisation issues were raised because of instigation from local
residents and ratepayers, the in-house staff, and the Councillors. All of them raised
their concerns about the efficiency, quality, and effectiveness of the leisure and
recreation services. In response to all these and various other reasons, such as
recommendations from different levels of the government, the services were handed
over to a separate and independent business unit for delivery. This also followed the
internal organisational restructuring in 1992. During this restructuring process some of
the units were earmarked as business units and were split into Purchaser-Provider to
distance service delivery from funding (cf. Glynn, 1993; Walsh, 1995).
The Leisure and Recreation unit was established in 1995 as a separate Planning and
Commissioning unit. The unit operated from a deficit of a few hundred thousand
dollars to a surplus of nearly one million-dollars in the fiscal year 1998. The
profitability, as reported by the Manager of the Leisure Centre services, suggested that
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the subunit was a self-sufficient unit and was less dependent on extra funding for the
expansion of its services. Its profitability meant that it could provide subsidy-free
services and also ensured the integrity of the business unit, made the use of funds
efficient, effective, and economic while making the management and delivery of the
services transparent and accountable to the ratepayers.

The National Competition Policy influenced this particular business unit in gaining
efficiency in its operations. Overall, the Council planned to implement the National
Competition Policy across all the areas of service delivery by the year 2000 and the
Leisure Centre was considered to be the first unit to be subjected to the market testing
required by the National Competition Policy. Even though the business of the Leisure
Centre activities was run profitably, this market testing was necessary to conform to the
policy guidelines of the National Competition Policy and Local Government Act of
1993. The next section will discuss various rationales for the market testing of the
activities of the Leisure Centre services.

10.3 RATIONALE OF THE MARKET TESTING EXERCISE
Market testing is defined as a process which allows an in-house provider to compete
with external providers of a service. The management used the following to justify the
pleas of ratepayers and other users that services should be provided from the best
possible source/s and that they were getting best value for their user charges.
10.3.1 THE INFLUENCE OF AUSTRALIA’S NATIONAL COMPETITION
POLICY
The National Competition Policy was introduced in Australia 1995 in different tiers of
government. In the public sector its aim was to promote efficiency in resources
utilisation, to remove the sluggishness of the sector and to augment competition.
Accordingly, various objectives, policies and strategies were initiated and adopted in
different tiers of the Australian public sector. The National Competition Policy
earmarked some services for open competition so that consumers could benefit from
such competition and get better value for money for their tax dollars. In order to ensure
better value for money, the National Competition Policy also stipulates competition in
263

contestable markets only. According to the National Competition Policy guidelines, a
contestable market is one that has at least one alternative provider. The objective of
compelling in-house providers to market test their services is to ensure better utilisation
of the constrained resources of city councils. Thus, the Competition Policy is an
‘umbrella concept’ that oversees the vested interest of the consumers and the public
sector bodies responsible for the delivery of those services. In commenting on the role
of National Competition Policy, the Planner of the Leisure Centre activities made the
following remarks:
National Competition Policy impacts on us because we are the planning and commissioning
unit. We’ve got to apply to guidelines of the National Competition Policy in various areas
as the tender specification development process, and tender assessment process. The
policies of the guidelines were not only being studied but in fact, we actually applied the
principles. Not that the policy is driving the efficiency, but the process itself is driving the
efficiency. The policy is the part of the process; the policy provides the framework for you.
I think the process we’ve gone through at the Leisure Centre and the fact that it was the real
tendering situation in that the Centre could actually lose at the end of the day. There was a
potential number of providers in the market so it was a real threat for the in-house provider.
What it did was that it forced them to look at their business operations, the structure of their
business, and the type of services they were providing. From the Planning Commissioning
point of view in terms of specification development it forced me to do lots of customer
research to find out what exactly customers wanted, to assure the services were specified to
meet their needs. So it definitely drives the efficiency, and then makes the operations more
effective at the end of the day. Thus, we will argue that we can actually qualify on a
competitive price, that is, the value for money is ensured (Interview, Planner and
Commissioner, Leisure Centre, 1998).

The Council developed its own Internal Competition Policy in line with the guidelines
of the National Competition Policy. Unlike the Victorian city councils, market testing
of services is not mandatory in New South Wales (Dollery and Marshall, 1997).
However, in this Council, market testing of services was made mandatory according to
its own Internal Competition Policy (Internal Competition Policy, 1997).
10.3.2 THE INFLUENCE OF THE INTERNAL COMPETITION POLICY
The previous section discussed the influence of the competition policy on the overall
public sector. The aim of this section is to specifically trace the influence of the
National Competition Policy on the adaptation process of the Council’s own Internal
Competition Policy. The National Competition Policy dictates that any Local
Government can adopt the policy if the resources don’t permit a Council to have its
own version of the policy. Alternatively, the specific local government body can have
its own version of the competition policy that can be adapted to conform to the
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National Competition Policy. The only difference between the National Competition
Policy and Internal Competition Policy is the flexibility permitted to a local
government. This Internal Competition Policy also allows this Council to prepare for
open competition in various areas of service provision.

Pursuant to the National Competition Policy and the Internal Competition Policy, the
Council embarked on a detailed plan of market testing of a series of services (see
Appendix 8.1 for details). The Leisure Centre service area was the pilot case of such
competitive tendering. Before embarking on it, some criteria were set, such as the
outputs should be measurable with minimum subjectivity, there must be at least some
providers in the market to ensure contestability and the design of the contract was
simple. The Council had planned to implement these in all areas in phases and had
plans for full implementation by the end of the financial year 2001/2002.

According to the Internal Competition Policy of the Council and the National
Competition Policy, the Leisure Centre activities fall under Category 1 business
activity (Internal memo, August 1998, p. 1). Category 1 activities are those which the
annual allocated budget is more than $2 million (Internal Competition Policy, 1996).
For all Category 1 activities, market testing is mandatory. Chapter 2 demonstrated how
market testing could be done to test the efficiency of a service in the marketplace. The
market testing policy guideline stipulated mandatory compliance of competitive
provisions for Category 1 services. The implication of such provisions for a Category 1
unit was the requirement to submit internal bids along with other bidders or lose the
rights of service provision.
10.3.3 THE DEMAND OF THE COMMUNITY
The market testing policy of the Council followed the reform in its competitive
environment and its promise to local residents that a better mechanism was put in place
to maximise the value for tax dollars. Once market testing is complete, the winning bid
becomes a public document for comment or suggestion before a final decision is made
about the provision of the services. Thus competitive bidding is a mechanism to resolve
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grievances of the local community as it ensures competition and rationalisation of
service provision from the most efficient source/s.

The organisation took the view that there should be a mechanism to justify its position
in the delivery of the services. This was to ensure that the residents were getting the
best value for their user charges for the Leisure Centre services. Important accepted
criteria include benchmarked costs of similar services in similar organisations within
Australia, the user charge for such services, and the cost of private provision. In an
input based accounting environment, there was no provision for the Council to show
the local residents that their tax dollar was maximised or the services were not costlier
than alternative provision.
10.3.4 THE RATIONALISATION OF IN-HOUSE PROVISION
The rationale of the market testing policy dictates that the Council indulge in the
market testing policy, among many of its other services, to rationalise the service
delivery from the in-house sources. There were two justifications for this: to minimise
the potential threat of the service being contracted out to external parties, and to justify
to the residents and ratepayers that the internal provision was the most cost effective
(Interview, The Manager/Provider of Leisure Centre, September, 1998).

The bid discussed in the last chapter provided some guidance about this new bid. In
view of past experience, the Council tried to minimise the adverse impact on the
existing workforce involved in the delivery of the services. Some important steps were
taken to confine bids to a limited number of alternatives, including use of nondiscounting and use of market cost data about some of the services that were deemed
expensive to the internal provider (Interview, The Manager/Provider, Leisure Centre,
August, 1998).

10.4 THE ORGANISATION OF THE BIDDING
To market test the service, the Council underwent a massive restructuring to ensure
cost effective services to residents. The Leisure Centre bidding process actually
commenced following some preludes to actual bid preparation.
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10.4.1 PRE BIDDING INFLUENCES
The pre-bidding influences on the bidding of the Leisure Centre activities were the
precursors for organising the bids. They included the necessary restructuring of the
Council, such as the delegation of responsibilities for decision making and delivery of
services, demarcations of responsibility and delineating controllable responsibility from
uncontrollable responsibility. These were seen as necessary by management to cope
with the changes made under the National Competition Policy, Internal Competition
Policy and the Local Government Act of 1993. In essence, the sub-unit or the Leisure
Centre was given a distinct business unit identity in order to successfully bid for the
work but they had to consult the Financial Services and the Corporate Development
units to prepare the internal bid for the Leisure Centre services.

10.4.1.1

THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE ORGANISATION

The Council underwent a massive restructuring of its operating units. The main reason
cited by one operations manager suggests that the operations were growing in
complexity and there were too many role overlaps, making both delivery of services
and the measurement of them difficult (Interview, Manager, Design services, October,
1998; Manager, Finance Services and People resources, October, 1998). To reduce
these problems, the Council embarked on re-organisation of all the existing
departments into a Purchaser-Provider split. This restructuring followed the UK and
New Zealand models (Glynn, 1993; Walsh, 1995).

According to the new structuring rule, the Leisure and Recreation Centre was also
earmarked as one of the potential revenue-generating departments with the potential
also to grow in different areas of business activity. A new quasi-organisation was
formed in the Leisure Centre services area (see Appendix 10.1). Like other operating
divisions, this division was also split into Purchaser-Provider to distance service
delivery from funding supply. The purchaser of the Leisure Centre’s services was
primarily responsible for purchasing services according to the specifications agreed by
him/her and the local residents. In the process of getting the specifications, the
purchaser usually received feedback from the monthly meeting of residents, from
various stakeholders of the Council, and the experience of similar events across
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Australia and overseas. The manager also received assistance and cooperation from
independent market research about the quality of the services. The checklist was
prepared factoring in these and written down for reference.

On the other hand, the provider was responsible for the delivery of the services
according to the specification provided by the Purchaser. In delivering the services, the
provider was to receive the agreed level of funding for the agreed level of services
under an internal organisational contract with the Purchaser. Any departure from the
contract would automatically terminate the contract (Interview, Provider, Leisure
Centre, September, 1998).

The internal provider had continually provided the services since 1995 and there was
no trouble with the delivery of the service until the National Competition Policy
required the Council to market test the services according to National Competition
Policy’s specified categories. At the instigation of the stakeholders, the newly created
organisation was able to compete for the delivery of the services. For the preparation of
the bid, the business unit had to rely on new types of Accounting Information Systems
that could provide reliable cost data.

10.4.1.2

THE MODIFICATION OF THE INTERNAL INFORMATION SYSTEM

When the restructuring of the organisation took place, the management decided to
refine their Accounting Information System to improve the timeliness, quality, and
relevance of information to all the users. Especially, the independence of providers
from Purchasers meant that they could use the information system to produce their
internal trading accounts and review the user charges and so forth.

Evidence revealed that the cost allocation issue dominated the Accounting Information
System change agenda. While cost allocation was not required before the public sector
reform (in 1999), it emerged as a burning issue later. In particular, areas that were
exposed to stiff competition from outsiders were streamlined. A common finding in the
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literature is that competition can bring about changes in the cost allocation system in
partially regulated sectors (Bromwich, 1990; Cavalluzzo et al., 1998; Dent, 1991).

In response to the reforms and the Internal Competition Policy, the organisation
changed its Accounting Information Systems so that a commercial style ABC system
could be implemented (Internal memo, August, 1998). This transition was part of a
longer-term strategy to stay competitive and to comply with the reporting requirements
of Australian Accounting Standard 27. The second major overhaul was the design of
the transfer pricing system within an ABC costing environment. To charge for a fair
share of allocated costs for relevant costing calculations, the Leisure Centre managers
were largely dependent on support from the Financial Services department.

In summary, the Council had to resolve some key issues affecting its preparation for the
new competitive era. As a prelude to this, internal restructuring was necessary.
Following the UK evidence, a Purchaser-Provider scheme was adopted. This
restructuring necessitated a change to the internal accounting system to meet ad-hoc as
well as routine needs. But in the short term, change was perceived necessary to support
service delivery decisions. To this end, the primary use was for cost allocation for
internal bid preparation. Finally, ABC was implemented organisation-wide to improve
costing information for decision-making.
10.4.2 THE MANAGEMENT OF THE BIDDING
The preludes to the bidding were discussed in the previous section, suggesting the
preparedness of the Council for competition. In 1996, the Council embarked on its first
market testing exercise. This was the pilot case and the Council carefully watched the
success of its organisational restructuring and the Accounting Information Systems.
The bidding process began with a few steps before submission of the bid. One manager
managed these activities in phases. The management of this particular bid was the
primary responsibility of the Purchaser, who had the responsibility to oversee the
overall implementation of the market testing process. The management of the bidding
was a crucial exercise in that the Council was sceptical about the success of the
competitive tendering and contracting process, the second time in 10 years, following
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the past unsuccessful contract. Figure 10.1 below shows the process followed in the
new competitive tendering and contracting exercise.
FIGURE 10.1: THE BID SPECIFICATION PROCESS UNDER THE NEW
CONTRACTING REGIME
Specification of the bid

Invitation to bid

Bid evaluation

Decision making about the bid

Source: Adapted from the internal bid of the Leisure Centre activities

10.4.3 SPECIFICATION OF THE SERVICES
In the market testing process, the crucial issue was the design and specification of the
services in the contract. The Council defined its specification for the management and
planning of its Leisure and Recreation Services activities as:
The specification is the document that defines the particular requirements of a service in
terms of purpose, scope and quality. The specification translates the Council’s strategic or
corporate plan into a service specific plan (Internal Report of Community and Recreations
Services, 1998, p. 2).

The Sports and Recreation Planning and Commissioning Unit, in consultation with the
Leisure Centre Business unit, customers and unions, developed the specifications of the
contract. The specification defined a level, and the volume of the services to be
provided to the users. In the specification development process, customer consultation
was undertaken concerning two aspects of the services: current level of the services and
the types of programs offered. The overall finding was that the users were highly
satisfied with the quality, user charges and the level of the services.

The Council drew people from customer focus groups, members of the Council, and
other casual users of facilities to develop the specifications. The customer focus groups
provided spontaneous support in describing their expectations of the quality of the
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services, the fees to be charged, and the pool water quality of the facilities in the sports
and recreation services. Councillors also provided valuable input about the services in
the specification development process. The internal bidding team also consulted some
colleagues in Victoria when developing specifications for some of the areas. The
specification development process also focused on the level of services.

The level of services determined the volume and quality of services to be provided. The
team preferred to have written specifications for the level of services to adjust the level
whenever necessary. Extensive customer consultation used methods as such as random
surveys, focus groups, and centre-specific surveys to determine the expected level of
services. Based on these results, specification was developed to define the current level
of services. The document also allowed any provider to vary services, subject to
consultation with the Planning and Commissioning units, and according to the demand
of the community. The specification was as an output based document and encouraged
innovation, efficiency and high performance. The following services were taken from
the specification section of the tender document:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

School programs
Gym
Aquatics-learn to swim
Squash
Creche
Retail/Catering
Administration
Maintenance
Source: Internal documents, Leisure Centre.

The services identified were then translated into a specific format defined by the
Council as:
• activity defines the service to be delivered by the provider;
• workload-indicator—defines ‘how much’ of the service to be provided which is
crucial for planning of financial and human resources;
• performance criteria-defines the quality of the service to be delivered and must
be measurable
Source: Internal documents, The Council.
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Appendix 10.2 shows a sample page from this bid and shows how the services’
specifications were quantified into dollars, and aligned to the allocated budgets for
those services. The objective of this document was also to accurately plan the budget
for the term of the contract. In addition to the consultation process, and planning for the
level of services, there were other issues of concern to the Council. These issues,
described in Table 10.2 below, were considered for possible resolution before
endorsing the specification and issuing it to the potential bidders.
TABLE 10.2: ISSUES ARISING FROM THE SPECIFICATION DEVELOPMENT
PROCESS

ISSUES
Fees and charges

PARTY RESPONSIBLE FOR RESOLUTION
The Council is currently responsible for the resolution of
fees and charges.

User group access

The Council will guarantee the current level of operating
hours and access to the users.

Level of service

The planner and commissioner can vary the service levels,
depending on the variation in the level of demand by the
community.

Pool water quality

The service provider, after the market testing is over, should
maintain the practice of testing the water quality.

Hours of opening

Council determines the hours of opening. The proposed
market testing exercise will not change the current opening
hours.

Sources: The internal Report, Community and Recreation services, March 1998 and interview with
the Planner and Commissioner of the Community and Recreation Services, September 1998 and the
author’s own compilation.

The specification simply described the pros and cons of the services, the dollar amount,
and the criteria against which the services would be judged. It took six months to
prepare the specification of the contract (Interview, Purchaser of Leisure Centre,
September, 1998). The specification was carefully prepared to stop suppliers abusing
the specification. This was difficult for the Purchaser. Commenting about this issue,
one Purchaser stated:
This is perhaps the hardest part of all. Over the years we did all, we were the funders and
we were the provider of the services. But when it comes to specifying a service for
someone, when it comes to doing it as a provider, it gets a lot harder to do things without
any bias, with accuracy (Interview, Purchaser of Leisure Centre, September, 1998).
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Designing a contract is crucial as the savings, quality, efficiency, effectiveness and
value for money depend on a good design of contract. But it is very difficult to include
all the minute details in a contract. When a service is contemplated for contracting out,
every provision needs a careful review so the contractor or the outside provider cannot
manipulate the provisions and go beyond the terms of the contract.

The specification of the Leisure Centre contract showed that the contract was specified
in minute detail so that the ratepayers got maximum value for money (please see
Appendix 10.2 for details). However, the respondents also expressed their concerns that
the specification might be abused to deter entry or submission by outside contractors.
This may happen when societal concerns over a contracting out decision is strongly
manifested in strong unionist activities, strikes, layoffs, and non-cooperation from
workers. None of these had happened in this bid as the Leisure Centre services were
considered for market testing by unanimous support from all walks of the organisation.
The specification developed by the Council was endorsed in a meeting and was
forwarded to six bidders in early May 1998. The Council invited the in-house provider
to submit a competitive bid by the last week of May 1998.
10.4.4 PREPARATION OF INTERNAL BID
In section 10.4.2.4 it was noted that the existing provider received the invitation from
the Director of the Leisure Centre to formally submit a bid for the services. The
purpose of this section is to elaborate on this internal bid. The in-house provider
worked independently of the Planning and Commissioning unit of the Leisure Centre to
prepare the in-house bid. In coming up with the appropriate cost figures, however, the
team received considerable support from the financial services department and the
corporate development unit. The costing exercise was undertaken in four sequential
phases to ensure that the bid was competitive.

10.4.4.1

THE FIRST PHASE OF THE COSTING EXERCISE

The newly emerged National Competition Policy and Internal Competition Policy of
1995/6 required the Council to undertake massive tendering of the services provided by
the Leisure Centre as the total annual budget fell within a Category 1 item. While it has
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been mentioned both in sections 10.3.1 and 10.3.2 that the competition policy ensures
that the service meet the market test for efficiency and quality and the residents are
receiving the best value for money, this section describes how this scenario changed
from monopoly provision to competitive provision requiring the Council to cost its
services. This discussion sheds further light on the technical aspect of the costing of
bids prepared by the in-house team.

The market testing policy, as discussed in section 8.3, suggests that an internal service
be tested for cost and quality to justify its provision from the best source(s). The inhouse team, after receiving the formal invitation to tender, used its internal expertise
and ‘intellectual property’ (Interview, Purchaser, Leisure Centre, 1998) to cost the
services according to the pro-forma supplied by the provider (see Appendix 10.3). This
pro-forma which was supplied to all potential bidders indicated that some of the costs
were common to all the bidders. When asked to explain the reason for using these
figures as given, one interviewee replied:
Some of the cost figures were given in that those were unavoidable no matter who supplied
the service at the end of the day. In other words, these are not avoidable costs. So we have
provided blank spaces to fill in cost data for all of the centres owned by the Council. The
cost items, however, may vary for external suppliers. The external bidders need to explain
their costs to us as well. But we are not concerned about those. We are concerned about our
own bid and the costs that we are going to incur. Our financial services department and the
Corporate Development unit are actually assisting us in preparing the internal bid through
our new ABC system (Interview, Purchaser, Leisure Centre, 1998).

It has been indicated in sections 8.4.2 and 8.5.2 that the Council changed its resource
allocation and cost allocation systems following massive restructuring. Later there were
independent systems or a central system to provide the cost data to users. In this bid,
the Purchaser prepared the primary resource requirements, in consultation with the
provider. The provider conducted the market research and translated user expectations
into contract specification.

The Purchaser indicated (interview, Purchaser, Leisure Centre, September 1998) that
the variable costs were too objective for the quality and service specification, and
would be the same regardless of the choice of the suppliers. The cost elements that
were explained as variable were objectively determined after taking into careful
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consideration the resource usage requirement. The items were treated as variable costs.
For example, the volume of chlorine and its price, a variable cost element, would be
same for all the parties concerned. There were also other fixed costs of the department
and a share of allocated costs from the support services and the corporate development
departments. Those items were considered as common costs. The fixed costs of the
department were completely attributable to the department. The Financial Services and
Corporate Development staff involved in the Accounting Information System project
supplied such costs.

The allocated share of common costs (corporate overheads) was the costs imposed on
the Leisure Centre based on the principle of ‘ability to bear’ and ‘fairness’ (Fregman
and Liao, 1981) criteria discussed in Chapter 3. In the cost allocation process, the
Council used an ABC based system developed in 1996. The cost driver rates, the cost
pools and the charges were commercially confidential information and this information
was not supplied. It was also not perceived important to justify the costing exercise.
The respondents indicated that the allocated costs to the Leisure Centre were not
‘neutral’ and had bias in them. Therefore, some negotiations or concerns, to be
discussed in section 10.4.3.2, were considered to ensure that the bid was strategically
made to keep the service in-house on one hand and the ‘competitive neutrality’ was
maintained on the other.

Competitive neutrality requires organisations to maintain ‘fair practices’ and not
manipulate facts and figures materially. The Purchaser was primarily concerned about
the ‘transfer pricing’ and the ‘allocated share’ of corporate overheads. The concern
about the transfer pricing was raised because of lack of across the board policy for
implementing the system. This was explained as a system lacking organisation-wide
application (Interview, Purchaser, September 1998). The Purchaser explained that some
of the departments were under strict scrutiny while others were without any scrutiny
about the efficient usage of allocated funds. Similar concerns were also raised from
other areas of operations that raised concern about the internal use of the support
services. It was revealed during an interview that, for policy reasons, the Council
275

restricted the use of external support services for three years. One of the Purchasers
commented:
We are not allowed to use external support services, which are cheaper at times than the
internal support services. Moreover, a mark-up on the services makes the cost a burden for
us to compete successfully. We are given no choice but to accept the corporate decision. It
makes it hard for us to compete successfully (Interview, Purchaser, September 1998).

The implication of this for the internal provider was that there were inefficiencies in the
internal support services that were likely to magnify the cost of the bid because of
partial decentralisation accorded to the Leisure Centre. The provider had to find
alternative ways to come up with a very competitive bid. This implied that the first
round of the costing of the bid was not perceived to be a winning bid. Concerns were
raised about making the bid competitive and a review was considered by the Purchaser.

10.4.4.2

REVIEW OF THE COST DATA BY THE INTERNAL PROVIDER

The previous section laid the background for a review of the cost data for preparing a
competitive bid. The main concern was about the issue of excessive charge for
inefficient transfer pricing, excessive allocation of services from the Corporate
Development unit, and inefficiency in the processes of delivering the services to the
citizens. These were believed to be the sources of the uncompetitive bid and efforts
were made to diagnose the problems and mitigate those.

The first diagnosed problem was the excessive use of transfer pricing associated with
the higher cost of support services. It was reported that there was no control over the
recruitment of the staff in the support services area and that the area was overstaffed
(Interview, Purchaser, September 1998). This is similar to the view by Cooper and
Kaplan (1991) that the expansion of the support services is likely if there is no check on
their efficiency. Excessive staff in support areas causes higher costs and requires a
larger budget. This was believed to be a cause of a higher share of allocated costs. In
the short term there was no Purchaser-Provider split for the services in the support
services department and it was reported that there was no possibility of reducing the
costs within the period of the contemplated Leisure Centre tendering. Negotiations
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were considered with the Financial Services department, the Corporate Development
Unit and the internal provider for reducing the cost of the support services (Interview,
The internal Provider, September 1998).

The provider of the Leisure Centre argued that the Leisure Centre was getting a greater
share of allocated overheads, either in activities or in dollars, than it needed to provide
the services. This was in line with the resource supply view posited by Cooper and
Kaplan (1992). A negotiation was proposed with the corporate development unit which
oversaw the corporate-wide policy and strategy related issues affecting the
competitiveness of the Council. It was proposed that the Leisure Centre would forward
an estimate of the resources and their dollar values to signal the excess allocation in the
interim. This was acceptable at the corporate level to enhance the contestability of the
Leisure Centre. But it was warned that similar arrangements would not be possible in
future if the corporate wide Purchaser-Provider arrangement was implemented.

The provider took a resource usage view of all the activities to be used for the delivery
of the services. The usage of common and unavoidable resources was excepted from
this resource usage. The proposal was made that the excess dollars of the services be
put in the corporate overhead bucket for further allocation (with the exception of
Leisure Centre activities). Alternatively, it could be absorbed as a cost of governance
(cf. New Zealand Auditor General’s office, 1989). The second proposal was in line
with the reasoning by Cooper and Kaplan (1992) who have shown that, to enhance the
reported profitability of a product, the resources used by it should be considered
attributable cost and that excess costs (in the form of idle capacity where a product
contributes a part) be treated as a loss to an organisation. Similarly, Gal-Or (1993)
indicates that a firm may provide privileges to any product that is strategically
important and cost allocation can be made in such a way to give it an advantage over
the cost of other products or niche markets. In a similar vein, it had been proposed that
the Council not market test all of its services and that the services that were subject to
the market testing exercise be given some strategic advantage to compete. This was
proposed because the Council had earlier experienced a bad episode of contracting that
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nearly collapsed its internal facilities. It was proposed that if privileges were given to
the Leisure Centre, it would maintain its integrity and would not cause similar
contractual disputes over the services.

Following these arguments, discussions and negotiations took place from 1995 until
mid-February 1996. The exact amount of cost, deemed as excess, was being determined
after intensive market research about the cost of these services in the market, and the
identification process of the activities used in their delivery. In fact the provider also
considered the possibility, under pressure of the situation, of reviewing the services
delivery processes and cost reduction opportunities (Interview, Purchaser, Leisure
Centre, September 1998).

There was intense discussion among all the staff concerned with the operations of the
Leisure Centre activities. Accordingly, avenues were explored to reduce the cost of the
in-house operations. Since local governments are labour intensive and operate on a
fixed resource allocation basis, costs of efficiency and inefficiency are largely
dependent upon the intelligent use of the amount of labour or number of activities
performed by a single staff member. Some cost reduction techniques are suggested by
several researchers.

Turney (1992) suggests that businesses incur 80% of the costs from 20% of the
activities, and that not all activities add value. In similar vein, the provider, trained in
the ABC system by the Financial Services Department, tried to identify non-value
adding activities and wastage. Some avenues to cut down costs were found:
retrenchments of some staff, employing multi-skilled people, or increasing the work
intensity of people in some areas of work. These could help in identifying the slack in
budgets thought of as taken for granted during the era of monopoly provision. The
extent of slack or the quantum of costs in the process of re-engineering that emerged in
the identification process paved the way for intelligent planning and costing of
resources for the bid. This involved the recalculation of the bid (Interview with the
Provider, September, 1998).
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10.4.4.3

REITERATION OF COST DATA

In section 10.4.3.1 it was reported that the first phase of the costing of the bid was seen
as problematic and uncompetitive in the wake of transfer price related problems,
excessive charging, and allocation of support department and corporate costs to service
departments. These were identified and possible avenues for resolving them were
identified in section 10.4.3.2. Based on the review of the problem, and the possible
resolution mechanisms, the Corporate Development Unit came up with the rescue
package to make the bid competitive. The internal provider, in consultation with the
corporate development manager, addressed the problems by exploring some
alternatives.

Firstly, the transfer pricing problem and excessive charge allegations were resolved by
the corporate development unit. In doing this the internal provider proposed to use
market price as the benchmark of the support services costs used by the Leisure Centre.
This meant that the activities or services to be received from the support services be
costed at market price. This was to compensate for the alleged inefficiency already
discussed in section 10.4.3.2. The difference between the in-house costs and the
benchmark was bundled with the other excessive allocated costs. This excess supply of
resources was attributable to the ‘allocation mechanism’ discussed in Chapter 2.

Secondly, the support services costs were assigned on the basis of actual user
consumption rather than on an imposed allocation from the central office. It was
discovered that, because of a lack of a corporate-wide allocation system, the Leisure
Centre was receiving a greater share of allocated costs than it was consuming
(Interview, Provider, September, 1998). It was resolved that the excess be shifted to the
‘corporate overhead bucket’ and shown as a periodic expense. The dollar value of this
excess charge was not supplied because these costs could not be separated from the
operating budgets.

Thirdly, re-engineering activities in the operations area revealed that some units
employed in delivering the services were not working to capacity. This meant that they
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had some in-built slack. Some of them were old multi-skilled employees and were
called upon for coaching and teaching. These made some of the existing coaching and
training staff redundant. By adopting these and employing some of the staff in the dual
roles of administration and coaching, cost reduction opportunities were identified.

By adopting these three strategies to reduce the cost of the bid, the Purchaser identified
that re-engineering of the work as a whole enabled the Council to save nearly $1
million. This amounted to nearly 10% of the initial estimate of the costing of the first
bid and was considered significant. The Council collated the final cost figures over six
months.

10.4.4.4

THE FINAL COST OF THE INTERNAL BID

It was shown in section 10.4.3.1 that the cost of the bid comprises the cost of variable
resources, the direct fixed resources, and the share of the allocated costs of the Leisure
Centre. The final cost of the bid as shown below is a full cost of bid supported by the
ABC costing system of the Council. The bid, however, was in sharp contrast to the
theory discussed in sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.3. Section 5.4.3 suggests that the cost of a bid
be based on the relevant cost of the service provision which is simply the sum of
avoidable or attributable costs (Shillinglaw, 1963) of a service. One respondent
remarked:
If you consider only a single service and if there is not a significant level of change in the
volume of service contemplated for contracting, you cannot gain additional benefit of
calculating relevant costs for the service. You would not be able to avoid some of the fixed
costs. It is possible to identify the avoidable and non-avoidable part, but we did not bother
about it because we thought the cost of doing it would be significant to us. In future,
however, we might have to do it when more services will be exposed to competition. We
have the system in place and once the ABC becomes the full-fledged accounting system; we
might be able to do it in real time. The system support is currently being developed in
collaboration with the corporate development unit and by January 2001 we will be fully
prepared to cost bids using our full-fledged ABC system. But, for our single bid of the
Leisure Centre activities, we used full costs and believe that it would not be significantly
distorted because it has been carefully prepared using expertise from all corners of the
organisation (Interview with Assistant Management Accountant, 1998).

The cost of the bid was made available before the day of the bid submission. The final
deadline for bid submission was set for all bids and the bid was submitted. It was
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proposed that the submitted bids would be opened and evaluated in two phases
(Internal memo, 1998).

10.5 THE SUBMISSION OF THE BIDS
Because of the nature of the tendering process, it was not known until after the last day
of the tender submission that no party except the in-house provider bid for the job. The
internal provider submitted the bid in 14 different options. Instead of submitting a bid,
one of the interested bidders wrote a letter to the Council and explained his/her
reservations about the bidding system.
10.5.1 THE INTERNAL BID AND CRITICISM OF IT
The internal bid showed the estimated cost of providing the services in three Leisure
Centres run by the Council. The final cost figure was simply the sum of all the
estimated costs of the three centres. The costs were projected ones which assumed that
the dollar value of such costs would not change drastically by changes in the number of
users. The implication of this was that the internal bid was valid for the contemplated
contract period of three years.

The costs were, however, adjusted for opportunity cost of capital, meaning that the
funds to be committed would be subject to potential income loss had they been used to
provide the Leisure Centre activities or services. Since the bid was for a three-year
period, the cost figures were subjected either to inclusion of opportunity cost or
discounting. Adopting either approach provides the same result (Johnstone, 1999). The
bid thus correctly factored the time value of money of the cash flows. The question,
however, was about the use of full cost or relevant cost.

Although it was rationalised by one of the respondents that the full cost bid would
suffice its purposes, the bid had fatal errors in other areas. First, the opportunity cost of
capital was arbitrarily chosen although it was argued that the competitive neutrality
principle had been applied. Second, the costs marked as ‘given’ didn’t have any
relevance to the cost calculation process. If alternative providers used significantly
improved technology that required less consumption of these resources then that could
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make the in-house bid unattractive. Third, the cost flow did not consider the impact of
inflation, which could again make the bid unattractive. Fourth, the bid did not consider
the option value of ‘internalising the service’ if the contract was lost. Fifth, it did not
show the impact of a sudden change in the level and volume of services and the
revision of user charge in the wake of innovative ways of providing the same services.
The implications of these were that the bid might be uncompetitive, given the wrong
treatment of some of the items. But it would not be possible to know the
uncompetitiveness unless it was compared to external bids. On the last day of the
submission, there was no submission of bids from external parties even though a
number of parties initially showed some eagerness (Memo, August, 1998; Interview,
Purchaser of Leisure Centre, September 1998).
10.5.2 THE STORY OF NO EXTERNAL SUBMISSION
On the final day of the bid submission (that is, last part of May 1998), the Council
received two responses- one from the Leisure Facilities Group (the in-house team) and
the other from another interested supplier. The letter from the other tenderer explained
that the facilities in one of the centres owned by the Council did not fit into their
business (Internal Report, Community and Recreation services, June 1998. P. 4;
Interview, Planner, September 1998). The Planning Manager of the Leisure Centre
services later contacted the other potential bidders who declined to bid. Discussion
revealed the following reasons for their decision not to bid for the work (Internal report,
Community and Recreation Services, June, 1998):
•
•
•
•

the level of services required in the specification,
the stringent performance criteria (quality measures) specified,
the reputation of the ‘in-house’ team amongst the industry peers, and
the business risk associated with non-compliance.

It was attempted to further uncover the perceived role of inside information about the
internal team, especially the Director of the Leisure Centre services, and its impact on
the internal bid. The Director maintained neutrality at all times and was silent about the
costing aspect of the bidding. He also suggested that because of the tight specification
and set performance indicators, it would be difficult for any potential bidder to make a
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reasonable profit. Therefore, the writer of the letter decided not to bid for the Leisure
Centre activities. The letter also alleged Council bias. The issue of tight standards and
the set performance criteria were verified and corroborated with other sources of
evidence. In response to one question about this issue, one respondent made the
following remarks:
In the past, we have seen that the suppliers of services tend to abuse the clauses of the
contract. If they do a single job outside the written speciation of the contract, they charge
for that extra. These private providers are smarter people than we are and they consult
outstanding professional lawyers all the time to find loopholes in the contract and abuse the
clauses of the contract to make money. We have seen this happening in the UK and
Victoria. It is not possible for someone to cover all the aspects of a contract in writing.
Previously we supplied the services and there was no separation of funding from service
provision. But to ensure better delivery and management of the services, we distanced
service funding from provision so that neutrality can be maintained, so that the expectation
of the ultimate consumers can be reflected in the performance criteria set in a contract…
We had to work very hard to prepare the specification of the Leisure Centre activities. It is
our learning experience and only time will tell whether the service is competitive enough
and can withstand the test of the market (Interview, Purchaser, Leisure Centre, 1998).

The potential bidder who sent the letter to the tender box suggested that the Council
would learn more about the bias on this particular bid after the passage of the initial
contact period (of three years). But at the time of decision-making the specification was
just enough to ensure stiff competition amongst the competitors. The single bid was the
only bid for consideration by the Council. The resource in terms of lost productivity
was enormous in preparing the bid. It took six months to prepare the specifications of
the contract and another six-months to prepare the bid. The dilemma of the Council was
whether it would consider another invitation to bid or award the contract to the single
in-house bidder. This was the agenda for review by the arbitrator who had the authority
to either finalise the award of contract or to explore further contracting opportunities.

10.6 REVIEW OF SINGLE BID BY THE ARBITRATOR
The onus of reviewing all the bids and recommendation about the winning bid fell to
the Director of the Leisure Centre services of the Council. The Director was primarily
concerned about his role in this unique situation because he expected few bids for
review and selection. If a single bid was reviewed, there might be allegations about the
role of competition and the cost for the services to be borne by taxpayers. There might
be allegations from the residents about excess charge of services and the transfer of
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efficiency gains in the form of lower service costs. The competition policy and the
contract specification of the Council stated that the winner was required to enter into a
contract with the Purchaser for a period of three years and sign a document titling
‘service level agreements’ (Interview, Purchaser of Leisure Centre, September, 1998).
In return for signing the contract, the supplier would receive the funds necessary to
provide the services and buy other services.

Because there was no external bid, the internal bid could not be compared and assessed
for potential cost savings and other aspects set out in the contract specification. The
Council decided to evaluate the bid in two stages. The first phase identified four
priority areas: customer service, quality assurance, program development and
methodology, and financial capability. The bidder must also demonstrate its
competence in operating a Leisure Centre. The second phase involved analysis of the
price of delivering the services. A brief overview of the criteria, as outlined in Table
10.3, shows the relative importance of these criteria in the contract recommendation
process.
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TABLE 10.3: PHASES OF TENDER EVALUATION PROCESS
CRITERIA
Phase one
Customer Service

BRIEF DESCRIPTION

Quality Assurance

Ability to demonstrate that the quality
expectation of customers is met. This should
be manifested in various documents of
assuring quality, customer complaint
handling and suggestions.

Program and Methodology

Ability to demonstrate sound practices in
developing programs undertaken as part of
service delivery.

Financial capability

Ability to manage the services financially.

Occupational Health and safety

Ability to maintain all aspects of
occupational health and safety (OHS)
requirements.

Relevant experience

Ability to provide enhanced level of services
and
demonstrates
sound
financial
management.

Staffing

Ability to demonstrate acceptable level and
quality of staff consistent with the
specification document.
Should include operational costs and actual
on-costs for a total of 3 years.

Provision for customer
complaint handling.

Phase two
Price

feedback

and

Source: Author’s own compilation from the internal memo, Community and Recreation Services, June 1998.

These criteria were used to evaluate the in-house bid and make decisions about the
winner. It was resolved that if the in-house bid met the specific objective criteria, the
in-house team would win the contract for a three years primary term followed by the
option to renew the contract for another two years.

The summary findings of the evaluation, as shown in Table 10.4, demonstrated that the
in-house team had the ability to conform to the specifications of the bid and operate the
Leisure Centre. Based on these findings, a recommendation was made to award the
contract to the Leisure Group Facilities. The substance of the recommendation and the
other bases of the award are discussed next.
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TABLE 10.4: FINDINGS OF THE TENDER EVALUATION PROCESS
CRITERIA
Phase one
Customer Service

BRIEF DESCRIPTION

Quality Assurance

The in-house bid demonstrated, through a quality assurance
flow- chart, its ability to resolve customer complaints and
suggestions promptly. It also accompanied various businesses
and marketing plans that further reinforced quality assurance.
Therefore, the quality assurance criteria met the specific
provision of the specification document.

Program and Methodology

The in-house bid clearly demonstrated, through its flow-chart,
the process of program development. It clearly evidenced the
internal bidder’s extensive industry experience in developing
appropriate programs and methodology for those.

Financial capability

The in-house team demonstrated its ability to manage and
operate the centre in its current form for the past four years prior
to 1998. It was also evidenced in the testimonials provided from
business references.

Occupational
safety (OHS)

Health

The in-house team had definite complaint handling, customer
service plan and customer feedback options. Therefore, it
conformed to the specification.

and

Relevant experience

The in-house team complied with all aspects of occupational
health and safety (OHS) and sun protection requirement. This
ensured a high level of commitment to and achievement of a
quality OHS standard.

Staffing

The in-house team managed the centre for the past four years.
During this period it demonstrated enhanced levels of services
and sound financial management.
The in-house team, in its submission, demonstrated a level and
quality of staffing consistent with that specified. It included key
staff with experience and qualifications, a detailed organisational
structure, commitment to local area workplace agreements, and a
list of proposed sub-contractors.

Phase two
Price

Three detailed price schedules for the proposed contract period
included all operational costs and actual on-costs. The fees and
charges reflected a compromise of quality, and a financially
responsible operation. The fees and projections were based on
1998/99 budgets and adjusted CPIs in years 2 and 3,
respectively.

Source: Compilation from the ‘Internal memo, Community and Recreation services, June, 1998.
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10.7 THE DECISION ABOUT SOURCING OF LEISURE CENTRE
SERVICES
Chapter 2 discussed different theories of contracting. The philosophical routes and their
underlying conclusions converged on one single point- a service should be provided
from the least costly source. The service quality was overlooked in these theories,
which implicitly assumes that there is no cost of quality. However, this case study
showed that in addition to cost, quality is another important consideration about
sourcing decisions. Among the theories, the Transaction Cost Theory is considered as
the most pragmatic in that it factors in all the inherent deficiencies in the other theories
and suggests that the internal production of service is least expensive when writing the
contract for market arrangement is not easy, and expensive (Williamson, 1975).
However, the Leisure Centre bid did not fully reflect the underlying philosophical
theories of Transaction Cost Economics because the contract specification was too
objective (as evidenced by the objective criteria in Table 10.2). Rather the New Public
Management is a better contender in explaining the state of decision in the contract. In
this case, the Planning Unit of the Leisure Centre facilities was the funder of the
services and the Commissioning unit was the potential provider of the services. On
behalf of the funder, the potential provider of the services was supposed to perform
according to the specifications released to every single bidder. The final service
provision is conditional upon the winning of the bid after the competition is held
successfully.

As asserted earlier, the competition itself is found to have driven the efficiency. Cost
data are the primary means to make the service delivery decision. In the final decision
making process, the Planning Manager said the following:
At least this bidding exercise informed us about the inefficiencies in operations areas and in
support service areas. It significantly improved the productivity of the people involved in
the delivery of the services and impacted on other parts of the organisation. This had
happened because of the threat of competition and a fear of job losses. This created lots of
pressures on employees to work harder for this Council. Previously they considered that
their job was secured and they took their jobs for granted. But the threat of competition
changed the whole picture. I think this is the benefit of competition. Before the bid
submission nobody knew that there would be no submission. Everyone involved worked
very carefully to make the bid as lean as possible. We believe this is the success of market
testing of this service. We will be able to transfer this knowledge to other parts of the
organisation and will be more successful in future (Interview, Planning and Commissioning
Unit, The Leisure Centre of the Council, September, 1998).
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These remarks reflected the employees’ perception that the services were provided
from the best source. There was no hesitation by the Councillors after review of the
situation that the best value was guaranteed for the contract period and that the
residents would not have to cope with new providers. The committee responsible for
the bid evaluation and the Council concurred on the following points (Internal report,
Community and Recreation Services, June, 1998, p. 9):
THE FINAL RESOLUTIONS OF THE BID
1.

The Leisure Group facilities bid be accepted and they should commence their operation from 1 July
1998 for a contracted period of 3 years.
2. Only one of the three alternatives be accepted and others be investigated
3. That the Sports and Recreation Planning and Commissioning unit commence the development of an
‘in-house’ service level agreement to cover the three-year period
4. That a complete report be prepared in future about the cost benefit of the tendering of this job.
Source: Internal Report, Community and Recreation Services, June 1998.

The contract was signed between the provider and the Council for the agreed level of
services and for a total period of three years. Within this period, the provider would
constantly monitor the services with the help of the community, external service
competition watchdog, and the Department of Local Government of New South Wales.
Any departure from the criteria of the contract or the complaints from the recipients of
the services would trigger market testing at the instigation of the Councillors where the
cost of such competition would be insignificant. As an alternative to this,
benchmarking might be used. The childcare service of the Council was one of the
benchmarked services that were kept in-house for 5 years ending in 2003 (Interview,
Purchaser, September, 1998; Interview, Internal Provider of Leisure Centre, September,
1998; and Interview, Manager, Child Care Centre, September, 1998).

10.8 DISCUSSION OF THE BID
In this section, an evaluation of will be made, in light of extant theory on contracting
out and overhead allocation, of the theoretical fit of the evidence analysed in this
chapter. The issues are discussed at the unit level of analysis (the second research site
within the Council).
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The two main research questions- the reasons for outsourcing and the process of
outsourcing decisions are explored. Some reasons for outsourcing emerged from the
field: the pressure of reform through the National Competition Policy, the pressure
from the Internal Competition Policy, the demand of the community, and the
rationalisation of the in-house provision. All these factors (or reasons) were revealed as
arguments for the competitive tendering and contracting exercise in this particular site.
The second broad research question, the process aspect of the bidding, revealed that
there were intermediate phases within the competitive tendering and contracting
process. This change did not happen all of a sudden. It followed a decade long change
in the organisational structure, the Accounting Information System change, the
management control system change, the funding and provision change, input-output
measures and many other peripheral changes. It was revealed that the process aspect
was more involved and rigorous than previously thought. This suggested that
competitive tendering and contracting demands more human and monetary resources
than thought previously. It was also revealed that in a competitive tendering and
contracting exercise, presence of competition was not necessary to provide services
efficiently.
10.8.1 THE ARGUMENTS FOR CONTRACTING OUT
The arguments that emerged from the field evidence suggests that there were not too
many arguments for competitive tendering and contracting exercises of the Leisure
Centre services.

First, it was revealed that the mandates of the National Competition Policy to
streamline inefficiency, to improve productivity, and the quality of services, and finally
to foster competition within business services had driven this competitive tendering and
contracting exercise. The National Competition Policy categorisation of costs into
Category 1 and Category 2 services was used to conduct the market testing exercises.
The Leisure Centre services were categorised as Category 1 services by National
Competition Policy. Therefore, the competitive tendering and contracting by market
testing was argued as one of the first issues to be addressed. There is little research in
this line of inquiry to reveal the influence of National Competition Policy in driving the
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competitive tendering and contracting. This is, therefore, a new construct to explain the
reasons for contracting.

The second reason was the influence of the Internal Competition Policy of the Council.
The organisation-specific Internal Competition Policy, was an adapted version of the
National Competition Policy; this was revealed and stated as an exception to any public
sector body in the Australian State of New South Wales. The Council attempted to
introduce the adapted version of the National Competition Policy through its own
competition policy; this was contrary to the evidence found in any local government in
New South Wales at the time of the data collection. It was also revealed that the staff
welcomed the mandatory status of competitive tendering and contracting by the annual
allocated budget. Appendix 8.1 shows the list of services planned for market testing
and subsequent competitive tendering and contracting or benchmarking. This particular
construct is an addition to extant research as one of the explanatory variables for
competitive tendering and contracting in the Council.

The third reason was the demand of the community for the competitive tendering and
contracting. This was part of the broader accountability following the scrutiny of
efficiency and effectiveness issues. The bid was imposed from top management; the
ratepayers did not have any voice to express their concerns. This particular competitive
tendering and contracting was in sharp contrast to the old competitive tendering and
contracting in 1989 in that the ratepayers concerns were heard. The Council addressed
their concerns by assuring best value for money by providing the services through the
best source. The other contrasting attribute of this particular competitive tendering and
contracting was the opportunity given to the local residents to provide inputs for the
specification development and converting those to Key Performance Indicators, service
levels and service standards. Extant research in the Australian Public Sector context did
not reveal this construct as one of the significant arguments for competitive tendering
and contracting, therefore, this particular construct was an addition to the list of
arguments for competitive tendering and contracting.
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10.8.2 THE DISCUSSION ABOUT THE BIDDING PROCESS
The successful second bid suggested that it was prepared in the five distinct steps
discussed in Chapter 5. The first phase in the bid was identification of the activities.
This was done using the National Competition Policy and the Internal Competition
Policy guidelines about the service selection. According to these guidelines, the Leisure
Centre services were categorised as Category 1 services, earmarked for mandatory
market testing and the competitive tendering and contracting process. This service
identification process was ideology driven, in this instance it was driven by the
mandates of the National Competition Policy and the Internal Competition Policy. It
was revealed that the Liberal Party ideology was to streamline efficiency in
government service provision through competition, bringing in private sector principles
to establish input-outputs for competitive tendering and contracting processes. This
issue of service identification confirms the earlier conjecture of Tucker (1997, pp. 6970) that the public sector in Australia was following the new managerialist philosophy
which is descended from Public Choice theory. The second element in the specification
process was to develop the Key Performance Indicators for the services. It was revealed
that the specifications were developed using commercial sector output measurement
principles. The interviews with the focus groups revealed that the service level
agreements proxied the outputs.

In the second phase, the tender documents were released to the interested bidders. The
Council also released a costing template with some filled in cost figures. Usually, the
applicants prepare their own costing calculations and submit it as part of a tender.
When this particular issue was inquired about, the Purchaser of the Leisure Centre said
that the costing template had some unavoidable cost figures. This was justified to
rationalise the level playing field scenario and also to ensure the competitive neutrality
principle of the National Competition Policy.

The third phase was about the costing of the in-house bid. It was stated in Chapter 1
that the thesis examines the costing aspects of in-house bids because, the outside bids
will be taken for granted and their detailed calculations were often not supplied. This
costing aspect of the Council required a massive restructuring of its Accounting
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Information System, Management Control System and the Budgeting System discussed
in Chapters 7 and 8. The costing system change was a broader part of the management
control system (Otley and Berry, 1994). In Chapter 7 there was discussion about the
new budgeting system in a Purchaser/Provider split. It was suggested that in order to
improve the accountability and efficiency aspects of the budgets the split was
necessary. Two distinct pressures, the National Competition Policy and Internal
Competition Policy, brought in the Accounting Information Systems and Management
Control System changes.

While the National Competition Policy mandates of competition, competitive
neutrality, and compulsory market testing by category of services were the external
pressures hinging on the Accounting Information System change, the internal pressures
were created from the mandates of the Internal Competition Policy. The changes in
Accounting Information System and Management Control System from external and
internal forces are typical in organisations and are confirmed by the earlier theoretical
and empirical works (Baines and Langfield-Smith, 2003; Broadbent, 1992; Burns,
2000; Burns and Scapens, 2000; Burns and Vaivio, 2001; Cobb et al., 1995; Laitinen,
2001; Vaivio, 1999). The change in the Accounting Information System and
Management Control System was spontaneous and earned the support from all corners
of the Council. This evidence of such changes is contrary to the theoretical
prescriptions and empirical evidence on accounting system changes (see for example,
Hopwood, 1987; Ogden and Anderson, 1999; Scapens and Roberts, 1993). The users
urged management to make changes; their roles were revealed and expressed as
proactive. The implication of this particular finding is that in this researched Council,
Accounting Information System and Management Control System changes have had
positive impacts on employee performance and behaviour at the individual level. At the
collective level, the evidence provided the opposite picture, the employees working
within one division and not exposed to competition behaved differently from the staff
working in areas facing external competition.
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Within the scheme of the Management Control System change, the organisation
attempted to cater for the needs of the business units (that is, all the Category 1 service
providers) with full costing of services. The monopoly units were also required to cost
their services but not as accurately as the business unit’s services. The Key
Performance Indicators were translated into ‘service levels’ for costing purposes. This
particular finding has been revealed in the context of local governments. In the full
costing process, the overhead allocation issue was emphasised because the overheads
were a major component of budget in the Council, where in 1998/99, it represented
35% of the annual budget of the Council. The implication of exclusion of this was that
the services were undercosted or subsidized. This particular finding is consistent with
the works of Cooper (1989), Cooper and Kaplan (1992), and Keegan and Eiler (1994)
about the timing of changes in the costing system. The cost allocation system was,
however, not a full-fledged cost-allocation system at the time of the data collection.

The full costing data was recommended by the National Competition Policy and the
Internal Competition Policy for lodging grant applications with the Federal and the State
Governments. In this first step, cost calculation was done and overhead allocation was
incorporated for the first time in an ABC system. The cost calculation during this first
phase was, however, crude. The staff in the Financial Services and People Resources
defended it as an approximately accurate system of cost calculation. Literature on
overhead allocation suggests that full costing is a norm for businesses to recover the entire
costs from the customers (Baumol et al., 1987; Cohen and Loeb, 1982; Drury and Tayles,
1995; King et al., 1994). This full costing policy, thus, confirms the earlier works of
Baumol et al., 1987; Cohen and Loeb, 1982; Drury and Tayles, 1995; King et al., 1994 in
that the ratepayers or the consumers of the services would be required to pay full costs and
a mark-up on those costs to be recovered from them. For the purposes of bid pricing, this
costing iteration was not the end, but the beginning of a transition from a crude inputbased costing to an output-based costing system. The staff in the Leisure Centre services
had other iterations before finalising the internal bid.
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The second iteration of the costing exercise involved making the internal bid ‘leaner’
and more competitive (in the words of the existing providers). The in-house provider
was involved in the negotiation process to explore opportunities to reduce costs.
Overheads were the first element flagged in this process. The provider argued that the
excessive overheads could not make the bid competitive enough to win the contract.
The support services providers overlooked the plea for adjustments to the internal
transfer prices of support department costs. This was later allowed for three reasons:
the ad-hoc nature of overhead allocation at the time of preparing the internal bid, the
alleged inefficiency of the support services, and finally, the need to keep the job ‘inhouse’. These revelations confirm the work of Howes (1994), Gal-Or (1993) and
Cavalluzzo et al. (1998). Howes (1994) posited that ad-hoc costs, in contracting out
situations, could mislead bid prices. His suggestion was to use full cost of services.
Gal-or (1993) and Cavalluzzo et al. (1998) suggest that cost allocation should be done
strategically to allow the internal bidder/s some advantage to compete in a niche
market. Apart from a strategic cost calculation, the internal bidding team also explored
other avenues to reduce the internal bid prices. The bid team managed to be innovative
with ways to reduce costs by $0.8 million. This savings confirms the work of
Cavalluzzo et al. (1998).

The final step was the decision made about the sourcing of the services. That entailed
the selection of the provider who could provide the services on the agreed terms and
conditions of the contract. The competitive tendering and contracting policy of the
Council suggests some contrasting changes to those experienced in Waste Services
contracting in 1989, the changes followed the earlier contract failure in 1989. A number
of important unique characteristics were found. First, the decision makers had difficulty
deciding the winner of this competitive bid; secondly, they did not foresee the absence
of competition in this service area; thirdly, they did not have policies for making
decisions when only one bidder had submitted a bid; and finally, no provision was
revealed to organise another episode of bidding when a single bid was submitted.
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Decision-making in a single bidding situation was a unique problem in this bidding
situation. The requirements of the National Competition Policy were to ensure stiff
competition among the contestants before decisions were made. The implication of this
requirement was to invite potential providers to provide the services at minimum costs.
Research suggests that competition brings down costs and improves the efficiency and
effectiveness of public sector services when a competitive tendering and contracting
process is followed (Domberger and Hall, 1995; Szymanski and Wilkins, 1993). In this
bidding exercise, only the in-house bidder bid for the Leisure Centre services. Under
such a circumstance, the requirements of the National Competition Policy could be
questioned in that the market was not contestable and there was no competition at all.
The in-house bidder could manipulate the cost figures and still could provide the
services with their previous level of budgets allocated for the services. It turned out that
the in-house team didn’t use the asymmetric information about the competition, the
number of applicants before the last day of the bid submission. So the bid was a
competitive bid according to the internal bidder. Decision making on a single bid is a
rare event. This particular situation is an addition to extant case based research on
competitive tendering and contracting out.

The decision makers were sceptical about the success of the competitive tendering and
contracting exercise in that they were required to make a decision without having other
bids. The main concern was about the cost savings aspect. In the absence of any other
bids, cost savings were the suspect. The cost savings from the contracting were further
explored. It was discovered that the existing provider (the in-house team) managed to
save $0.8 million from the contracting option compared to the previous allocated fund.
This savings was nearly 16% of the allocated budget in the Leisure Centre services
area. The cost savings were consistent with the previous evidence on contracting out.
Earlier literature suggests that costs savings in Australian local government varied.
Because of the unique nature of the single bid, the decision was made to award the
contract to the in-house bidder. The other option was to call for tenders given that there
were no other submissions from any of the potential bidders. The staff interviewed
suggested that going through this tendering process once again could dissipate the
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Council’s valuable resources and have delayed the service’s provision. The decision to
award the contract was debated and questioned by the interested bidders.

The allegations of the potential bidders were that the decision was biased, not
transparent, and the savings were not real. The decision maker rationalised his decision
by referring to the Competitive Neutrality Principles, the National Competition Policy
and the Internal Competition Policy guidelines. Earlier case study evidence did not
address bidding issues and the decisions made by the decision makers. To ensure
transparent accountability, the Council created a position of an internal Ombudsman to
arbitrate disputes and ensure neutrality of decisions or intervention in dispute
resolution. The Ombudsman did not, however, have the opportunity to interfere with
the decision. The need for rationalisation was revealed as the fifth argument for this
competitive tendering and contracting exercise. This is also an addition to case study
based research on contracting out.

10.9 CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has shown how a sourcing decision was made in a competitive tendering
situation where only one bidder bid for the bundle of services. Earlier literature
suggests that competition brings down costs. This proposition was established with
some scepticism in this chapter. The potential bidders raised their concerns about the
decision of the Council without having ‘fair competition’. As discussed in Chapters 4
and 5, costing of services for contracting purposes was very crucial; the revelation in
this chapter suggested otherwise. However, it was a means to ensure that the Council’s
internal competition agenda is addressed seriously and the benefit flowing from it is
transferred to the recipients of the services.

The National Competition Policy and the Internal Competition Policy provided
important impetus and paved the way for stiff competition. It effectively empowered
the stakeholders to demand competitive services from the most acceptable sources, for
a given level of quality. In the bidding process, the most crucial challenge was to
develop specifications, and translating the specifications to reflect the quality and
measurable output. In developing the specification process, consultation with the
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stakeholders provided valuable insights. In addition, external expertise in the area
ensured better development of the specifications. In the tendering process, almost all
the outside bidders showed reluctance to submit any bid (which was discovered later by
the Purchaser of the services). The allegation was that there was a bias in the
specifications.

After the closure of the tender submissions, the crucial challenge for management was
to make a decision about the winning bid. In the tender evaluation process, the
committee looked at different criteria in two phases. The first phase mainly looked at
the capabilities to manage the operations of the Leisure Centre activities and other
aspects of marketing. This was perceived as crucial in that reluctance to use the
facilities was perceived valuable in bringing down the bottom line figures. The second
phase of the process involved the examination of the pricing structure of the facilities
and its uses. The Council maintained the principle of competitive neutrality and used
the ‘full cost recovery’ principle, even though it had the provision to clearly state the
amount of subsidy in any service area. In the decision-making process, the criteria
based evaluation enhanced decision-making process and it was resolved that the
internal provider be awarded the contract for three years. For carrying out the contract,
however, the Council required the winner to sign a contract to maintain the agreed level
of services. Finally, it is shown in this chapter that cost data is valuable in contracting
out situations. Cost data, especially overheads, may be used strategically to the
advantage of an internal provider and they can give significant edge over its
competitors. This practice can lead to increased integrity of a business unit exposed to
competitive pressures.
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CHAPTER 11
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

11.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter summarises the major findings of this thesis, the implications of these
findings for the researched organisation, and concludes with some directions for future
research. In exploring the research problems posed in this thesis, the literature on
contracting out, cost allocation in traditional and activity based costing environments,
was reviewed. A blend of theory and practice, of contracting out and cost allocation,
was perceived necessary to understand the holistic nature of contracting out decisions,
to explore the research problems, and finally to analyse the evidence collected from the
field.

The evidence collected from the field was discussed and analysed using an explanatory
case study method. Generalisations about contracting out decisions at the organisational
level are made from two cases of contracting out during the data collection period.
Patton (2002) and Yin (2003) argue that where multiple cases are involved, the
generalisations are made from the multiple cases to the organisational level. The
empirical section of the thesis introduced the discussion and analysis of the general
aspects of the researched organisation, and two instances of big-ticket bids. The
discussion of the organisation itself was purely descriptive and provided insights into
the organisation’s transformations between 1989 to 2000. Except for a few changes in
the service delivery arrangements, the organisation was able to maintain its tradition of
providing the majority of services from its internal sources, though competitive
tendering and contracting out was required occasionally for some of its bigger budget
services. The competitive bidding in the Council had required adjustments in its
resource allocation system, changes in its accounting system, and its governance
system. The findings from the field in general, and the bidding exercises in particular,
were compared to the extant literature. The conceptual framework developed in this
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thesis, and the other literature reviewed, explained the cases, and a good theoretical fit
was found.

11.2 MAJOR FINDINGS
Two major research questions are posed in this thesis. The first research question is:
why is contracting out used in an organisation? This research question essentially leads
to the arguments that explain the reasons or the ‘why’ (Yin, 1994) aspect of contracting
out. Some specific research questions tied to this first research question are posed in
this thesis; the findings are linked to these research questions.

Question 1(a): Why is outsourcing a preferred choice?
The Council had used contracting out in two eras- before the introduction of public
sector reform, that is prior to 1995, and after the public sector reform, that is, after the
year 1995. The reasons discussed below relate to the arguments derived in these eras of
contracting out.

Contracting out during the old era:
During the old era only one big ticket contracting was used. The reasons discussed
below, therefore, relates to the contracting out during the old era.

The first finding was that the Council had contracted out large dollar value services to
deunionise the employees in inefficient service areas. The unionised workers demanded
pay rises, better work conditions and stable employment within the Council. These
arguments conform to the reasons cited in the works of Rehfuss, (1989, p. 54);
Szymanski and Wilkins (1993). The resistance by unions, in the wake of the Councl’s
move to contracting out, supports the view posited by Rehfuss (1989, p. 58). It was also
revealed from the interviews that the workers in waste services had demanded
compensation or alternative employment if they lost their jobs due to contracting out
(cf. Shulman, 1982).

The second major finding was that competitive tendering and contracting was
undertaken to achieve cost reduction through employee retrenchments and by
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improving competitive conditions in the operations area. This conforms to the
theoretical and empirical propositions of a large body of studies in local government
contracting out (e.g. Brooks, 1996; Domberger and Hall, 1995; Miranda, 1994; Sciulli,
1996). The sources of cost savings revealed from the field also conform to the extant
research on the sources of cost savings (see for example, Rehfuss, 1989).

The third major finding was that competitive tendering and contracting was used for the
tapping of new technologies and streamlining inefficient operations. These reasons,
however, are shown as secondary sources of cost savings (Rehfuss, 1989). Improving
productivity was also advanced as a contributing factor to cost savings and, therefore,
not shown as a dominant rationale in contracting out in local government (Rehfuss,
1989).

The fourth major finding was that efficiency and productivity improvement were the
driving forces behind the contracting initiatives. Efficiency of the services was a major
concern in the competitive tendering and contracting exercise. Research on contracting
out considers this as a mirror image of the cost savings argument.

Contracting out during the new era:
The arguments for contracting out in the new era of contracting, that is, after the
changes in legislation, and imposition of legislation, revealed the following arguments
for contracting out.

The first argument was that the imposition of new legislation, and the introduction of
regulations on competition, has put pressure on the Council to introduce competitive
tendering across the board, by defining its services into Category 1 and Category 2. The
contracting out regime imposed on this Council also split the Council into two distinct
segments for competition: business units - that is, units that have private sector
competitors; and monopoly units- that is, units that don’t have any competitors in the
private sector.
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The second argument is that embracing and adapting external legislation were the
major catalysts for introducing mandatory contracting out in business unit services.
Though the monopoly units were not subjected to contracting out, they had pressure on
them to keep their spending limits within the threshold limits for the categories of
services (i.e., Category 1 and Category 2 services). The implication of this was that
these units were forced to find alternatives for efficient services.

The third argument for contracting stemmed from the insistence of the ratepayers
through various council meetings and other interfaces with the Council. This was part
of the broader accountability following the scrutiny of efficiency and effectiveness
issues.

Question 1(b): What are the circumstances for preferring in-house options?
The evidence finds that the Council used the following arguments for preferring
internal provisions over contracting out when it contracted out its big ticket services.

The Council was apprehensive of losing the possibility of core competencies if
contracting out eventuated. The fear of losing core competency in contacting out
confirms earlier works of Davis-Blake and Uzzi (1993); Messiter (1993, p. 53); Quinn
and Hilmer, (1994); and Rehfuss (1989).

Strong union resistance was found as one of the major barriers to contracting out. The
employees working in one of the service areas attempted to destabilise management’s
move to introduce competition and outsource the services. This is a reflection of public
sector employees’ attitude towards their job (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993). Union
resistance is seen as pressure to keep services in-house (Dehoog, 1984; Rehfuss, 1989;
Schulman, 1982).

Apprehension of low-balling tendencies (setting a low initial bid to win) of the bidders
deterred contracting out. This finding suggests that low-balling can be used as a major
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strategy to win bids (Ogden and Anderson, 1999; Sciulli, 1996), and to transform
public monopolies into private monopolies (Ogden and Anderson, 1999).

Fear of contract failure and subsequent cost of internalisation or insourcing was found
as another reason for preferring internal provision. This particular finding confirms the
work of Johnstone (1999) that contracts can fail and be costly to an organisation if the
contracted services are in-sourced again.

Absence of a sound costing methodology was found as the major reason for
contemplating in-house provision as an alternative to contracting out. The absence of
costing methodology in the Council echoes the concerns of Domberger and Rimmer
(1994) and Sciulli (1996). The ad-hoc cost calculations in bids also confirm the
admonitions of Howes (1994) that a fully fledged costing system is required for costing
for contracting out.

Lack of a multiple-year contract appraisal method was found as the final reason in
favour of internal provision over contracting out. This fear was advanced as a major
reason for contracting out, in that the absence of incorrect methodology could be
proved wrong and impose huge penalties on the Council if the contact failed during the
contract period. The fear of the Council that the absence of a long- term contract
evaluation technique can be disastrous confirms the works of Drtina (1994), Howes
(1994), Miranda (1994).

While there were some arguments for choosing in-house provision, during the old era
of contracting, the Council did not have choices to avoid contracting initiatives if the
services fit the requirements of legislation and regulations on contracting out of
services.
Question 1(c): What philosophical stances drive outsourcing in general and in
specific circumstances?
The comparison of contracting out policies is restricted to two distinct eras: prior to
1995 and after 1995 (following the public sector reform). Contracting out during the
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first era followed the philosophical tenets of Transaction Cost Economics: asset
specificity, uncertainty, and cost savings (Williamson, 1985). These arguments stress
cost as the sole driving force for contracting out of services.

Contracting out during the second era or post reform era revealed influence of the New
Public Management doctrines: the use of private sector management principles and
practices in solving public sector problems, the involvement of citizens in decisionmaking, and, above all, cost as a partial consideration in bid evaluation.
Question 1(d): What are the different practices in local government contracting out
in Australia?
The major findings were that the Council used two different approaches to contracting
out: contracting of small value and insignificant services, and contracting of bigger
budget and complex services. These again differed by the timeframe of contracting: one
approach before 1995 and the other after 1995, that is, after the adoption of public
sector reform and National Competition Policy.

The major findings from the outsourcing of small value, non-core services were that the
divisional managers used their connections with the local providers to source these
services. These services were small in dollar value, insignificant, one-off in nature,
implying no significance to the provision of the Council’s services. Before procuring
the services, the Council took the view that those outsourced services would not be
provided from in-house sources. Besides, the revelation also suggested that local
employment issues, a part of community service obligations, were a major
consideration for these divisional managers. The processes of sourcing these services
were informal, in that the divisional managers made ad-hoc calculations of costs. Few
local bidders supplied their quotes for these services. After receiving the bids, decisions
were made after considering some factors such as the cost and the quality of the
services, the financial strength and the reputation of the provider, feedback from the
local residents, and above all a post-audit of the quality aspects of the services.

303

The findings about the bigger budget, complex services, are different from the smaller
items. The Council had formal policies in place to make decisions about bigger budget
services. The bigger budget services were categorised by their dollar value: Category 1
services (services over $2 million), and Category 2 services (services below $1
million). These services were market tested and benchmarked before contracting out.

The second research question was: How are outsourcing decisions made? This broad
question essentially is tied to few specific research questions outlined in chapter one.
The findings are linked to the specific research questions and discussed below.

Question 2(a): How did the Council prepare the internal bid for competitive bidding?
The study finds that the Council had to change its resource allocation system and then
couple the system to its new Accounting Information Systems (including the costing
system) to cost outputs, and prepare internal bids. It was found that in contracting out
prior to 1995, a cross sectional ad-hoc committee initiated tendering and prepared the
internal bid. The cross-sectional team members had expertise in accounting and finance
and engineering. The bid documents set out the specifications and instructions for
preparation of an internal bid.
This stance changed after the Council’s adoption of public sector reform initiatives.
Internal bids were initiated by the existing internal staff working in a particular area;
bids were to be prepared in consultation with staff members in finance and corporate
development divisions. Bids were prepared to specifications developed by the
Purchaser (funder) of the services. Bid templates, with some given cost figures, were
issued to potential bidders. The cost data were extracted from the Council’s new ad-hoc
cost management system.

Question 2(b): How does the Council treat overheads (including internal transfer
prices) in pricing the internal bids?
The findings suggest that the Council treated overheads differently in its two big ticket
bids. In its first instance of bidding, overheads were partially allocated using inputs
from staff members working in different areas of the organisation. The respondents
attributed the lack of access to sophisticated information technology as the major
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reason for using inputs from cross sections of the Council. In the second instance of big
ticket bidding (i.e., bidding after 1997), overheads were captured through its ad-hoc
Activity Based Costing system. The respondents claimed, but later proved wrong, that
the bid cost data were only approximate but best intelligent estimate of the
consumption of overheads. This evidence confirms the conjecture of Howes (1994) that
an ad-hoc overhead costing system may not provide the full picture of overhead
consumption.
Question 2(c): How does it prepare a competitive bid strategically to successfully
compete in a contestable market?
On only one occasion the Council used strategic costing to prepare its bid. Using the
data extracted from the ad-hoc costing system (i.e,. the Activity Based Costing), the
internal provider prepared the bid, reviewed the cost figures and negotiated with the
staff members in Finance and Corporate Development Divisions to reduce the share of
allocated overheads and imposed transfer prices. The provider argued that without
these concessions, the in-house bid might not win the contract. This claim could not be
verified because only the internal bid was submitted and the in-house provision was
maintained. This evidence, however, confirms theory and evidence that strategic use of
cost data may assist the competitive segment of an organisation operating both in a
monopoly and competitive segment for the provision of goods and services (Cavalluzzo
et al., 1998; Gal-or, 1993).
Question 2(d): How did the Council solve the dilemma of allocating joint costs in the
presence of interdependencies and jointness of services?
This study finds that the Council had interdependencies and jointness of services
provided to the ratepayers. The respondents suggested that allocating joint costs was
difficult and complex where too many products have interdependencies and jointness;
approximate consumption was used as the only option, given that an estimated cost
benefit analysis was done. This evidence confirms that pricing of internal bids in the
presence of huge common costs or overheads (joint costs) is too difficult (Cohen and
Loeb, 1989, pp. 165-166) suggesting alternative courses of actions, such as estimates of
consumption.
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Question 2(e): What methodologies are available to evaluate outsourcing decisions?
The study finds that the Council had used widely the discounted method (i.e., Net
Present Value method) to evaluate bids. This evidence confirms the suggestions of
Drtina (1994), Kee et al. (1997), and Miranda (1992) that long-term contracting out
should be evaluated using Capital Budgeting techniques. The findings, however,
contradict the suggestions of the literature that competitive bids should be prepared on
the basis of avoidable costs. It was found that the Council used partial full costs
(including a share of fixed overheads) to prepare internal bids, and subsequently
appraised the cost streams using its bid evaluation methodology, that is the Net Present
Value approach.

11.3 IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS FOR THE COUNCIL’S
PRACTICE
The first implication was that the contracting out process required some exposure to
management and economics theory of contracting out. Alignment of managerial aspects
of contracting, and the costing aspect of bidding, would be required to improve
competitiveness of business segments’ services of the Council, which were subject to
regulations and the Council’s own competition policy.

The second implication is that accounting changes were required before the use of
costing data for competitive bidding. The Council’s adoption of Activity Based Costing
as the response to such needs is established in this thesis. The evidence has identified
four implications of using an Activity Based Costing system.

The first implication was that the Council had to educate its employees about the uses
of the new Activity Based Costing. The documentary evidence and interviews suggest
that the Council imparted new knowledge and provided training to the employees on its
Activity Based Costing system. There were training sessions, group discussions, slide
presentations and other induction methods to address this training need. Argyris and
Kaplan (1994) suggest that dissemination of new knowledge, such as Activity Based
Costing, requires organisation-wide training to make the users comfortable about its
usage.
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The second implication stems from the training need. The new Activity Based Costing
system required the employees to spend time learning new knowledge, unlearning old
knowledge, and simultaneously using the new knowledge in preparing competitive
bids, and other routine tasks. It was revealed that this process would impact on their
productivity and efficiency in the short term.

The third implication was that the new system would demand application of better
computing skills (including the use of Activity Based Costing functionality). While the
Activity Based Costing system generated cost data may help reduce inefficiencies of
the Council, the demand for better skills in employees might not be met by the existing
workforce. The interviews with the Financial Services Managers revealed that the
Council started to recruit fresh graduates. The new employees were better paid than
their counterparts working in the monopoly area. The implications for such
improvement in Activity Based Costing may prove counterproductive at the end. Some
of the employees may leave the Council and take up lucrative jobs in the private sector.

Finally, the cost benefit issue in the Activity Based Costing project might be a longerterm consideration, and might not stand the test of time. With the passage of time, the
Council may be able to decide the optimal level of usage of the Activity Based Costing
system.

11.4 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS THESIS
The contributions of this thesis to theory and to method are summarised below.

11.4.1 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEORY
The first contribution of this thesis is that it has contributed to the academic literature
on contracting out in a multi-year time horizon. The development of a single coherent
theory, integrating the concepts of contracting out from Transactions Cost Economics
and New Public Management, and the methods of cost allocation using the concepts
from traditional volume based and Activity Based cost allocation, has informed the
evidence collected in this thesis. The implication of the development of this theory for
academics and practitioners is that a contracting decision requires multiple perspectives
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from multiple stakeholders in an organisation. The framework developed in this thesis
addresses the calls by Drtina (1994) and Miranda (1992) to fill the gap in theory on
multiple-year contracting and extends the contracting out process by integrating
management aspects.

The second contribution of this thesis is that the role of cost data is quite important for
preparing internal bids in a competitive bidding situation. However, in preparing and
evaluating competitive bids, provisions for contract failure should be made for contract
failure costs. It is found that contract failure can dissipate nearly all the savings
estimated prior to contracting out. Therefore, contract evaluation should factor the cost
of contract failure in the form of an option value (cf. Johnstone, 1999).

The third contribution of this thesis is that a single bid can be a winning bid in a
competitive tendering exercise if competitive neutrality about the competition process
is maintained and asymmetric information is contained within an organisation. This
contribution to contracting literature is contrary to the prescriptions and general notion
that multiple bids are required in a competitive tendering exercise.

The fourth contribution of this thesis is that concepts and practices of private sector
cost management can be applied to a public sector entity to resolve unique cost
management problems faced by a public sector entity. To be able to do this, a public
sector needs expertise and skills of private sector managers.

The fifth contribution is that adoption of a sophisticated cost allocation system may
partially solve the costing needs in the preparation of a competitive bid. In particular,
cost data generated from an Activity Based Costing system may not be competitive
enough in bid calculations, requiring an entity to manipulate such cost data strategically
to prepare a competitive bid. This contribution strengthens the earlier assertions of
Radhakrishnan and Srinidhi (2001) that cost data generated from an Activity Based
Costing is useful for competitive bidding, but shows more support that strategic cost
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allocation is required in an entity operating both in the competitive market segement
and monopoly market segement (Cavalluzzo et al., 1998; Gal-Or, 1993).

11.4.2 CONTRIBUTION TO RESEARCH METHOD
The first contribution of this study is its strength of findings from the use of multiple
cases. The case study method literature suggests that multiple case studies reveal more
variables that have cause-and-effect relationships, and are important determinants to
examine a research problem. Yin (2003, 133) argues that in multiple cases “…the
analysis is likely to be easier and the findings likely to be more robust than having only
a single case study.”

The second contribution is the use of triangulation approach to analyse the data from
the field. The use of multiple sources of data or data triangulation to analyse the
evidence has provided better insight into the issues examined in this thesis. Data on the
same research issue is examined across the sources of evidence and corroborated for
convergence. The corroboration has converged in all research questions, leading to the
same conclusion about each of the research questions posed in this thesis. Yin (2003, p.
99) argues that “…case studies using multiple sources of evidence were rated more
highly, in terms of their overall quality, than those that relied solely on only single
sources of information.”

The final contribution of this thesis is that it has provided a rich account of the practices
of an organisation over a period of time between 1989 to 2000. A longitudinal approach
to capture the accounting and organisational change in a contextual setting has better
potential to capture the richness of practice of an organisation than any other methods.

11.5 DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This study has opened up some possibilities of research for future researchers. Future
researcher may explore similar problems in local governments or other tiers of the
public sector to confirm, test, refute or extend the findings of this thesis.
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This study can be replicated in other local governments with similar purchaser/provider
arrangements for service provision to see whether similar conclusions can be reached.
Alternatively, the database and the techniques used in this thesis can be replicated by
other researchers to determine if the same conclusions can be drawn. If the same
findings are reached, then the external validity may be improved significantly. Subject
to the availability of a large number of bid documents, a meta-analysis can be
conducted from similar case study findings to improve the reliability of case studies on
the bidding processes. Once a large database of similar cases is available, survey-based
research can be carried out to improve the scientific validity of the research problems
examined in this thesis. Conclusions reached from this field may be tested in other
contexts or in similar situations to examine their internal and external validities. This
may be done to generalise further applications in similar situations or to examine larger
sample sizes so that the survey method can be used. More services may be tested to see
the impact of contracting out on in-house provision. This can be performed to observe
the impact of contracting out on overall cost savings of an entity in the long term.

Some of the widely used theories, such as contingency theory, agency theory,
expectancy theory, and new public management, can be used to study the underlying
reasons for contracting out, and the role of overhead allocation in bid pricing. Game
theoretic analysis of bidding practices can be used to examine the motives underlying
the behaviour of the bidders. This is particularly important because of the low balling
practices observed in other countries that transformed public monopolies to private
monopolies (see, e.g., Ogden and Anderson, 1999). Cost allocation theory and bidding
can be studied in more detail. The current practice of cost allocation in Australian Local
Government is quite new, and little is known about the holistic picture of the bidding,
where other services are provided from the same organisation.

The domain of contracting out can be extended to include other peripheral issues such
as accountability, efficiency, effectiveness and value for money aspects, while other
issues (mostly qualitative in nature) can be addressed to see whether they outweigh the
cost savings. Some application of other modern management concepts such as best
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value, benchmarking, and a balanced scorecard, may be studied as part of the
explanation building process used in this thesis. These concepts may provide
alternative explanations of management control system changes and outsourcing.

11.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this thesis, two broader issues affecting public sector outsourcing decisions have
been explored. The first issue was about the ‘why’ aspect (or the reasons), and the
second issue was about the ‘how’ aspect (or the process aspect) of outsourcing. A case
study approach was adopted to explore these two broad research questions. Yin (1994)
argues that to study contemporary phenomena, case studies are the right tool to
investigate and build theories from the field. Ansari and Euske (1987) argue that
collecting evidence from a rarely visited field has significant potential to advance
management accounting research. This case study was based on a rarely visited site and
the documents supplied were highly confidential in nature. Therefore, it has significant
potential to advance case study based research on contracting out.

The research findings from this thesis contribute to existing research (based on case
studies) by showing that outsourcing is used as an alternative service delivery system
when an organisation is either undisposed to, or unable to, provide the services through
its existing logistics. It also showed that the outsourcing process is more involved than
previously documented in similar research on local government. Outsourcing decisions
are made by staff from a cross-section of an organisation. The decisions also reflect the
political ideology of the final decision makers ruling at the time of such decisions. In
the decision making process, the rationalisation of decisions is done after a careful
scrutiny of the processes involved. Bid pricing is one of the most crucial considerations
in this process.

The findings from this thesis are based on practices of two big-ticket bids of the
researched site. The first bid suggested that the cost calculation process, especially the
overhead allocation issue, was the most challenging issue for the preparers of an
internal bid. The preparation of internal bids demanded an organisation-wide (common)
cost allocation process because ad-hoc cost allocations could mislead decisions.
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Depending on the changing nature of the operations, a public sector body can
streamline its accounting information system and management control system to cater
for the needs of the internal users involved in internal bid pricing for competitive
tendering and contracting out submissions. This is reflected in the second case study, in
which the organisation was seen to have attempted to implement a full-fledged cost
allocation system for internal bid pricing. The second case provided contrasting
evidence that competitive tendering and contracting could effectively be managed
without having sufficient number of bidders bidding for a contract.

The contribution of this thesis has the obvious limitations of case study research. It is a
mere attempt to advance theoretical generalisation from a single site. The debate about
case study generalisability is a never-ending one and will continue until such time when
case studies are established as research strategies equally acceptable as survey based
research.
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